There was no absolute need to do it all in one big battle.That would not be possible anyway given the length of the front. There were 4 months available to do the job. There were certainly ways to do better than one actually did .MarkN wrote: ↑20 Dec 2019, 23:38The Heer chewed through what stood in its way. But it it did significantly less damage than it supposed/assumed. Those poor assumptions, or errors in combat analysis, came back to haunt them.BDV wrote: ↑20 Dec 2019, 22:09Even through those 170 divisions, they mostly left them un-chewed, with only the Minsk pocket in the first 4 weeks of Barbarossa. In the corresponding time interval in the West in 1940, Germans had already removed the Dutch Army, the Belgian Army, the BEF and the French 1st Army from the conflict.
Back to poster Appleknocker27's problem...This is the problem of TAIFUN brought forward in time and assumes the Heer finished off Smolensk far quicker than they did in history and then immediately lurched forward again without a pause. A logistical pause presumed necessary but never implemented.So...(to me) The problem statement for OKH would read something like; "How does AGC conduct a deep encirclement of Red Army forces East of Smolensk by the third week of July in order to, 1) destroy the STAVKA reserve on the central axis, 2) occupy major Red Army mobilization centers Vyazma and Briansk before forming Soviet forces become combat capable".
Given how much earlier this takes place, and it assumes the Heer performing significantly better than it did in reality in the first 3 weeks of the battle, we are into complete fiction.
If it is posited as a startpoint for a TEWT for HGM staff circa April/May 1941, the answer will be similar to "How does AGC conduct a deep encirclement of Red Army forces West of Minsk by the last week of June in order to, 1) destroy the Red Army Western Front reserve on the central axis, 2) occupy major Red Army mobilization centers in and around Minsk before forming Soviet forces become combat capable" except with a closer analysis of the logistical situation.
The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
There were no 4 months available to do the job, but only 4 weeks .The claim that if the Germans had failed to eliminate the Soviets in two months, they still had two months left to do it,is only wishful-thinking.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Untrue.The job had to be done before the autumn rains. It could never be done in 4 weeks anyway.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
The planning was more complicated than that and it would always take much more than 4 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 11:30Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
b) The consumption of ammunition produced by units temporarily attached to the regiment:
...
...
________________________________________________________________
140300 shells - 5324 tons
This amounts to 355 rail cars or 12 train echelons of 30 cars each.
c) The total consumption of ammunition of the regiment with attached units:
...
...
________________________________________________________________
491400 shells - 17308 tons
This amounts to 1,154 cars or 39 train echelons of 30 cars each.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
No : what could not be done in a few weeks, could not be done in a few months : the longer the war lasted, the stronger the SU and the weaker Germany . That's why Hitler said in the Barbarossa Weising that combat able parts of the Red Army should not be allowed to withdraw east of the DD line ,that's why there would be a small operational pause after the crossing of the DD line: it would not be dangerous, it would not give the Red Army the time to recover, because after the border fighting, there would be no longer a Red Army and the regime and the state would disappear : August 1941 in the SU would be as November 1917 in Russia : total chaos .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 15:10The planning was more complicated than that and it would always take much more than 4 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 11:30Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
But if the regime and the Red Army continued to exist in August, they would still be there in November and Germany would not win .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
A little more information to think about.
Consumption ammunition 9th anti-aircraft division Luftwaffe (motorized) for October 1942 amounted to:
- 5,108 tons (at is more than 11 echelons).
Mileage cars 330,100 kilometers.
9.Lw.FlakDivision (mot.) acted together with AOK.6 in district Stalingrad.
Consumption ammunition 9th anti-aircraft division Luftwaffe (motorized) for October 1942 amounted to:
- 5,108 tons (at is more than 11 echelons).
Mileage cars 330,100 kilometers.
9.Lw.FlakDivision (mot.) acted together with AOK.6 in district Stalingrad.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Nonsense. There was no absolute need to the job in a few weeks. Finishing before the autumn rains was the only imperativeljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 21:09No : what could not be done in a few weeks, could not be done in a few months : the longer the war lasted, the stronger the SU and the weaker Germany . That's why Hitler said in the Barbarossa Weising that combat able parts of the Red Army should not be allowed to withdraw east of the DD line ,that's why there would be a small operational pause after the crossing of the DD line: it would not be dangerous, it would not give the Red Army the time to recover, because after the border fighting, there would be no longer a Red Army and the regime and the state would disappear : August 1941 in the SU would be as November 1917 in Russia : total chaos .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 15:10The planning was more complicated than that and it would always take much more than 4 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 11:30Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
But if the regime and the Red Army continued to exist in August, they would still be there in November and Germany would not win .
