The worst moment for Germans on the Eastern front

[jesk]

Clearly Stalingrad.

Before it the Germans had clear tactical and operational superiority, could still make major strategic decisions and could still convince themselves that they had some prospect of winning the wider war, or at least achieving a compromise peace on advantageous terms compared with 1939.

After it, they lost their biggest single army, any air of operational superiority and had to be responsive strategically to their foes.

Following Stalingrad the Allies felt confident enough of winning to demand unconditional surrender.

Sid

In Stalingrad Germans lost 200 thousand. From July, 1943 to February, 1944 in 8 months the number of east front decreased by 675,000 people. From 3.1 million to 2.4 million. At the end of 1944 the reserve army was reduced by 1.5 million people for completion of losses. Maybe it should have been made earlier. Till July, 1944 3 million in a reserve surplus.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

As has been discussed before, the strength of the Ersatzheer is not the same as the number of men it had trained and ready as replacements.

Cheers,

Sid.

[jesk]

Big subject for discussions but, why in 1944 not 1.5 million? Reserves for completion of losses were necessary.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

The Ersatzheer had many roles apart from training replacements. It guarded POW camps, it ran the military hospitals, recuperating wounded were on its strength, it ran demonstration units, it developed new equipment, etc., etc. These men, mostly older or otherwise incapacitated, were not freely available for service unless their necessary roles were abandoned.

Even within the training side of the Ersatzheer there was no significant reserve of trained men. This peaked at the start of the Russian campaign, when it was believed it had five months of repcacements ready. In fact, initial casualties used them up in only two months! Thereafter, almost as soon as recruits were trained they were off to the front. Indeed, most of them did part of their preparation as part of the Reserve divisions on occupation duties, which was disruptive of their training. In fact, it was so disruptive that the Feldeheer set up field training divisions to finish the combat preparation the Ersatzheer should have done.

Certainly the Ersatzheer had 1-2 million men at various times, but very few of them were fit or fully trained for service at the front. It was, like the rest of the German armed forces, an organization under massive strain in trying to perform its function of adding value to the men and equipment the Feldheer received.

Cheers,

Sid.

[jesk]

The Ersatzheer had many roles apart from training replacements. It guarded POW camps, it ran the military hospitals, recuperating wounded were on its strength, it ran demonstration units, it developed new equipment, etc., etc. These men, mostly older or otherwise incapacitated, were not freely available for service unless their necessary roles were abandoned.

In any case, the distribution of people in Germany was not adequate. In mid-1943, the total number of the armed forces 11 million, of which only 3 on the eastern front. Another 8 million anywhere. The shortage of manpower, at rather small losses, had artificial character and was not caused by the shortage of human resources.
Also for example with the use of foreign workers. Female labor in industry is practically not used. The number of domestic workers at the wealthy owners to the end of the war was 2 million German women.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

The problem was fit and trained manpower. Germany had not been allowed to train conscripts for over 15 years after WWI. As a result, there were no masses of trained reserves. Indeed, Germany only had two years worth of time-completed, trained reservists at the outbreak of war. These were the so-called "White Years" because they appeared almost blank on graphs of annual trained manpower intakes. These men, when finally trained during WWII, were already middle aged.

Cheers,

Sid.

[jesk]

The problem was fit and trained manpower. Germany had not been allowed to train conscripts for over 15 years after WWI. As a result, there were no masses of trained reserves. Indeed, Germany only had two years worth of time-completed, trained reservists at the outbreak of war. These were the so-called "White Years" because they appeared almost blank on graphs of annual trained manpower intakes. These men, when finally trained during WWII, were already middle aged.

These are the indirect reasons. For example, Omsk region of Russia. By July, 1944 in army 465 thousand people, 56 thousand unusable to service, employed in agriculture and the industry of 59 thousand. 21 thousand disabled veterans. 84% of men at the age of 17-55 years are called up for military service.
In Germany even in the beginning 1945 of 40% of recruits at the age of 38-43 years are mobilized. The appeal in Germany had no such total character as in the USSR. The main reason as to me it seems, will lock on use in the industry of female labor.

