The worst moment for Germans on the Eastern front

[jesk]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%. 66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

Attack in the North done (Nordlich), thwarted by Sovjet resistance.

Demjansk pocket vanity project was too costly for the available resourcing (airbridge continuing AFTER Operatsyia Uran starting). Seydlitz Operation and Hannover Operation are done, that is strength of AGC allowing to do. AGC beyond this depleted to strengthen AGA and AGB of Fall Blau (PGr 4 destroyed at Stalingrad). Moving from Donetsk basin north after Fredericus is possible (likely best option - but not war'winner), but Baku keeps inflamed imagination of Fuhrer and underlings.

I wrote that to him before. He didn't care.

You remember the defensive operations. The Russians attacked and the Germans defended there. I'm talking about something else, about the lack of initiative of the Wehrmacht. Even after Sinyavino, there was no attack on Leningrad. The Russians accumulated resources and in January 1943 again attacked positions of HGN.
Defense is not an activity. This is a passive tactic.

The lack of activity of HGN and HGM in 1942?

HGN was fighting off the Sinavinyo Offensive and HGM was fighting for its survival in the battles of Rhzev.

David Glantz even argues in Zhukov's greatest defeat that Operation Mars was just as equally important as Uranus.

[jesk]

likely single leadership AGC-AGN is needed.

Nothing depended of them. Global decisions were taken personally by Hitler.

[Peter89]

1942 in a variety of sources is comparable with viewing of the tip of the iceberg. Army Group "South" and "Blau" only 33%. 66% of the negative, refusal to attack two army groups. Strengthened by a stretched front line there.

Attack in the North done (Nordlich), thwarted by Sovjet resistance.

Demjansk pocket vanity project was too costly for the available resourcing (airbridge continuing AFTER Operatsyia Uran starting). Seydlitz Operation and Hannover Operation are done, that is strength of AGC allowing to do. AGC beyond this depleted to strengthen AGA and AGB of Fall Blau (PGr 4 destroyed at Stalingrad). Moving from Donetsk basin north after Fredericus is possible (likely best option - but not war'winner), but Baku keeps inflamed imagination of Fuhrer and underlings.

I wrote that to him before. He didn't care.

You remember the defensive operations. The Russians attacked and the Germans defended there. I'm talking about something else, about the lack of initiative of the Wehrmacht. Even after Sinyavino, there was no attack on Leningrad. The Russians accumulated resources and in January 1943 again attacked positions of HGN.
Defense is not an activity. This is a passive tactic.

The lack of activity of HGN and HGM in 1942?

HGN was fighting off the Sinavinyo Offensive and HGM was fighting for its survival in the battles of Rhzev.

David Glantz even argues in Zhukov's greatest defeat that Operation Mars was just as equally important as Uranus.

My mother studied in Leningrad State University as a physician for 6 years, so my first area of interest on the Eastern Front was its siege.
I am always open to new knowledge though, I learned quite a lot on this forum from the old threads.

The series of offensives planned by the AGN was thwarted by the Soviet attacks. All its accumulated resources were consumed by the intense fights. If you want divisional-level infos, I can give you some.

AGM was also heavily pounded, the Soviets were slowly gaining ground. Here, around Rhzev-Vyazma, Demjansk and Kholm, the main goal of the Germans was to help their forces to break out towards West, and establishing a proper front line. They even had difficulties with that.

[jesk]

The series of offensives planned by the AGN was thwarted by the Soviet attacks. All its accumulated resources were consumed by the intense fights. If you want divisional-level infos, I can give you some.

After Sinyavino was Vitebsk and preparations for a counteroffensive there. Hitler's plans were constantly changing and they were not in favor of Leningrad. He managed to link large settlements with strong defense of the enemy. Not taken Leningrad should not cause surprise, because there is a fortress.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/10.html

During my visit to Vinnytsa, Hitler told me that the headquarters of the 11th Army was likely to be transferred to the Army Group Center in the Vitebsk region, where there were signs of a major offensive of the enemy in the near future. We had to respond, if possible, to the advancing enemy with a counter-offensive.

AGM was also heavily pounded, the Soviets were slowly gaining ground. Here, around Rhzev-Vyazma, Demjansk and Kholm, the main goal of the Germans was to help their forces to break out towards West, and establishing a proper front line. They even had difficulties with that.

The main goal was to hold the ledge. After the reduction of the front, 21 divisions went to other sectors of the front. If the Russians had pushed the Germans out of the ledge, there would have been no victory under Stalingrad. Hitler ordered to keep Rzhev for the future offensive against Moscow.

