Soviet failure during Barbarossa

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Stiltzkin
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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 26 Sep 2018 22:09

I agree that there might be periods and attacks in which the wounded to kill ratio might be different, but overall it seems rather unlikely that these laws would not apply and by all means, this excerpt has a political tone. The majority of soldiers would not have been "mowed" though, but shelled, which results in high numbers of wounded. The units which attacked the steep bank might have been annihilated, but that would just refer to maybe...platoons (max).

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 26 Sep 2018 22:37

Stiltzkin wrote:
26 Sep 2018 22:09
I agree that there might be periods and attacks in which the wounded to kill ratio might be different, but overall it seems rather unlikely that these laws would not apply and by all means, this excerpt has a political tone. The majority of soldiers would not have been "mowed" though, but shelled, which results in high numbers of wounded. The units which attacked the steep bank might have been annihilated, but that would just refer to maybe...platoons (max).
In Chechnya, according to unofficial data, the ratio of the killed / wounded is the same.

http://phorum.bratishka.ru/viewtopic.php?p=82657

The losses, according to my interlocutors, in our parts are creepy. For example, a wounded motor-gunner-contractor said that after the battle for the height near the village of Oktyabrsky in his company - more than 100 people - only 15 remained in the ranks, the rest were killed and wounded. According to rough estimates of the wounded soldiers, on average, our troops lost at least one hundred people in December and January, only killed and slightly more wounded. Such a large discrepancy between the standard proportions between the number of killed and wounded is explained by the high combat training of militants and the almost complete absence in the advanced units of physicians who are able to skillfully treat wounds.

Of course, there is no real possibility to check all the words of the interlocutors. However, medical staff confirms that sometimes 10-15 bodies of dead are delivered to the morgue of the Rostov hospital - not every day, but often enough - two or three times a week. In addition, there are other, indirect evidence of the great losses of our army in Chechnya: the military hospitals are overflowing not only in Rostov-on-Don, but also in Mozdok, Vladikavkaz, Buinaksk, Makhachkala, Saratov, Volgograd, Astrakhan, Voronezh, the wounded lie in the military hospitals in Moscow, Samara, Yekaterinburg - we are talking only about military hospitals, and there are still hospitals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Even judging by these very approximate data, it turns out that the actual number of people killed and wounded is several times higher than officially named figures.

Vladimir VORONOV, January 21, 2000

Rostov-on-Don - Moscow

January 7: the agency of the Netherlands Press and the ANP-RUSNET newspaper cite fragments of the publications of some Dutch newspapers:

"Uit de Volkskrant":

In the division of sergeant Tarasyuk - one in ten died.
"Sergeant Nikolai Tarasyuk is in hospital number 1458, which is located in the north-west of Chechnya, along with his fighting friends who miraculously survived along with him in a crowded hospital." He counted 8 out of a hundred of the active "colleagues" at the front. According to the 20-year-old sergeant Tarasyuk, the majority of his comrades - killed or wounded in the battles for Grozny. "

January 19: The Netherlands Press Agency and the Russian newspaper ANP-RUSNET reported that the data of the Russian Union of Soldier Mothers Committees, which refute the government's official information about losses among federal forces in Chechnya, can be confirmed by wounded soldiers being treated at a military hospital in Chechnya Yekaterinburg.

According to the wounded soldiers, the official data of the Ministry of Defense of Russia about the dead servicemen in Chechnya - reduced fourteen times. According to one of the participants in the battles for Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, only in one battle 40 of his colleagues were killed.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 26 Sep 2018 23:18

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In Chechnya, according to unofficial data, the ratio of the killed / wounded is the same.
Also Chechenya is mostly an asymmetric conflict, which nature and parameters are close to genocide.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 27 Sep 2018 14:52

The Germans have a smaller proportion. 1: 2.4. This is information for 10-day reports. The soldier is wounded, died 2 days later, the wounded are listed in the statistics. On 31.1.1945, the Germans had 295,000 dead from wounds. Of the 3.8 million wounded, 300,000 can be taken away and the same number added to the killed. 1.9 million / 3.5 million; 1: 1.84

