The worst moment for Germans on the Eastern front

[Ironmachine]

From 1933 to 1945, Hitler was the Master of the Planet Earth. Never before or after in the hands of one person did so much power concentrate. To lead Germany to defeat, how to make an elephant through a coal ear.

You could equally say that from 1933 to 1945 Hitler was the Master of the Known Universe. Knowing something about history should be a requisite to talk about it. And it is clear that you know very little about history.
By the way, what is a coal ear?

Of my observations, 95-99% of those interested in military history do not know the military theory. How and why battles are won. When I hear Stalingrad and Kursk it is lol. The Battle of Kursk was to begin in March 1943, Hitler postponed the beginning of the attack, on July 13, he stopped the Germans.

Thank God that we have you here, one of the select 1-5%, to illuminate us with your (lack of) knowledge.

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[jesk]

You could equally say that from 1933 to 1945 Hitler was the Master of the Known Universe. Knowing something about history should be a requisite to talk about it. And it is clear that you know very little about history.
By the way, what is a coal ear?

Coal and angle in Russian are similar. Hole in needle for thread. Hitler unleashed not only the second world, but also the cold war. He's a lot of things!

Thank God that we have you here, one of the select 1-5%, to illuminate us with your (lack of) knowledge.

It is not necessary to believe in the Illuminati. Without the advice of German generals, few historians will notice the fallacy of the blow on one strategic direction in 1942. Army groups "North", "Center" and "South" had to attack simultaneously. The new "Barbarossa" did not happen. Hitler stopped the Germans near Moscow. Leningrad Germans did not take and did not try.

[Ironmachine]

It is not necessary to believe in the Illuminati.

From your previous posts, you seem to believe in many strange things. But the main problem is that you don't understand plain English.

Without the advice of German generals, few historians will notice the fallacy of the blow on one strategic direction in 1942. Army groups "North", "Center" and "South" had to attack simultaneously. The new "Barbarossa" did not happen. Hitler stopped the Germans near Moscow. Leningrad Germans did not take and did not try.

From the man who said: "95-99% of those interested in military history do not know the military theory", here we have the evidence that he doesn't know neither military theory nor military history.

[jesk]

From your previous posts, you seem to believe in many strange things. But the main problem is that you don't understand plain English.

You still from the first post expressed a categorical disagreement with the thesis: Hitler wanted to lose the war. Why do you think this is strange. It's normal for me - Hitler's desire to lose the war.

From the man who said: "95-99% of those interested in military history do not know the military theory", here we have the evidence that he doesn't know neither military theory nor military history.

I know the military theory and prove where mistakes were made. Coincides with what Clausewitz wrote, and you do not even know who it is. I'll tell you: a well-known German military theorist. After reading it, it's easy to understand where the war was wrong.

[Ironmachine]

You still from the first post expressed a categorical disagreement with the thesis: Hitler wanted to lose the war. Why do you think this is strange. It's normal for me - Hitler's desire to lose the war.

I'm sure you think you are right. That does't make you right.

I know the military theory and prove where mistakes were made. Coincides with what Clausewitz wrote, and you do not even know who it is. I'll tell you: a well-known German military theorist. After reading it, it's easy to understand where the war was wrong.

You thing you know the military theory and you think you prove where mistakes were made. But even if you are right (but you aren't), that does not prove that those mistakes were made on purpose to lose the war, and that is the basic premise of your thesis.
It's just like your statement about Clausewitz. You suppose (without any evidence) that I don't know who he was, when the truth is that you do not even know who I am. It's always the same: All of your reasoning is faulty because you reason from your desired conclusion backwards to a false premise that allows you to "justify" it, never doubting the veracity of your thesis :roll:

[Carl Schwamberger]

... You suppose (without any evidence) that I don't know who he was, when the truth is that you do not even know who I am. ...

Theres a peculiar sort of arrogance that accompanies that sort of thinking.

[jesk]

The statement that Hitler wanted to defeat Germany, I'll leave to myself. In fact, not everyone will be able to believe this. Psychologically difficult. Therefore, even Manstein, who thoroughly knew the theory, never had such thoughts. But ordinary Berliners in the winter of 1945 had questions about Hitler. There were rumors, Hitler is Stalin's agent, sent from the Kremlin. Easily gave the first victory (a very impressive victory). Before the Soviet offensive, he removed the tanks from the Oder. The Ardennes, Hungary has many tanks; to Berlin 600 km for 2 weeks in January have passed.

I will return to the initial thesis of the topic. There are many discussions and criticisms of Hitler's actions during Operation Blau in the south in 1942. And the fact of inaction of 2 out of 3 army groups is completely ignored. This decision of Hitler, not to attack Moscow and Leningrad, is as bad as his mistakes in the south. And this is the moment that demonstrates ignorance of military theory by an overwhelming majority. Hitler's decision not to advance 2/3 of the Wehrmacht was ignored by German generals. They concentrated more on discussing the events on the southern flank. There was no prompting from them, as a consequence of the fat piece of history that fell out of consideration.
Look at the documentary films, much criticism of the actions during the Blau and the utter disregard for the monstrous decision to stop the Germans outside Moscow and Leningrad.

