The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Aida1]

You did overinflate the losses by - at some point, even applying the reduction in combat strength on the total mobilisable strength of the red army in order to make Halder look like a fool. The only thing the FHO underestimated was the ability of the red army to replace losses in men and equipment and set up new units.

I posted a excerpt - for all to see - of the FHO assessment itself.

The assessment where the FHO indicates that the Red Army had already suffered 3-4 times the losses that they had actually incurred. An error that could be easily recognised by a simple comparison with the Soviet body count (dead and alive) that the Heer had overrun.

I was not me that overinflated the losses of the Red Army up to the beginning of August, it was the FHO and OKH who did that.

If you wish to continue denying to yourself the historical evidence, so be it. I bothers me not.


PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

You misinterpreted what the FHO stated as was explained before in detail.

[MarkN]

You misinterpreted what the FHO stated as was explained before in detail.

If by "explained before in detail" you mean your own unevidenced, tangental and rambling attempts to deny and misdirect, then they don't count.

You have explained nothing of relevance regarding the FHO assessment and calculation that I presented. Nothing.

I was not me that overinflated the losses of the Red Army up to the beginning of August, it was the FHO and OKH who did that themselves. At look what the consequences were of that....

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupidity?


PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

[Aida1]

You misinterpreted what the FHO stated as was explained before in detail.

If by "explained before in detail" you mean your own unevidenced, tangental and rambling attempts to deny and misdirect, then they don't count.

You have explained nothing of relevance regarding the FHO assessment and calculation that I presented. Nothing.

I was not me that overinflated the losses of the Red Army up to the beginning of August, it was the FHO and OKH who did that themselves. At look what the consequences were of that....

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupidity?


PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

Repeating yourself does not change the facts. You misinterpreted what the FHO stated so you should look in the mirror when making accusations against individuals who are y more competent than you.

[MarkN]

Repeating yourself does not change the facts. You misinterpreted what the FHO stated so you should look in the mirror when making accusations against individuals who are y more competent than you.

Fact: it was the FHO and OKH who overinflated the success of the Heer up to early August. A fact that had significant consequence on subsequent operations.

Repeating it again does not change the fact that the FHO assessment of 8 August 1941 was a significant, by a factor of 3 or 4, overinflation of the losses actually suffered by the Red Army. Nor does it change the fact that nobody in the OKH seems to have picked up on this error or seen the flaw in the calculation. Nor does it change the fact that Heer then failed with BARBAROSSA.

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupidity that lead to the overinflation of, and belief in, their own successes?

PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

[Appleknocker27]

Fact: it was the FHO and OKH who overinflated the success of the Heer up to early August. A fact that had significant consequence on subsequent operations.

Pardon the interruption... What is the inflated success of the Heer up to August in specific reference to? Are you referring to Halder's premature comments about the Russian campaign being decided in 6 weeks, etc.?
I'm just looking to get the proper context of what you're discussing.

[MarkN]

Fact: it was the FHO and OKH who overinflated the success of the Heer up to early August. A fact that had significant consequence on subsequent operations.

Pardon the interruption... What is the inflated success of the Heer up to August in specific reference to? Are you referring to Halder's premature comments about the Russian campaign being decided in 6 weeks, etc.?
I'm just looking to get the proper context of what you're discussing.

Off the top of my head.

It was the daily FHO assessment/lagebericht for 8 August 1941.

Amongst a daily tactical update, it also included a strategic assessment of what was left of the Red Army. That equated to, l think, 60-70 divisions (kampfvert) in front of them, 40 divisions in the interior and 20 divisions on other fronts.

It also explained how they had calculated the expected Red Army size of 370 kriegsstarke Divisionen and a breakdown of the 390 division they now thought the Red Army started with. The 390 includes the remaining 120-130 mentionned above.

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.



PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

[Appleknocker27]

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.

Thanks for providing needed context. On face value, I would tend to agree with the assessment to ignore destroyed units, at least for the most part. It would depend on if they were "destroyed" in respect to their primary equipment, leadership and most of their combat personnel. Based on that criteria, it would seem that within Barbarossa's timeline that it would be fair to ignore units "destroyed" in that way.

[BDV]

In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops.

Unless FHO specifically states so, the briefing cannot be taken to mean that FHO stated or even implied that 7.42 - 7.56 million troops have been eliminated.

