Barbarossa Planning

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#646

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2019, 14:31

To mention that Van Crefeld is Jewish can be considered as antisemitism which is here not allowed .
What Wagner is saying is meaningless , as AGC was weaker in July than in August : total tank losses at the end of July were 600, replacements 87 only .Not only was the number of tanks down by 500 +, but a big number of the remaining tanks was not operational .
Wagner could NOT know how many ammunition,fuel,etc AGC needed to go to Moscow, as this was depending on the Soviet resistance only .The stronger the opposite forces were,the more fuel,ammunition, manpowe, spare parts, trucks, tanks, .. AGC would need and the stronger it was, the slower would be its advance .
Thus,search for something serious to prove that AGC could advance in July to Moscow.
Besides: why only to Moscow ? The aim was NOT Moscow, but the AA line= the Wolga .

Boby
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#647

Post by Boby » 05 Feb 2019, 14:44

So Pz.Gr. 2 attacked with the 10., 17., 18. Pz.Div, 10. and 29. Inf.Div. (mot.)
Pz.Gr. 3 with 7., 19., 20. Pz.Div. and 14., 18. and 20. Inf.Div. (mot.)

Much back, three infantry divisions are following the advance.

How strong were the Western and Central fronts at this time, jesk?


jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#648

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 14:56

ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:31
What Wagner is saying is meaningless , as AGC was weaker in July than in August : total tank losses at the end of July were 600, replacements 87 only .Not only was the number of tanks down by 500 +, but a big number of the remaining tanks was not operational .
Wagner could NOT know how many ammunition,fuel,etc AGC needed to go to Moscow, as this was depending on the Soviet resistance only .The stronger the opposite forces were,the more fuel,ammunition, manpowe, spare parts, trucks, tanks, .. AGC would need and the stronger it was, the slower would be its advance .
Thus,search for something serious to prove that AGC could advance in July to Moscow.
Besides: why only to Moscow ? The aim was NOT Moscow, but the AA line= the Wolga .
This is a hard job. Calculate the supply divisions. In the context of the discussion, Wagner and Bock are enough for me. In addition, on July 13-15, in the Moscow direction, the Germans advanced to a depth of 150 km. They were able to go a considerable distance.
To mention that Van Crefeld is Jewish can be considered as antisemitism which is here not allowed .
Crefeld wrote a book at the age of 31 and his opinion is given to me as authoritative. Without evidence and figures, as a specialist in supply. And this is wrong.

Boby
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#649

Post by Boby » 05 Feb 2019, 15:03

Is not a book, is a chapter in his 1977 book "Supplying War".

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#650

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:05

Boby wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:44
So Pz.Gr. 2 attacked with the 10., 17., 18. Pz.Div, 10. and 29. Inf.Div. (mot.)
Pz.Gr. 3 with 7., 19., 20. Pz.Div. and 14., 18. and 20. Inf.Div. (mot.)

Much back, three infantry divisions are following the advance.

How strong were the Western and Central fronts at this time, jesk?
All Russian forces in the Moscow sector were defeated in July. Von Bock protested against the blow to Nevel. He was going to use these troops to strike at Moscow. 20 divisions were easily assembled for a spurt of 320 km, and in July this could have been enough to capture the capital of the USSR. The Gomel operation didn’t like von Bock either. Hitler sprayed forces.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html
25/7/41

