Barbarossa Planning

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Paul Lakowski
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#46

Post by Paul Lakowski » 11 Dec 2018, 01:03

jesk wrote:
10 Dec 2018, 19:48
The railway is all empty. The reasons for the failure of the timing has nothing to do. At the beginning of July, the 4th and 9th armies remained in the rear of stupidity. They broke through the defense, went to the rear and returned to the surrounded Russians. As a later maneuver in Bryansk.
They had exhausted there supply and it took 5-10 days to replenish and advance slowly. Logistics had a lot to do with it. The 70 tons a day can only replenish infantry division after 8-10 days of minimum deployment.

Not stupidity but necessity. Encircling all those REDARMY troops ensured they would not come back to haunt the Wehrmacht at a later date. Every Kessel meant more troops for Russia to train and less troops for the Wehrmacht to fight.

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#47

Post by Stugbit » 11 Dec 2018, 03:06

In my opinion, the biggest mistake of Barbarossa was with the German intelligence service at the time, as they underestimated the Soviet numerically and technologically.

Someone said (in another topic here in the forum, I guess) that tanks such T-34s didn`t mattered most in the outcome of the war. But the thing is, technology had a huge deal in the WWII development. WWII was quite different from any other war that had ever took place in the past. It was something completely different for the time.

And, in the end, just look how the Soviet developed things. Compare a King Tiger Tank with a JS3 tank. It`s a Bunker with wheels against a Modern design of a tank. Compare the 600hp engine of a T-34 with any tank engine the Germans had at the time. Compare the design of a Lavotin 7 aircraft with a Fock-Wulf 190A, for instance.

The Germans knew the Soviet would be quite a hard thing to crack, but it turned out that it was even harder.

In the beginning of Barbarossa, however, the Red Army cohesion was very bad, the overall situation for the majority of the troops was not ok and moral was low with many of it`s soldiers. BDV was talking about the Soviet resistance in the beginning. Yes, is very true, but we have to point out that it was a minority resisting. It was the best part of the forces that were holding in the Germans, as most of the other troops weren`t in a same condition. A very well know case that illustrates this was a single KV tank that stood many German forces of the AGN for two days in a row when advancing in Lithuania.

But blitzkrieg, before anything, is psychological tactic. And that`s why the tanks separate so much of the infantry. The movement and keeping the enemy under stress is more important than an organic force enveloping the enemy conventionally. It works that way because blitzkrieg is meant for an inferior force to beat a bigger and stronger enemy. That`s how they defeated the stronger Western Allies in France, for instance.

They hoped to do the same with the Soviet, but it turned out, for the same reasons I just said above, that the Soviet was even stronger from what they considered.
Still, the Germans did finish Barbarossa, by the way. The level of forces they defeated, the level of equipment they destroyed. The extensive ground they captured. It was needed all kind of new reserves for the Soviets to keep fighting. They almost completely destroyed the 1941 Red Army and the forces that fought after that had to be brand new ones. So, as you can see, the thing is Soviet Union did not ended in Moscow, isn`t it? Look the size of the transfer of the industries to the Urals. It was something just colossal. One of the biggest things that ever occurred in Human History.

But since the Soviet resistance was made by a minority in 41, I believe if the Germans simply went straight to Moscow, as did Napoleon, they would be able to capture that city without risking an overall flank counter-attack from the forces they encircled within Kiev as they made their turn of September. Many Ukrainian and Russian people and soldiers received the Germans with open arms as did the Cossacks in 42, they did not knew at the time what was waiting for them. But capturing Moscow or not, it would not matter.

If the Germans did not murder so much people, they would have had much of a support for Barbarossa from the Soviet population as they manage to get from the Cossacks in 42. The communist regime murdered many people as well. Yet, Nazi ideology killed Barbarossa in the first place.


