Barbarossa Planning

[doogal]

Any German offensive movement in 1941 meant that mobile elements outran the slow moving elements. A large gap has to be bridged logistically. You have to clear your flanks at some point before you consider another 3/400 km advance... You seem to be saying that Hitler sacrificed victory by pushing south and North and that pushing east as soon as possible after smolensk would result in an operational success.? ... This is highly unlikely I would think

[jesk]

Any German offensive movement in 1941 meant that mobile elements outran the slow moving elements. A large gap has to be bridged logistically. You have to clear your flanks at some point before you consider another 3/400 km advance... You seem to be saying that Hitler sacrificed victory by pushing south and North and that pushing east as soon as possible after smolensk would result in an operational success.? ... This is highly unlikely I would think

Infantry moves too fast. 40-70 km per day for a person not older than 35 years is normal. The movement of Army Group "Center" from Smolensk to the Volga on a front 200 km wide means the defeat of all Russian troops vertically west.

[Peter89]

Not to mention that taking Moscow couldn't have finished off the Soviets per se.

The capital was ready to be evacuated and sacrificed. The Soviets would have continued to fight at the Volga line, several hundred kms from Moscow, which was utterly out of the reach of the Wehrmacht.

Not to mention that Leningrad, Sevastopol and Eastern Ukraine was still firmly in Soviet hands in the winter of 1941.

As for 1942:
Jesk, you come up with the "lazy German AGN & AGM" myth as you always do. We have discussed it several times: AGN & AGM were fighting for their survival, their offensive operations were of limited scope.

The Germans have never been one step from victory over the Soviets; neither in 1941 nor in 1942. It would have taken several unlikely major events to occur in a specific order to bring the SU down. (Eg. major victories in the SU and Africa, the West does not ally herself with the SU, the SU loses more men than she can replenish, etc.).

[Paul Lakowski]

Just a summery map of phases of the operations.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fil ... 41-12.png

NOTE; the first phase [beige ] represents 22nd JUNE to 9th JULY [19 days] , while the next phase [brown] is to September 1 ...another 50+ days!!!! This doesn't count the KIEW maneuver [gray] which is a further 9 days. The move on Moscow cant even be considered until after that!

NEVER FORGET the closer the roads are to Europe the better they are. One sources suggest only 10% of the roads were paved in any way, while the rest are kart tracks, for lack of a better term.

[Paul Lakowski]

Any German offensive movement in 1941 meant that mobile elements outran the slow moving elements. A large gap has to be bridged logistically. You have to clear your flanks at some point before you consider another 3/400 km advance... You seem to be saying that Hitler sacrificed victory by pushing south and North and that pushing east as soon as possible after smolensk would result in an operational success.? ... This is highly unlikely I would think

Infantry moves too fast. 40-70 km per day for a person not older than 35 years is normal. The movement of Army Group "Center" from Smolensk to the Volga on a front 200 km wide means the defeat of all Russian troops vertically west.

The mileage recorded on the Panzers was ~ 4 times what it was on their command tanks, suggesting most tank maneuver was tactical not operational.

Operationally the Panzer Groups got maybe 500km +/- 50km in the first two weeks in Barbarossa , while infantry armies managed only ~ 200-300km.
In the following fortnights , the Panzers managed another 200km advance , when they ran into the Soviet counter offensive around Smolensk, fighting for another 100km or so.. At best the infantry armies have to finish the Minsk pocket [first week July] then advance >400km to Smolensk . While Panzer groups are encircling Smolensk in the 3rd week of July [~ 20 July] , the infantry armies are still 100-200km behind those spearhead's.

After this the whole rate of advance slows to a crawl.

[BDV]

The reason why Axis infantry was "slow" is not that those guys could not march. Corps 1 made it to Pskov by July 9, woulda have made it to Leningrad by July 15 at the same rate. The reason was persistent soviet resistance (slowing down infantry), and soviet couterattacks (restricting armor's freedom of movement, increasing armor's logistical expeditures).