- Appleknocker27
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
That isn't what happened or what I stated. The only source you will find that does say anything substantial to that effect is Krivosheev as he breaks down Red Army losses for the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclements and says something to the effect of 497,000 men were Red Army Soldiers, the remainder of the 600+ thousand were still civilians that hadn't been in-processed yet. The point that I was trying to make in the spirit of the original topic of logistics, was that those forces around Vyazma-Bryansk were forming in that area as the Smolensk battle played out. Point being, better Intel, better support plan, longer operational reach, effect those mobilization centers early enough to completely disrupt Soviet force generation on the central axis. As it was, those forces were in the last stages of forming, but no where near wartime establishment in anything (men, equipment, proficiency, etc.). See page 68-69 of Glantz' "When Titans Clashed" for a mobilization map that shows armies, by wave, by location, by month.HistoryGeek2019 wrote: ↑20 Dec 2019, 20:52Appleknocker - can you please give a cite for where Glantz (or anyone) says that Soviet mobilization plans were thwarted by the Germans capturing mobilization centers too quickly?
- Appleknocker27
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- Joined: 05 Jun 2007, 18:11
- Location: US/Europe
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
No, it remains to be seen if you understand Soviet mobilization, force generation and force management as it was in 1941, and simply listing something in Cyrillic does not provide an example of your understanding of the material, even if you can read it.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Hitler,Brauchitsch, Halder, Paulus, all those who made the planning,they all disagree with you : it was Halder who said : speed is essential .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 21:30Nonsense. There was no absolute need to the job in a few weeks. Finishing before the autumn rains was the only imperativeljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 21:09No : what could not be done in a few weeks, could not be done in a few months : the longer the war lasted, the stronger the SU and the weaker Germany . That's why Hitler said in the Barbarossa Weising that combat able parts of the Red Army should not be allowed to withdraw east of the DD line ,that's why there would be a small operational pause after the crossing of the DD line: it would not be dangerous, it would not give the Red Army the time to recover, because after the border fighting, there would be no longer a Red Army and the regime and the state would disappear : August 1941 in the SU would be as November 1917 in Russia : total chaos .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 15:10The planning was more complicated than that and it would always take much more than 4 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 11:30Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
But if the regime and the Red Army continued to exist in August, they would still be there in November and Germany would not win .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Appleknocker27 wrote: ↑23 Dec 2019, 04:50No, it remains to be seen if you understand Soviet mobilization, force generation and force management as it was in 1941, and simply listing something in Cyrillic does not provide an example of your understanding of the material, even if you can read it.
Similarly, it remains to be seen if you understand Soviet mobilization, force generation and force management as it was in 1941, and simply listing a couple of books you've read in English does not provide an example of your understanding of the material, even if you can read it.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Untrue. They did not believe it needed to be done in 4 weeks. It was always planned to be done in 8-10 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑23 Dec 2019, 09:20Hitler,Brauchitsch, Halder, Paulus, all those who made the planning,they all disagree with you : it was Halder who said : speed is essential .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 21:30Nonsense. There was no absolute need to the job in a few weeks. Finishing before the autumn rains was the only imperativeljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 21:09No : what could not be done in a few weeks, could not be done in a few months : the longer the war lasted, the stronger the SU and the weaker Germany . That's why Hitler said in the Barbarossa Weising that combat able parts of the Red Army should not be allowed to withdraw east of the DD line ,that's why there would be a small operational pause after the crossing of the DD line: it would not be dangerous, it would not give the Red Army the time to recover, because after the border fighting, there would be no longer a Red Army and the regime and the state would disappear : August 1941 in the SU would be as November 1917 in Russia : total chaos .Aida1 wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 15:10The planning was more complicated than that and it would always take much more than 4 weeks.ljadw wrote: ↑22 Dec 2019, 11:30Wrong : Brauchitsch said to Paulus : a few weeks of big fighting,followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy .
The Soviet Union had to be defeated before August , or at last in the first half of August .If it was not,the Soviets would parade in Berlin .
Brauchitsch was talking about 6-8 weeks at maximum, others about 4 weeks .On July 3 Halder said : we have won in 2 weeks .
But if the regime and the Red Army continued to exist in August, they would still be there in November and Germany would not win .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Clearly,his advantage over you is that he has more than book knowledge about the subject which makes a big difference.MarkN wrote: ↑23 Dec 2019, 12:56Appleknocker27 wrote: ↑23 Dec 2019, 04:50No, it remains to be seen if you understand Soviet mobilization, force generation and force management as it was in 1941, and simply listing something in Cyrillic does not provide an example of your understanding of the material, even if you can read it.
Similarly, it remains to be seen if you understand Soviet mobilization, force generation and force management as it was in 1941, and simply listing a couple of books you've read in English does not provide an example of your understanding of the material, even if you can read it.