Утром приехал представитель ставки генерал-фельдмаршал Кейтель, чтобы получить из первых рук сведения о «смоленском котле» и «дыре» в его фронте. После того как я коротко обрисовал ему обстановку, Кейтель изложил мне идеи фюрера на этот счет. Фюрер считает, что окружения необязательно должны быть стратегическими и что нам следует уделять больше внимания тактическим «малым котлам», которые легче очистить от противника. По мнению фюрера, подобный метод является более эффективным и требует куда меньших временных и ресурсных затрат, нежели прежний. К сожалению, эта идея кажется мне ошибочной. Я полагаю, что многочисленные «малые котлы», напротив, еще больше отдалят нас от выполнения поставленных перед нами важных задач! Кейтель пропустил мое заявление мимо ушей и сказал, что фюрер был бы рад узнать, как его идея «малых котлов» реализуется, к примеру, на правом крыле 2-й армии при содействии частей 2-й танковой группы или XXIV моторизованного корпуса. Фюрер, кроме того, весьма озабочен положением на этом крыле, поскольку русские войска, разбитые Рейхенау, отступают на север в направлении Мозыря, откуда они могут атаковать южное крыло группы армий. Я сказал Кейтелю, что эти рассуждения вступают в противоречие с директивой, присланной нам вчера Верховным командованием сухопутных сил. В соответствии с этой директивой войска моего правого крыла вместе с танковой группой Гудериана должны продвигаться на юго-восток, в то время как Кейтель предлагает повернуть их на юго-запад. Кейтель сказал, что обязательно переговорит на эту тему с Верховным командованием сухопутных сил. Я позвонил Грейффенбергу, который в настоящее время находится в штаб-квартире Верховного командования сухопутных сил, и попросил его поднять тот же самый вопрос.

In the morning, a representative of the headquarters, Field Marshal Keitel, arrived to get first-hand information about the Smolensk cauldron and the "hole" in its front. After I briefly outlined the situation for him, Keitel presented to me the ideas of the Führer in this regard. The Fuhrer believes that the environment does not have to be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small boilers", which are easier to clear from the enemy. According to the Fuhrer, this method is more efficient and requires far less time and resource costs than the former. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me wrong. I believe that numerous “small boilers”, on the contrary, further alienate us from the fulfillment of important tasks set before us! Keitel ignored my statement and said that the Führer would be glad to know how his idea of ​​“small boilers” is being implemented, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd army with the assistance of parts of the 2nd tank group or XXIV motorized corps. The Fuhrer, moreover, is very concerned about the situation on this wing, since the Russian troops defeated Reichenau are retreating north towards Mozyr, from where they can attack the southern wing of the army group. I told Keitel that these arguments contradict the directive sent to us yesterday by the High Command of the Army. In accordance with this directive, the troops of my right wing, together with the tank group of Guderian, should move to the southeast, while Keitel proposes to turn them to the southwest. Keitel said that he would definitely talk on this topic with the Supreme Command of the Army. I called Greyfenberg, who is currently at the headquarters of the Army High Command, and asked him to raise the same question.

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#651

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:05

Boby wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:03
Is not a book, is a chapter in his 1977 book "Supplying War".
I saw, 6 pages there

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#652

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:16

tanks in the battle of Gomel? :x


Boby
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#653

Post by Boby » 05 Feb 2019, 15:20

jesk wrote:
All Russian forces in the Moscow sector were defeated in July.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#654

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2019, 15:23

jesk wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:05
Boby wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:44
So Pz.Gr. 2 attacked with the 10., 17., 18. Pz.Div, 10. and 29. Inf.Div. (mot.)
Pz.Gr. 3 with 7., 19., 20. Pz.Div. and 14., 18. and 20. Inf.Div. (mot.)

Much back, three infantry divisions are following the advance.

How strong were the Western and Central fronts at this time, jesk?
All Russian forces in the Moscow sector were defeated in July. Von Bock protested against the blow to Nevel. He was going to use these troops to strike at Moscow. 20 divisions were easily assembled for a spurt of 320 km, and in July this could have been enough to capture the capital of the USSR. The Gomel operation didn’t like von Bock either. Hitler sprayed forces.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html
25/7/41