That can be seen on all battlegroup fronts:

Resistance:
AGN, where Soviet resistance forces 18th to stay in Estonia until end of August. Luga line defense, forcing 46th Panzer to turn northwest and the Wehrmacht to commit major forces to its breach, after the Stalin Line had already been breached at high cost.

In the center, starting with Brest defense, the 9th being stuck at Polotsk while 3rd Panzer Gruppe is jumping in the void, to Mogilev, holding the 4th Army behind while Guderian is dashing around.

In the South, Odessa keeping the Romanian forces back.

Couterattacks:
(mentioning only the more successful ones):
AGN at Soltsy and Parnu, AGC at Rogachev and Velikiye Luki, AGS on Pruth (more attack than counterattack) and Novohrad-Volynsky.

=========================================================================

To my nonspecialist eye, by allowing separation between armor and infantry to develop, the Wehrmacht gave an opportunity to the RKKA units defender to challenge each separately (infantry with 'irrational' resistance, armor with 'irrational' counterattacks) with enough success to "derail" Barbarossa.


P.S.
I wish I could put more eloquently, but panzer commanders (panzerjockeys, if you will) sound like a broken gramophone:
"we need to jump Vorwärts!",
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!"
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!"
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!", etc, etc, etc

[jesk]

Not to mention that taking Moscow couldn't have finished off the Soviets per se.

The capital was ready to be evacuated and sacrificed. The Soviets would have continued to fight at the Volga line, several hundred kms from Moscow, which was utterly out of the reach of the Wehrmacht.

Not to mention that Leningrad, Sevastopol and Eastern Ukraine was still firmly in Soviet hands in the winter of 1941.

As for 1942:
Jesk, you come up with the "lazy German AGN & AGM" myth as you always do. We have discussed it several times: AGN & AGM were fighting for their survival, their offensive operations were of limited scope.

The Germans have never been one step from victory over the Soviets; neither in 1941 nor in 1942. It would have taken several unlikely major events to occur in a specific order to bring the SU down. (Eg. major victories in the SU and Africa, the West does not ally herself with the SU, the SU loses more men than she can replenish, etc.).

The bulk of the population, resources is located to the Urals. The war in Siberia for Russians is a little perspective.

In the winter of 1941 nothing strong in hands of Soviets not was. Such grandiose conclusion!

AGM and AG fought for survival, but Russians attacked. Has to be on the contrary. Germans attack, Soviets reflect the attacks.

Germans always were in a step from a victory. To Leningrad 0 km, Moscow 80 km. Hitler did not give the order...

[jesk]

Just a summery map of phases of the operations.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fil ... 41-12.png

NOTE; the first phase [beige ] represents 22nd JUNE to 9th JULY [19 days] , while the next phase [brown] is to September 1 ...another 50+ days!!!! This doesn't count the KIEW maneuver [gray] which is a further 9 days. The move on Moscow cant even be considered until after that!

NEVER FORGET the closer the roads are to Europe the better they are. One sources suggest only 10% of the roads were paved in any way, while the rest are kart tracks, for lack of a better term.

And what? Hitler imposed environments unnecessary Germans near Minsk, forbade Bock to attack Moscow. Read Halder's,Bock's diaries. There is a truth. Not necessarily most to invent a story.

[jesk]

The mileage recorded on the Panzers was ~ 4 times what it was on their command tanks, suggesting most tank maneuver was tactical not operational.

Operationally the Panzer Groups got maybe 500km +/- 50km in the first two weeks in Barbarossa , while infantry armies managed only ~ 200-300km.
In the following fortnights , the Panzers managed another 200km advance , when they ran into the Soviet counter offensive around Smolensk, fighting for another 100km or so.. At best the infantry armies have to finish the Minsk pocket [first week July] then advance >400km to Smolensk . While Panzer groups are encircling Smolensk in the 3rd week of July [~ 20 July] , the infantry armies are still 100-200km behind those spearhead's.

