Soviet failure during Barbarossa

[jesk]

jesk wrote - In 1942, any attack on Leningrad led to fall of the city. Cut off from the main forces Soviet armies quickly destroyed. The Germans would have shot down elementary defenders of the city. Stalingrad stayed because fresh meat was shipped along the Volga every day.
90% of the operation to seize Leningrad was carried out in 1941. The transfer of Manstein with artillery from Sevastopol is the same farce as the campaign for oil ... Very and very easily in 1942 the Germans could crush the Leningrad front and take the city.

Please show how they could crush the "Leningrad front!" in 1942(an extra arrow on a map really doesn't explain anything ), then please explain why this course of action wasn't taken:
Then you can explain the reason that the 11th army went to AGN in Aug/Sep 1942 if it was a farce:

Part of forces of the 11th army. Hitler ordered. All others wanted to use it in the Caucasus. Analysis of the actions of Hitler shows they were stupid.

[doogal]

jesk wrote - Part of forces of the 11th army. Hitler ordered. All others wanted to use it in the Caucasus. Analysis of the actions of Hitler shows they were stupid.

11th army HQ did not necessarily need to have those units from the Crimea under its command, as an HQ it would use which ever forces are deemed necessary...(I understand that it would be preferable to maintain cohesion of command with units that had fought together) But the fact that some were removed for other operations is irrelevant:
Are you saying that employing it in the Caucasus was a better idea??? … And how does this reply support your previous post.???

[jesk]

jesk wrote - Part of forces of the 11th army. Hitler ordered. All others wanted to use it in the Caucasus. Analysis of the actions of Hitler shows they were stupid.

11th army HQ did not necessarily need to have those units from the Crimea under its command, as an HQ it would use which ever forces are deemed necessary...(I understand that it would be preferable to maintain cohesion of command with units that had fought together) But the fact that some were removed for other operations is irrelevant:
Are you saying that employing it in the Caucasus was a better idea??? … And how does this reply support your previous post.???

there is a witness in confirmation of sabotage

http://b-ok.cc/book/2059431/6b3bd5

[doogal]

Using a quote from a German General concerning Hitlers "interference" does not equate to sabotage!!!!…..

And lets be frank if you are a dictator who had disdain for the higher military ranks for a number of reasons. Some social and personal and others owing to a cortege of your generals in 1941 attempting to quietly guide your strategic vision to fit there own version, then you would try to gain more control over there sphere of influence.

In fact one could level the claim of sabotage at the feet of Halder, von Bock, Hoth, and Guderian, who all exhibited an inclination to ignore orders when it suited them:

[jesk]

Using a quote from a German General concerning Hitlers "interference" does not equate to sabotage!!!!…..

And lets be frank if you are a dictator who had disdain for the higher military ranks for a number of reasons. Some social and personal and others owing to a cortege of your generals in 1941 attempting to quietly guide your strategic vision to fit there own version, then you would try to gain more control over there sphere of influence.

In fact one could level the claim of sabotage at the feet of Halder, von Bock, Hoth, and Guderian, who all exhibited an inclination to ignore orders when it suited them:

My findings are consistent with authoritative sources. Without reference to Warlimont, one can argue about the use of the 11th Army as long as desired. But to fantasize on the theme of history is not good. Post earlier you wrote a goofy question.

then please explain why this course of action wasn't taken:
Then you can explain the reason that the 11th army went to AGN in Aug/Sep 1942 if it was a farce:

11th army went to AGN... what a serious historical discussion - because Hitler did it!

[doogal]

Jesk wrote - My findings are consistent with authoritative sources. Without reference to Warlimont

1. You referenced Warlimont not other sources

2.Which Authoritative sources

3. If you have more authoritative sources why did you reference Warlimont ????

Doogal wrote then please explain why this course of action wasn't taken:
Then you can explain the reason that the 11th army went to AGN in Aug/Sep 1942 if it was a farce:
Jesk replied 11th army went to AGN... what a serious historical discussion - because Hitler did it!

