Soviet failure during Barbarossa

[BDV]

Barbarossa was the textbook example of maneuver. A mincer has the job to grind, but if you throw in too much meat it gets stuck. Armies have limitations set by circumstances, or by the opponents strength/warmaking potential which results in an equilibrium. If a sprinter runs 100 under 10 seconds, how often can he repeat his performance until he gets tired?

I agree. It seems to me that the problem was the disregard for the need to have mass (infantry) behind the penetration. Soviet ("fanatical" or "irrational") resistance kept infantry behind and ensured that the infantry could not keep up with the armored units.

Hence the complaints from the panzerjockeys, who forget it was them who decided to jump ahead when infantry was in no position to offer support.

But whenever the infantry was not pinned down trying to eliminate Soviet units bypassed by panzers, and rather infantry and panzer units attacked together great victories were achieved - opening of Barbarossa, opening of Taifun, opening of Blau.

The prescription is simple, IMO, in the sense of closer cooperation of infantry and panzer movements was required. There are double digit examples of that in 1941, from North in Tikhvin and Parnu to South in Rostov and Sevastopol.

It is the 10-20 times of the failure of the Dunkirk myth ("when panzers break through, victory follows.", - no it does not, RKKA proved, in a bloody way, but proved it, nonetheless) Festina Lente, the Latins prescribed, not without reason.

[Stiltzkin]

I agree. It seems to me that the problem was the disregard for the need to have mass (infantry) behind the penetration. Soviet ("fanatical" or "irrational") resistance kept infantry behind and ensured that the infantry could not keep up with the armored units.

Hence the complaints from the panzerjockeys, who forget it was them who decided to jump ahead when infantry was in no position to offer support.

But whenever the infantry was not pinned down trying to eliminate Soviet units bypassed by panzers, and rather infantry and panzer units attacked together great victories were achieved - opening of Barbarossa, opening of Taifun, opening of Blau.

The prescription is simple, IMO, in the sense of closer cooperation of infantry and panzer movements was required. There are double digit examples of that in 1941, from North in Tikhvin and Parnu to South in Rostov and Sevastopol.

It is the 10-20 times of the failure of the Dunkirk myth ("when panzers break through, victory follows.", - no it does not, RKKA proved, in a bloody way, but proved it, nonetheless) Festina Lente, the Latins prescribed, not without reason.

Yes and do note that it was actually a trial and error thing. If we observe what happens every year then the story repeats itself. The Wehrmacht is hitting the Soviets repeatedly in the same fashion they attacked them before (they Soviets recover, but the recovery time gradually increases between further operations). Every victory gave them a false sense of security, in which they underestimated the soviet reserves again and again. On the other side, the Soviets partially did the same, after the failure of Barbarossa the Soviets launched their counter attacks and failed. The 1942 offensive failed again, only in 1943 a summer offensive survived. They did not manage to destroy AGC (the prerequisite for Berlin) before mid 1944, thus it is rather a question of how many more mistakes you can afford to make and how many men can be poured into the campaign. We all know the differences between December 1941 and Summer 44,taking into account the military, economic and political context. The idea that either the German or Soviet victory was a certainty is thus erroneous, it is about a balance, a chance of victory. Prolonged wars have to be pcitured as a "weighing instrument", a scale so to speak, every advantage or disadvantage might tip the balance. The idea that the war changes so dramatically in nature between each quarter or year is not particularly convincing, this also applies to comparisons between WW1 and WW2.
With that in mind, scholars can create maps with "fancy arrows" pointing everywhere, this is rather ridiculous, since they are a product of leadership, supply, weather, circumstances, morale, force ratios/strengths and fighting power. The big red arrow on the map? Thats the price the RKKA has to pay for a 30km advance. Shaped by the action, units only rarely ended up where they originally had to be according to plans. Exploits or penetrations had to be achieved the hard way and if a "deep strike" occurred, it was rather conincidental than actually planned (and can be considered a rare phenomenon for all belligerents).

[jesk]

I agree. It seems to me that the problem was the disregard for the need to have mass (infantry) behind the penetration. Soviet ("fanatical" or "irrational") resistance kept infantry behind and ensured that the infantry could not keep up with the armored units.

Hence the complaints from the panzerjockeys, who forget it was them who decided to jump ahead when infantry was in no position to offer support.

