Different German Oil Strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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BDV
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#151

Post by BDV » 27 Sep 2018, 00:24

Stugbit wrote:
And somehow, a tank is a little bit a piece of artillery as well. A T-34 tank have a 76mm gun that fires either Howitzers or AT projectiles, this is not little thing.
IIRC the historical usage of high explosive shells vs antiarmor shells by tank units also indicates that tanks did function most of time as mobile armored artillery.
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#152

Post by Stugbit » 27 Sep 2018, 01:05

IIRC the historical usage of high explosive shells vs antiarmor shells by tank units also indicates that tanks did function most of time as mobile armored artillery.
Hello BDV, how are you?

Yep, what you said is pretty much true. And the Assault Guns as well. Think about a SU-152 assault gun, that thing could take a tank turret apart just by the inertia of the explosion of it`s shell.

Best Regards!


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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#153

Post by wahidovic » 23 Dec 2018, 11:27

Stugbit wrote:
21 Sep 2018, 00:28
In my opinion, if Hitler had heard Guderian and marched towards Moscow instead of Kiev, there would be a good chance they captured the city, even with the not so good roads that leads there. The motorized infantry could keep up with the tanks within Hanomag halftracks and trucks. As long as I`m concerned, Geoffrey jukes said the forces that defended Moscow with Zhukov were the forces who fought the Japanese in Manchuria, reverve troops arriving just in time, so if the Germans arrived there a bit earlier it wouldn`t be virtually anything to defend the city.

Many authors (Vasili Grossman included) stated that there was panic in Moscow back then.

But still, the most important thing here is:

The Germans capturing Moscou or not wouldn`t make any difference.

Stalin was a smart guy and he planed the whole moving of everything to behind the Urals. It was the biggest transfer of it`s kind in History. Hitler underestimated the industrial capacities and the will of the Russian people. In just one year they would have already many equipment and reserve troops coming from the Urals.

I read once that the Soviet had already transferred all their important papers, their diplomatic and strategic papers, all the capital structure to another city. They were prepared for the fall of Moscow.
Stalin just stayed there because Zhukov said to him they would be capable to hold the city and it was not necessary to leave.
about Stalin yes I agree with you, he was a very clever guy and dangerous at the same time

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#154

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019, 19:57

somua33 wrote:
19 Mar 2018, 22:54
Japan with a much smaller economy had an approximately 6 million ton strategic oil reserve.

During the depression, oil was selling extremely cheap. I believe as little as 25 cents a barrel (about $1.75 million a ton if my math is correct).

My understanding is that a coal to oil plant cost about $50 million. What if the Germans used those resources to accumulate a strategic oil reserve of say 30 million tons?

It would be a huge steel, coal and manpower saving. Coal and the manpower needed to mine it were ongoing expenses as well.

Although in our timeline Germany had a shortage of foreign exchange, that was in part from her coal conversion strategy. Germany made many things that were in demand on the world market. My family is from old Mexico, I know how much they valued German products. I believe it could have come up with the cash (or in deep depression, barter)
This may intrest you.https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... sequence=1
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#155

Post by ljadw » 11 Jan 2019, 21:24

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019, 19:57
somua33 wrote:
19 Mar 2018, 22:54
Japan with a much smaller economy had an approximately 6 million ton strategic oil reserve.

During the depression, oil was selling extremely cheap. I believe as little as 25 cents a barrel (about $1.75 million a ton if my math is correct).

My understanding is that a coal to oil plant cost about $50 million. What if the Germans used those resources to accumulate a strategic oil reserve of say 30 million tons?

It would be a huge steel, coal and manpower saving. Coal and the manpower needed to mine it were ongoing expenses as well.

Although in our timeline Germany had a shortage of foreign exchange, that was in part from her coal conversion strategy. Germany made many things that were in demand on the world market. My family is from old Mexico, I know how much they valued German products. I believe it could have come up with the cash (or in deep depression, barter)
This may intrest you.https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... sequence=1
1 The figures for Japan are inflated
The reserves (in barrels) were
January 1942 :43 million
January 1943 : 28 million
January 1944 : 16,5 million
January 1945 : 6 million
2 Why should Germany need an oil reserve of 30 million at the start of the war ?
3 How could Germany pay for such a reserve ? It could only have more foreign exchange (here : $ ) if it could export more to countries with $ ,thus the USand the reality is that in 1929 Germany exported for 990 million of RM to the US and in 1938 150 million only .
4 Where would Germany get all this additional oil ? Mexico had a lot of problems with its oil production
5 From 1933 to 1939, Germany imported 29 million tons of oil,at the end of 1939 its reserves were 1 million tons, to have at that date a reserve of 30 million,Germany should import 58 million tons, the double , something which is excluded: even if Germany had the money ,how could the sellers increase their production and where would one find the additional tankers to transport all this oil ?
6 If Germany had imported 29 million tons more, it would not have a synthetic oil industry ,that produced before the war 5,1 million ton and during the war 21 million ton,a gain of 3 million tons would not change the outcome of the war .During the war (40-44 ) ,Germany had 40 million ton of oil (crude,synthetic, import ) and ... lost .
If it had 3 million more, it also would lose ,because the more oil it had in the HTL, the worse its military situation became . Why would that be different in the ATL ?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#156