Boris Sokolov described the problem.

http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov2/08.html

The most curious thing is that both Stalin and Zhukov had quite objective reasons to expect the Germans to advance in the Western direction. In the army group "Center" there were still more than 70 German divisions - more than in any other group of armies on the Eastern Front. In the south, 90 divisions participated in the general offensive, but more than half of them were made up by the allied units of Germany - Romania, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia. Their fighting efficiency was very much inferior to that of Germany. On one Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, which Hitler ordered to keep for the future, after reaching the main targets in the south, 42 divisions were concentrated to attack Moscow. When in February-March 1943 the Germans still had to abandon this bridgehead, by cutting the front line they managed to free 21 divisions. If his evacuation had been carried out in the spring or, at the worst, in the summer of the 42nd, these divisions would have gone to Stalingrad. The release of the same number of Soviet divisions would not restore equilibrium in the south, since their fighting efficiency was significantly lower. And it is by no means a fact that Stalin would have decided to weaken the Moscow direction. 21 German divisions - this power would be enough to prevent a catastrophe at Stalingrad. After all, then the flanks of Paulus's army would have been shielded not by weak Allied forces, but by full-fledged Germanic formations. I'm afraid that if Zhukov still managed to get the Germans to leave the Rzhev-Vyazma bridgehead, this could deprive the Red Army of victory at Stalingrad.

[BDV]

likely single leadership AGC-AGN is needed.

Nothing depended of them. Global decisions were taken personally by Hitler.

großer Raum between "Global decisions" and "Nothing depended". If decision made to eliminate Soviet units west of Olenino-Demjansk line (the only excuse to keep Demjansk vanity project), task is too complex to be coordinated between two different commands (AGN-AGC).

Also, FuhrerSchuldLegende excuses commanders - incompetent, criminal, and criminally incompetent without regard to truth and justice.
(see Erich "einhundertzwanzig Armbanduhren" Manstein who manages to be all 3)

[jesk]

likely single leadership AGC-AGN is needed.

Nothing depended of them. Global decisions were taken personally by Hitler.

großer Raum between "Global decisions" and "Nothing depended". If decision made to eliminate Soviet units west of Olenino-Demjansk line (the only excuse to keep Demjansk vanity project), task is too complex to be coordinated between two different commands (AGN-AGC).

Also, FuhrerSchuldLegende excuses commanders - incompetent, criminal, and criminally incompetent without regard to truth and justice.
(see Erich "einhundertzwanzig Armbanduhren" Manstein who manages to be all 3)

This is not a legend. There are masses of documents, evidence of orders issued by Hitler. For example, in September 1941 he canceled a planned strike across the Neva for a complete blockade of Leningrad. The strike on Tikhvin is 100% the idea of the Fuhrer.

[Gerst]

Frankly, if Hitler had avoided the Balkan entanglements and just attacked straight ahead, taken Moscow, the Russians would been screwed. Had he been smart (he wasn't), he could have enlisted the aid of the Ukranians and , the Baltic states early on - they all hated the Russians (still do) and countless ethnic minorities who hated both the Russians and the Soviets. Even the White Russians of Belarus would have joined in if Adolf had promised them a quasi-independent homeland. Of course Lebensraum-Adolf had other ideas. The Germans should have shot the idiot after the French campaign and everything would have been alright.

[jesk]

Frankly, if Hitler had avoided the Balkan entanglements and just attacked straight ahead, taken Moscow, the Russians would been screwed. Had he been smart (he wasn't), he could have enlisted the aid of the Ukranians and , the Baltic states early on - they all hated the Russians (still do) and countless ethnic minorities who hated both the Russians and the Soviets. Even the White Russians of Belarus would have joined in if Adolf had promised them a quasi-independent homeland. Of course Lebensraum-Adolf had other ideas. The Germans should have shot the idiot after the French campaign and everything would have been alright.

You probably did not read the topic at first. It is about that Hitler hasn't wanted to attack Moscow in 1942. All mistakes of 1941 could easily be corrected. But they occurred, again and again...

[BDV]

This is not a legend. There are masses of documents, evidence of orders issued by Hitler. For example, in September 1941 he canceled a planned strike across the Neva for a complete blockade of Leningrad.

Does the Fuhrer get the CREDIT for what those troops of PzGr 3 and 4 did two weeks later (Typhoon)?

The strike on Tikhvin is 100% the idea of the Fuhrer.