But whenever the infantry was not pinned down trying to eliminate Soviet units bypassed by panzers, and rather infantry and panzer units attacked together great victories were achieved - opening of Barbarossa, opening of Taifun, opening of Blau.

The prescription is simple, IMO, in the sense of closer cooperation of infantry and panzer movements was required. There are double digit examples of that in 1941, from North in Tikhvin and Parnu to South in Rostov and Sevastopol.

It is the 10-20 times of the failure of the Dunkirk myth ("when panzers break through, victory follows.", - no it does not, RKKA proved, in a bloody way, but proved it, nonetheless) Festina Lente, the Latins prescribed, not without reason.

Yes and do note that it was actually a trial and error thing. If we observe what happens every year then the story repeats itself. The Wehrmacht is hitting the Soviets repeatedly in the same fashion they attacked them before (they Soviets recover, but the recovery time gradually increases between further operations). Every victory gave them a false sense of security, in which they underestimated the soviet reserves again and again. On the other side, the Soviets partially did the same, after the failure of Barbarossa the Soviets launched their counter attacks and failed. The 1942 offensive failed again, only in 1943 a summer offensive survived. They did not manage to destroy AGC (the prerequisite for Berlin) before mid 1944, thus it is rather a question of how many more mistakes you can afford to make and how many men can be poured into the campaign. We all know the differences between December 1941 and Summer 44,taking into account the military, economic and political context. The idea that either the German or Soviet victory was a certainty is thus erroneous, it is about a balance, a chance of victory. Prolonged wars have to be pcitured as a "weighing instrument", a scale so to speak, every advantage or disadvantage might tip the balance. The idea that the war changes so dramatically in nature between each quarter or year is not particularly convincing, this also applies to comparisons between WW1 and WW2.
With that in mind, scholars can create maps with "fancy arrows" pointing everywhere, this is rather ridiculous, since they are a product of leadership, supply, weather, circumstances, morale, force ratios/strengths and fighting power. The big red arrow on the map? Thats the price the RKKA has to pay for a 30km advance. Shaped by the action, units only rarely ended up where they originally had to be according to plans. Exploits or penetrations had to be achieved the hard way and if a "deep strike" occurred, it was rather conincidental than actually planned (and can be considered a rare phenomenon for all belligerents).

The appearance of the army group "North" in the beginning of 1945 on the Vistula forever stopped the advance of the Russians to Berlin. But this did not happen, so there was a bizarre atmosphere of 10 times the superiority of the Russians in quantity.
There are a lot of fantasies in your post, without binding in real combat actions.

[Stiltzkin]

The appearance of the army group "North" in the beginning of 1945 on the Vistula forever stopped the advance of the Russians to Berlin. But this did not happen, so there was a bizarre atmosphere of 10 times the superiority of the Russians in quantity.
There are a lot of fantasies in your post, without binding in real combat actions.

I think you should read my comment again, you were incapable of understanding the essence, this has little to do with any of the Army Groups per se (not sure what AGN has anything to do with it, the front was mostly static and then the group got kicked out pretty quickly with the exception of their defenses around Narva), also I am not sure if force concentration on the tactical to operational level was really 10x greater, it was mostly 1.4-1.9 (range of attacks) and 2.4-3 on the operational level. Maybe you should make an analysis of what an arrow means, that is, breaking it apart in operation duration (days), breakthroughs, orders and movements of units and how many bloody casualties they took.

This is exactly what I mean, the guys who keep posting the maps with arrows....