http://forum.vgd.ru/post/187/41126/p1228699.htm

.... В Новосибирской области с 22 июня 1941 г. по 1 октября 1942 г. было мобилизовано 558758 человек. Тем не менее, Главупраформ потребовал в первом полугодии 1943 г. призвать дополнительно 86 тыс. новосибирцев. Выполняя мобилизационные задания, военкоматы области с 1 января по 1 июля 1943 г. призвали и направили в войска 83005 человек. Помимо этого, для укомплектования специальных частей в армию были мобилизованы «особо проверенные» коммунисты и комсомольцы: для пополнения Сталинской дивизии добровольцев-сибиряков – 1335 человек, для 4-го гвардейского миномётного полка – 120 человек, для укомплектования новосибирского батальона добровольцев-сибиряков – 300 человек, в Сталинский гвардейский корпус добровольцев – 546 человек. В результате крупномасштабных изъятий людей, к 1 июля 1943 г. на воинском учёте в Новосибирской области осталось 148697 человек. Однако из этого числа призвать в Действующую армию можно было только 487 человек, годных к строевой службе и 7446 человек, годных к нестроевой. Людской потенциал области, казавшийся в начале войны неисчерпаемым, к середине 1943 г. был истощён почти полностью.

Невзирая на это, во втором полугодии 1943 г. Главупраформ установил наряд на призыв ещё 57 тыс. человек. Путём перенапряжения всех сил, проведя разбронирование, организовав медицинские переосвидетельствования и перерегистрации военнообязанных, направив в Вооруженные силы призывников 1926 г. рождения и женщин, область сумела в основном выполнить мобилизационное задание. За период с 1 июля по 31 декабря 1943 г. из Новосибирской области на фронт ушли 2676 человек сержантского состава, 33220 человек рядовых, 18898 призывников 1922-1926 гг. рождения, а также 482 офицера запаса. Сверх того, область выделила бойцов для укомплектования специальных частей. В гвардейскую Сталинскую дивизию добровольцев-сибиряков было направлено 150 человек, для 4-го миномётного полка – 45 человек. Всего в 1943 г. Новосибирская область направила в армию свыше 142 тыс. человек. Стало быть, с начала войны до конца 1943 г. область передала в РККА около 742 тыс. бойцов.

В Омской области к июлю 1944 г. в Красную армию было направлено 476 тыс. человек, из них около 11 тыс. женщин. Весь запас людских ресурсов области в середине 1944 г. определялся мизерной цифрой – 118 тыс. человек. Из них нестроевых и годных к физическому труду насчитывалось 12 тыс. человек, военнообязанных, получивших отсрочку от призыва и красноармейцев-отпускников – 630 человек, отсеянных по политическим и национальным признакам – 2675 человек, негодных со снятием с военного учета – 44 тыс. человек. Число забронированных за сельским хозяйством составляло всего 7 тыс., за промышленностью – 52 тыс. человек. Кроме того, в области проживало 21 тыс. инвалидов войны, из них 287 инвалидов I группы.

По сути дела, Западная Сибирь отдала фронту всё, что могла. Численность и удельный вес (и без того низкий) мужчин активного возраста сократились до минимальных величин. В западносибирской деревне по данным переписи 1939 г. численность мужчин призывного возраста (18-49 лет) составляла приблизительно 1081 тыс. человек. К 1 января 1945 г. их осталось всего 225 тыс. Свободных ресурсов, годных к службе в армии, по существу, не осталось. Миф о неисчерпаемости советских людских ресурсов развеялся как дым. Армия и экономика испытывали острейший дефицит людей, многократно усиленный их неэффективным использованием.

Начавшаяся 9 августа 1945 г. война с Японией не потребовала дополнительных людских ресурсов. Поэтому 20 мая 1945 г. из Западной Сибири ушли последние воинские эшелоны. С этого момента чрезвычайная воинская мобилизация в Действующую армию была прекращена. Молодые люди 1928 г. рождения, поздней осенью 1944 г. – в начале зимы 1945 гг. взятые на воинский учёт и прошедшие приписку к призывным участкам, в 1945 г. в армию не призывались и на фронт не попали. А 26 июня 1945 г. в Западную Сибирь прибыл первый эшелон с демобилизованными воинами старших возрастов...........
________________________________________

