Different German Oil Strategy

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ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 07:45

Stugbit wrote:
09 Sep 2018 19:31
Most of the German forces were fighting the Soviet in the east when Operation Overlord happened. If the Allied already took a toll against a half cook German force there, how it could manage the whole thing? They tried to make a desembark in 42 and everything got wront. The battle of Salerno was almost a German victory.

The Soviet only manage to reach Berlin because they had a vastly numeric superior tank force. Those tank pincers were broking the German lines and making kessels in the front just like the Germans did back in 41. Without numeric superiority in armour, the Soviet wouldn`t be able to broke the spikes of the defenses.

And how they managed to build such large numbers of tanks? Beucase they did not needed to build trucks. The majority of the trucks of the Soviet Union after 41 came from the Allied as Lend Lease. Those truck were the logistic support of the tanks spearheads.


On the other hand, the Atlantic War was lost because Hitler never give a serious attention to the submarines, for him it was secundary. He could not see the potential of these weapons. If they given investment to submarine development and rush the development of the latter models, things could have been different.

And the Desert War was not a side show. The middle East position is very strategic, the Suez Channel as well. There were battles in the Napoleonic Wars, in WWI...
The Atlantic War was lost before it was started : more submarines does not mean more sinkings (the Germans had more submarines in 1944 than in 1942 but less sinkings )and more sinkings does not mean starvation .Before the war British anti submarine weapon production outweighed the German submarine production and during the war the Allies produced more GRT than could be sunk.
About the ME : the Suez Channel was not used from June 1940 to June 1943 .Its importance was meaningless ,as was the importance of the ME . Britain could do without the ME, as it did in WWI,and the ME was only a wast of means for the Germans .If the Germans conquered the ME (what they could not do ) they could not attack the SU . They had not the forces for both .
Last edited by ljadw on 10 Sep 2018 08:16, edited 1 time in total.

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 07:47

Stugbit wrote:
09 Sep 2018 19:06
On July 3 ,Halder wrote in his diary :
"' It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian cvampaign has been won in the space of 2 weeks ." and " We can say that the task of destroying the main forces of the Russian land army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper River is accomplished ."
On August 11 (5 weeks later ) when the Russian Army started a big offensive that costed the Germans 200000 men in August , the same Halder wrote in his diary :'we have underestimated the Soviets''-which was not true, and implying that this underestimation was the reason of the German failure,which was also not true .
The Allied LL deliveries between July 3 and August 11 were almost inexistent and had no influence on the outcome of the fighting during that period .The Soviets stopped the Germans WITHOUT any Allied help .
The war did not ended in 41. If it has been that way, the Soviet would have captured Berlin in 42. It did not happened, the Germans managed to stabilise the front after the Soviet offensive. Despite all the losses they took from the Soviet superior numbers, the hash winter, etc. Berlin felt in 45...

Do you know how much time is three years?
SU could defeat Germany on its own
I don`t believe on this and I know a lot of people that would follow suit.

The only way the Western Allied could win alone against Germany was using atomic bombs. Even with the Soviet help they suffered to fight the Germans, just look at the Italian Campaign.
The Italian war was not needed to defeat Germany

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 08:15

Stugbit wrote:
09 Sep 2018 19:31
Most of the German forces were fighting the Soviet in the east when Operation Overlord happened. If the Allied already took a toll against a half cook German force there, how it could manage the whole thing? They tried to make a desembark in 42 and everything got wront. The battle of Salerno was almost a German victory.

The Soviet only manage to reach Berlin because they had a vastly numeric superior tank force. Those tank pincers were broking the German lines and making kessels in the front just like the Germans did back in 41. Without numeric superiority in armour, the Soviet wouldn`t be able to broke the spikes of the defenses.

And how they managed to build such large numbers of tanks? Beucase they did not needed to build trucks. The majority of the trucks of the Soviet Union after 41 came from the Allied as Lend Lease. Those truck were the logistic support of the tanks spearheads.