You stated that Leningrad could be easily taken in 1942 I asked you to explain why this course wasn't taken. And then I ask if you would explain why sending 11th army to AGN was a "farce" I see nothing goofy in that and cannot understand why you will not at least substantiate your own opinion:

[DavidFrankenberg]

DavidFrankenburg wrote - After Manstein took Sebastopol, in 1942 Hitler sent him to Leningrad with the order to take the city... but he failed.

27 August 1942 Mansteins HQ 11th army moved to the North of Leningrad: While ambitious plans had been made to "raze leningrad to the ground" these were pre empted by the Volkov fronts.
Hitler telephoned Manstein directly 4 September to "restore the situation" p.278 Manstein (Melvin)
"so instead of launching the major assault on Leningrad 11th army was used as a fire brigade to master a local crisis" ibid p,278
you can find mansteins description on p,262,263,264 Lost Victories (Manstein)
While he had intended to mount an operation to "break through the front south of Leningrad" p,264 this never took place. His intention was to close the encirclement properly.

I would say in this instance the soviets pre-empted the German assault so it is tenuous to say he failed as events over took 11th army and then events in the South removed him from that part of the theatre:

"Events" ? Which "events" ?

The soviet attacks on the Volkov front, if i read you well.

The correct conclusion is : Manstein did fail to take or even try to take Leningrad, because of the soviet attacks on the Volkov fronts.

[DavidFrankenberg]

They failed to get Moscow in 41 not 42. They were not 0km away from Leningrad, but they were outside of it, assieging it. They never entered Leningrad. They failed there too.

In September 1941, the Germans wanted to attack across the Neva, Hitler canceled the plan of operation. Imposing an attack on Tikhvin. In 1942, the desire to attack Lenngrad is doubtful. Russian many times unsuccessfully attacked, the Germans did not even try.

You say "Hitler wanted to attack" and then "Hitler cancelled the attack".
Why did he cancel the attack ?
Because he could not attack... Why ? because the germans suffered heavy losses before arriving in front of Leningrad and during the siege.

This is boorish logic.

Let's take a look at it.

You have to check your conclusions with sources at least a little.

This applies to you too.

In September 1941 there was a cancellation of the planned strike across the Neva, for the complete blockade of Leningrad, in favor of the redistribution of resources for the attack on Tikhvin.

Well, the correct conclusion of this is the following : since Hitler suffered heavy losses facing the Red army, he could not attack both Leningrad and Tikhvin. In other words : he didnt attack Leningrad because he could not do it.

[Peter89]

I think this is the time when a Forum Staff intervention would be great.

Jesk sabotages almost every topic concerning the Eastern front, and no one can reason with him.

[doogal]

David Frankenburg wrote - The correct conclusion is : Manstein did fail to take or even try to take Leningrad, because of the soviet attacks on the Volkov fronts.

What ever the wording of the original order Mansteins intention was to not enter or take Leningrad (he makes this clear) but to complete the encirclement.

So: He failed to complete the encirclement of Leningrad as he was forced to mount defensive operations: i think that it fairer.. are we discussing semantics now ??wow that's my fault, maybe I was a tad hasty in my assertion that he did not fail.

[DavidFrankenberg]

David Frankenburg wrote - The correct conclusion is : Manstein did fail to take or even try to take Leningrad, because of the soviet attacks on the Volkov fronts.

What ever the wording of the original order Mansteins intention was to not enter or take Leningrad (he makes this clear) but to complete the encirclement.

So: He failed to complete the encirclement of Leningrad as he was forced to mount defensive operations: i think that it fairer..

I agree with that

are we discussing semantics now ??wow that's my fault, maybe I was a tad hasty in my assertion that he did not fail.

I just need to make the things as clear as possible
Take no offense.
You're welcome.

[doogal]

I just need to make the things as clear as possible
Take no offense.
You're welcome.