What is the price for Barbarossa to fail? 3,638,795 operational losses (counting the defensive operations mostly) after a 1.000km advance with a 1.800 km long front. There are three fundamental ways to avoid destruction: High manpower flow, (vast territory) the ability to give ground, high attrition rate/kill rate. 1.)The Soviets could give more ground than the Germans (and note, they actually attempted to hold it). 2.) There are periods in which the Soviet attrition rate exceed replacement rates, at this pace they would run out of men first, thus it was a race against time for both belligerents, not just the Wehrmacht, as it is frequently argued. 3.) The Soviet drive on Berlin did not start with the Summer offensive of 1944, but already with the Winteroffensive in 1941 (in order to annihilate AGC), which they did not manage to achieve before 1944. What enables the Germans to survive in the East? Their economic strength, their relative strength (still being able to replace enough units) and their relative efficiency.
It has less to do with the inability of maneuver, the nature of the execution of operations (rather than the mission, the setting of Barbarossa itself). The Soviets cannot stop the Wehrmacht early on because the Wehrmacht is tactically superior to the Soviets (and no the Wehrmacht did not enjoy a substantial numerical advantage, no matter how much Soviet literature insists), independent of the understanding of their adversaries intentions and strengths, no matter how well the Soviets were defending (defensive posture is also a force multiplier). The Germans cannot bring the Red Army to its knees since their capacity to wage war exceeds their own, by far (tentative national force effectiveness x labour force/men of military age potential, I am assuming 15% here, based on GNP => 0.15*82*1.6 = 19.68 vs 0.15*197 = 29.55.
Humans have a pair of arms and hands, start throwing balls at someone. The individual will catch the first few balls, then increase the number to 5, 7 or 10 balls, throw them simultaneously, guess what will happen. Observe the Polish campaign, the effectiveness of the RKKA did not substantially differ from the Polish or Japanese forces, they had about the same performance. Now picture Fall Weiß, instead of 37 days the campaign will last longer and the Wehrmacht would have (which was a classic envelopment) to repeat the action over and over, until a "break even" point occurs. How long can an army keep up its game, while gradually declining?
Using the historical constellation and rates the Germans could go to about 1944 (end), the Soviets to 1946. If the Wehrmacht could hypothetically fill up its forces to pre Barbarossa or Zitadelle levels again in late 1943, then the RKKA has to reconsider and cease its attacks.

[jesk]

The appearance of the army group "North" in the beginning of 1945 on the Vistula forever stopped the advance of the Russians to Berlin. But this did not happen, so there was a bizarre atmosphere of 10 times the superiority of the Russians in quantity.
There are a lot of fantasies in your post, without binding in real combat actions.

I think you should read my comment again, you were incapable of understanding the essence, this has little to do with any of the Army Groups per se (not sure what AGN has anything to do with it, the front was mostly static and then the group got kicked out pretty quickly with the exception of their defenses around Narva), also I am not sure if force concentration on the tactical to operational level was really 10x greater, it was mostly 1.4-1.9 (range of attacks) and 2.4-3 on the operational level. Maybe you should make an analysis of what an arrow means, that is, breaking it apart in operation duration (days), breakthroughs, orders and movements of units and how many bloody casualties they took.

This is exactly what I mean, the guys who keep posting the maps with arrows....

The severance of the "North" group from the main forces was result of the defeat of the "Center" and the withdrawal of Soviet units to the Vistula and to the borders of East Prussia. Strong defense Narva contributed to this, when the decisive battles were fought south.
The ratio before the Vistula-Oder operation in 9 army is 7 infantry, 2 tank divisions. In 1 Belorussian Front there are 8 field, 2 tank armies. Ratio for the infantry Guderian counted 1:11, tanks 1: 7. Approximately this was it. The density of defense is 20-25 km per division. According to the maximum standards, in the presence of a fortified area, 10-12 km of the front per division is permissible. 25 km just the front is open. 5-7 km per division normal defense density. Where the Germans had one division, it should be 4-5.

