Different German Oil Strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2019 07:10

About the rearmament before the war : there was NO policy of guns before butter: what Goering and Goebbels said were only words . Also from Abelshauser : P 525 :
Meat consumption per head in Germany :
1929 : 51,7 kg
1930 : 43,5 kg
1938 : 48,6 kg
And,as meat was a luxury before the war (and even long time after the war ).....

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2019 07:44

After the war, Speer said : Veni, vidi, almost vinci .
I came, I saw the existing chaos, I took the necessary measures, and I almost succeeded .That I failed is the fault of the nazis (who were conveniently dead and could not defend themselves ) .
And as proof, Speer used the Wagenführ figures,which were manipulated by Wagenführ at the order of Speer .
And after the war, the USSBS said the same, they parrotted Speer .One of the reasons was that they were lazy : it was easier to use figures,of which they knew they were manipulated,( and if they didn't know that the figures were manipulated, they should have known, but they knew,because wartime AND peacetime Washington was /is swarming with people doing the same as Wagenführ ) than to search for the truth .
Burton Klein said : The Blitzkrieg strategy allowed the Nazi government to maintain a prosperous civilian economy .

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 19 Jan 2019 10:35

ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
The nazis were not deceived by the Wagenfuür's numbers,as these were only used for propaganda aims .Propaganda by Speer and for Speer .
And about autarky: it is very questionable to say that it was unsuccessful .
Reich propaganda ministry was a separate entity. They used different numbers from the Economics Ministry. Economics ministry number values were for economic plans of production, for setting allocation of resources etc. Your not using Tooze for your historically inaccurate claims.
Tooze
"Rolf Wagenfuehr, the chief statistician in Speer's Ministries, busied himself with an impressive collection of statistics, which to this day provide us with the most influential account of the German war effort".

By all means explain the worlds education systems are wrong, and you and you internet bloggers are correct.
ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
About the rearmament before the war : there was NO policy of guns before butter: what Goering and Goebbels said were only words . Also from Abelshauser : P 525 :
Abelshauser "the German diet was remarkably modest", his conclusion was that the Nazis were "largely successful" in producing both "butter and guns" Abelshauser "as much butter as necessary, as many guns as possible". Modest ment 75% of Uk levels.

Meat consumption was low because Germany imported 20% of its national food requirements, in 1940 10% of German cattle were slaughterd due to lack of feed for them. This was the lowest amount of the war. In 1941 german average food consumption fell by 25%, by 1945 the meat allowence was 25kg. Silesia went into the war with 550k cattle, by 45 it had 55k.

It was not just German livestock that were slaughterd to feed the Nazi war machine, occupied nations had theirs slaughtered too, Low countries were required to find 20% of Wehrmacht meat ration, so theirlivestock went to slaughter.

Beef production in 000s of tons.
Belgium 1939=151.9 1940=140.7 1941=116.0 1942=125.3 1943=23.1

Margarine production in 1000 of tons
Belgium 1939=60.7 1941=40.0 1941=21.1 1942=11.4 1943=11.0

Please stop misusing authors words.

Schackt disagreed with you he told Goring in 36, 'They are being starved of oil to cook with, butter for their bread, meat for a Sunday dinner,'
CCEA AS-level History Student Guide: Germany (1919-1945
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8cl ... er&f=false

Goring in his 4 year plan, replacing Schacht who wanted some butter with his guns, who was told by AH, no i want guns with just enough butter and repalced him with goring, explained exactly what guns butter meant."Guns will make us strong, butter will only make us fat. We have no butter... but I ask you, would you rather have butter or guns? Preparedness makes us powerful. Butter merely makes us fat.

Zdroj: https://citaty.net/citaty/1732253-herma ... only-make/"

Goebbels in 36“We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns.”

