Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting. So, in the mind of a logistician and the analysis of an operation; we look specifically at "requirements", priority of support as designated by the Ops section, by phase, by day, by 8 hour, etc. That is matched with "capabilities", as in stockage level, delivery assets, etc. The Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) drives demand, which conversely drives logistical planning. A concept of support is built based on the information from the Intel section (trafficability of road net, weather, expected enemy interdiction, etc.) and the Ops section (priority of support, type or level of combat expected, etc.). From that we get "burn rates" for fuel, ammo, etc.ljadw wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019 08:02Iraq 2016-2017 is not the SU 1941 .
You are arguing as a Logistician of 2019 with the knowledge and bias of 2019 about what happened 78 years ago in an other country,but you forget that only the German logisticians of 1941 with the knowledge and bias of 1941 could decide ,judge the importance of logistics of 1941 . The logistics of the Ostheer in 1941 are not the logistics of the US army in the ME .
You make the big mistake of assuming that there are universal logistic laws and that what is used in 2019 could also be used in 1941 .
1941 was an other world with other laws,where the principals and concepts of 2019 had no place .
You know the outcome of Barbarossa, the logisticians of 1941 did not, thus you should not judge or condemn them . You would not have done better because your knowledge, your MA would be useless .
Like the Wehrmacht, we use what we call a LEW (Log est worksheet) that lists all of the major equipment and its burn rates depending on terrain, weather, level of combat, etc. and we plug in the numbers from there and get base estimates to match against our capabilities and prioritize.
That is Kindergarten level logistics in a paragraph. What part of that seems modern and out of touch to you? I've studied Paulus' wargames from Fall of 1940 and we don't do business much different than he and his staff did then. So...seems obvious to me your comments are way off. To bring this full circle, "IF" the Wehrmacht had better Intel in 1940 about the Soviet force array, dispositions, force generation, etc., what would the operational plan look like and more importantly what could Germany have done to support it?