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 27 Sep 2018 23:56

The Germans have a smaller proportion.
Actually it is not much of a difference, that is exactly what is shown in the list of "wounded to kill ratios" I quoted. 1,105,987 KIA (3,498,059 WIA) on the EF or 1,326,902 KIA (4,145,863 WIA) up to Jan.45 of all ground forces for all fronts. DOW for the EF (41-45) is approx. 240,000 for the Heer (295,659 all fronts). The "Ratio of Surviving wounded to battle deaths and DOW" is 2.42 and 3.16 wounded to killed for the Eastern Front (the US figure is actually 2.6 and 3.1 respectively).
can be taken away and the same number added to the killed.
That is double counting then.
You used the total "Kriegswehrmacht" figure, but DOW refers to Heer only, since LW and Marine DOW rates are already implemented into their totals.
The ratio of DOW to all battle deaths of ground units was 18% in the Heer, 21% in the Soviet Army (that however is still not 1:1) and 12% for the US in Europe (12% for German units in Normandy as well, ), not that much of a difference. The EF has a higher rate of attrition due to non combat causes or its nature, self explanatory. The Killed to DOW rates were 21% for the EF, compare, 18% for US troops in the Pacific.

We can thus derive a law from this: These rates are dictated by combat and medical services, the overall figures by the theatre.

As I have stated before, 1:1 occurs if entire small units are wiped out or if larger formations (Divisions to Armies) are encircled. Your theory that the entire Soviet Army suffered a total annihilation of 100% while controlling the battlefield and holding the initative is not tenable.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 28 Sep 2018 07:33

Stiltzkin wrote:
27 Sep 2018 23:56
Your theory that the entire Soviet Army suffered a total annihilation of 100% while controlling the battlefield and holding the initative is not tenable.
Not only mine. Manstein had reason to assume extremely large Soviet losses.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/manstein/15.html

The following data describing the combat operations of individual armies belonging to our group may also be of interest. Of course, in some cases there could have been errors caused by double counting, for example, of wrecked tanks.

According to these reports, the enemy lost: in January - 17653 prisoners, 2873 tanks, 588 guns, 2481 anti-tank guns; in February - 7700 prisoners, 1055 tanks, 200 guns, 885 anti-tank guns {* 23}.

These figures show how well the Soviet Army at that time was equipped with technology. The Soviets were no longer forced to throw into the battle huge masses of people. However, the numbers indicate a large difference between the number of captured prisoners and the number of captured and destroyed equipment. Either the matter was that the Soviets often managed to avoid captivity if they left their heavy weapons (and this at the same time could indicate a reduction in the morale of the troops), or they suffered extremely heavy casualties.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 29 Sep 2018 00:50

These figures show how well the Soviet Army at that time was equipped with technology. The Soviets were no longer forced to throw into the battle huge masses of people. However, the numbers indicate a large difference between the number of captured prisoners and the number of captured and destroyed equipment. Either the matter was that the Soviets often managed to avoid captivity if they left their heavy weapons (and this at the same time could indicate a reduction in the morale of the troops), or they suffered extremely heavy casualties.
I do not disagree with parts of the text (and do note that many of Mansteins post-war claims were incorrect) but Soviet losses of men and material remained high during the entire war. There is no difference, for the millionth time.
I think this thread derailed a bit (just like Barbarossa :D ).
Anyway, the prospect of stopping the Soviet onslaught in the later phases of the war by the Army Groups was (historically, ceteris paribus) very slim. On the other hand, for the Soviets to perform better in the opening stages of Barbarossa, it would require more than just knowing the intentions of the enemy and I think even a preparation on the scale of Kursk might have not been enough.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 29 Sep 2018 13:50

Stiltzkin wrote:
29 Sep 2018 00:50
Anyway, the prospect of stopping the Soviet onslaught in the later phases of the war by the Army Groups was (historically, ceteris paribus) very slim.
It seems so to you. Germans not only held surely held the front to summer 1944, but during this time could create new groups of armies in Italy, Balkans and France. In the east, everything that was required from Germans to withdraw troops to the line of Vistula. Having created very high density of defense. But what we know. Germans are at war in Kurland, Norway, Italy and in the Balkans. In Germany not really disturb Russians.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 30 Sep 2018 04:50

It seems so to you. Germans not only held surely held the front to summer 1944, but during this time could create new groups of armies in Italy, Balkans and France. In the east, everything that was required from Germans to withdraw troops to the line of Vistula. Having created very high density of defense. But what we know. Germans are at war in Kurland, Norway, Italy and in the Balkans. In Germany not really disturb Russians.
The impact of other fronts was indeed felt, I did not deny it (in fact faster advances were a direct result of this), however even with all available troops which were prepared from the Wehrkreise it would have been difficult to stop the Soviets without a vantage point in 1943-44, this would have merely increased the chance.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 30 Sep 2018 06:42