Утром приехал представитель ставки генерал-фельдмаршал Кейтель, чтобы получить из первых рук сведения о «смоленском котле» и «дыре» в его фронте. После того как я коротко обрисовал ему обстановку, Кейтель изложил мне идеи фюрера на этот счет. Фюрер считает, что окружения необязательно должны быть стратегическими и что нам следует уделять больше внимания тактическим «малым котлам», которые легче очистить от противника. По мнению фюрера, подобный метод является более эффективным и требует куда меньших временных и ресурсных затрат, нежели прежний. К сожалению, эта идея кажется мне ошибочной. Я полагаю, что многочисленные «малые котлы», напротив, еще больше отдалят нас от выполнения поставленных перед нами важных задач! Кейтель пропустил мое заявление мимо ушей и сказал, что фюрер был бы рад узнать, как его идея «малых котлов» реализуется, к примеру, на правом крыле 2-й армии при содействии частей 2-й танковой группы или XXIV моторизованного корпуса. Фюрер, кроме того, весьма озабочен положением на этом крыле, поскольку русские войска, разбитые Рейхенау, отступают на север в направлении Мозыря, откуда они могут атаковать южное крыло группы армий. Я сказал Кейтелю, что эти рассуждения вступают в противоречие с директивой, присланной нам вчера Верховным командованием сухопутных сил. В соответствии с этой директивой войска моего правого крыла вместе с танковой группой Гудериана должны продвигаться на юго-восток, в то время как Кейтель предлагает повернуть их на юго-запад. Кейтель сказал, что обязательно переговорит на эту тему с Верховным командованием сухопутных сил. Я позвонил Грейффенбергу, который в настоящее время находится в штаб-квартире Верховного командования сухопутных сил, и попросил его поднять тот же самый вопрос.

In the morning, a representative of the headquarters, Field Marshal Keitel, arrived to get first-hand information about the Smolensk cauldron and the "hole" in its front. After I briefly outlined the situation for him, Keitel presented to me the ideas of the Führer in this regard. The Fuhrer believes that the environment does not have to be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small boilers", which are easier to clear from the enemy. According to the Fuhrer, this method is more efficient and requires far less time and resource costs than the former. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me wrong. I believe that numerous “small boilers”, on the contrary, further alienate us from the fulfillment of important tasks set before us! Keitel ignored my statement and said that the Führer would be glad to know how his idea of ​​“small boilers” is being implemented, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd army with the assistance of parts of the 2nd tank group or XXIV motorized corps. The Fuhrer, moreover, is very concerned about the situation on this wing, since the Russian troops defeated Reichenau are retreating north towards Mozyr, from where they can attack the southern wing of the army group. I told Keitel that these arguments contradict the directive sent to us yesterday by the High Command of the Army. In accordance with this directive, the troops of my right wing, together with the tank group of Guderian, should move to the southeast, while Keitel proposes to turn them to the southwest. Keitel said that he would definitely talk on this topic with the Supreme Command of the Army. I called Greyfenberg, who is currently at the headquarters of the Army High Command, and asked him to raise the same question.
To say that the Russians opposite to AGC were defeated is nonsense : if they were defeated there would be no need to advance to Moscow with 17 divisions . Thus they were not defeated .
About supplies for AGC, I found an old thread on this forum ''Germany and railway bottlenecks in the east '',where on post 27 Michate mentioned the following :
in November 1941 the following daily trains were needed for normal supplies
AGN 20
AGC 32
AGS 22
= 74 trains with 29600 tons of supplies or monthly 2220 trains and 888000 tons .
In September 2093 trains arrived
In October 1860
In November 1701
in December 1643
In January 1420
If in November AGC needed daily 32 trains for normal operations, would it not be so that in July /August a smaller AGC would also need 32 trains for an advance to Moscow ? And, as there were not 32 trains available , is it not obvious that this advance was not possible at the end of JUly ?