The biological standard of living improved in Western European countries during the 1930s, in Germany it stagnated.

https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp800.pdf
6. Conclusion
We conclude that an autarchy policy was, indeed, highly detrimental to the health in an
industrialized food-importing economy. Price and quantity regulations did not alleviate the
situation, at least not for people living in large cities. We compare trends in mortality and
nutritional status with other living standard indicators for the Weimar Republic (1919–1933)
and for the early years of the Nationalist Socialist regime (1933–1937). The findings reveal a
little known fact, that in the mid-1930s mortality rates in Germany increased substantially in
almost every age group, even when compared with those in 1932, the worst year of the Great
Depression
ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
Burton Klein said : The Blitzkrieg strategy allowed the Nazi government to maintain a prosperous civilian economy
You seem to have overlooked Tooze disagreed with klien and formed a totally different view.

Tooze
As Hitler saw it, warlike conquest, not liberal free trade, was the necessary precondition forsocial reconstruction. Conquest, however, dependd on rearm-ament. And it was rearmament that was clearly the dominating feature of economic policy in the Third Reich. The restoration ofmilitary regalia to the centre of public life, the reintroduction of conscription and a variety of paramilitary preparations, the regularparading of military hardware and its celebration in all available media, the mass dissemination of military spectacle were surelythe most significant acts of social reconstruction undertaken by the ThirdReich.
Rearmament dominated economic policy in Germany to agreater extent and from an earlier stage than in any of the other European combatants of the Second World War. As early as June1933) at the same time as Hitler's government was launching thei billioRM Reinhardt work-creation package, Schacht, GeneralBlomberg, and Goring were secretly agreeing a military spend- ing programme amounting to 35 billion RM over eight years.And while civilian work-creation spending tailed off after December 1933, military spending accelerated dramatically. Viewed inmacro-economic terms the Third Reich shifted a larger percentageof national resources into rearmament than any other capitalist regime in history.
Last edited by Hanny on 20 Jan 2019 09:15, edited 9 times in total.
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Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 19 Jan 2019 10:36

Boby wrote:
18 Jan 2019 23:15
Why do I suspect that Hanny never read a paper by Jonas Scherner?
I know this one, its because your not very bright and lack reasoning skills.

But of course your going to come back and link us to how its taught were you live right?, you know the same as its taught in the UK.

"All military and political authorities must strive for a short war, The political authorities however must be prepared for a war lasting ten or fifteen years" Adolf Hitler
Last edited by Hanny on 20 Jan 2019 01:10, edited 1 time in total.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jan 2019 17:28

ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:48
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Jan 2019 03:43


"According to German statistics, civilian consumption in 1939 was above the 1929 level and had only fallen slightly by 1941. This shows that Germany entered the war with a "guns and [emphasis in original] butter" philosophy which was continued well after the initial defeats in Russia."

And, as one could expect from the USSBS, this quote is wrong, as it ignores,fails to consider the fact that 40/50% of the production of consumption goods was for the Wehrmacht, NOT for the civilians .
Source : Abelshauser P 527 of Kriegswirtschaft und Wirtschaftswunder .
No, I did not write that you buffoon.

I doubt that Abelshauser confuses the consumption of goods by civilians with the production of civilian goods. It is irrelevant if the military consumed 40 to 50 percent of "consumption goods", if those consumer goods were still being produced rather than non-consumer goods, i.e., munitions. What Abelshauser actually wrote was:

"For the assumption that Germany came late in mobilizing for total war, speaks another argument. In the period from the beginning of 1942
until the summer of 1944, German war production tripled, but even at that time, as Alan Milward rightly points out, she was unable to fully exploit her potential: "Neither theoretically nor in the real world of war had the German armaments effort, reached its extreme limit, when she finally collapsed.

Other indicators point in the same direction, but contradict the Wagenführschen explanation.It is true that consumer goods production only declined significantly in 1942. Already at the end of 1940 most of the consumer goods industries delivered but 40 to 50 percent of their generation to the military and adjusted accordingly little to the civilian consumption. This can be derived from the distribution of the workers to those branches of industry which were engaged in the fulfillment of military orders. It becomes clear that the biggest shift towards the wartime economy from 1939 to 1940. The production level of the consumer goods industry can not therefore be taken as evidence of the hypothesis of the "peace economy in war"."