Stiltzkin wrote:
30 Sep 2018 04:50
It seems so to you. Germans not only held surely held the front to summer 1944, but during this time could create new groups of armies in Italy, Balkans and France. In the east, everything that was required from Germans to withdraw troops to the line of Vistula. Having created very high density of defense. But what we know. Germans are at war in Kurland, Norway, Italy and in the Balkans. In Germany not really disturb Russians.
The impact of other fronts was indeed felt, I did not deny it (in fact faster advances were a direct result of this), however even with all available troops which were prepared from the Wehrkreise it would have been difficult to stop the Soviets without a vantage point in 1943-44, this would have merely increased the chance.
This opinion, if you do not have an idea of military theory. Churchill believed 30-40 divisions of the central reserve guaranteed the victory to Germany. This is well illustrated by the example of the Ardennes, 24 German divisions forced the Allies to show maximum effort. 50-60 Germans won by quantity.

viewtopic.php?p=2160999#p2160999

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 01 Oct 2018 16:41

This opinion, if you do not have an idea of military theory. Churchill believed 30-40 divisions of the central reserve guaranteed the victory to Germany. This is well illustrated by the example of the Ardennes, 24 German divisions forced the Allies to show maximum effort.
First of all I would have to check the wikipedia references, but observe the relative increase of Allied and the decline of German strength, its the same on all fronts, by January the Allies have almost a 2:1 advantage and that is merely the Western Front, their main enemy was in the East. If we assume that they would have been available, then it is unlikely that these depleted Divisions would have been enough to tip the balance against the Soviets by the end of 1944 (those are practically 20 extra Divisions at best, the Soviets fielded over 500), in order to effectively utilize the available manpower of all other theatres, the High Command would have had to forward them throughout 1941 to 1943.

I do however agree that these units may have been enough to withstand and survive offensives, such as Operation Bagration and keep AGC alive, for how long I do not know.
50-60 Germans won by quantity.
Except that they could not operate with such an amount at that time. The Western front denied the possibility of a victory through attrition (or at least fighting the front to a standstill), the Eastern Front made it impossible to achieve a quick victory, or in this case, to push the Allies back to the sea. There were limitations.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 01 Oct 2018 21:29

Stiltzkin wrote:
01 Oct 2018 16:41
First of all I would have to check the wikipedia references, but observe the relative increase of Allied and the decline of German strength, its the same on all fronts, by January the Allies have almost a 2:1 advantage and that is merely the Western Front, their main enemy was in the East.
The Allies saw an abundance of people in the aviation, navy and rear parts. The divisions of Americans at the beginning of December - 45. For comparison, 1 Ukrainian front 70 divisions, if count the tank units in the divisions, 90. Only one 1UF twice superior to the combat strength of the American army.
50-60 Germans won by quantity.
Except that they could not operate with such an amount at that time. The Western front denied the possibility of a victory through attrition (or at least fighting the front to a standstill), the Eastern Front made it impossible to achieve a quick victory, or in this case, to push the Allies back to the sea. There were limitations.
Could. Easily. Courland 33 divisions, Norway equivalent to 20 divisions. In East Prussia in February 1945, 30 German divisions were blocked. It was necessary to try very hard not to create numerical superiority over the allies. The German western front is surprisingly small.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by Stiltzkin » 02 Oct 2018 14:11

Could. Easily. Courland 33 divisions, Norway equivalent to 20 divisions. In East Prussia in February 1945, 30 German divisions were blocked. It was necessary to try very hard not to create numerical superiority over the allies. The German western front is surprisingly small.
By all means, these units were tied due to combat and not exactly full strength either, there is a reason why they were not available, don't you think? Why would the Allies allow the Wehrmacht to concentrate its forces or to recover? That would be against their overall strategy.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by jesk » 02 Oct 2018 18:31

Stiltzkin wrote:
02 Oct 2018 14:11
By all means, these units were tied due to combat and not exactly full strength either, there is a reason why they were not available, don't you think? Why would the Allies allow the Wehrmacht to concentrate its forces or to recover? That would be against their overall strategy.
In other topics is now discussed. The Germans themselves wanted to leave many soldiers in isolation from the main forces. The Wehrmacht was constantly crushed and it was the choice of Hitler.

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Re: Soviet failure during Barbarossa

Post by BDV » 03 Oct 2018 11:13

jesk wrote: In other topics is now discussed. The Germans themselves wanted to leave many soldiers in isolation from the main forces. The Wehrmacht was constantly crushed and it was the choice of Hitler.

But, not abandoning bypassed outposts was Djugashvilli's winning play in 1941 (Leningrad, Sevastopol). What is good for the goose is good for the gander. Both Courland and Norway were strategically important, not to mention Lombardia. One can argue about Courland, of course, but the other two were pretty important strategically.
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