"designed to look deadly"

[Michael Kenny]

It is also not "just land", it is a combination of factors.

If I am trying to catch a Greyhound on a vast open field then clearly I am wasting my time. If I get the same greyhound in a small room then I can edge it into a corner and it will run out of room to dodge around me. The same with Germany. Vast areas to move about means they have an advantage. Corned with nowhere to run its the end of the game. Being simple I like simple analogies.

[Michael Kenny]

I am surprised the administrators tolerate anti scientific and anti intellectual behaviour.

You could only make that claim if you have another poster in this thread on ignore.

[jesk]

Russians and in the last days of the war were much weaker; used the opportunities provided by Hitler to concentrate enormous superiority in forces. In the 9th German army in April there were 15 divisions, and 1.5 million Soviet soldiers attacked it. Lost about 300 thousand. If the divisions in the 9th army were not 15, but 30, the Germans might have stopped the offensive and even launched a powerful counterblow.

[jesk]

15 Soviet armies attacked 15 divisions of 9 army. Why the Russians could concentrate so much strength without fear of a counterattack to the flanks. The troops needed for the counteroffensive were scattered throughout Europe.

[jesk]

Clownery. Last reserves. In Norway, 350 thousand Germans do not want to fight for Germany ...

[Michael Kenny]

. In the 9th German army in April there were 15 divisions........... the Germans might have stopped the offensive and even launched a powerful counterblow.

Oh yes. A third 'Miracle of the House of Brandenburg'.

I think you have a better case arguing the troops used in the filming of Kolberg could have been better employed leading a surprise attack on Moscow!

[jesk]

. In the 9th German army in April there were 15 divisions........... the Germans might have stopped the offensive and even launched a powerful counterblow.

Oh yes. A third 'Miracle of the House of Brandenburg'.

I think you have a better case arguing the troops used in the filming of Kolberg could have been better employed leading a surprise attack on Moscow!

In Courland, Norway, Italy, Yugoslavia. Do not need to remember them? Hitler desperately fought with the generals for the right to save the land outside of Germany. At the end of March 1945, by Hitler’s personal order, 3 divisions of the 9th army were sent to Czechoslovakia. It was 18, Hitler counted 15 enough. Trifle, but ..

[Stiltzkin]

Stiltzkin, and you abuse reasoning about war, regardless of military operations. Why consider them, if it’s so clear, by 1943 Germany lost the war and this can be calculated mathematically. Resources, people, land-lease ...

Abuse? I am not the one posting large maps with theories revolved around Hitlers involvement, or absurd statements that AGN would have saved the day. There seems to be little interest in the intellectual side of warfare.
I will give you an analogy here: The Soviet-Afghani war and the Vietnamese war. According to your theory both Soviet and American formations should have run out of men first, before their opponents.
Another example: Army A has 80,000 men, B has 30,000 who wins? Most people would say Army A (now go and study Cannae). A tripod machinegun replaces 16 men on the battlefield in terms of firepower, but from a strategic side of view it looks different when comparing overall asssets. There are chances involved which change and influence outcomes.
Removing the WAllies out of the equation does not guarantee victory for the Wehrmacht, nor does it mean that the Soviets would succeed if any other variable remains untouched.

Lets take this thread as an example: A Tiger B possesses a higher combat rating compared to most of the AFVs fielded in 1944, producing millions of them is useless and a waste of resources. It does not win you the war, but it does increase Allied casualties on the battlefield and it diminishes German casualties, while increasing their breakthrough capabilities or long range engagement advantage, it is contextual. Opposed by this is the general view of the typical internet enthusiast: "Tanks won world war II". "Germany should have produced 10,000,000 Royal Tigers but they came too late". Production is a function of losses and tanks are only a small part of warfare, without looking at steel allocations and how armies operate, it is impossible to make conclusions based on such limited facts. The Soviets had 13,000 operational tanks during Barbarossa, their opponent not even 1/4 of this, yet the Soviets were hard pressed to replace them first.