On the contrary, Wehrmacht's rush to prevent the non-eliminated part of the 7.42 - 7.56 million from joining the battle has significant explanatory value for the tea leaf reading exercise we're engaged in.

[MarkN]

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.

Thanks for providing needed context. On face value, I would tend to agree with the assessment to ignore destroyed units, at least for the most part. It would depend on if they were "destroyed" in respect to their primary equipment, leadership and most of their combat personnel. Based on that criteria, it would seem that within Barbarossa's timeline that it would be fair to ignore units "destroyed" in that way.

Fair? Really?

Historically the Heer still had considerable more than 60-70 divisions (kampfvert) in front of them and the great majority of that additional kampfvert was manpower and equipment that the FHO had chosen to ignore as already having been destroyed or assumed not to count. Fair?

The FHO's calculations were flawed in so many ways that the assessment they produced was worthless.

First, yes, ignoring destroyed units is ok. But first you have to be assured that a unit is sufficiently destroyed to be able to be ignored.

The FHO didn't do that. They waved their hand and hej presto! 260-270 division (kampfvert) were gone.

Was that a realistic and credible judgement? On what did they base that judgement?

On what basis did the OKH accept those judgements? Did they make any effort to question or confirm the judgement and assessment?

Consider this.
The FHO briefings prior to the start of BARBAROSSA stated a Red Army after mobilization up to 11 million strong. The FHO briefing of 8 August 1941 suggests a Red Army calculated up to 370 kreigsstarke Divisionen strong. Either:
(a) the write down of 260-270 divisions (kampfvert) represents about 7.5 million troops destroyed and ignored with about 3.5 million remaining (120-130 division kampfvert) or
(b) the FHO has suddenly written down several million from their pre-invasion estimation (11 million) of Red Army strength as not even existing!!!!

Take your pick.


PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

[MarkN]

In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops

Unless FHO specifically states so, the briefing cannot be taken to mean that FHO stated or even implied that 7.42 - 7.56 million troops have been eliminated.

On the contrary, Wehrmacht's rush to prevent the non-eliminated part of the 7.42 - 7.56 million from joining the battle has significant explanatory value for the tea leaf reading exercise we're engaged in.

The pre-invasion planning assumption was a mobilized Red Army could/would field upto 11 million troops.

In your mind BDV, how many troops does the 60-65, 40 and 20 divisions remaining represent? How many does the 265-270 divisions now considered destroyed/ignired/irrelevant/gone represent?

[Aida1]

Fact: it was the FHO and OKH who overinflated the success of the Heer up to early August. A fact that had significant consequence on subsequent operations.

Pardon the interruption... What is the inflated success of the Heer up to August in specific reference to? Are you referring to Halder's premature comments about the Russian campaign being decided in 6 weeks, etc.?
I'm just looking to get the proper context of what you're discussing.

Off the top of my head.

It was the daily FHO assessment/lagebericht for 8 August 1941.

Amongst a daily tactical update, it also included a strategic assessment of what was left of the Red Army. That equated to, l think, 60-70 divisions (kampfvert) in front of them, 40 divisions in the interior and 20 divisions on other fronts.

It also explained how they had calculated the expected Red Army size of 370 kriegsstarke Divisionen and a breakdown of the 390 division they now thought the Red Army started with. The 390 includes the remaining 120-130 mentionned above.

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.



PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

Again you are misinterpreting. That the red army divisions had the combat strength of 65 divisions does not mean that there are only 65 divisions left. It means that the divisions left have the equivalent combat strength of 65 divisions. It is not mentioned in that Lagebericht how many divisions have actually been totally destroyed. In a FEindlage bericht of 27.07 it was explicitly mentioned that after deduction of divisions destroyed and the divisions in North FInnland ,Kaukasian,middle Asia and the Far East ,there were 150 infantrydivisions, 25 panzerdivisions and 5 cavalry of which only 6 had not been in combat or not much.Given losses sustained, the battle strength of these was 80 infantry, 13 panzer and 2-3 cavalry(Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion Boog/Forster/Hoffmann/Klink/Müller/Uberschar Fischer 1991 p 584). Implicitly, this means that on average the combat strength of the remaining divisions is estimated to be down by 50 %.
You are always confusing combat strength and total strength of a unit. Only exceptionally the total manpower of a unit is destroyed.
So your statement of 260 divisions being totally destroyed is nonsense.

[Aida1]

In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops

Unless FHO specifically states so, the briefing cannot be taken to mean that FHO stated or even implied that 7.42 - 7.56 million troops have been eliminated.

On the contrary, Wehrmacht's rush to prevent the non-eliminated part of the 7.42 - 7.56 million from joining the battle has significant explanatory value for the tea leaf reading exercise we're engaged in.

The pre-invasion planning assumption was a mobilized Red Army could/would field upto 11 million troops.

In your mind BDV, how many troops does the 60-65, 40 and 20 divisions remaining represent? How many does the 265-270 divisions now considered destroyed/ignired/irrelevant/gone represent?

Wrong question as the FHO never stated there were 65 divisions left.

[Aida1]

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.

Thanks for providing needed context. On face value, I would tend to agree with the assessment to ignore destroyed units, at least for the most part. It would depend on if they were "destroyed" in respect to their primary equipment, leadership and most of their combat personnel. Based on that criteria, it would seem that within Barbarossa's timeline that it would be fair to ignore units "destroyed" in that way.

Fair? Really?

Historically the Heer still had considerable more than 60-70 divisions (kampfvert) in front of them and the great majority of that additional kampfvert was manpower and equipment that the FHO had chosen to ignore as already having been destroyed or assumed not to count. Fair?

The FHO's calculations were flawed in so many ways that the assessment they produced was worthless.

First, yes, ignoring destroyed units is ok. But first you have to be assured that a unit is sufficiently destroyed to be able to be ignored.

The FHO didn't do that. They waved their hand and hej presto! 260-270 division (kampfvert) were gone.

Was that a realistic and credible judgement? On what did they base that judgement?

On what basis did the OKH accept those judgements? Did they make any effort to question or confirm the judgement and assessment?

Consider this.
The FHO briefings prior to the start of BARBAROSSA stated a Red Army after mobilization up to 11 million strong. The FHO briefing of 8 August 1941 suggests a Red Army calculated up to 370 kreigsstarke Divisionen strong. Either:
(a) the write down of 260-270 divisions (kampfvert) represents about 7.5 million troops destroyed and ignored with about 3.5 million remaining (120-130 division kampfvert) or
(b) the FHO has suddenly written down several million from their pre-invasion estimation (11 million) of Red Army strength as not even existing!!!!

Take your pick.


PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

You are completely wrong. There are many more than 65 divisions left. At the end juli a of number of 150 infantry divisions was estimated with a combat strength of 80.
Losses are mostly sustained by the combat units in a division so the combat strength of a division being down by 50 % does not imply the total strength of the division is down by 50 %. And casualties are wounded and dead. So you are overinflating the numbers of what allegedly was discounted.
The only thing the FHO underestimated was the extent to which existing units could be refitted and new units could be set up.

[Aida1]

The implication being that 260-270 divisions (kampvert) - and their total manpower - had already been destroyed to the point of being able to ignore them completely in respect of future operations.

Thanks for providing needed context. On face value, I would tend to agree with the assessment to ignore destroyed units, at least for the most part. It would depend on if they were "destroyed" in respect to their primary equipment, leadership and most of their combat personnel. Based on that criteria, it would seem that within Barbarossa's timeline that it would be fair to ignore units "destroyed" in that way.

In that Lagebericht it is not mentioned how many divisions were remaining on the front at that time,only what their equivalent combat strength was. So MarkN overstates massively.The number of divisions really considered destroyed is much less than he pretends. He goes even further by applying the reduction of combat strength on anything above the level of the division.

[Aida1]

Repeating yourself does not change the facts. You misinterpreted what the FHO stated so you should look in the mirror when making accusations against individuals who are y more competent than you.

Fact: it was the FHO and OKH who overinflated the success of the Heer up to early August. A fact that had significant consequence on subsequent operations.

Repeating it again does not change the fact that the FHO assessment of 8 August 1941 was a significant, by a factor of 3 or 4, overinflation of the losses actually suffered by the Red Army. Nor does it change the fact that nobody in the OKH seems to have picked up on this error or seen the flaw in the calculation. Nor does it change the fact that Heer then failed with BARBAROSSA.

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupidity that lead to the overinflation of, and belief in, their own successes?

PS.
Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

No and i explained again in detail why you are so massively wrong.FHO may have underestimated certain aspects of the red army but there was no stupidity or hybris. Look in the mirror before making accusations.