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#655

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:26

so it was, Hitler ordered to wait when the Russians stop moving troops to Smolensk :)

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

The introduction of an intermediate authority between the army group and the two tank groups, such as the headquarters of the 4th army, has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing the offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#656

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2019, 15:27

jesk wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:56
ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:31
What Wagner is saying is meaningless , as AGC was weaker in July than in August : total tank losses at the end of July were 600, replacements 87 only .Not only was the number of tanks down by 500 +, but a big number of the remaining tanks was not operational .
Wagner could NOT know how many ammunition,fuel,etc AGC needed to go to Moscow, as this was depending on the Soviet resistance only .The stronger the opposite forces were,the more fuel,ammunition, manpowe, spare parts, trucks, tanks, .. AGC would need and the stronger it was, the slower would be its advance .
Thus,search for something serious to prove that AGC could advance in July to Moscow.
Besides: why only to Moscow ? The aim was NOT Moscow, but the AA line= the Wolga .
This is a hard job. Calculate the supply divisions. In the context of the discussion, Wagner and Bock are enough for me. In addition, on July 13-15, in the Moscow direction, the Germans advanced to a depth of 150 km. They were able to go a considerable distance.
To mention that Van Crefeld is Jewish can be considered as antisemitism which is here not allowed .
Crefeld wrote a book at the age of 31 and his opinion is given to me as authoritative. Without evidence and figures, as a specialist in supply. And this is wrong.
The fact that you never heard of Van Crefeld,neither of Schüler does not indicate that you have even a superficial knowledge about German logistics in thye East in WWII .

ljadw
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Posts: 15589
Joined: 13 Jul 2009, 18:50

Re: Barbarossa Planning

#657

Post by ljadw » 05 Feb 2019, 15:29

jesk wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:26
so it was, Hitler ordered to wait when the Russians stop moving troops to Smolensk :)

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

The introduction of an intermediate authority between the army group and the two tank groups, such as the headquarters of the 4th army, has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing the offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.
Did you not say that the Russians opposite AGC were defeated ? :P

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#658

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:31

ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:23
If in November AGC needed daily 32 trains for normal operations, would it not be so that in July /August a smaller AGC would also need 32 trains for an advance to Moscow ? And, as there were not 32 trains available , is it not obvious that this advance was not possible at the end of JUly ?
In November, the whole army group was near Moscow. In July, the infantry armies 500 km west. Logic has its own nuances ...

jesk
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

#659

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:34

ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:27
jesk wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:56
ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 14:31
What Wagner is saying is meaningless , as AGC was weaker in July than in August : total tank losses at the end of July were 600, replacements 87 only .Not only was the number of tanks down by 500 +, but a big number of the remaining tanks was not operational .
Wagner could NOT know how many ammunition,fuel,etc AGC needed to go to Moscow, as this was depending on the Soviet resistance only .The stronger the opposite forces were,the more fuel,ammunition, manpowe, spare parts, trucks, tanks, .. AGC would need and the stronger it was, the slower would be its advance .
Thus,search for something serious to prove that AGC could advance in July to Moscow.
Besides: why only to Moscow ? The aim was NOT Moscow, but the AA line= the Wolga .
This is a hard job. Calculate the supply divisions. In the context of the discussion, Wagner and Bock are enough for me. In addition, on July 13-15, in the Moscow direction, the Germans advanced to a depth of 150 km. They were able to go a considerable distance.
To mention that Van Crefeld is Jewish can be considered as antisemitism which is here not allowed .
Crefeld wrote a book at the age of 31 and his opinion is given to me as authoritative. Without evidence and figures, as a specialist in supply. And this is wrong.
The fact that you never heard of Van Crefeld,neither of Schüler does not indicate that you have even a superficial knowledge about German logistics in thye East in WWII .
This is a difficult way to prove the inability to move towards Moscow. The trains were, along with them the confidence to move to Moscow.

jesk
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Location: Belarus

Re: Barbarossa Planning

#660

Post by jesk » 05 Feb 2019, 15:35

ljadw wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:29
jesk wrote:
05 Feb 2019, 15:26
so it was, Hitler ordered to wait when the Russians stop moving troops to Smolensk :)

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

The introduction of an intermediate authority between the army group and the two tank groups, such as the headquarters of the 4th army, has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing the offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.
Did you not say that the Russians opposite AGC were defeated ? :P
Yes, Hitler forced to surround the Soviet reserves, suitable to Smolensk. Them was a little, enough, that Germans could promote, without having noticed them.

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