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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#48

Post by stg 44 » 11 Dec 2018, 04:20

Stugbit wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 03:06
And, in the end, just look how the Soviet developed things. Compare a King Tiger Tank with a JS3 tank. It`s a Bunker with wheels against a Modern design of a tank. Compare the 600hp engine of a T-34 with any tank engine the Germans had at the time. Compare the design of a Lavotin 7 aircraft with a Fock-Wulf 190A, for instance.
The JS-3 wasn't ready in WW2 and it's armor scheme was dumped in the 1940s as flawed. Beyond that it was highly cramped for the crew and had a lower rate of fire than even the JS-2 and as a heavy breakthrough tank was never tested in combat to know if it was worthwhile as a design how it's restricted internal space would have impacted combat awareness.

As far as the La-7, it wasn't ready until years after the FW190 and was plagued with engine problems during the war in the LA-7 air frame.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7
The British test pilot, Eric "Winkle" Brown was given the chance to fly an La-7 at the former Erprobungsstelle Tarnewitz Luftwaffe aircraft test station on the Baltic coast, shortly after the German surrender in May 1945. He described the handling and performance as "quite superb", but the armament and sights were "below par", the "wooden construction would have withstood little combat punishment" and the instrumentation was "appallingly basic".[15]
Sounds like a Japanese Zero in 1941.

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Re: Slow Infantry

#49

Post by jesk » 11 Dec 2018, 06:36

BDV wrote:
10 Dec 2018, 22:04
jesk wrote:You ignore the huge Soviet losses. Battle for Estonia, battle for Polotsk and 4 million prisoners in 1941
Four millionen only if we count all the Jewish children, and Jewish women, and Jewish elderly, that the brave Einsatzgruppen made the World safe from.
Soviet staged "the greatest mass rape in history". Even Hennelore Kohl was raped many times at the age of 12. I think this fully compensates for the German crimes against the Soviet-Russian. Rape has come to every German family. And this often strongly influenced the psyche.
At the beginning of July, Hitler sent the main forces of Army Group Center to the Minsk encirclement. Therefore, the force of impact weakened. Von Bock insisted on a speedy attack on Smolensk, without being distracted by the Soviet units left behind. The orders of Hitler from the first days of "Barbarossa" slowed down the advance to the east.
The value in destroying enemy formations is never to have to face them again. ever.
4th army and 10th Army were never to be faced again. Neither were 6th and 12th (Uman pocket). look at 3rd Army; not only survived; the only major OstFront battle it did not take part in was the Operatsiya Uran. 5th Army would be also like that; if Comrade Djugasvilli listens to Comrade Zhukov.

black arrows as the offensive should have developed, without Hitler
It was tried in mid-July, with disastrous results.

The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

That the German warplan would have reflected that, and then the field commanders would have attempted to actually implement it is an intruiging proposition.

I guess what transpired historically was a chimera of "plant-the-flag" plan and the "destroy RKKA then stroll to AA line" plan.

I now see your point on the "plant the flag" plan.
Can surround in different ways. It would be naive to believe that the Soviet armies would be able to walk 600 km through the German rear and get out of the environment somewhere in Smolensk. To put barriers in the path of retreat, throw aviation on the retreating columns, with the main forces moving on. I have already proposed that the post analyze the actions of the Germans, but I do not see any interest in this analysis. Only the lazy encircled Russian armies will not leave the encirclement. And everything?

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#50

Post by jesk » 11 Dec 2018, 06:55

Paul Lakowski wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 01:03
jesk wrote:
10 Dec 2018, 19:48
The railway is all empty. The reasons for the failure of the timing has nothing to do. At the beginning of July, the 4th and 9th armies remained in the rear of stupidity. They broke through the defense, went to the rear and returned to the surrounded Russians. As a later maneuver in Bryansk.
They had exhausted there supply and it took 5-10 days to replenish and advance slowly. Logistics had a lot to do with it. The 70 tons a day can only replenish infantry division after 8-10 days of minimum deployment.

Not stupidity but necessity. Encircling all those REDARMY troops ensured they would not come back to haunt the Wehrmacht at a later date. Every Kessel meant more troops for Russia to train and less troops for the Wehrmacht to fight.
They have not exhausted reserves there. The fighting ended July 9. On July 10, Von Bock asked Hitler for permission to attack Moscow with 2 and 3 tank groups. He refused him.

Surround, again, can be different. The Russians in January 1945 fought 600 km from the Vistula to the Oder in 2 weeks, throwing large masses of Germans into the rear. The situation of June 1941 was worse for the Russians. There the Germans broke through on the flanks, throwing equipment, the Soviet armies did not have such an opportunity. Do not justify the actions of Hitler; Halder,Bock diaries a lot of mistakes. Can not be lazy, open and see everything there.
You are in a hurry with the findings, having for this limited information.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Białystok–Minsk

The Battle of Białystok–Minsk was a German strategic operation conducted by the Wehrmacht's Army Group Centre under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock during the penetration of the Soviet border region in the opening stage of Operation Barbarossa, lasting from 22 June to 9 July 1941.


19 days of battle, if left them in the rear, 2 days would be enough. Already on June 22, Soviet defense was proven, Germans rushed into a breakthrough.

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#51

Post by jesk » 11 Dec 2018, 07:18

Real material for analysis. Without supply tons.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Białystok–Minsk

The Soviet troops trapped in the gigantic pockets continued fighting, and concluding operations resulted in high German casualties. An estimated 250,000 Soviet troops escaped because of the lack of German infantry troops' motor transport that slowed the encirclement process. Most of them were later sent to penal battalions.

The Polish Institute of National Remembrance claims that withdrawing Soviet troops committed regular crimes against the inhabitants of Białystok and its areas, including cases of whole families being executed by firing squads.[13]

The quick advance east created the possibility for the Wehrmacht to advance rapidly towards the land bridge of Smolensk from which an attack on Moscow could be planned. It also created the impression in the OKW that the war against the Soviet Union was already won within days of its start. Still, Hitler blamed the Panzer generals for leaving gaps in the lines. The Panzer generals were deeply frustrated as for almost a week their advance east had been stopped while they closed the pocket and waited for the infantry to catch up. They feared the momentum of the armored offensive would be lost.

Front Commander General Pavlov and his Front Staff were recalled to Moscow and accused of intentional disorganization of defense and retreat without battle. They were soon executed by the NKVD for cowardice and "failure to perform their duties" and their families were repressed. They were pardoned in 1956.

An exception was Pavlov's operations officer, general Ivan Boldin, who had been cut off by the German advance at a forward headquarters in the first days of the invasion but then fought his way back to Soviet lines, with over 1,000 other soldiers a month and a half later.

Casualties
From 22 June to 9 July, the Soviet forces in Belarus lost 417,729 men, including 341,012 killed or missing and 76,717 wounded or sick.[4][1] Soviet equipment losses totaled 1,177–1,669 aircraft,[6][1] 4,799 tanks[1] and 9,427 guns and mortars.[1]

On the German side, from 22 June to 4 July, the 2nd Panzer Group lost 7,089 men and its 18th Panzer Division had 16 tanks destroyed by 6 July.[3] The Panzer Group had only 6,320 replacements to cover these losses, a deficit that, however, imposed only a minimal burden on its combat capabilities.[2] The 3rd Panzer Group had casualties of 1,769 men by 2 July and had 85 tanks destroyed by 4 July.[2] Its replacements totaled 4,730, more than enough to restore its losses.[2] Five of the infantry divisions in the German Fourth and Ninth Armies lost 3,299 men.[2]

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#52

Post by BDV » 11 Dec 2018, 19:29

jesk wrote:An estimated 250,000 Soviet troops escaped ... Most of them were later sent to penal battalions.
SOURCING?

An estimated 250,000 Soviet troops escaped because of the lack of German infantry troops' motor transport that slowed the encirclement process... The Panzer generals were deeply frustrated as [they] waited for the infantry to catch up.
And WHO had the motor transport of Germany, France, and Low Countries?

Still, Hitler blamed the Panzer generals for leaving gaps in the lines.
Obviously, GROFAZ was correct for a change.

Even a broken clock is right twice a day, they say. Barbarossa execution mistakes obviously belong to the field commanders.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#53

Post by Stugbit » 11 Dec 2018, 21:37

The JS-3 wasn't ready in WW2 and it's armor scheme was dumped in the 1940s as flawed. Beyond that it was highly cramped for the crew and had a lower rate of fire than even the JS-2 and as a heavy breakthrough tank was never tested in combat to know if it was worthwhile as a design how it's restricted internal space would have impacted combat awareness.
Yes, yes. I know the JS3 did not saw action in WWII. And I know that there`s many flaws and the tank itself was somehow a prototype. But I meant more the tank overall look. In the place of picking the King Tiger for comparison, lets pick the Maus tank instead. In the case of the JS3, you can see many corresponding things on modern tanks later after the war. It has the overall feel of a modern tank. It`s design by far was not outdated.

Now look the Maus tank. It`s a cartoonish tank, it looks like it came from a Metal Slug video game… You just can`t find any kind of link to any modern tank design with the Maus. As I said, it`s a bunker with wheels.

As far as the La-7, it wasn't ready until years after the FW190 and was plagued with engine problems during the war in the LA-7 air frame.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7
About the La-7. Yes the aircraft had it`s problems as well. But, bad machine for bad machine, the La-7 at least had the air intake in the wing root, instead of behind the engine, as it was with the FW 190A.

The 190 gets hot air without aerodynamic pressure for it`s engine. It had a very poor high-altitude performance because of that.

Sounds like a Japanese Zero in 1941.
They were British. They flew Spitfires! Any other aircraft those pilots may flew after they would consider it a Zero…

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RE: Barbarossa Planning - (The Stategy of Mein Kampf).

#54

Post by Robert Rojas » 11 Dec 2018, 22:28

Greetings to both citizen Dougal and the community as a whole. Howdy Dougal! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Sunday - December 02, 2018 - 8:54am AND citizen Stugbit's posting of Monday - December 10, 2018 - 5:06pm, old yours truly is of the school of thought that the BOTH of you have touched upon the twin pillars of disaster that, in retrospect, foreshadowed the ultimate failure of Fall Barbarossa. It is nothing short of astounding how the synergy of HUBRIS and INTELLIGENCE (or lack thereof) negatively impacted the Wehrmacht's "planning" of this Herculean campaign. It is amazing how the senior leadership of National Socialist Germany's military establishment blithely accepted Adolf Hitler's ideological assertion of "YOU ONLY HAVE TO KICK IN THE DOOR AND THE WHOLE ROTTEN STRUCTURE WILL COME CRASHING DOWN". On must wonder whatever happened to Helmuth von Moltke's dictum of "NO PLAN OF OPERATIONS EXTENDS WITH ANY CERTAINTY BEYOND FIRST CONTACT WITH THE MAIN HOSTILE FORCE". And the rest, as some would say, is history. Well, that's my initial two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on the exercise into Monday morning quarterbacking - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of Caledonia.

Best Regards
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#55

Post by Stugbit » 11 Dec 2018, 23:05

Even a broken clock is right twice a day, they say. Barbarossa execution mistakes obviously belong to the field commanders.
If that was true, BDV, they wouldn`t be able to even pass the Dniepr. No army could reach as far as Grozny or Volgograd against Soviet Union with 100% dump commanders. Specially with a 80% horse drawn army.

Considering all the circumstances, Barbarossa was a victory, not a defeat, in military terms.

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#56

Post by stg 44 » 12 Dec 2018, 00:17

Stugbit wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 21:37
Yes, yes. I know the JS3 did not saw action in WWII. And I know that there`s many flaws and the tank itself was somehow a prototype. But I meant more the tank overall look. In the place of picking the King Tiger for comparison, lets pick the Maus tank instead. In the case of the JS3, you can see many corresponding things on modern tanks later after the war. It has the overall feel of a modern tank. It`s design by far was not outdated.

Now look the Maus tank. It`s a cartoonish tank, it looks like it came from a Metal Slug video game… You just can`t find any kind of link to any modern tank design with the Maus. As I said, it`s a bunker with wheels.
The Maus was a prototype with a grand total of 2 produced based on Hitler's fantasies not the military's requests. The JS-3 was mass produced and never fought, leading to a series of heavy breakthrough tanks that were ultimately dumped as a line for the T-54/55 series.
If anything the King Tiger looks as much like the modern Russian AFV as the JS-3:
Image
Image
Image

Stugbit wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 21:37
As far as the La-7, it wasn't ready until years after the FW190 and was plagued with engine problems during the war in the LA-7 air frame.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7
About the La-7. Yes the aircraft had it`s problems as well. But, bad machine for bad machine, the La-7 at least had the air intake in the wing root, instead of behind the engine, as it was with the FW 190A.

The 190 gets hot air without aerodynamic pressure for it`s engine. It had a very poor high-altitude performance because of that.
You do realize they both used air cooled engines that did not perform well at high altitude, right? Placement of the air intake is meaningless compared to the supercharger they had to work with and the equivalent late model FW190 had a higher service ceiling than the 1945 La-7. With MW50 boost it was probably even faster too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin ... ion_model)
Powerplant: 1 × Shvetsov ASh-82FN 14-cylinder, two-row, air-cooled radial, 1,380 kW (1,850 hp)
Service ceiling: 10,450 m (34,280 ft)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wul ... w_190_A-8)
b)
Powerplant: 1 × BMW 801 D-2 radial engine, 1,250 kW (1,700 PS, 1,677 hp)
Service ceiling: 11,410 m (37,430 ft)

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#57

Post by Paul Lakowski » 12 Dec 2018, 00:37

Yes, yes. I know the JS3 did not saw action in WWII. And I know that there`s many flaws and the tank itself was somehow a prototype. But I meant more the tank overall look. In the place of picking the King Tiger for comparison, lets pick the Maus tank instead. In the case of the JS3, you can see many corresponding things on modern tanks later after the war. It has the overall feel of a modern tank. It`s design by far was not outdated.

Didn't the Egyptians use the IS-III?

https://www.reddit.com/r/Warthunder/com ... acts_from/

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#58

Post by Paul Lakowski » 12 Dec 2018, 00:50

jesk post
Real material for analysis. Without supply tons.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Białystok–Minsk

Hitler's understanding of strategic war was abysmal . Only he could convince the Wehrmacht , the RED ARMY could be wiped out in a matter of weeks. ...and when it fails he blames his troops for not being 'super-soldiers' .

The Intel failure is definitely key to the failure.

https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf

The planning assumed the first phase would be concluded upon reaching Leningrad- Smolensk and the Dnieper river in the south. After any phase there is always regroup of forces, which is when the major Soviet counter offensive began. That did delay the Wehrmacht enough with fall weather to allow the Soviets time to mobilise their reserves, which were much bigger than Hitler ever imagined. Ultimately that was enough to stall the advance before Moscow.
Last edited by Paul Lakowski on 12 Dec 2018, 03:29, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#59

Post by Stugbit » 12 Dec 2018, 02:11

stg 44 wrote:
12 Dec 2018, 00:17
Stugbit wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 21:37
Yes, yes. I know the JS3 did not saw action in WWII. And I know that there`s many flaws and the tank itself was somehow a prototype. But I meant more the tank overall look. In the place of picking the King Tiger for comparison, lets pick the Maus tank instead. In the case of the JS3, you can see many corresponding things on modern tanks later after the war. It has the overall feel of a modern tank. It`s design by far was not outdated.

Now look the Maus tank. It`s a cartoonish tank, it looks like it came from a Metal Slug video game… You just can`t find any kind of link to any modern tank design with the Maus. As I said, it`s a bunker with wheels.
The Maus was a prototype with a grand total of 2 produced based on Hitler's fantasies not the military's requests. The JS-3 was mass produced and never fought, leading to a series of heavy breakthrough tanks that were ultimately dumped as a line for the T-54/55 series.
If anything the King Tiger looks as much like the modern Russian AFV as the JS-3:
Image
Image
Image

Stugbit wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 21:37
As far as the La-7, it wasn't ready until years after the FW190 and was plagued with engine problems during the war in the LA-7 air frame.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin_La-7
About the La-7. Yes the aircraft had it`s problems as well. But, bad machine for bad machine, the La-7 at least had the air intake in the wing root, instead of behind the engine, as it was with the FW 190A.