Post by Paul Lakowski » 12 Jan 2019, 04:36

4 million tons reserve stockpiled makes sense prewar and is doable.

German merchant fleet could shift 1/4 million tons in one sortie. Perhaps a million tons per year from foreign sources covered by credit, while the cost of product should be MAYBE 100 million RM per year. From 1934-39 that's 2/3 billion RM for 6 MILLION TONS fuel over and above historical rates..

WESTWALL required 200,000 workers [34-39] and 3 BRM investment plus 1.7 million tons steel and 10 million tons concrete . SHIPPING 6 million tons of fuel should reduce this WW to 78% of these figures, UNLESS bilateral trade arrangement can be hammered out. Instead of WW more synthetic fuel and plants could be built .

Balance of the WW concrete , steel and labour can erect 1.4 additional tons fuel storage, bring the prewar capacity to 3.8 million tons surplus fuel storage. In theory there was a built in 2 million tons gap between oil production and refinery capacity.

AriX
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#157

Post by AriX » 12 Jan 2019, 11:59

Storages of such huge ammount of oil products would be a perfect target for allied bombers.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#158

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019, 12:36

This may intrest you.https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... sequence=1
[/quote]
ljadw wrote:
11 Jan 2019, 21:24
1 The figures for Japan are inflated
The reserves (in barrels) were
January 1942 :43 million
January 1943 : 28 million
January 1944 : 16,5 million
January 1945 : 6 million
They are?, which figures for japan are inflated?.
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ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#159

Post by ljadw » 12 Jan 2019, 13:58

Paul Lakowski wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 04:36
4 million tons reserve stockpiled makes sense prewar and is doable.

German merchant fleet could shift 1/4 million tons in one sortie. Perhaps a million tons per year from foreign sources covered by credit, while the cost of product should be MAYBE 100 million RM per year. From 1934-39 that's 2/3 billion RM for 6 MILLION TONS fuel over and above historical rates..

WESTWALL required 200,000 workers [34-39] and 3 BRM investment plus 1.7 million tons steel and 10 million tons concrete . SHIPPING 6 million tons of fuel should reduce this WW to 78% of these figures, UNLESS bilateral trade arrangement can be hammered out. Instead of WW more synthetic fuel and plants could be built .

Balance of the WW concrete , steel and labour can erect 1.4 additional tons fuel storage, bring the prewar capacity to 3.8 million tons surplus fuel storage. In theory there was a built in 2 million tons gap between oil production and refinery capacity.
I like to see the proof that there were sufficient idle German tankers to transport an additional 250000 tons of oil .
Why should Germany build more synthetic plants to have more oil reserves (= IDLE oil ) and no West Wall ?Besides, the construction of the WW started only in 1936 .
About the synthetic oil industry ,it produced in 1933 170000 ton, in 1934 150000, in 1935 240000,in 1936 500000, in 1937 650000,in 1938 1,2 million, in 1939 2,2 million.
There is no proof that 1,2 million tons were possible before 1938 and if possible that it would be produced .
Synthetic oil costed more than imported oil/ crude domestic,thus the demand was limited, but the demand for other oil was also limited :the imports were going up from 2,65 million in 1933 to 5,1 million in 1939, but British imports for the same period were on the 10 million + level .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#160

Post by ljadw » 12 Jan 2019, 14:07

Hanny wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 12:36
This may intrest you.https://repository.library.georgetown.e ... sequence=1
ljadw wrote:
11 Jan 2019, 21:24
1 The figures for Japan are inflated
The reserves (in barrels) were
January 1942 :43 million
January 1943 : 28 million
January 1944 : 16,5 million
January 1945 : 6 million
They are?, which figures for japan are inflated?.