What is the price for Barbarossa to fail? 3,638,795 operational losses (counting the defensive operations mostly) after a 1.000km advance with a 1.800 km long front. There are three fundamental ways to avoid destruction: High manpower flow, (vast territory) the ability to give ground, high attrition rate/kill rate. 1.)The Soviets could give more ground than the Germans (and note, they actually attempted to hold it). 2.) There are periods in which the Soviet attrition rate exceed replacement rates, at this pace they would run out of men first, thus it was a race against time for both belligerents, not just the Wehrmacht, as it is frequently argued. 3.) The Soviet drive on Berlin did not start with the Summer offensive of 1944, but already with the Winteroffensive in 1941 (in order to annihilate AGC), which they did not manage to achieve before 1944. What enables the Germans to survive in the East? Their economic strength, their relative strength (still being able to replace enough units) and their relative efficiency.
It has less to do with the inability of maneuver, the nature of the execution of operations (rather than the mission, the setting of Barbarossa itself). The Soviets cannot stop the Wehrmacht early on because the Wehrmacht is tactically superior to the Soviets (and no the Wehrmacht did not enjoy a substantial numerical advantage, no matter how much Soviet literature insists), independent of the understanding of their adversaries intentions and strengths, no matter how well the Soviets were defending (defensive posture is also a force multiplier). The Germans cannot bring the Red Army to its knees since their capacity to wage war exceeds their own, by far (tentative national force effectiveness x labour force/men of military age potential, I am assuming 15% here, based on GNP => 0.15*82*1.6 = 19.68 vs 0.15*197 = 29.55.
Humans have a pair of arms and hands, start throwing balls at someone. The individual will catch the first few balls, then increase the number to 5, 7 or 10 balls, throw them simultaneously, guess what will happen. Observe the Polish campaign, the effectiveness of the RKKA did not substantially differ from the Polish or Japanese forces, they had about the same performance. Now picture Fall Weiß, instead of 37 days the campaign will last longer and the Wehrmacht would have (which was a classic envelopment) to repeat the action over and over, until a "break even" point occurs. How long can an army keep up its game, while gradually declining?
Using the historical constellation and rates the Germans could go to about 1944 (end), the Soviets to 1946. If the Wehrmacht could hypothetically fill up its forces to pre Barbarossa or Zitadelle levels again in late 1943, then the RKKA has to reconsider and cease its attacks.

A piece of spam. In the text a fantasy on the near-historical themes. For example, why they lost in Bagration. There are few reserves, but this is not the main thing. Hitler created a fortress system along the perimeter of defense. Orsha, Bobruisk, Mogilev, Vitebsk. As a result, the Germans are deprived of freedom of maneuver along the front, the enemy has gained more numerical superiority in the places of attack. And at the same time, the troops were surrounded and the Germans did not try to avoid the encirclement. 3-4 days were lost when it was still possible to keep the divisions. The defeat in Belorussia was artificial and in no way corresponded to the correlation in forces. Then, as already written, Courland and Norway supplemented the situation to a hopeless one.

[Stiltzkin]

A piece of spam

I was in the process of writing a long response, but then my comment was eaten up because of a disconnect, so I am just going to save my breath at this point.
Just because things are beyond your comprehension this does not make them spam. I have argued in two previous comments that with the destruction of AGC, the whole skeleton breaks apart, it may be due to a language barrier I do not know.
This thread is about the "Soviet failure during Barbarossa", considering they did not fail but succeed this is rather an oxymoron.
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were the most uparmed systems in the world at that time, the development of this operation had less to do with the misconduct and execution of plans but rather with the nature of both armies.
If the Soviets "failed during Barbarossa" and their performance is a measure of effectiveness, then they also failed during the entire war, it is again the believe that there is a fundamental difference between 1941 and 44. Their losses remained high in relation to their opponents operational casualties. The war in the East was not particularly characterized by large numbers of captives (that is MIA in contrast to the Western front, and note that the Soviets surrendered to a greater degree), even if large numbers of POWs were taken, they rarely survived.
Soviet casualties lowered due to the following factors a) A decline of German strength b) the dropout of Axis Allies c)the emergence of multiple fronts d) increase in the committment of forces to Soviet operations, peaking in Summer 1944.

[jesk]

I was in the process of writing a long response, but then my comment was eaten up because of a disconnect, so I am just going to save my breath at this point.
Just because things are beyond your comprehension this does not make them spam. I have argued in two previous comments that with the destruction of AGC, the whole skeleton breaks apart, it may be due to a language barrier I do not know.

Nothing breaks. The defeat in Belorussia was followed by new mistakes. Hitler refused to withdraw the group "North" to East Prussia and this reduced the number of shooting Germans on the way to Berlin.

Soviet casualties lowered due to the following factors a) A decline of German strength b) the dropout of Axis Allies c)the emergence of multiple fronts d) increase in the committment of forces to Soviet operations, peaking in Summer 1944.

I would also add a low quality of human material. The infantry is weak and, for example, Field Marshal Schörner noted that Russians rely solely on artillery and tanks in their actions. If, according to Schörner, to conduct a real offensive against them, they can be beaten under any circumstances. No artillery compensates for the lack of infantry.

[Stiltzkin]

Nothing breaks. The defeat in Belorussia was followed by new mistakes. Hitler refused to withdraw the group "North" to East Prussia and this reduced the number of shooting Germans on the way to Berlin.