No offense taken: you have a point:

The fault is mine as tbh no matter what the original direction was he (Manstein) was unable to carry out his orders or intentions and this can rightly be viewed a failure:

[Stiltzkin]

The fault is mine as tbh no matter what the original direction was he (Manstein) was unable to carry out his orders or intentions and this can rightly be viewed a failure:

Well, I always think that every individual has a right to express itself. Jesk brings a lot of information and enthusiasm to the table, which is fine, perhaps there is something we do not see nor understand, but many seem to lack the understanding of the true nature of the war. Even if we accept the theory that interference prohibited success, then it would be still a failure, since humans make mistakes. The other question would be of course if the mission was achievable. What If scenarios can be a useful tool, but in this case taking Leningrad would have consumed manpower which was already strained, tied and dispersed over a vast front. Its strategic importance was also relative: It would have mattered only, if it could be held for a prolonged period. There is a reason why arrows end on the map, the enemy is willing to pay the price and I doubt that the Wehrmacht was that suicidal and too incompetent to assess the situation in which they found themselves in. I think they were doing exactly what they were supposed to and could do: Sieging it. Everything else would lie in the realm of fantasy.
Other than that, the EF was a war of manpower, necessary to cover vast areas, it was not the Karelian Isthmus, nor the Thermopylae. The Germans could not be everywhere, while also fighting a numerically superior enemy, simple as that. After the failure of Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht was trapped in a life and death struggle, Hitlers "divine" intervention or not, that barely mattered. I honestly think that the German High Command is equally guilty, perhaps even more responsible for poor decision making than Hitler (at least from my studies). They were great tacticians, but poor strategists and even worse diplomats.

[DavidFrankenberg]

The fault is mine as tbh no matter what the original direction was he (Manstein) was unable to carry out his orders or intentions and this can rightly be viewed a failure:

Well, I always think that every individual has a right to express itself. Jesk brings a lot of information and enthusiasm to the table, which is fine, perhaps there is something we do not see nor understand, but many seem to lack the understanding of the true nature of the war. Even if we accept the theory that interference prohibited success, then it would be still a failure, since humans make mistakes. The other question would be of course if the mission was achievable. What If scenarios can be a useful tool, but in this case taking Leningrad would have consumed manpower which was already strained, tied and dispersed over a vast front. Its strategic importance was also relative: It would have mattered only, if it could be held for a prolonged period. There is a reason why arrows end on the map, the enemy is willing to pay the price and I doubt that the Wehrmacht was that suicidal and too incompetent to assess the situation in which they found themselves in. I think they were doing exactly what they were supposed to and could do: Sieging it. Everything else would lie in the realm of fantasy.
Other than that, the EF was a war of manpower, necessary to cover vast areas, it was not the Karelian Isthmus, nor the Thermopylae. The Germans could not be everywhere, while also fighting a numerically superior enemy, simple as that. After the failure of Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht was trapped in a life and death struggle, Hitlers "divine" intervention or not, that barely mattered. I honestly think that the German High Command is equally guilty, perhaps even more responsible for poor decision making than Hitler (at least from my studies). They were great tacticians, but poor strategists and even worse diplomats.

If, as you are stating, the Eastern front was a matter of "manpower", then you have to logically conclude that the OHW and OKH were suicidal by doing a war they could not win with "manpower"... since the German manpower was inferior to the Soviet manpower, according to your own statements.

[Stiltzkin]

If, as you are stating, the Eastern front was a matter of "manpower", then you have to logically conclude that the OHW and OKH were suicidal by doing a war they could not win with "manpower"... since the German manpower was inferior to the Soviet manpower, according to your own statements.

No, because the High Command was convinced that they will capture the capital before the end of 1941, or (speaking about the prolonged war of attrition) will be able to drain the enemy of manpower until its offensive power seeps in. Defeating the USSR was not impossible, it was just impossible to do that while being overextended over the vast steppes of the EF. Caesar in Gaul had the same problem (in "de bello gallico" he reveals his concerns), so he chose a slow approach.