The claim that the Soviets could build a lot of tanks because they did not build trucks ,is wrong (Britain and the US built tanks and trucks, why should the SU not be able to do this ?)
From this forum (by Igor Kurtukov):
On June 22 the Red Army had 270000 trucks,during the war it received an additional 745000 trucks

from the domestic production ( which was 205000 ) 150000
from the industry and agriculture 221000
captured trucks 60000
LL trucks (mostly after 1942 ) 312000
The facts are
1 the SU built during the war 205000 trucks and some 110000 tanks and SPs
2 the LL trucks ,which arrived since 1943, were a minority of the additional trucks (some 40 % )and of the total of trucks (some 30 % )

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Stugbit » 10 Sep 2018 11:16

When I said about submarines, I meant investment, not exactly numbers. When you put money and people working on something, you harvest it's fruits.

If somehow the Germans managed to rush the development of the latter submarine models, the Allied would have had way more problems, as quality was more important than quantity in submarine warfare.

Anyway, James Mason says that there was a time when the Germans could sink more ships than the Allied could build, and he says that if the Germans had a bit more submarines they could have done more damage. But I don't know if this information is correct because Mason writes in the 70's and 80's, at that time things were not so clear. There's a lot of miss information.


The Suez Channel was not used because of Malta, as I said before. If the island were in Axis hands it would become a important strategic site very quick.

In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.


About the truck number, if the Lend Lease managed to bring at least 40% of trucks to the Russians it is very much. It could influence in the tanks production and consequently the offensives of late 43, 44.
The allied production was bigger than Soviets. There was many countries producing together and the US alone could build ships in industrial mass production scale. But I don't know if they built more tanks than the SU in the war.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 12:26

Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 11:16
When I said about submarines, I meant investment, not exactly numbers. When you put money and people working on something, you harvest it's fruits.

If somehow the Germans managed to rush the development of the latter submarine models, the Allied would have had way more problems, as quality was more important than quantity in submarine warfare.

Anyway, James Mason says that there was a time when the Germans could sink more ships than the Allied could build, and he says that if the Germans had a bit more submarines they could have done more damage. But I don't know if this information is correct because Mason writes in the 70's and 80's, at that time things were not so clear. There's a lot of miss information.


The Suez Channel was not used because of Malta, as I said before. If the island were in Axis hands it would become a important strategic site very quick.

In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.


About the truck number, if the Lend Lease managed to bring at least 40% of trucks to the Russians it is very much. It could influence in the tanks production and consequently the offensives of late 43, 44.
The allied production was bigger than Soviets. There was many countries producing together and the US alone could build ships in industrial mass production scale. But I don't know if they built more tanks than the SU in the war.
What Mason said, was true ,but incomplete, because he failed to recognize the influence of the merchant fleets of Norway,Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Greece who reinforced the British merchant fleet .The result was that at the end of 1941 Britain had gained more GRT than it had lost by submarines .This means that at the end of 1941 the UBoat war had failed .
Other point is that figures about sinkings are meaningless, unless they are accompanied by the figures about the imports that were indespensable for britain . It is even so that a decrease of available shipping does not mean a decrease of imports ,because in first instance imports are not depending on GRT but on the availability of the goods : X ton of GRT does not mean X ton of imports .
British Dry-Cargo inports in WWII were
1940 : 41,9 million GRT
1941 :30,5 million GRT
1942 : 22,9 million GRT
1943 : 26,4 million GRT
1944 :25,1 million GRT
If one compares these figures to those of the sinkings,operational submarines and available GRT, one will see that their relation is very questionable.
One example :there were in 1944 more operational submarines ,less sinkings and more available GRT than in 1943 and 1940, but the imports were lower .
Less sinkings does not mean more imports
More Uboats does not mean more sinkings
Less sinkings does not mean more available GRT .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Stugbit » 10 Sep 2018 12:40

But sinking a merchant ship per se isn't already a gain? Because those ships are a lot more expansive than a torpedo. It would somehow affecting the other countries as well as the British ships desappear, no?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 16:05