If units are not available, the explanation is usually that they might be overcommitted. Why would they not commit reserves, when they had practically done so the past years. They were simply not available, people should start to distance themselves from the "it is all Hitler's misdetermination".

No artillery compensates for the lack of infantry

Everyone relies on artillery, it is the single most important asset, this makes it a weird statement and yes if you are constrained, effective offensive or defensive maneuvers are impossible and most importantly, holding ground. The Soviets practically defeated the Wehrmacht with mortars.
Soviet units were not universal, i.e. they weren't flexible formations which could create breakthroughs as well as exploiting them, mainly due to coordination and communication issues.

I would also add a low quality of human material

I am not sure if you refer to the Wehrmacht here or RKKA. While quality personnel is going to decline throughout the year, it does not seem that the Wehrmacht lost its qualitative edge here, quality is a relative term and should be always compared to the adversary, I keep repeating that often. Both belligerents suffered from this phenomenon.

[jesk]

If units are not available, the explanation is usually that they might be overcommitted. Why would they not commit reserves, when they had practically done so the past years. They were simply not available, people should start to distance themselves from the "it is all Hitler's misdetermination".

Specifically, Hitler's fault. On March 30 Hitler has dismissed Guderian for the next requirement to return troops to Germany. Yet in July, 1944 Model has suggested Hitler to bring one army out of the Baltics, that has referred to negative reaction of Finland if reduction of troops happens. And at the end of March, 1945 Hitler remained isn't bent.

Everyone relies on artillery, it is the single most important asset, this makes it a weird statement and yes if you are constrained, effective offensive or defensive maneuvers are impossible and most importantly, holding ground. The Soviets practically defeated the Wehrmacht with mortars.
Soviet units were not universal, i.e. they weren't flexible formations which could create breakthroughs as well as exploiting them, mainly due to coordination and communication issues.

Boris Sokolov's figures about the Soviet losses are comparable to books of memory of different regions of the USSR. Everyone Soviet actually came to the end with the mountain of corpses. Massaging of artillery helped to solve problems in the absence of qualitative infantry. According to Sokolov the Soviet losses in 1945 2,5 million killed.

I am not sure if you refer to the Wehrmacht here or RKKA. While quality personnel is going to decline throughout the year, it does not seem that the Wehrmacht lost its qualitative edge here, quality is a relative term and should be always compared to the adversary, I keep repeating that often. Both belligerents suffered from this phenomenon.

I referred to Schörner. As a result of the fighting in Silesia, he estimated the Soviet infantry as very weak. In the event of a large German offensive, the artillery could not compensate for the lack of infantry. Artillery was massaged in narrow areas, weakening others.

[BDV]

Soviet losses in 1945 2,5 million killed.

1:3 dead to wounded means RKKA took 10 million casualties in 4 months of 1945. This is easterbunny territory.

[jesk]

Soviet losses in 1945 2,5 million killed.

1:3 dead to wounded means RKKA took 10 million casualties in 4 months of 1945. This is easterbunny territory.

Why 1:3? If the infantry is weak, the ratio is close to 1:1.

[Stiltzkin]

Boris Sokolov's figures about the Soviet losses are comparable to books of memory of different regions of the USSR. Everyone Soviet actually came to the end with the mountain of corpses. Massaging of artillery helped to solve problems in the absence of qualitative infantry. According to Sokolov the Soviet losses in 1945 2,5 million killed

I have seen Sokolov's figures, some appear to be reasonable, others are over the top (2.5 million in just 4 months seems very unlikely, you have to compare it to other periods). You have to realize though that by that time there was neither enough territory to give (reducing combat time and exposure) nor enough men to spare to effectively inflict enough casualties.

I referred to Schörner. As a result of the fighting in Silesia, he estimated the Soviet infantry as very weak. In the event of a large German offensive, the artillery could not compensate for the lack of infantry. Artillery was massaged in narrow areas, weakening others.

Yes I agree, but that is not something unique, or merely tied to 1944. If their attacks fail, they will repeat them and how many times are German formations going to withstand continous charges?

Why 1:3? If the infantry is weak, the ratio is close to 1:1.

It would be irrelevant anyway, because that is an operational to total war dead comparison again.

