Just like Napoleon. The whole army is in a fist. Von Bock in his diary confirmed the plan of Marcks, wrote about his rage in connection with the decision to arrange an enemy "mites" west of Minsk.Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 22:13In other words, there is no record of how Marcks planned to invade.
Why not just state that?
Looking at the map posted , it looks like the plan only included 5 armies or maybe 60 divisions?
Different German Oil Strategy
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
In my opinion, if Hitler had heard Guderian and marched towards Moscow instead of Kiev, there would be a good chance they captured the city, even with the not so good roads that leads there. The motorized infantry could keep up with the tanks within Hanomag halftracks and trucks. As long as I`m concerned, Geoffrey jukes said the forces that defended Moscow with Zhukov were the forces who fought the Japanese in Manchuria, reverve troops arriving just in time, so if the Germans arrived there a bit earlier it wouldn`t be virtually anything to defend the city.
Many authors (Vasili Grossman included) stated that there was panic in Moscow back then.
But still, the most important thing here is:
The Germans capturing Moscou or not wouldn`t make any difference.
Stalin was a smart guy and he planed the whole moving of everything to behind the Urals. It was the biggest transfer of it`s kind in History. Hitler underestimated the industrial capacities and the will of the Russian people. In just one year they would have already many equipment and reserve troops coming from the Urals.
I read once that the Soviet had already transferred all their important papers, their diplomatic and strategic papers, all the capital structure to another city. They were prepared for the fall of Moscow.
Stalin just stayed there because Zhukov said to him they would be capable to hold the city and it was not necessary to leave.
Many authors (Vasili Grossman included) stated that there was panic in Moscow back then.
But still, the most important thing here is:
The Germans capturing Moscou or not wouldn`t make any difference.
Stalin was a smart guy and he planed the whole moving of everything to behind the Urals. It was the biggest transfer of it`s kind in History. Hitler underestimated the industrial capacities and the will of the Russian people. In just one year they would have already many equipment and reserve troops coming from the Urals.
I read once that the Soviet had already transferred all their important papers, their diplomatic and strategic papers, all the capital structure to another city. They were prepared for the fall of Moscow.
Stalin just stayed there because Zhukov said to him they would be capable to hold the city and it was not necessary to leave.
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Quoted already. July 11, 1941 the Germans were 15 km from Kiev. Hitler drove troops to the south of Ukraine, for wheat. Hitler could listen to Halder and abandon Uman in favor of operations in the north of Ukraine. Then there was no need to withdraw troops from the group "Center".
Halder's diary
Uman pocket this bullshit.
Halder's diary
Uman pocket this bullshit.
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
1 Operationsentwurf Ost (8 pages ! ) is available on Unternehmen Barbarossa ( by Walther Post ) the same for its successor : Die Lossberg Studie .Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 22:13In other words, there is no record of how Marcks planned to invade.
Why not just state that?
Looking at the map posted , it looks like the plan only included 5 armies or maybe 60 divisions?
2 The map gives a false picture of the plan ,as do maps without text .
Marcks proposed the following :
AG South ( of the Pripet Marsh ) :
12th Army : 12 divisions
16th Army : 17 divisons
Reserve : 6 divisions
Total :5 PzD, 6 Mot.Divisions, 24 ID = 35 divisions
AG North :
4th Army : 19 divisions
6th Army : 20 divisions
18th Army : 15 divisions
Reserve : 14 divisions
Total :68 divisions : 15 PzD, 2 Mot.Divisions,50 ID, 1 Cavallery Division
OKH reserve :
4 PzD,4 Mot.D.,36 ID
General total : 147 divisions
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Thank you very much for this information Ljadw!ljadw wrote: ↑21 Sep 2018, 09:371 Operationsentwurf Ost (8 pages ! ) is available on Unternehmen Barbarossa ( by Walther Post ) the same for its successor : Die Lossberg Studie .Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 22:13In other words, there is no record of how Marcks planned to invade.
Why not just state that?
Looking at the map posted , it looks like the plan only included 5 armies or maybe 60 divisions?