To address the issue "designed to look deadly": Psychology, Morale have always been important factors in warfare. Browsing through history we have examples of intimidating designs, armour (Samurai masks, although many were ceremonial), the christian symbol on the Milvian bridge (Constantine vs Maxentius), so I would not factor out the "aesthetics" of tanks. The T-34 is a good example, everyone's favourite tank, while e.g., the M3 Lee is overall less attractive. Most of these articles are poorly researched, they aim at ridiculing equipment or either exalting the performance of their favourite faction. In no way were the Allies " substantially outclassed", nor was the Tiger B a total development failure, rather a product of the experiences the Germans gathered during the war. In a constant arms race, both belligerents compete against each other, which causes action and reaction. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dda7/0 ... 468a4f.pdf
Weapon systems are specialized and selected by combat and their surrounding, no weapon system will remain superior infinitely. The natural selection and evolution of weapon systems so to speak.

You could only make that claim if you have another poster in this thread on ignore.

I do not put people on ignore (which is in itself very presumptuous). I do not like censorship and believe that anyone can contribute something useful.

[jesk]

Stiltzkin, and you abuse reasoning about war, regardless of military operations. Why consider them, if it’s so clear, by 1943 Germany lost the war and this can be calculated mathematically. Resources, people, land-lease ...

Abuse? I am not the one posting large maps with theories revolved around Hitlers involvement,

Not just my theory. All the generals who lost the war blamed Hitler for defeat. I only clarified the motives of the wrong decisions of Hitler, not accessible to the understanding of the generals.

or absurd statements that AGN would have saved the day. There seems to be little interest in the intellectual side of warfare.

Why not save? It is necessary for you too if the military history is interesting, sometimes to consider a course of military operations.
Further your reasoning is gymnastics for the mind. What happened in January 1945 between the Vistula and the Oder? No theory will explain. Only practice and analysis of perfect actions.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Monday - October 08, 2018 - 11:22am, just like citizen Rumple Stilzkin, old yours truly has been more than a bit perturbed with what often appears to be your cavalier approach to the intellectual side of warfare. So, just to sate my personal curiosity and undoubtedly the curiosity of many others, in terms of both the ART and SCIENCE of WARFARE, which military theoretician OR theoreticians have had the greatest impact upon your world view? A clarification on this philosophical matter "MIGHT" provide the neighborhood-at-large with a modicum of understanding with your quite unorthodox approach with THIS and OTHER topics. Now, with that said, old Uncle Bob would like to convey my heartfelt apologies to the forum's disparate Armored Fighting Vehicle constituency for clearly going miles or kilometers off topic with this entry. SORRY ABOUT THAT! Well, that is my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this meandering exercise into the realm of argumentum ad absurdum. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[BDV]

Cudda/shudda/mighta. I am amazed the wealth of detail proving Germany was cheated out of her (mathematically deserved) victory against the Soviets. Your case is unarguable. Germany won the % war by a good (99%?) mile.

Now THAT's a straw man if my lying eyes Ever laid their gaze on one.

As I put it many moons ago Germany was going to run out of land before the Soviets ran out of men

Now that's the rub! When Wehrmacht tried to do "stiff" they lost a lot of men (Bagration, and almost - Crimea, Korsun pocket), much more than they could afford. When they did "elastic", got pushed back faster than acceptable...

[Richard Anderson]

Why did they develop Pershing's then?

The "Pershing" was developed as a medium tank. It was the culmination of the Medium Tank T20-series. Development began 25 May 1942, two months after the combat debut of the Tiger, but long before the U.S. Army Ordnance Department was aware there was such a thing as a "Tiger tank". When deployed, it was employed as a medium tank. It was designated "heavy tank" on 29 June 1944, but only retained that designation for a few years, before reverting to a medium tank.

[jesk]

So, just to sate my personal curiosity and undoubtedly the curiosity of many others, in terms of both the ART and SCIENCE of WARFARE, which military theoretician OR theoreticians have had the greatest impact upon your world view? A clarification on this philosophical matter "MIGHT" provide the neighborhood-at-large with a modicum of understanding with your quite unorthodox approach with THIS and OTHER topics.