After this the whole rate of advance slows to a crawl.

Infantry armies surrounded Russians at Novogrudok, Bialystok. Therefore lagged behind. Von Bock did not want environments to Moscow. Germans wasted time, weakened the external front.

[jesk]

The reason why Axis infantry was "slow" is not that those guys could not march. Corps 1 made it to Pskov by July 9, woulda have made it to Leningrad by July 15 at the same rate. The reason was persistent soviet resistance (slowing down infantry), and soviet couterattacks (restricting armor's freedom of movement, increasing armor's logistical expeditures).

That can be seen on all battlegroup fronts:

Resistance:
AGN, where Soviet resistance forces 18th to stay in Estonia until end of August. Luga line defense, forcing 46th Panzer to turn northwest and the Wehrmacht to commit major forces to its breach, after the Stalin Line had already been breached at high cost.

In the center, starting with Brest defense, the 9th being stuck at Polotsk while 3rd Panzer Gruppe is jumping in the void, to Mogilev, holding the 4th Army behind while Guderian is dashing around.

In the South, Odessa keeping the Romanian forces back.

Couterattacks:
(mentioning only the more successful ones):
AGN at Soltsy and Parnu, AGC at Rogachev and Velikiye Luki, AGS on Pruth (more attack than counterattack) and Novohrad-Volynsky.

=========================================================================

To my nonspecialist eye, by allowing separation between armor and infantry to develop, the Wehrmacht gave an opportunity to the RKKA units defender to challenge each separately (infantry with 'irrational' resistance, armor with 'irrational' counterattacks) with enough success to "derail" Barbarossa.


P.S.
I wish I could put more eloquently, but panzer commanders (panzerjockeys, if you will) sound like a broken gramophone:
"we need to jump Vorwärts!",
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!"
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!"
"so then what?", "so then we can jump Vorwärts!", etc, etc, etc

Estonia, Polotsk, Velikiye Luki attacked 2-5 German divisions. 30-40 Russians sweep away straw. For a start it need to be defined how many forces are necessary for a victory. And why one soldier is not enough?

[BDV]

Estonia, Polotsk, Velikiye Luki attacked 2-5 German divisions. 30-40 Russians sweep away straw. For a start it need to be defined how many forces are necessary for a victory. And why one soldier is not enough?

5 divisionen in Estonia are 2 divisionen not marching behind the 46th Panzer Korps on the Pskov-Luga line; 1 divisionen not marching right behind 8th Panzer at Stoltsy; with 2 divisionen still left to occupy Estonia. Why is there 5 divisionen NEEDED in Estonia? Russian resistance.

So the 46th Panzer Korps has no business at Luga, unless 46th Panzer Korps being at Luga cancels the RKKA force in Estonia - which it did not do.

Why is 5 divisionen at Polotsk and not one divisionen marching right behind 19th Panzer at Velikiye Luki? No one knows about Polotsk, because 5 divisionen were NEEDED at Polotsk (to take care of the business, which they did). People know about 19th Panzer at Velikiye Luki in July 19-21, because 19th Panzer being there at that time, without 8th Panzer being there at the same time, was a mistake.

Bad plan Barbarossa, then Panzer Jockeys get a go at it, and get "creative", July 10-20 1941.

Fuhrer and fuhrer-bootlicking Generals, both fathers of German disaster; Barbarossa level, and 3rd Reich level.

[Paul Lakowski]

What slows all advances is mostly the resistance , no matter how inept it might seem at the time. But the Wehrmacht logistic system was limited to rail-net-works, and their gauge was different and required conversion- failing that - Russian trains/rolling stock needed to be captured , not shot to pieces.

So the deeper it went beyond the rail heads -the less volume was able to get through to the front units. One sources claims it was limited to 70 tons per motorized division per day , when 300 tons a day was needed.

What the hell are "environment's to Moscow"...another AL STEWART song? [no offence I loved most of his albums prior to the 1980s].

[jesk]

Estonia, Polotsk, Velikiye Luki attacked 2-5 German divisions. 30-40 Russians sweep away straw. For a start it need to be defined how many forces are necessary for a victory. And why one soldier is not enough?

5 divisionen in Estonia are 2 divisionen not marching behind the 46th Panzer Korps on the Pskov-Luga line; 1 divisionen not marching right behind 8th Panzer at Stoltsy; with 2 divisionen still left to occupy Estonia. Why is there 5 divisionen NEEDED in Estonia? Russian resistance.

So the 46th Panzer Korps has no business at Luga, unless 46th Panzer Korps being at Luga cancels the RKKA force in Estonia - which it did not do.

Why is 5 divisionen at Polotsk and not one divisionen marching right behind 19th Panzer at Velikiye Luki? No one knows about Polotsk, because 5 divisionen were NEEDED at Polotsk (to take care of the business, which they did). People know about 19th Panzer at Velikiye Luki in July 19-21, because 19th Panzer being there at that time, without 8th Panzer being there at the same time, was a mistake.

Bad plan Barbarossa, then Panzer Jockeys get a go at it, and get "creative", July 10-20 1941.

Fuhrer and fuhrer-bootlicking Generals, both fathers of German disaster; Barbarossa level, and 3rd Reich level.

You ignore the huge Soviet losses. Battle for Estonia, battle for Polotsk and 4 million prisoners in 1941 ... At the beginning of July, Hitler sent the main forces of Army Group Center to the Minsk encirclement. Therefore, the force of impact weakened. Von Bock insisted on a speedy attack on Smolensk, without being distracted by the Soviet units left behind. The orders of Hitler from the first days of "Barbarossa" slowed down the advance to the east.

black arrows as the offensive should have developed, without Hitler

[jesk]

What slows all advances is mostly the resistance , no matter how inept it might seem at the time. But the Wehrmacht logistic system was limited to rail-net-works, and their gauge was different and required conversion- failing that - Russian trains/rolling stock needed to be captured , not shot to pieces.

So the deeper it went beyond the rail heads -the less volume was able to get through to the front units. One sources claims it was limited to 70 tons per motorized division per day , when 300 tons a day was needed.

What the hell are "environment's to Moscow"...another AL STEWART song? [no offence I loved most of his albums prior to the 1980s].

The railway is all empty. The reasons for the failure of the timing has nothing to do. At the beginning of July, the 4th and 9th armies remained in the rear of stupidity. They broke through the defense, went to the rear and returned to the surrounded Russians. As a later maneuver in Bryansk.

[BDV]

You ignore the huge Soviet losses. Battle for Estonia, battle for Polotsk and 4 million prisoners in 1941

Four millionen only if we count all the Jewish children, and Jewish women, and Jewish elderly, that the brave Einsatzgruppen made the World safe from.

At the beginning of July, Hitler sent the main forces of Army Group Center to the Minsk encirclement. Therefore, the force of impact weakened. Von Bock insisted on a speedy attack on Smolensk, without being distracted by the Soviet units left behind. The orders of Hitler from the first days of "Barbarossa" slowed down the advance to the east.

The value in destroying enemy formations is never to have to face them again. ever.
4th army and 10th Army were never to be faced again. Neither were 6th and 12th (Uman pocket). look at 3rd Army; not only survived; the only major OstFront battle it did not take part in was the Operatsiya Uran. 5th Army would be also like that; if Comrade Djugasvilli listens to Comrade Zhukov.

black arrows as the offensive should have developed, without Hitler

It was tried in mid-July, with disastrous results.

The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

That the German warplan would have reflected that, and then the field commanders would have attempted to actually implement it is an intruiging proposition.

I guess what transpired historically was a chimera of "plant-the-flag" plan and the "destroy RKKA then stroll to AA line" plan.

I now see your point on the "plant the flag" plan.