The 190 gets hot air without aerodynamic pressure for it`s engine. It had a very poor high-altitude performance because of that.
You do realize they both used air cooled engines that did not perform well at high altitude, right? Placement of the air intake is meaningless compared to the supercharger they had to work with and the equivalent late model FW190 had a higher service ceiling than the 1945 La-7. With MW50 boost it was probably even faster too.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavochkin ... ion_model)
Powerplant: 1 × Shvetsov ASh-82FN 14-cylinder, two-row, air-cooled radial, 1,380 kW (1,850 hp)
Service ceiling: 10,450 m (34,280 ft)



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wul ... w_190_A-8)
b)
Powerplant: 1 × BMW 801 D-2 radial engine, 1,250 kW (1,700 PS, 1,677 hp)
Service ceiling: 11,410 m (37,430 ft)

I don`t know if the T-14 Armata is a bad or a good tank for comparison. :lol:

The tank you`re really looking for comparison is this one right here,

THE BEST AND MOST FEARSOME TANK EVER MADE:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EE-T1_Os%C3%B3rio

About the La-7:

Yes, both aircraft have poor high-altitude performance, but the Focke have an even worse performance due to bad design. I have to point out that we`re not talking about a cooling system here, we`re talking about the air flow that brings the engine to work.

In higher altitudes the air is thinner and engines need aerodynamic pressure to work better. In the case of the 190A, the body of the engine itself was blocking the pressure from the air to get in. And all of the heat the engine made there just warmed up even more the airflow which crippled the engine performance.

So, the Focke-Wulf do had design problems.

And I`m talking about the 190 “A”, not the “D” one. The D was a completely different aircraft. It`s not a fair comparison with the Lavotin. It should be compared to the Yak-3 or a Yak-9P or something.

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Re: RE: Barbarossa Planning - (The Stategy of Mein Kampf).

#60

Post by ljadw » 12 Dec 2018, 20:35

Robert Rojas wrote:
11 Dec 2018, 22:28
Greetings to both citizen Dougal and the community as a whole. Howdy Dougal! Well sir, in respect to your posting of Sunday - December 02, 2018 - 8:54am AND citizen Stugbit's posting of Monday - December 10, 2018 - 5:06pm, old yours truly is of the school of thought that the BOTH of you have touched upon the twin pillars of disaster that, in retrospect, foreshadowed the ultimate failure of Fall Barbarossa. It is nothing short of astounding how the synergy of HUBRIS and INTELLIGENCE (or lack thereof) negatively impacted the Wehrmacht's "planning" of this Herculean campaign. It is amazing how the senior leadership of National Socialist Germany's military establishment blithely accepted Adolf Hitler's ideological assertion of "YOU ONLY HAVE TO KICK IN THE DOOR AND THE WHOLE ROTTEN STRUCTURE WILL COME CRASHING DOWN". On must wonder whatever happened to Helmuth von Moltke's dictum of "NO PLAN OF OPERATIONS EXTENDS WITH ANY CERTAINTY BEYOND FIRST CONTACT WITH THE MAIN HOSTILE FORCE". And the rest, as some would say, is history. Well, that's my initial two cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on the exercise into Monday morning quarterbacking - for now anyway. In any case, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of Caledonia.

Best Regards
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
There was no hubris/lack of intelligence,no ideological assertion, but the resigning knowledge /or knowing resignation that Barbarossa could be successful only, if the Red Army was defeated between the border and the DD line,and if this resulted in the collaps of the Soviet state .Hitler's ''ideological ''assertion was only peptalk to convince everyone that the farther east one would go, the less the resistance would be .No one will attack with the assertion : we will lose .Barbarossa had to b e successful,thus it would be successful,otherwise the Soviets would in Berlin .Only plan A could succeed,thus there was no plan B ,and what Moltke sr said,was irrelevant .

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