.... In the Novosibirsk region from June 22, 1941 to October 1, 1942, 558,758 people were mobilized. Nevertheless, in the first half of 1943, Glavupraform demanded an additional 86,000 Novosibirsk residents to be summoned. Complying with the mobilization tasks, the military registration and enlistment offices of the region from January 1 to July 1, 1943 called and sent to the troops 83005 people. In addition, “specially tested” communists and Komsomol members were mobilized to recruit special units: for the replenishment of the Stalinist division of Siberian volunteers - 1,335 people, for the 4th Guards Mortar Regiment - 120 people, for the recruiting of the Novosibirsk Volunteer Siberian battalion - 300 man, in the Stalinist Guards Corps of volunteers - 546 people. As a result of large-scale seizures of people, by July 1, 1943, 148,697 people were left in military registration in the Novosibirsk region. However, from this number only 487 people fit for combat service and 7446 people fit for non-combatant could be drafted into the army. The human potential of the region, which seemed inexhaustible at the beginning of the war, was almost completely depleted by mid-1943.

Despite this, in the second half of 1943, Glavupraform established an order to recruit another 57 thousand people. By overstretching all the forces, having spent the reservations, organizing medical re-examinations and re-registration of military service, sending to the Armed Forces recruits born in 1926 and women, the region was able to mainly perform the mobilization task. During the period from July 1 to December 31, 1943, 2,676 non-commissioned sergeants, 3,220 privates, 18,898 draftees from 1922 to 1926 left the Novosibirsk region for the front. birth, as well as 482 reserve officers. Moreover, the region allocated fighters for staffing special units. 150 people were sent to the Stalinist Guards Division of the Siberian volunteers, 45 people for the 4th mortar regiment. In total, in 1943, the Novosibirsk region sent over 142 thousand people to the army. So, from the beginning of the war until the end of 1943, the region transferred about 742 thousand soldiers to the Red Army.

In the Omsk Region, by July 1944, 476 thousand people were sent to the Red Army, of which about 11 thousand were women. The entire stock of human resources in the region in the middle of 1944 was determined by a meager figure - 118 thousand people. Of them non-combatant and fit for physical labor, there were 12 thousand people, persons liable for military service who received a deferment from conscription and Red Army officers, 630 people, screened out on political and national grounds - 2675 people, unfit with removal from military records - 44 thousand people. The number of those booked for agriculture was only 7 thousand, for industry - 52 thousand people. In addition, 21 thousand war invalids lived in the region, of which 287 are group I invalids.

In fact, Western Siberia gave everything it could to the front. The number and proportion (and without that low) of men of active age were reduced to the minimum values. In the West Siberian village, according to the 1939 census, the number of men of military age (18-49 years old) was approximately 1081 thousand people. By January 1, 1945 there were only 225 thousand left. There were essentially no free resources suitable for military service. The myth of the inexhaustibility of Soviet human resources has been dispelled like smoke. The army and the economy experienced an acute shortage of people, repeatedly magnified by their inefficient use.

The war with Japan, which began on August 9, 1945, did not require additional human resources. Therefore, on May 20, 1945, the last military echelons left Western Siberia. From that moment on, extraordinary military mobilization to the army in the field was stopped. Young people born in 1928, late autumn 1944 - in the early winter of 1945 taken on military registration and having been added to the recruiting stations, in 1945 they were not called up to the army and did not go to the front. And on June 26, 1945, the first train with demobilized warriors of older ages arrived in Western Siberia ...........

[Erwinn]

How do you plan to feed and supply 8 million troops?

Germany had the capacity of supplying 3 million at the same front, that's why they been stuck to that number.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Erwinn and the community as a whole. Howdy Erwinn! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Monday - January 21, 2019 - 9:52pm. unless you were being rhetorical of course, old yours truly was curious to whom you were addressing your question. I, for one, have absolutely no idea how to answer your question. Hyperbole notwithstanding, I would also concur that feeding and supplying eight million troops would certainly be quite a herculean task. Now, given adequate lead time, the only nation that retained the industrial and agricultural base to deal with such an undertaking would clearly be the United States of America. In regards to this matter, National Socialist Germany was hopelessly out of its depth. Well, that's my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this purely subjective topic of interest - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of one of the great crossroads of the world.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

Are you proposing the Soviet model of using manpower was appropriate to Germany?

The USSR lost about four times as many soldiers on one front in four years as Germany, with half the available population, lost on multiple fronts in six.

Germany had to rely on superior quality to compensate for its manpower limitations.