Clausewitz defined the concept of strategy and at the same time noted that errors in this area are extremely rare. They can not be done because they are obvious. Hitler refused to understand that the need to return the troops from Norway. And such mistakes throughout the history were made extremely rarely. Hitler has hundreds of them.

http://militera.lib.ru/science/clausewitz/03.html

The size of the army’s absolute strength is determined by the government, and although genuine military activity begins with this definition and the definition itself constitutes an extremely significant part of it, still in most cases the commander, who will then lead the armed forces in a war, will have to look at their numbers as already this value, because whether he did not take any part in its establishment, or because the circumstances prevented to bring it to the proper size.

Thus, the commander remains one: skillful use of these armed forces to achieve relative numerical superiority at a decisive point, even when an absolute superiority of forces is unattainable.

The most significant is the calculation of time and space; This gave reason to look at strategies in this calculation as an object that adequately embraces the entire use of the armed forces. [129] In this direction, they even went so far that they began to see in the tactics and strategies of the great commanders a special secret part specially adapted for this.

But this comparison of time and space, if it is to a certain extent and underlies the strategy and constitutes its daily bread, so to speak, is nevertheless neither the most difficult nor the most crucial moment in it.

If we take a military history with an unbiased look, we will find that cases in which errors in such a calculation did indeed cause a major failure, at least in the strategy, are extremely rare. But if the concept of a skillful combination of the elements of time and space should reflect all cases when, through fast marches, a decisive and active commander of the same army beat several opponents (Frederick the Great, Bonaparte), then we should not be confused in these purely conditional expressions. For clarity and fruitfulness of representations, it is necessary to call things by their proper names.

The correct assessment of their enemies (Down, Schwarzenberg), the risk of temporarily leaving in front of them only insignificant forces, the energy of forced marches, the audacity of lightning attacks, the increased activity that great people show at the moment of danger - these are the real reasons for such victories. What is there to do with the ability to correctly compare such two simple things as time and space?

But this ricochetting game of forces, when victories near Rosbach and Monmirale gave the necessary scope for victories near Leyten and Montro {69}, a game that great commanders repeatedly entrusted their fate to in a defensive war, yet, frankly and frankly, represents a rare phenomenon in history.

More often, the relative preponderance of forces, i.e. skillful concentration of superior forces on a decisive point is based on the correct assessment of this point and on the right direction that the army receives from the very beginning, on the determination required to neglect the unimportant in favor of the important, i.e. keep your strengths more focused. These are the characteristics of Frederick the Great and Bonaparte.

We believe that what we have said has given its numerical superiority its proper meaning; we must look at it as the main idea, and if possible we should look for it everywhere and first of all.

But to consider it for this reason as a necessary condition for victory would be a complete misunderstanding of the thought we develop; we sought only to clarify the significance that should be given to the number of forces in battle. If we collect the forces as large as possible, we are completely satisfied with the principle, and only an assessment of the situation as a whole can decide whether due to lack of strength, we should avoid fighting. [130]

[jesk]

It is possible to complete a full course of strategy in 5 seconds. Strategy is aspiration to the numerical majority in the fight. And this all that is necessary to know about strategy. But in this area Hitler made mistakes. To make a mistake at the level of strategy, it as the adult on a question 2+2, will tell 5.
Clausewitz in general excluded the possibility of making a strategic mistake. Decisions are so elementary.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in respect to your postings of Monday - October 08, 2018 - 9:14pm and Tuesday - October 09, 2018 - 11:37am, old yours truly would like to convey my appreciation for your efforts to address my pointed inquiries. Given your fascinating treatise on the mechanics of strategy, I will assume (rightly OR wrongly) that your world view has ostensibly been shaped by the martial theories and dictums of Karl von Clausewitz, Frederick The Great and Napoleon Bonaparte. And yes, these three philosophers were truly great captains of strategy. The application of their respective theories into the body of your disparate contributions has been quite illuminating to say the very least. Oh, and by the way, until the advent of your posting of Tuesday - October 09, 2018 - 11:37am, old Uncle Bob was not at all aware that it was at all possible to complete a full course in strategy in a time period of "FIVE SECONDS". Yes, decisions are so elementary - unless, of course, you are the one that must shoulder the final responsibility of such a weighty LIFE or DEATH course of action. It's just some sobering food for thought as you move markers around your maps. Well, that is my latest two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this topic that once gravitated upon the assorted PROS and CONS of the Fatherland's mighty King Tiger Heavy Battle Tank - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob