Barbarossa Planning

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Paul Lakowski
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Paul Lakowski » 14 Feb 2019 05:23

This is true!

JP-2 was 50-50 diesel kerosene mix maximizing from the USSBS table 6 "'German production of petroleum products" got the following amounts of JP-2 per year.

1941 =108,000 tons kerosene = 216,000 tons of JP-2 , while diesel production is down 1.006 million tons from 1.114 million tons

1942 =152,000 tons kerosene = 304,000 tons of JP-2 , while diesel production is down 0.981 million tons from 1.285 million tons .@ 2 tons per sortie that's ~ 416 sortie per day. Which is more than 3 times the need [120sortie per day]

1943 =182,000 tons kerosene = 364,000 tons of JP-2 , while diesel production is down 1,045 million tons from 1.409 million tons .@ 2 tons JP-2 fuel per sortie that's ~ 249 sortie per day. Which is still quite a bit more than the need [160 sortie per day]

1944 =124,000 tons kerosene = 248,000 tons of JP-2 , while diesel production is down .660 million tons from .911 million tons .@ 2 tons JP-2 fuel per sortie that's ~ 170 sortie per day. Which is about 1/4 of the need demand, so a good deal will have to come from AVGAS.

IF ME-262 CAN TRUNCATE DESTRUCTION OF JP-2 FUEL, then the JP-2 production for 1944 should reach 336,000 tons , enough for 230 sortie per day, still 1/3 of demand ; but still just enough to fill every "Luftwaffe West" sortie that year.

Again AVGAS would still be needed. In fact to fill the projected 700-800 sortie per day should consume a million tons of fuel ,deducting the potential JP-2 fuel still means 2/3 million tons of AVGAS would be needed, which is the much of the historic AVGAS supply [million tons]. The planned production without Wallie bombing would mean 2 million tons AVGAS, so if the 700-800 daily Me-262 sortie truncates the bombing there should still be 1.35 million tons of AVGAS or more than historic AVGAS supply.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by ljadw » 14 Feb 2019 07:22

Paul Lakowski wrote:
13 Feb 2019 22:01
ljadw wrote:
13 Feb 2019 19:40
Henschel made trucks, tanks, diesel engines, etc during the war.How many more trucks would Henschel have built if the Gneisenau was not built ?
And what should Germany have done with 30000 jet engine , as there were never 30000 jets ? And if there were that many jets, there would not be fuel for them , and if there was fuel for them, there would not be 30000 additional pilots .
The result would be no Atlantik Wall and idle jets .


30,000 JET engines would start in mid war with maybe 2000 2500 engines per year. Two per Me-262 with 2 hours warm-up and sortie, that's 4 engine hours per sortie . The engine boasted life of 88 flying hours ,so to a first approximation that's 44,000 to 55,000 sortie per year or 120-150 sortie per day...barely enough to fill a determined training programme for 1-2 years. After that its ~12-13,000 engines per year or 250,000-300,000 sortie per year or 700-800 sortie per day. Luftwaffe West was flying 250-300 sortie per day to desperately throttle the allied bomber stream.

Imagine if those LW sortie were Me-262? That could mean every bomber stream could lose 30-40 bombers per or 210 -300 per week.
Where would you get the pilots ? Everything starts with/depends on a sufficient number of candidate pilots : if there are 100 candidates in march 1942, and the training lasts 1 year, you will have not more than 100 pilots in march 1943 .
And about the allied losses : a big part of the attacks were night attacks ,and I like to see that your ME-262 would be that efficient at night .

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by ljadw » 14 Feb 2019 07:33

And about the additional trucks ( and also aircraft, etc ): it is not so that you could say to a director of a plant who is producing 1000 trucks/200 aircraft a year: you will receive more steel, aluminium,.. but you must now produce the double of trucks, or aircraft : where will he get the additional needed workers ? It is not so that,if there are workers available in Bavaria, they will emigrate to a town in Prussia,to live amongst people they despise, or that Prussians will go to Bavaria ;and besides : where would they live ?
What would be possible/be needed would be to build a new plant, somewhere where there is place, where there is a connection with a railway, where there is electricity, where, where, etc, but, as this would demand a lot of time , ...And to enlarge the existing plant would also demand time ...

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Stugbit
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Stugbit » 14 Feb 2019 13:38

ljadw wrote:
14 Feb 2019 07:33
And about the additional trucks ( and also aircraft, etc ): it is not so that you could say to a director of a plant who is producing 1000 trucks/200 aircraft a year: you will receive more steel, aluminium,.. but you must now produce the double of trucks, or aircraft : where will he get the additional needed workers ? It is not so that,if there are workers available in Bavaria, they will emigrate to a town in Prussia,to live amongst people they despise, or that Prussians will go to Bavaria ;and besides : where would they live ?
What would be possible/be needed would be to build a new plant, somewhere where there is place, where there is a connection with a railway, where there is electricity, where, where, etc, but, as this would demand a lot of time , ...And to enlarge the existing plant would also demand time ...
Couldn`t they convert the workers from the field of battleship construction? And they could also build the new jet plants in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven as long as it don`t gets in the way of submarine construction.

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by BDV » 14 Feb 2019 15:25

ljadw wrote:About the French mechanized artillery : how many were available in 1941 ? How would their ammunition be transported? How many would it make to the Wolga ? They would slow up the German advance.
I am not talking only mechanized artillery, but all towed heavy tubes. They would indeed slow down operations between border and DD line, with the payoff of more thorough destruction of RKKA units and the reduction in casualties for Panzerwaffe and infantry.

And, essentially : there was no need for them , there could be no need for them, because, if they were needed, this would mean that, as in the HTL, the Soviets were not defeated, and that a fighting advance was needed to the Wolga, which was out of the question. If the Soviets were defeated after the border battle, no one needed the mechanized artillery: if Ivan was on the run, tanks, artillery, trucks were not needed, infantry was sufficient. If the infantry could not do the job on its own, this meant that Ivan was not on the run.
Exactly, if RKKA is defeated west of and on the DD line AND the Panzerwaffe is minimally affected, THEN panzerwaffe can chase the RKKA remnants to the AA line. This implies that RKKA gives battle West of the DD line (cannot be controlled by Wehrmacht) AND that firepower is made available to do this task (than is strictly controlled by Wehrmacht).

Historically RKKA gave battle west of DD line, and Wehrmacht (in particular PanzerWaffe) REFUSED to accept it.
And there were also the ammunition and fuel problems who made a fighting advance to the Wolga impossible ,problems caused mainly by production and transport difficulties , and a fighting advance to the Ural would only increase these problems .
In July artillery consumption was 101594 ton, In August 108855, in September 107670, in October 90563, in November 68035, in December 83547. How would Germany transport 83547 ton of ammunition to the Wolga, given that a train could carry 400 ton? 400 ton only.
That's 200 trains, 6 trains per day. The German railway operation in Sovjetunion was somewhat lacking, but even they should be able to do that. After all, historically they did help move 3rd Panzer Army North (for the Luga battle) and then South (for Taifun).

The ammunition production for the whole WM was in 1940 864970 ton , in 1941 539500 (down by 38 %),the reasons were that the consumption in 1940 was less than had been estimated, and that there were thus big stocks, that on June 22 LW and KM received again priority and that it would be impossible to transport the needed ammunition if after the border battle, the fighting continued.<br/>
From Waffen und Geheimwaffen P 223 :Die ursprüngliche Annahme allgemein rückläufigen Munitionverbruches in den Wintermonaten hat sich nicht bestätigt.
The assumption that in the winter the consumption of ammunition would decrease, was wrong .
Message from begin March 1942 .
Well, if Wehrmacht can reach the AA line, the level of activity that RKKA can raise should be lesser, as the Sovjet State is obviously much less capable of warfare, so ammo consumption would be less. This hinges on Wehrmacht taking Schneller Heinz's "Klotzen, nicht Kleckern" and Alte Fritz's "He who defends everywhere defends nowhere" konzepta seriously.

Historically German warplanner manages to (simultaneously and at the same time) screw up BOTH these things from the planning stage.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Stugbit
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Stugbit » 14 Feb 2019 16:08

BDV wrote:
14 Feb 2019 15:25
ljadw wrote:About the French mechanized artillery : how many were available in 1941 ? How would their ammunition be transported? How many would it make to the Wolga ? They would slow up the German advance.
I am not talking only mechanized artillery, but all towed heavy tubes. They would indeed slow down operations between border and DD line, with the payoff of more thorough destruction of RKKA units and the reduction in casualties for Panzerwaffe and infantry.

And, essentially : there was no need for them , there could be no need for them, because, if they were needed, this would mean that, as in the HTL, the Soviets were not defeated, and that a fighting advance was needed to the Wolga, which was out of the question. If the Soviets were defeated after the border battle, no one needed the mechanized artillery: if Ivan was on the run, tanks, artillery, trucks were not needed, infantry was sufficient. If the infantry could not do the job on its own, this meant that Ivan was not on the run.
Exactly, if RKKA is defeated west of and on the DD line AND the Panzerwaffe is minimally affected, THEN panzerwaffe can chase the RKKA remnants to the AA line. This implies that RKKA gives battle West of the DD line (cannot be controlled by Wehrmacht) AND that firepower is made available to do this task (than is strictly controlled by Wehrmacht).

Historically RKKA gave battle west of DD line, and Wehrmacht (in particular PanzerWaffe) REFUSED to accept it.
And there were also the ammunition and fuel problems who made a fighting advance to the Wolga impossible ,problems caused mainly by production and transport difficulties , and a fighting advance to the Ural would only increase these problems .
In July artillery consumption was 101594 ton, In August 108855, in September 107670, in October 90563, in November 68035, in December 83547. How would Germany transport 83547 ton of ammunition to the Wolga, given that a train could carry 400 ton? 400 ton only.
That's 200 trains, 6 trains per day. The German railway operation in Sovjetunion was somewhat lacking, but even they should be able to do that. After all, historically they did help move 3rd Panzer Army North (for the Luga battle) and then South (for Taifun).

The ammunition production for the whole WM was in 1940 864970 ton , in 1941 539500 (down by 38 %),the reasons were that the consumption in 1940 was less than had been estimated, and that there were thus big stocks, that on June 22 LW and KM received again priority and that it would be impossible to transport the needed ammunition if after the border battle, the fighting continued.<br/>
From Waffen und Geheimwaffen P 223 :Die ursprüngliche Annahme allgemein rückläufigen Munitionverbruches in den Wintermonaten hat sich nicht bestätigt.
The assumption that in the winter the consumption of ammunition would decrease, was wrong .
Message from begin March 1942 .
Well, if Wehrmacht can reach the AA line, the level of activity that RKKA can raise should be lesser, as the Sovjet State is obviously much less capable of warfare, so ammo consumption would be less. This hinges on Wehrmacht taking Schneller Heinz's "Klotzen, nicht Kleckern" and Alte Fritz's "He who defends everywhere defends nowhere" konzepta seriously.

Historically German warplanner manages to (simultaneously and at the same time) screw up BOTH these things from the planning stage.
But are you sure about those guns efficiency, BDV?

We were debating another day about late war air-strikes efficiency, people were saying they are overrated. If air-strikes are overrated, what about the artillery? They had tons of guns in WWI and neither side could defeat the other.

Wouldn`t it be better to melt the guns in a furnace and turn them into Hanomags, so the infantry could keep pace with the tanks?

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by BDV » 14 Feb 2019 21:38

Stugbit wrote:But are you sure about those guns efficiency, BDV?

We were debating another day about late war air-strikes efficiency, people were saying they are overrated. If air-strikes are overrated, what about the artillery? They had tons of guns in WWI and neither side could defeat the other.

I don't know about efficiency, but US schlepped about 500 (wheeled!) GPFs to the ETO, and gave UK and French Auxilliaries another 200.

Turns out, ubermensch were not impervious to Colonel Filloux's 100 pound shells. I doubt the Neuer Sowjetischer Mann were any more resilient. Guess, we will never know for sure, though.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by ljadw » 15 Feb 2019 08:03

BDV wrote:
14 Feb 2019 15:25




Exactly, if RKKA is defeated west of and on the DD line AND the Panzerwaffe is minimally affected, THEN panzerwaffe can chase the RKKA remnants to the AA line. This implies that RKKA gives battle West of the DD line (cannot be controlled by Wehrmacht) AND that firepower is made available to do this task (than is strictly controlled by Wehrmacht).
That is not correct : the Panzerwaffe could not chase the RKKA remnants to the Wolga, because tanks are too slow, they would not make it, they would need supplies transportede by trucks, who could not make it , and they did not operate independently ,but always in collaboration with the infantry and artillery . Only infantry could go to the Wolga. By train .

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by BDV » 15 Feb 2019 15:18

ljadw wrote:
BDV wrote:Exactly, if RKKA is defeated west of and on the DD line AND the Panzerwaffe is minimally affected, THEN panzerwaffe can chase the RKKA remnants to the AA line. This implies that RKKA gives battle West of the DD line (cannot be controlled by Wehrmacht) AND that firepower is made available to do this task (than is strictly controlled by Wehrmacht).
That is not correct : the Panzerwaffe could not chase the RKKA remnants to the Wolga, because tanks are too slow, they would not make it, they would need supplies transportede by trucks, who could not make it , and they did not operate independently ,but always in collaboration with the infantry and artillery . Only infantry could go to the Wolga. By train .

Well, vKleist's Panzers made it to Rostov-on Don before retreating to Taganrog, with 2450 km travelled while fighting. Unless Guderian had worse panzers than vKleist, 2nd Panzer would also be able to cover the 2450 km it would take to get to Samara, provided RKKA is defeated by someone else, and 2ndPanzer has to do modest amount of fighting beyond chasing RKKA remnants to the AA line.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Stugbit » 15 Feb 2019 16:05

What is AA line and DD line? DD line = Dvina/Dniepr line?

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by ljadw » 15 Feb 2019 16:08

And, how long took it the Pz of Kleist to go to Rostov-0n-Don ?
If the tanks of Patton did not go to Berlin in 1944,why would Guderian go to Samara in 1941 ?
How many of von Kleist's tanks made it to Dunkirk in 1940 ? And how many were operational when they arrived at Dunkirk ?
There is also the fact that to defend the Wolga,the Germans needed boots on the ground,and not tanks .
First the infantry would go to the Wolga, by train, than , small numbers of tanks and artillery would also go to the Wolga, also by train : in June 1944 9 and 10 SS were going from Poland to Normandy, by train, 2 SS was going from Toulouse to Normandy, by train, after the fall of Sevastopol, units from Manstein were going to Leningrad, by train .Tanks could not go on their own, they needed supply,infantry,artillery units ...

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by ljadw » 15 Feb 2019 16:09

Stugbit wrote:
15 Feb 2019 16:05
What is AA line and DD line? DD line = Dvina/Dniepr line?
Dvina/Dnjepr and Archangelsk /Astrachan .

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by BDV » 15 Feb 2019 17:29

ljadw wrote:And, how long took it the Pz of Kleist to go to Rostov-0n-Don?
5 months. What does it matter?
If the tanks of Patton did not go to Berlin in 1944,why would Guderian go to Samara in 1941 ?
"WHY?" is a different issue from the issue of "Could they physically do it?" Which, they could.

How many of von Kleist's tanks made it to Dunkirk in 1940 ? And how many were operational when they arrived at Dunkirk ?
How is Dunkirk relevant when actual units, involved in the actual Barbarossa fighting completed the actual task of moving 2500 km?

There is also the fact that to defend the Wolga,the Germans needed boots on the ground,and not tanks.

First the infantry would go to the Wolga, by train, than , small numbers of tanks and artillery would also go to the Wolga, also by train
No quarrel here.

Tanks could not go on their own, they needed supply, infantry, artillery units ...
Yes, and given the shoestring on which Axis was acting, operations in heavy terrain (marshland, i.e. the assault on Leningrad) should have been reduced to minimum, as to allow timely repair of destroyed logistical infrastructure to support the march east.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Paul Lakowski » 16 Feb 2019 04:41

ljadw wrote:
14 Feb 2019 07:22
Paul Lakowski wrote:
13 Feb 2019 22:01
ljadw wrote:
13 Feb 2019 19:40
Henschel made trucks, tanks, diesel engines, etc during the war.How many more trucks would Henschel have built if the Gneisenau was not built ?
And what should Germany have done with 30000 jet engine , as there were never 30000 jets ? And if there were that many jets, there would not be fuel for them , and if there was fuel for them, there would not be 30000 additional pilots .
The result would be no Atlantik Wall and idle jets .


30,000 JET engines would start in mid war with maybe 2000 2500 engines per year. Two per Me-262 with 2 hours warm-up and sortie, that's 4 engine hours per sortie . The engine boasted life of 88 flying hours ,so to a first approximation that's 44,000 to 55,000 sortie per year or 120-150 sortie per day...barely enough to fill a determined training programme for 1-2 years. After that its ~12-13,000 engines per year or 250,000-300,000 sortie per year or 700-800 sortie per day. Luftwaffe West was flying 250-300 sortie per day to desperately throttle the allied bomber stream.

Imagine if those LW sortie were Me-262? That could mean every bomber stream could lose 30-40 bombers per or 210 -300 per week.
Where would you get the pilots ? Everything starts with/depends on a sufficient number of candidate pilots : if there are 100 candidates in march 1942, and the training lasts 1 year, you will have not more than 100 pilots in march 1943 .
And about the allied losses : a big part of the attacks were night attacks ,and I like to see that your ME-262 would be that efficient at night .
I'd get the extra pilots from useless arguments on the internet or recruiting them from the clans on WOW .

The LW had 1000 aces by the beginning of 1943 and new pilots were flying 250 hours per year in 1943.

If 300 Me-262 sortie per day by 43/44 , could drive the Americans to night bombing - then its mission accomplished- since night bombing was 1/3 as accurate as day bombing.

BTW were the hell are you getting MORE TRUCKS from? All my proposals are always " X INSTEAD OF Y"!!!!!!!!!

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Re: Barbarossa Planning

Post by Paul Lakowski » 16 Feb 2019 05:19

ljadw wrote:
14 Feb 2019 07:33
And about the additional trucks ( and also aircraft, etc ): it is not so that you could say to a director of a plant who is producing 1000 trucks/200 aircraft a year: you will receive more steel, aluminium,.. but you must now produce the double of trucks, or aircraft : where will he get the additional needed workers ? It is not so that,if there are workers available in Bavaria, they will emigrate to a town in Prussia,to live amongst people they despise, or that Prussians will go to Bavaria ;and besides : where would they live ?
What would be possible/be needed would be to build a new plant, somewhere where there is place, where there is a connection with a railway, where there is electricity, where, where, etc, but, as this would demand a lot of time , ...And to enlarge the existing plant would also demand time ...
Actually that's exactly how its done. Give them enough incentive profit and they will change. This was done with Zugkraftwagen industry in 44 , with conversion to building other tanks , aero engines etc. tank engines tank transmissions , small arms. Doesn't seem to have be much difficulty according to USSBS. In the occasional case -the follow on production was 1/2 what they hope for, but it worked 'more or less'.

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