In other words, his argument was that since the consumer goods industry continued to produce only 50 to 60 percent of its production for the civilian sector during wartime, after 15 months of war, then that contradicts the idea of a leisurely transition to wartime economy. Given the state of other wartime economies after 15 months of war, such as the British and Soviet (and less so the American), I find that argument weak to say the least.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 20 Jan 2019 10:10

Hanny wrote:
19 Jan 2019 10:35
ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
The nazis were not deceived by the Wagenfuür's numbers,as these were only used for propaganda aims .Propaganda by Speer and for Speer .
And about autarky: it is very questionable to say that it was unsuccessful .
Reich propaganda ministry was a separate entity. They used different numbers from the Economics Ministry. Economics ministry number values were for economic plans of production, for setting allocation of resources etc. Your not using Tooze for your historically inaccurate claims.
Tooze
"Rolf Wagenfuehr, the chief statistician in Speer's Ministries, busied himself with an impressive collection of statistics, which to this day provide us with the most influential account of the German war effort".

By all means explain the worlds education systems are wrong, and you and you internet bloggers are correct.
ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
About the rearmament before the war : there was NO policy of guns before butter: what Goering and Goebbels said were only words . Also from Abelshauser : P 525 :
Abelshauser "the German diet was remarkably modest", his conclusion was that the Nazis were "largely successful" in producing both "butter and guns" Abelshauser "as much butter as necessary, as many guns as possible". Modest ment 75% of Uk levels.

Meat consumption was low because Germany imported 20% of its national food requirements, in 1940 10% of German cattle were slaughterd due to lack of feed for them. This was the lowest amount of the war. In 1941 german average food consumption fell by 25%, by 1945 the meat allowence was 25kg. Silesia went into the war with 550k cattle, by 45 it had 55k.

It was not just German livestock that were slaughterd to feed the Nazi war machine, occupied nations had theirs slaughtered too, Low countries were required to find 20% of Wehrmacht meat ration, so theirlivestock went to slaughter.

Beef production in 000s of tons.
Belgium 1939=151.9 1940=140.7 1941=116.0 1942=125.3 1943=23.1

Margarine production in 1000 of tons
Belgium 1939=60.7 1941=40.0 1941=21.1 1942=11.4 1943=11.0

Please stop misusing authors words.

Schackt disagreed with you he told Goring in 36, 'They are being starved of oil to cook with, butter for their bread, meat for a Sunday dinner,'
CCEA AS-level History Student Guide: Germany (1919-1945
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8cl ... er&f=false

Goring in his 4 year plan, replacing Schacht who wanted some butter with his guns, who was told by AH, no i want guns with just enough butter and repalced him with goring, explained exactly what guns butter meant."Guns will make us strong, butter will only make us fat. We have no butter... but I ask you, would you rather have butter or guns? Preparedness makes us powerful. Butter merely makes us fat.

Zdroj: https://citaty.net/citaty/1732253-herma ... only-make/"

Goebbels in 36“We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns.”

The biological standard of living improved in Western European countries during the 1930s, in Germany it stagnated.

https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp800.pdf
6. Conclusion
We conclude that an autarchy policy was, indeed, highly detrimental to the health in an
industrialized food-importing economy. Price and quantity regulations did not alleviate the
situation, at least not for people living in large cities. We compare trends in mortality and
nutritional status with other living standard indicators for the Weimar Republic (1919–1933)
and for the early years of the Nationalist Socialist regime (1933–1937). The findings reveal a
little known fact, that in the mid-1930s mortality rates in Germany increased substantially in
almost every age group, even when compared with those in 1932, the worst year of the Great
Depression
ljadw wrote:
19 Jan 2019 06:57
Burton Klein said : The Blitzkrieg strategy allowed the Nazi government to maintain a prosperous civilian economy
You seem to have overlooked Tooze disagreed with klien and formed a totally different view.