The sinking of a merchant ship COULD hurt Britain, if the ship had to be replaced ,but in a lot of cases, this was not so .
An example :
during a month 100000 GRT were lost ,but 100000 GRT was built ;situation remained unchanged .next month : 80000 GRT were lost and 80000 GRT was built . situation remained changed .If during the following month more MS were lost than built, would this hurt Britain ? And how ? And if more MS were built than were lost , would this help Britain ? And how ? Ships on itself had no importance, if they remained in a harbour because there were no goods to transport .
In 1942 the US built 391 ships and 2.67 million GRT
In 1943 they built 1949 ships and 13 million GRT
in 1944 they built 1786 ships and 12,26 million GRT
In 1944 US built much more ships than in 1942 although the losses in 1944 were a fraction of the losses of 1942 .Thus the correlation between shipbuilding and losses does not exist .
During the war, Britain imported less than before the war, but the average Britain was better feed during the war than before the war .Thus where is the German gain of sinking a MV ?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 10 Sep 2018 18:16

Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 12:40
But sinking a merchant ship per se isn't already a gain? Because those ships are a lot more expansive than a torpedo. It would somehow affecting the other countries as well as the British ships desappear, no?
What merchant ship ? An empty one or one with a cargo ? what cargo ? Supplies or food or oil ?
When ? what would benefit Germany more :the sinking of a MV of 10000 GRT in 1944 or one of 5000 GRT in 1942 ?
A ship built before the war or during the war when there was a shortage of materials to build ships?
Etc...
There is no general answer on the question if the sinking of a MV was a gain per se ?

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Peter89 » 10 Sep 2018 19:37

Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 11:16

In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.
The Axis tried to influence (at least that I know of) Iraq, Syria and Iran, but in the second half of 1941 all of them were swiftly occupied by the Allied forces.

Strangely, Iran's joint occupation by the Soviets and the Brits turned out to be the first international conflict resolved by the UN in 1946. The Soviets didn't want to leave the country when the promised time came.

Some comments before, we had an argument about "why the SU needed the approval and legal guarantees of the Western powers". I forgot to mention this bit, but I think this makes it clear; the SU in 1940-1945 couldn't fight a war without the Western powers' approval.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Stugbit » 10 Sep 2018 21:58

What merchant ship ? An empty one or one with a cargo ? what cargo ? Supplies or food or oil ?
When ? what would benefit Germany more :the sinking of a MV of 10000 GRT in 1944 or one of 5000 GRT in 1942 ?
A ship built before the war or during the war when there was a shortage of materials to build ships?
Etc...
There is no general answer on the question if the sinking of a MV was a gain per se ?
Those are good questions, I don`t know exactly what would be considered an ideal target. I think the bigger the ship the better.

I`m saying about submarines because recently I was reading a book of the Argentinean submarine warfare during the Falklands War. The author shows how a single IKL submarine influenced the entire British fleet at the region, as the British could not find the submarine. It was a non-nuclear submarine from German origen, based and very similar to those they ended the war. Here in Brazil we also have those IKL submarines because of the large coastal line we have to defend. Non-nuclear submarines have an advantage over the nuclear ones because they`re way more silent.

If the Germans could have had those Uboats of latter model, I don`t know the impact they could bring to the Allied forces.

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 11 Sep 2018 08:02

Peter89 wrote:
10 Sep 2018 19:37
Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 11:16

In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.
The Axis tried to influence (at least that I know of) Iraq, Syria and Iran, but in the second half of 1941 all of them were swiftly occupied by the Allied forces.

Strangely, Iran's joint occupation by the Soviets and the Brits turned out to be the first international conflict resolved by the UN in 1946. The Soviets didn't want to leave the country when the promised time came.

Some comments before, we had an argument about "why the SU needed the approval and legal guarantees of the Western powers". I forgot to mention this bit, but I think this makes it clear; the SU in 1940-1945 couldn't fight a war without the Western powers' approval.
The Soviets did not leave Iran because of the UN: UN could not force the SU to leave Iran.
The Soviets did fight wars in 1940-1945 without the approval of the West : the war against Finland, there was nothing the West could do to prevent the SU to attack an other country,if it wanted .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 11 Sep 2018 08:11

Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 21:58
What merchant ship ? An empty one or one with a cargo ? what cargo ? Supplies or food or oil ?
When ? what would benefit Germany more :the sinking of a MV of 10000 GRT in 1944 or one of 5000 GRT in 1942 ?
A ship built before the war or during the war when there was a shortage of materials to build ships?
Etc...
There is no general answer on the question if the sinking of a MV was a gain per se ?
Those are good questions, I don`t know exactly what would be considered an ideal target. I think the bigger the ship the better.