Not a bad idea, as it got to Tikhvin and kept it for 1 month. Bad execution by local commander, mediocre quality of german troops and poor mid-level officers (basically Lieutenants over-promoted to Kernels or worse). Finns had no problem making it to Svir River in similar terrain against same opponent.

Axis keeps Tikhvin, soviet airframe production is going to be under trouble.

[jesk]

Does the Fuhrer get the CREDIT for what those troops of PzGr 3 and 4 did two weeks later (Typhoon)?

No. In 1942 they have taken defensive positions on strongly stretched front. Demyansk, Leningrad, Rzhev. Reduction of the front released 40 divisions. 45 German divisions participated in "Blau", near Moscow 70 defended...

Not a bad idea, as it got to Tikhvin and kept it for 1 month. Bad execution by local commander, mediocre quality of german troops and poor mid-level officers (basically Lieutenants over-promoted to Kernels or worse). Finns had no problem making it to Svir River in similar terrain against same opponent.

Where that you have read about bad lieutenants, actually forces is allocated a little 4-5 divisions, came they diversely, there was no necessary massaging of blow. The idea of the Fuhrer to leave the 18th army in the back probably was wrong. Remained not destroyed Soviet 8, 23, 42, 55 armies.

Axis keeps Tikhvin, soviet airframe production is going to be under trouble.

Production moved east.

[BDV]

Does the Fuhrer get the CREDIT for what those troops of PzGr 3 and 4 did two weeks later (Typhoon)?

No. In 1942 ...

Unternehmen Taifun took place in 1941, using panzer forces from Leningrad Assault (PzGr 3 and 4). Keep Leningrad attack, no Taifun.

Where that you have read about bad lieutenants, actually forces is allocated a little 4-5 divisions, came they diversely, there was no necessary massaging of blow.

I do not need to 'read', I can look for myself at what Finnish forces done in the field and what German forces done in the same operational area. German unit severely mocked for unpreparedness and general contemptuousness by Finnish soldier.

Axis keeps Tikhvin, soviet airframe production is going to be under trouble.
Production moved east.

Aircraft factory is in Tula (big-mouth-Guderian site of failure). Tikhvin is bauxite ore mine site. No bauxite, no aluminum. No aluminum, no airplane.

[jesk]

Unternehmen Taifun took place in 1941, using panzer forces from Leningrad Assault (PzGr 3 and 4). Keep Leningrad attack, no Taifun.

41 corps with 1 panzer and 36 motorized divisions departed from the group "North" to participate in the "Typhoon". 32000 people, 260 tanks is all help. Not densely.

I do not need to 'read', I can look for myself at what Finnish forces done in the field and what German forces done in the same operational area. German unit severely mocked for unpreparedness and general contemptuousness by Finnish soldier.

Always considered Finns good soldiers. I know, they in the winter of 1941 laughed at boots of Germans, told those ideal conductors of cold. With same to progress you could walk in socks, Finns said.

Aircraft factory is in Tula (big-mouth-Guderian site of failure). Tikhvin is bauxite ore mine site. No bauxite, no aluminum. No aluminum, no airplane.

How difficult. Planes nevertheless were and much.

[ljadw]

Frankly, if Hitler had avoided the Balkan entanglements and just attacked straight ahead, taken Moscow, the Russians would been screwed. Had he been smart (he wasn't), he could have enlisted the aid of the Ukranians and , the Baltic states early on - they all hated the Russians (still do) and countless ethnic minorities who hated both the Russians and the Soviets. Even the White Russians of Belarus would have joined in if Adolf had promised them a quasi-independent homeland. Of course Lebensraum-Adolf had other ideas. The Germans should have shot the idiot after the French campaign and everything would have been alright.

These are unproved assumptions

[Kelvin]

Frankly, if Hitler had avoided the Balkan entanglements and just attacked straight ahead, taken Moscow, the Russians would been screwed. Had he been smart (he wasn't), he could have enlisted the aid of the Ukranians and , the Baltic states early on - they all hated the Russians (still do) and countless ethnic minorities who hated both the Russians and the Soviets. Even the White Russians of Belarus would have joined in if Adolf had promised them a quasi-independent homeland. Of course Lebensraum-Adolf had other ideas. The Germans should have shot the idiot after the French campaign and everything would have been alright.

Only in theory are effective in enlisting minorities in Russia, By 1942, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were under German rule and also did Belarus and most of Ukraine. Even German threat them very good. Who had the arms for equipping them for fighting war against USSR ? even German was short of weapon for themselves.

[jesk]

There simply Hitler interfered and sabotage turned out.