[BDV]

Why 1:3? If the infantry is weak, the ratio is close to 1:1.
It would be irrelevant anyway, because that is an operational to total war dead comparison again.

I think that the idea of RKKA suffering 10 million losses (replaceable or not) in 1945, and keeping on fighting, is not tenable.

Remember after this, there was the beatdown administered to the Kwantung Army and the preparations for the expected invasion of Japan.

[Stiltzkin]

I think that the idea of RKKA suffering 10 million losses (replaceable or not) in 1945, and keeping on fighting, is not tenable.

According to their statistics they suffered 1/4 of this, with corrected figures it would be around 1/3.

[jesk]

I think that the idea of RKKA suffering 10 million losses (replaceable or not) in 1945, and keeping on fighting, is not tenable.

According to their statistics they suffered 1/4 of this, with corrected figures it would be around 1/3.

If infantry weak, not necessarily proportion 1:3. Certificates on fights in Ukraine, Germans have admitted 100 meters on distance and have mown clean all.

https://forum.dpni.org/showthread.php?t ... d1640d4457

Most of all just called up in the ranks of the Red Army perished during the crossing of the Dnieper, when people, except for the Germans, had to contend with the water element. The main blow to the enemy at the rate was decided to be inflicted by the forces of the First Ukrainian Front from the Bukrin bridgehead, where the Dnipro's very high and steep right bank, which was also well fortified by German troops, was also laid. It was this unapproachable bridgehead that had to be stormed by unarmed and unarmed soldiers.

Then the mobilization and storming of the well-known Ukrainian front-line writer Anatoly Dimarov vividly depicts: "There were no medical examinations. Cripples and sick people were taken to the front. I was already at the age of 20 disabled, blind and deaf from concussion, they still took it. And drove us to the German machine guns know with what? With half bricks! So the second genocide against the Ukrainians was. We were not equipped, not armed. We were driven all day in a fierce frost, and drove to a place, destroyed to the ground. They gave out those halves of bricks, showed a huge pond, bound with ice, and said to wait for the signal - the rocket. And when it takes off, amicably pour out on the ice and run to the enemy, which sat on the opposite side behind a strong fence, and ... knock it out with half-bricks. And he let him think it's ... grenades. There was no one to turn back, because we were shown well-equipped trenches, in which, every three steps, the scorers sat with the machine guns aimed at us in the back. I was saved only by the fact that I already smelled gunpowder and ran not in the first row, but in the fifth. We reached a hundred meters from the fence, the Germans let us in. You imagine, bare ice, there's nowhere to hide! And how they struck from machine guns with dagger fire! The guys fell down before me, as if they had been knocked down, I also fell and lay, and the soldier in front of me was already spinning from the bullets that hit him. All the time I got pissed on ... Then the Germans started shooting mortar shells, heard about such mines, which they called "cuckoo"? It falls, strikes against the ice, does not explode, but jumps up to 4-5 meters, then it explodes and the fragments go down. How did those shards not kill me? .. And then the explosion - and the black pit, which I fell into. I was picked up by the orderlies: with a tightly clamped brick in my hands. "

Even more terrible picture describes his colleague Viktor Astafyev - an eyewitness of the crossing of the Dnieper: "The most terrible were the machine guns. Easy to transfer quick-fire emkashki with tape for five hundred rounds. All of them were previously shot and now, as if from the narrow necks of the hoses, watered the shore, the island, the river, in which a mess of people was boiling.

Old and young, conscious and not conscious, volunteers and mobilized military commissariats, punitive men and guards, Russians and non-Russians - they all shouted the same words: "Mom! Godfather! God! "And" Guard! "," Help! "... And the machine guns were seked and smeared, watered with multicolored deadly trickles. Grabbing for each other wounded and those who have not yet hooked the bullets, went in bundles under the water, the river was boiling, shuddering from human convulsions, foaming with red breakers. "

The number of deaths was such that not all of them could even be buried humanly: "The corpses with their eyes hammered thickly in the water, began to limp, with faces that froze, as if soaped, were smashed by shells, mines, riddled with bullets ... Sappers , who were sent to drag the bodies out of the water and dig in them, could not cope with the work - too many people were killed ... And then, after the river, the raking of corpses continued, new pithes filled the human mess, but many and many fell in the bridgehead so and not ud moose find on the beams, to bury, "- wrote Astafyev.