Tooze
As Hitler saw it, warlike conquest, not liberal free trade, was the necessary precondition forsocial reconstruction. Conquest, however, dependd on rearm-ament. And it was rearmament that was clearly the dominating feature of economic policy in the Third Reich. The restoration ofmilitary regalia to the centre of public life, the reintroduction of conscription and a variety of paramilitary preparations, the regularparading of military hardware and its celebration in all available media, the mass dissemination of military spectacle were surelythe most significant acts of social reconstruction undertaken by the ThirdReich.
Rearmament dominated economic policy in Germany to agreater extent and from an earlier stage than in any of the other European combatants of the Second World War. As early as June1933) at the same time as Hitler's government was launching thei billioRM Reinhardt work-creation package, Schacht, GeneralBlomberg, and Goring were secretly agreeing a military spend- ing programme amounting to 35 billion RM over eight years.And while civilian work-creation spending tailed off after December 1933, military spending accelerated dramatically. Viewed inmacro-economic terms the Third Reich shifted a larger percentageof national resources into rearmament than any other capitalist regime in history.
Comparison with Britain or Belgium is totally irrelevant .Their economies were different .
The reality is that in 1938 the food situation in Germany was better than in 1932, and this was the main reason why the German population supported Hitler .The Germans did not care if they had only 75 % of the food the British population had ,
About Klein : you don.t get it : I cited him because he belonged to the USSBS gang,and because after the war he gave wrong informations about the German war economy . What he said was wrong .
Tooze disagreed with Klein and with the USSBS .
An other one of the USSBS gang (Kaldor ) wrote in 1946 : 'Speer's administration in the ourse of the following two-and-a - half years was the single great success which the German war economy can record,and the only that will retain a more than historical interest '.
Source :Economic History of Warfare and State formation P 245
And ,on P 249 : We can only speculate why Wagenführ presented the wrong figures :either he made a massive calculation error or he deliberately provided incorrect values .The latter appears more likely ......
And on P 256 :The mirage of the so-called German armament miracle was evoked by the manipulations and omissions of armament minister Speer and his statistician Wagenführ .
Comments :

P 245 : no one today is believing what Kaldor was saying ,although Speer would have approved the propaganda from Kaldor .
P 249 : I disagree : speculations are not needed : we know very well why Wagenführ was lying : he followed the orders of Speer .
P 256 : something is missing ,which is :the mirage was also evoked by the USSBS report : the USSBS collaborated in the construction of the Speer myth .See what Klein and Kaldor were saying .Thus, the USSBS report is not a reliable thing .
As Wagenführ has been debunked, it is a waste of time to use the USSBS report .

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 20 Jan 2019 12:09

ljadw wrote:
20 Jan 2019 10:10
Comparison with Britain or Belgium is totally irrelevant .
Context is never irrelevant, you refered to meat consumption, German meat consumption during the war was kept up by taking it from occuppied nations, and consuming it at home. For the military, half of their meat ration came from direct confiscation of the nation they were in and consumed there to ease the logistiocal burden of supply.
ljadw wrote:
20 Jan 2019 10:10
Their economies were different .
Which is why context is required, in 1936 50% of Germans lived below the official poverty line.

Low countries economy once occuppied was subordinated to that of the Reich, the food they would have eaten was consumed by Germans instead.
ljadw wrote:
20 Jan 2019 10:10
The reality is that in 1938 the food situation in Germany was better than in 1932, and this was the main reason why the German population supported Hitler .The Germans did not care if they had only 75 % of the food the British population had ,
Except it was not.

It imported food as it was food deficit nation. What had changed was that their was increased income to purchase it.There was refigeration in most homes ( state gave everyone a home, and you payed back the cost depending on how many children you had, and if your wife gave up working, by 4 children the house became a gift of the state) to store it for longer, hence Tooze moves state expenditure on refrigeration/canning to the military sector as the Reich invested massively in stockpiling frozen/tinned foodstuffs, to replace imports lost in case of blockade, and setting up civilian infrastructure to consume less food due to decreased wastage.

German Life expetency fell between 32 and 37.