It could not adopt the Soviet model, of profligate expenditure of under trained manpower to compensate for qualitative disadvantage, and expect to win.

For the USSR, with its much more numerous available manpower, this worked - but only just.

For smaller Germany, it was not a sensible option.

Certainly Germany could have sent more under trained, under equipped men to the front, but it could not afford Soviet wastage levels.

Cheers,

Sid.

[jesk]

Hi Jesk,

Are you proposing the Soviet model of using manpower was appropriate to Germany?

The USSR lost about four times as many soldiers on one front in four years as Germany, with half the available population, lost on multiple fronts in six.

Germany had to rely on superior quality to compensate for its manpower limitations.

It could not adopt the Soviet model, of profligate expenditure of under trained manpower to compensate for qualitative disadvantage, and expect to win.

For the USSR, with its much more numerous available manpower, this worked - but only just.

For smaller Germany, it was not a sensible option.

Certainly Germany could have sent more under trained, under equipped men to the front, but it could not afford Soviet wastage levels.

Cheers,

Sid.

The thesis about small Germany amuses. Germany 4th world economy.

[Erwinn]

The Ersatzheer had many roles apart from training replacements. It guarded POW camps, it ran the military hospitals, recuperating wounded were on its strength, it ran demonstration units, it developed new equipment, etc., etc. These men, mostly older or otherwise incapacitated, were not freely available for service unless their necessary roles were abandoned.

In any case, the distribution of people in Germany was not adequate. In mid-1943, the total number of the armed forces 11 million, of which only 3 on the eastern front. Another 8 million anywhere. The shortage of manpower, at rather small losses, had artificial character and was not caused by the shortage of human resources.
Also for example with the use of foreign workers. Female labor in industry is practically not used. The number of domestic workers at the wealthy owners to the end of the war was 2 million German women.

How do you plan to feed and supply 8 million troops?

Germany had the capacity of supplying 3 million at the same front, that's why they been stuck to that number.

To be more precise.

[jesk]

The Ersatzheer had many roles apart from training replacements. It guarded POW camps, it ran the military hospitals, recuperating wounded were on its strength, it ran demonstration units, it developed new equipment, etc., etc. These men, mostly older or otherwise incapacitated, were not freely available for service unless their necessary roles were abandoned.

In any case, the distribution of people in Germany was not adequate. In mid-1943, the total number of the armed forces 11 million, of which only 3 on the eastern front. Another 8 million anywhere. The shortage of manpower, at rather small losses, had artificial character and was not caused by the shortage of human resources.
Also for example with the use of foreign workers. Female labor in industry is practically not used. The number of domestic workers at the wealthy owners to the end of the war was 2 million German women.

How do you plan to feed and supply 8 million troops?

Germany had the capacity of supplying 3 million at the same front, that's why they been stuck to that number.

To be more precise.

It is necessary to prove. I am not ready to believe you. 3, 5 or 10. What figure is better?

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Jesk,

1) I did not write about "small Germany", so I don't have to address that point.

2) By contrast, you conspicuously failed to address anything in my post that I actually did write. Will you be doing so?

Cheers,

Sid.

[jesk]

1) I did not write about "small Germany", so I don't have to address that point.

2) By contrast, you conspicuously failed to address anything in my post that I actually did write. Will you be doing so?

recently discussed, for example, here
viewtopic.php?f=76&t=234255&p=2183227&h ... 2#p2183227

"Study of German war production data as well as interrogation of those who were in charge of rearmament at the time, leaves no doubt that until the defeat at Moscow German industry was incompletely mobilized and that in fact Germany did not foresee the need for full economic mobilization. German arms production during 1940 and 1941 was generally below that of Britain. When the full meaning of the reverses at Moscow became apparent the German leaders called for all-out production. The conquests of the previous years had greatly strengthened Germany's economywith the exception of oil and rubber, supplies of virtually all the previously scarce imported materials were or had become accessible. Great reserves of foreign labor only awaited voluntary or forced recruitment. The industrial plant of France, the Low Countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia had been added to that of Germany. After the defeat at Moscow early in1942, armament production increased rapidly. However, such increase was more the result of improvements in industrial efficiency than of general economic mobilization. Studies of German manpower utilization show that throughout the war a great deal of German industry was on a single shift basis, relatively few German women (less than in the first war) were drawn into industry and the average work week was below British standards.