2 The map gives a false picture of the plan ,as do maps without text .
Marcks proposed the following :
AG South ( of the Pripet Marsh ) :
12th Army : 12 divisions
16th Army : 17 divisons
Reserve : 6 divisions
Total :5 PzD, 6 Mot.Divisions, 24 ID = 35 divisions
AG North :
4th Army : 19 divisions
6th Army : 20 divisions
18th Army : 15 divisions
Reserve : 14 divisions
Total :68 divisions : 15 PzD, 2 Mot.Divisions,50 ID, 1 Cavallery Division
OKH reserve :
4 PzD,4 Mot.D.,36 ID
General total : 147 divisions
You say the map is misleading. Could you elaborate?
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
You said it yourself : " looking at the map,it looks like the plan only included 5 armies or maybe 60 divisions ". The map did not mention the Heeresgruppenreserves, neither the OKH reserves,the map did also not mention the dislocation of the mobile divisions:Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑21 Sep 2018, 19:53Thank you very much for this information Ljadw!ljadw wrote: ↑21 Sep 2018, 09:371 Operationsentwurf Ost (8 pages ! ) is available on Unternehmen Barbarossa ( by Walther Post ) the same for its successor : Die Lossberg Studie .Paul Lakowski wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 22:13In other words, there is no record of how Marcks planned to invade.
Why not just state that?
Looking at the map posted , it looks like the plan only included 5 armies or maybe 60 divisions?
2 The map gives a false picture of the plan ,as do maps without text .
Marcks proposed the following :
AG South ( of the Pripet Marsh ) :
12th Army : 12 divisions
16th Army : 17 divisons
Reserve : 6 divisions
Total :5 PzD, 6 Mot.Divisions, 24 ID = 35 divisions
AG North :
4th Army : 19 divisions
6th Army : 20 divisions
18th Army : 15 divisions
Reserve : 14 divisions
Total :68 divisions : 15 PzD, 2 Mot.Divisions,50 ID, 1 Cavallery Division
OKH reserve :
4 PzD,4 Mot.D.,36 ID
General total : 147 divisions
You say the map is misleading. Could you elaborate?
17 in the northern AG against only 11 in the southern AG .That's why a map must always be accompanied by a text .
- AbollonPolweder
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Thanks! But all "applauds" for ljadw! He is the main character.
Exactly!
Either you don't understand english or you have no idea of German armoured divisions advanced towards Minsk or Smolensk without the support of infantry. What was the fundamental difference between Smolensk and Moscow?ljadw wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 21:33Lol : I see that you have no arguments and answer on something I did not say .
I said that Guderian's tanks could not go to Moscow without the support of infantry /artillry ,because tanks without support of infantry/artillery are sitting ducks .Besides,even with the support of infantry/artillery,tanks would not make it to Moscow: tanks are not made to drive 1000 km . Infantry can advance 1000 km, tanks not .
One sniper can eliminate a tank, unless the tank is protected by infantry,and let's not talk about things as mines .
The T34 engines needed a general refurb after 250 hours,the German tank engines were not better .And there was the problem of the tracks ...
" ... problem of the tracks ", "lack of supply" and "mines" did not stop Guderian to surround Kiev. How many times can the same thing be repeated?
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find
- AbollonPolweder
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy
It is rather counter-propaganda to downplay the role of lend-lease.Stugbit wrote: ↑21 Sep 2018, 00:28Stalin was a smart guy and he planed the whole moving of everything to behind the Urals. It was the biggest transfer of it`s kind in History. Hitler underestimated the industrial capacities and the will of the Russian people. In just one year they would have already many equipment and reserve troops coming from the Urals.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Surrounding Kiew is not the same as capturing Kiew .AbollonPolweder wrote: ↑22 Sep 2018, 19:12Thanks! But all "applauds" for ljadw! He is the main character.Exactly!Either you don't understand english or you have no idea of German armoured divisions advanced towards Minsk or Smolensk without the support of infantry. What was the fundamental difference between Smolensk and Moscow?ljadw wrote: ↑20 Sep 2018, 21:33Lol : I see that you have no arguments and answer on something I did not say .