[/quote]
Somua 33 said that Japan's oil reserves were 6 million tons (= 48 million barrels ) ,and that is too high : the highest reserve was 43 million barrels .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#161

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019, 14:29

ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 14:07
Somua 33 said that Japan's oil reserves were 6 million tons (= 48 million barrels ) ,and that is too high : the highest reserve was 43 million barrels .
Yes he did, probably because , USSBS gave 6.6 million tons as of Dec 1941.
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ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#162

Post by ljadw » 12 Jan 2019, 18:20

The USSB figure is inflated :
Japanese stocks were
in March 1941 48,9 million barrels
in March 1942 38,2 million
in March 1943 25,3 million
in March 1944 13, 8 million
in (March ? ) 1945 4,7 million .
Source : Pacific War online Encyclopedia .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#163

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Jan 2019, 19:33

ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 18:20
The USSB figure is inflated :
Japanese stocks were
in March 1941 48,9 million barrels
in March 1942 38,2 million
in March 1943 25,3 million
in March 1944 13, 8 million
in (March ? ) 1945 4,7 million .
Source : Pacific War online Encyclopedia .
Hmmm, unsourced internet content or USSBS? Gee, I wonder which source to accept at face value?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Paul Lakowski
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#164

Post by Paul Lakowski » 12 Jan 2019, 22:35

ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 13:58
Paul Lakowski wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 04:36
4 million tons reserve stockpiled makes sense prewar and is doable.

German merchant fleet could shift 1/4 million tons in one sortie. Perhaps a million tons per year from foreign sources covered by credit, while the cost of product should be MAYBE 100 million RM per year. From 1934-39 that's 2/3 billion RM for 6 MILLION TONS fuel over and above historical rates..

WESTWALL required 200,000 workers [34-39] and 3 BRM investment plus 1.7 million tons steel and 10 million tons concrete . SHIPPING 6 million tons of fuel should reduce this WW to 78% of these figures, UNLESS bilateral trade arrangement can be hammered out. Instead of WW more synthetic fuel and plants could be built .

Balance of the WW concrete , steel and labour can erect 1.4 additional tons fuel storage, bring the prewar capacity to 3.8 million tons surplus fuel storage. In theory there was a built in 2 million tons gap between oil production and refinery capacity.
I like to see the proof that there were sufficient idle German tankers to transport an additional 250000 tons of oil .
Why should Germany build more synthetic plants to have more oil reserves (= IDLE oil ) and no West Wall ?Besides, the construction of the WW started only in 1936 .
About the synthetic oil industry ,it produced in 1933 170000 ton, in 1934 150000, in 1935 240000,in 1936 500000, in 1937 650000,in 1938 1,2 million, in 1939 2,2 million.
There is no proof that 1,2 million tons were possible before 1938 and if possible that it would be produced .
Synthetic oil costed more than imported oil/ crude domestic,thus the demand was limited, but the demand for other oil was also limited :the imports were going up from 2,65 million in 1933 to 5,1 million in 1939, but British imports for the same period were on the 10 million + level .
WW construction was underway since the early 1930s .

USSBS reports hydro/FT produced million tons in 1938.
BENZOL increased from 1/3 million tons in 1935 to 1/2 million tons in 1938.
In 1938 2 million tons was produced in coal tar distillation. This feed the hydrogenation plants in 1938 and as by product also produced 180k oil. LOW TAR produced 1/4 million tons [mostly diesel] in 1938.

Indigenous synthetic fuel production.
1936 1.85 million tons = surplus 446 k tons
1937 2.195 million tons = surplus 353k tons
1938 2.755 million tons = surplus 728k tons
1939 3.876 million tons= surplus 166k tons
1940 4.747 million tons

In 1939 2.4 million tons fuel stockpiled.

synthetic oil capacity at out break of war 4.638 million tons.

ALL USSBS.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

#165

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019, 23:35

ljadw wrote:
12 Jan 2019, 18:20
The USSB figure is inflated :
Japanese stocks were
in March 1941 48,9 million barrels
in March 1942 38,2 million
in March 1943 25,3 million
in March 1944 13, 8 million
in (March ? ) 1945 4,7 million .
Source : Pacific War online Encyclopedia .
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/O/i/Oil.htm

Oil measure, storage, and transport
Oil is normally measured by volume in barrels with one barrel equaling 42 gallons or 159 liters. However, warship designs often specified their bunkerage by weight in metric tons, since this was used to calculate standard displacement. The conversion depends on temperature and grade of oil, but for Navy Special Fuel Oil (with a specific gravity of about 0.96) a metric ton was approximately 6.55 barrels, while for light crude oil with a specific gravity of 0.83 a metric ton was about 7.58 barrels.

Using that for the numbers given in the table of Japanese oil inventories in thousands of barrels given on the website, we find Japanese stocks total 6.92 million in 1941.

So no, the USSBS and the op are not using inflated numbers as they are using numbers lower than the website.
Last edited by Hanny on 12 Jan 2019, 23:42, edited 2 times in total.
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