I`m saying about submarines because recently I was reading a book of the Argentinean submarine warfare during the Falklands War. The author shows how a single IKL submarine influenced the entire British fleet at the region, as the British could not find the submarine. It was a non-nuclear submarine from German origen, based and very similar to those they ended the war. Here in Brazil we also have those IKL submarines because of the large coastal line we have to defend. Non-nuclear submarines have an advantage over the nuclear ones because they`re way more silent.

If the Germans could have had those Uboats of latter model, I don`t know the impact they could bring to the Allied forces.
The Falklands War was a military invasion, while 'The Battle of the Atlantic '' was a rader war against enemy merchant shipping .
About the UBoats of later model,Type XXI and XXIII,the comments of Clay Blair in ''The Hunted'' (PP 709/710 are very negative .

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Peter89 » 11 Sep 2018 10:08

ljadw wrote:
11 Sep 2018 08:02
Peter89 wrote:
10 Sep 2018 19:37
Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 11:16

In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.
The Axis tried to influence (at least that I know of) Iraq, Syria and Iran, but in the second half of 1941 all of them were swiftly occupied by the Allied forces.

Strangely, Iran's joint occupation by the Soviets and the Brits turned out to be the first international conflict resolved by the UN in 1946. The Soviets didn't want to leave the country when the promised time came.

Some comments before, we had an argument about "why the SU needed the approval and legal guarantees of the Western powers". I forgot to mention this bit, but I think this makes it clear; the SU in 1940-1945 couldn't fight a war without the Western powers' approval.
The Soviets did not leave Iran because of the UN: UN could not force the SU to leave Iran.
The Soviets did fight wars in 1940-1945 without the approval of the West : the war against Finland, there was nothing the West could do to prevent the SU to attack an other country,if it wanted .
I don't know if you either possess extraordinary knowledge of international affairs or simply not aware of the basic facts and the history of the LN / UN.

If you have some sources to back up your opinion, I'd rather be delighted to read and argue about them; my Russian became particurarly rusty in the late years, but I can still manage through most texts.

The problem is that I sense in your comments a wee bit of a blind arrogance and quite a bit of a one-sided vision.

- You never talk about the Western contribution to WW2 in the same way (weight) as the SU's
- You refuse to acknowledge the huge role of LL in the war effort of the SU
- You never admit the importance of international conventions, agreements and institutions, let alone the SU's huge violations of international law, the war crimes and crimes against humanity she committed
- You seem to be ignorant towards the economical, military and geographical and thus political situation the SU governed itself into before its nuclear weapons were made
- You deny to discuss any alternate decision making on the Axis side, even though the very basics of historical evaluation is built upon the evaluation of possible outcomes
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Peter89 » 11 Sep 2018 10:10

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_crisis_of_1946

There you can start to read about the Iran crisis of 1946.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by antwony » 11 Sep 2018 11:38

Stugbit wrote:
10 Sep 2018 11:16
In my opinion, the Middle East was a strategic region at WWII. It was somehow developed, it was mid way to the Pacific, it had some oil fields and it was enough developed for the Axis to reach any of it's outskirts in time. They could attack Soviet Union from behind there. They could pressure Turkey to joint the war on the Axis side more easely as well. And specially, the population was in the Axis side. It wouldn't be needed to fight a resistance there.
Palestine, Aden and Oman were (at least technically) at war with Germany and Italy. Saudi was, technically, neutral but had suspended diplomatic relations with Germany in 1939 and was very important to the Allied war effort. The Vichy French areas; Lebanon and Syria, were (once again, technically) Axis for about a year. But, as Peter mentioned, all Axis influence ended during 1941. Palestine and Lebanon even sent units off to fight the Germans.

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