I said that Guderian's tanks could not go to Moscow without the support of infantry /artillry ,because tanks without support of infantry/artillery are sitting ducks .Besides,even with the support of infantry/artillery,tanks would not make it to Moscow: tanks are not made to drive 1000 km . Infantry can advance 1000 km, tanks not .
One sniper can eliminate a tank, unless the tank is protected by infantry,and let's not talk about things as mines .
The T34 engines needed a general refurb after 250 hours,the German tank engines were not better .And there was the problem of the tracks ...
" ... problem of the tracks ", "lack of supply" and "mines" did not stop Guderian to surround Kiev. How many times can the same thing be repeated?
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
But the Lend Lease and the industrial transfer were not mutually exclusive variables, AbollonPolweder. Without the transfer, the Lend Lease wouldn`t make much sense and vice-versa. It was not the Valentine Tanks that brought havoc to the Germans in the years after, it was the better T-34 ones, built behind the Urals. The Lend Lease made those T-34`s appear in the large numbers it was necessary to counter the Axis defensive positions.It is rather counter-propaganda to downplay the role of lend-lease.
In my opinion, the industrial transfer was the most important decision the Russians made in the war. Together with the choice of building the T-34 tanks instead of other weaker ones, before the war started.
Without the T-34 they would lose the war.
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
That is giving tanks an importance they did not have :artillery was more important than tanks .
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
But if artillery was more important, WWII would look much more like WWI, as a more static front, instead of a "plastic" one, with ever changing war maps, Ljadw.That is giving tanks an importance they did not have :artillery was more important than tanks .
And somehow, a tank is a little bit a piece of artillery as well. A T-34 tank have a 76mm gun that fires either Howitzers or AT projectiles, this is not little thing.
And the Germans developed ways of deflecting the Soviet artillery when in defense, at least. I think it was called deep lines, or something.
Robert Forczyk states in his Kuban Campaign book that it took many years for the Soviet to really use it`s artillery properly to their full potential during the war.
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Yes, little knowledge of tactics among the participants, and I have. For what tanks are needed, artillery can not really say. There is a sure way to get around the gaps: count the divisions by number and becomes noticeable, the Germans fought not so ...
Re: Different German Oil Strategy
“Deep lines” is a rather misleading term if you don`t read much about the late war tactics, Jesk.There is a sure way to get around the gaps: count the divisions by number and becomes noticeable, the Germans fought not so ...
It actually consisted of a flexible force that shifted positions during the defense. Their goal was to tackle the enemy focus and waste their energy on empty positions and then inducing the enemy advance towards traps. It was a reactive way of defending. Firing, then withdrawing, then firing again from a different place. To do this, it needed to understand every position on the defensive map and know where exactly to be after falling back. So, there was no actually “gaps” as you say, because it was not a static defense but something “alive”. Many authors states that it worked pretty well. Forczyk including. The most prominent name for that tactic come from a commander in the Army Group North. I don`t remember his name, have to check.
Anyway, defending is always easier than attacking.
As you may know, there was no satellite imagery back then, so you could not monitor the enemy on the battlefield 100% of the time. Aircraft did prove useful, but it was not the same thing.
The only way to get through those defenses was with large numbers of a good tank to saturate the entire area. So the T-34 fit well on this objective. The Soviet also developed the Sturmovik aircraft which, by 44, was quite much a “can opener” against the moving defense.
- AbollonPolweder
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy
Yeah! Very big difference! Kiev was surrounded on September 15, and captured September 19, 1941. Look! I already mentioned the orders of the highest Soviet command. There it was actually established that Russian soldiers and commanders refused to fight and massively surrendered. To force them to fight "Stalin" ordered to use terror. So, where was the center of resistance to the German blitzkrieg? Where was its driver? Of course, in Moscow! So you need to isolate this driver from the rest of Russia. Surround or capture - it does not matter.
Simply to say, it was necessary to fulfill this instruction of Barbarossa: "... are the offensive operations aimed at the occupation of the important traffic and armament center of Moscow to be pursued."
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find