Kershaw "A summary of price and wage levels prepared for Hitler on 4 September 1935 showed almost half of the German work-force earning gross wages of 18 ReichMarks or less per week. This was substantially below the poverty line...Wages, then, remained at the 1932 level--substantially lower than the last pre-Depression year of 1928 in the much-maligned Weimar Republic. Food prices, on the other hand, had risen officially by 8 per cent since 1933. Overall living costs were higher by 5.4 per cent. Official rates did not, however, tell the whole tale. Increases of 33, 50, and even 150 per cent had been reported for some foodstuffs. By late summer, the terms `food crisis' and `provisions crisis' were in common use."

Annual food consumption in 1937 had fallen for wheat bread, meat, bacon, milk, eggs, fish vegetables, sugar, tropical fruit and beer compared to the 1927 figures. The only increase was in rye bread, cheese and potatoes.

Kilo of bacon cost 2.5rm
kilo of butter 3 rm.

1933 State had 937 million in gold reserves, in 1937 72 million.

ljadw wrote:
20 Jan 2019 10:10
About Klein : you don.t get it : I cited him because he belonged to the USSBS gang,and because after the war he gave wrong informations about the German war economy . What he said was wrong .
Tooze disagreed with Klein and with the USSBS .
I totaly get that your views are shaped by your ideology. What Klien said was based on Wagenführ statistics and he argued that 1939 9% on military expenditure ment AH was prepared for short wars, not long nutritional ones, Tooze used 17% for the same period and argued AH was prepared for long attrition wars.

Now if you had given klien Toozes numbers you would get a different explanation of what they meant from him. Each is counting things radically different from each other.

Wagenfuhr/Tooze in comparison of Military share of industrial production.
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
9 16 15 22 31 40
Tooze
17 24 30 34 38 43
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Boby
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Boby » 20 Jan 2019 12:31

German "official" gold reserve dissapeared mostly from 1930 until 1934. But there was a hidden reserve accumulated by Schacht. In May 1937 = 360 mill. RM.

This has been well documented by Dr. Ralf Banken

You are copy-pasting things you don't have sufficient knowledge.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Boby » 20 Jan 2019 12:36

What utter nonsense to use wage-earning published data from 1934 as a representative picture of 1933-39.

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 20 Jan 2019 12:46

Boby wrote:
20 Jan 2019 12:31
German "official" gold reserve dissapeared mostly from 1930 until 1934. But there was a hidden reserve accumulated by Schacht. In May 1937 = 360 mill. RM.

This has been well documented by Dr. Ralf Banken

You are copy-pasting things you don't have sufficient knowledge.
So you cant post how its taught in Spain then. For the good reason that its taught the same way as in the UK.

If you have a problem with kershews use of the data in Roberts work, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IgD ... on&f=false then take it up with him, and explain to him what Roberts wrote was wrong.
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Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 20 Jan 2019 12:48

Boby wrote:
20 Jan 2019 12:36
What utter nonsense to use wage-earning published data from 1934 as a representative picture of 1933-39.
Your reading and comprehension impaired. Wages, then, remained at the 1932 level--substantially lower than the last pre-Depression year of 1928 in the much-maligned Weimar Republic. Food prices, on the other hand, had risen officially by 8 per cent since 1933. Overall living costs were higher by 5.4 per cent. If you dont like that i used Tooze example of butter costs, i suggest the problem is at your end.
Last edited by Hanny on 20 Jan 2019 12:58, edited 1 time in total.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Boby
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Boby » 20 Jan 2019 12:53

Read Banken ignoramus, instead of copy-pasting books that cooy-paste a 1937 author that simply copy-paste the official published data.

I wish there was an ignore option.

Boby
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Boby » 20 Jan 2019 12:57

Kershaw is using 1934 data. How about 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939?

You are ridiculous.

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 20 Jan 2019 12:59

Boby wrote:
20 Jan 2019 12:53
Read Banken ignoramus, instead of copy-pasting books that cooy-paste a 1937 author that simply copy-paste the official published data.

I wish there was an ignore option.
Its quite simply, when you become an adult, you learn to ignore and not react, rather than to act on impulse.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Hanny » 20 Jan 2019 13:03

Boby wrote:
20 Jan 2019 12:57
Kershaw is using 1934 data. How about 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939?

You are ridiculous.
Asked and answered.
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