[jesk]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%.
66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

[BDV]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%. 66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

Attack in the North done (Nordlich), thwarted by Sovjet resistance.

Demjansk pocket vanity project was too costly for the available resourcing (airbridge continuing AFTER Operatsyia Uran starting). Seydlitz Operation and Hannover Operation are done, that is strength of AGC allowing to do. AGC beyond this depleted to strengthen AGA and AGB of Fall Blau (PGr 4 destroyed at Stalingrad). Moving from Donetsk basin north after Fredericus is possible (likely best option - but not war'winner), but Baku keeps inflamed imagination of Fuhrer and underlings.

[jesk]

Attack in the North done (Nordlich), thwarted by Sovjet resistance.

Manstein received a phone call from Hitler on September 4. Probably, he overestimated the danger of Soviet attacks. For a week they already suffered losses and then Stalingrad, strategically the Germans could not attack the city. Are you talking about this ?!

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/10.html

Already on August 27 the enemy attacked the 18th Army, which was facing the east. It was necessary to bring into battle the newly arrived 170 division. In the following days it became clear that the Soviet side, using large forces, organized an offensive in order to break through the siege of Leningrad; By this offensive, the enemy obviously wanted to preempt our advance.

On September 4th, Hitler called me. He said that my immediate intervention in the situation on the Volkhov Front was necessary in order to avoid a catastrophe. I had to immediately assume the command of this sector of the front and take energetic measures to restore the situation. Indeed, on this day the enemy in the area to the south of Lake Ladoga made a wide and deep breakthrough of the 18th Army, occupied by insignificant forces.

Of course, it was not very convenient for us to take command of the threatened [301] sector of the front in the area of ​​the 18th Army at a critical moment. Even the fact that we were assigned the task of organizing an offensive against Leningrad, at the headquarters of the 18 armies looked negatively, which was quite just. However, despite such obvious disregard (from the side of the General Command, - Prim., Ed.), The headquarters of the 18th Army did its utmost to help us in carrying out our task by all means, especially considering that we did not have a rear department at our headquarters.

And instead of the planned offensive on Leningrad, a "battle south of Ladoga Lake" unfolded.

Demjansk pocket vanity project was too costly for the available resourcing (airbridge continuing AFTER Operatsyia Uran starting). Seydlitz Operation and Hannover Operation are done, that is strength of AGC allowing to do. AGC beyond this depleted to strengthen AGA and AGB of Fall Blau (PGr 4 destroyed at Stalingrad). Moving from Donetsk basin north after Fredericus is possible (likely best option - but not war'winner), but Baku keeps inflamed imagination of Fuhrer and underlings.

In 1942, Alfred Jodl's imagination was occupied by Leningrad. He proposed to advance on Leningrad instead of the Caucasus. Baku is only Hitler. But he withdrew the 11th army from the Caucasus, sent to Leningrad. It's hard there.

[Ironmachine]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%.
66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

Really, although it depends on varying factors like water density, iceberg density, shape, size, etc., about 80-90% of any iceberg is below the water line.

[jesk]

I wanted to show a break from the context of the events of 1942. Army groups "North" and "Center" are waiting for the end of fight in the south. Further it is not necessary to discuss anything, this is enough for me to analyze the whole year of war.

[BDV]

I wanted to show a break from the context of the events of 1942. Army groups "North" and "Center" are waiting for the end of fight in the south. Further it is not necessary to discuss anything, this is enough for me to analyze the whole year of war.

There is no "waiting."

RKKA is keeping ArmeeGroups busy.
not only in Leningrad rooms but also in Rshew rooms, throughout the summer; in addition to the Demjansk vanity project.

Failure to exploit huge Sovjet kessel from Demjansk to Toropets can be faulted; likely single leadership AGC-AGN is needed.

[jesk]

There is no "waiting."

RKKA is keeping ArmeeGroups busy.
not only in Leningrad rooms but also in Rshew rooms, throughout the summer; in addition to the Demjansk vanity project.

Failure to exploit huge Sovjet kessel from Demjansk to Toropets can be faulted; likely single leadership AGC-AGN is needed.

Hitler, it is known, stretched the front line. He forbade the liquidation of the Oranienbaum bridgehead, the Leningrad Front, and agreed to withdraw troops from the demian pocket only in February 1943. Did not want earlier.

[Peter89]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%. 66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

Attack in the North done (Nordlich), thwarted by Sovjet resistance.

Demjansk pocket vanity project was too costly for the available resourcing (airbridge continuing AFTER Operatsyia Uran starting). Seydlitz Operation and Hannover Operation are done, that is strength of AGC allowing to do. AGC beyond this depleted to strengthen AGA and AGB of Fall Blau (PGr 4 destroyed at Stalingrad). Moving from Donetsk basin north after Fredericus is possible (likely best option - but not war'winner), but Baku keeps inflamed imagination of Fuhrer and underlings.

I wrote that to him before. He didn't care.