The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 26 Jan 2020 19:30

Headquarters of the 1st Tank Army
Chief of sapper troops of the Army
Appendix 1
To intelligence summary # 54
26.1.42


Excerpt from the testimony of a prisoner of war about Russian flamethrowers.

Praydak George, born in 1913, a native of Chernigov, Ukrainian, a collective farmer, a Separate 20th chemical company (flamethrower).

Praydak was mobilized in July and sent to a collection point in the Moscow region.
Training together with other recruits took place in a Separate 20th chemical company located in the forest near Moscow.
More than 50 such companies were organized there. The training lasted two and a half months.

All this time, they were trained only to fire a flamethrower.

18.9.1941 the 20th flamethrower company was sent to the front in Novgorod.

For the commander of PzAOK1
Chief of the General staff on behalf VENIKE.
Removed copy right: adjutant Ober-Lieutenant (signed)

Translated: /Reinert/
Head of the Intelligence Department
headquarters of the Northern group of troops of the Transcaucasian front major /Barsukov/

-----------

So, the city of Chernigov /this is Ukraine/ is located South-West of the Smolensk-Vyazma region.
A resident of the Chernigov region drafted in July 1941.
According to one of the members of AHF forum, this person should be sent to the division that is being formed in the Smolensk-Vyazma area.
In fact, as we can see, from the area southwest of Vyazma, this recruit is sent to Moscow, that is, 500 km to the East of the place of residence.
And only in mid-September 1941, the Red Army soldier Praydak was sent to Novgorod, that is, to the North-Western front.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Jan 2020 00:37

Appleknocker27 wrote:
26 Jan 2020 02:06
I acknowledge the casualties of the OTL and postulate that the main issue facing the Wehrmacht is force protection and maintaining its own fragile balance with personnel replacements and losses in order to have the requisite combat power to execute their own tactical doctrine effectively. Many of the losses to the all important Infantry battalions came about during the month long pause brought about by the Kiev operation. Leaving AGC in a fixed position for the Soviets to batter was an invitation for a bloodbath. It should also be noted that the majority of the 228k reported frostbite cases happened after Taifun had long culminated and also after the Soviets launched the counter offensive. By neutralizing Moscow as a transportation, logistics, mobilization and communications hub, the chances of the Soviets being able to mount a surprise offensive are remote, thus potentially saving the Wehrmacht a huge number of casualties (OTL 262k from 26 Nov to 28 Feb). The point being that the Soviet offensive forced the Germans to conduct active operations out in the cold as opposed to focusing on winter survival and reset.
I'm not so sure that is the case? Casualties were severe throughout BARBAROSSA, with some of the severest coming during the first weeks (22 June-6 July)...the first two weeks of so much success resulted in 63,675 casualties, with "only" 23,188 in HG-Mitte. The trend continued over the next month, 6 Jul-3 August, with 184,090 casualties of which 70,412 were HG-M. Losses 3-30 August in the opening stages of the Kiev encirclement, when HG-Mitte was starting its month-long "pause" were 154,828, with HG-Mitte incurring 64,940, while 1-30 September losses decreased to 131,575, with HG-Mitte suffering 40,518. The problem was by then the damage to the Ostheer was done...all the readily available replacements were used up and the Heer was forced to scramble for more. Half a million casualties in just over the first three months of the campaign...any "savings" after 26 November or 3 December are essentially moot, since the campaign was already lost by then and the initiative for the winter was with the Soviets.
Medical care is part of logistics and in the spirit of "improved logistics" for Barbarossa the medical services would also have to react to more accurate intel (that is the assumption). I believe pages back several posters agreed that more accurate intel would produce a better operational design and greater depth to the logistical concept of support as a result. Wehrmacht medical support in the OTL was based on a plan that more or less ended at the Dnieper. Anything after that point was pure improvisation on the fly with limited resources.
I don't think the problem was accurate intel for medical services, it was crap medical services. See for example the scathing review of German medical practices at the end of the war as surveyed by the U.S. Army Medical Corps. After nearly six years of fighting, the Germans were still struggling with typhus, mostly due to poor sanitary practices, and hospital standards were considered sub-par to say the least. If you are familiar with the history of medicine in the U.S. and Europe that is an astonishing turnaround from the first two decades of the century, when German medical care and knowledge was considered best in the world, while American medicine was still in the dark ages. It was not a logistical issue, which could be improved by tweaking; it was a systemic issue.
The original Barbarossa plan as it was could not carry the day no matter how anyone 2nd guesses or changes the decisions made, it needed to be re-worked from the start. My point all along was that the issue started with the failure of the Intel branch, which led to an unrealistic operational plan and inadequate concept of support. For that, you cannot blame Barbarossa's failure on Wehrmacht logistics.
Agreed...except that it started when the senior command decided to ignore intelligence assessments that contradicted their assumptions. As we have seen, the operational intelligence on Soviet forces on the frontier to a depth of about 700-1000 kilometers was reasonably accurate, while the strategic assessment actually exaggerated overall Soviet force generation capability. Despite that the decision was to go ahead and then it became easy to blame events on an "intel failure".
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 27 Jan 2020 07:22

Appleknocker27 wrote:The ultimate aim is an encirclement or outright seizure of the Moscow communications and transport hub, which cripples the Soviet ability to launch a counter-attack that winter.
You still haven't addressed the point that every line **TO** the Moscow area would have remained operational, only transit **THROUGH** Moscow would have been knocked out. That probably means Stavka is forced to concentrate its winter counteroffensive on Moscow rather than dissipating forces as in OTL, which would have been very bad for AGC's prospects of holding Moscow. Plus absent the Kiev kessel, AGC has an additional ~800k soldiers on its right flank. 2nd army will have to reinforced to deal with this threat, further denuding the forces holding Moscow.
Appleknocker27 wrote:this is one small secondary effect or part of what I had stated regarding Wehrmacht logistics enabling greater operational reach. Why such interest in a tangent that seems rather obvious?
I'd be really interested to hear you say more about the primary aspect of your proposal - better logistics in general.
I think one reason for the focus on the mob centers is it's a very discrete outcome and the impact of destroying the mobilizing forces - assuming for now this happens - is easy to judge as potentially decisive.
That's less true of better logistics in general. I understand that better logistics would have amplified the fighting power of Ostheer, especially during the months when logistics were particularly bad OTL (i.e. from November when the rail transport crisis started).

But how much more combat power from better logistics? 5%? 10%? 15%? 20%?
If it's 10%, that's like adding 6-7 divisions with logistics similar to OTL (i.e. bad). 6 divisions would certainly have helped but is it decisive? I.e. do six divisions mean the Germans take Moscow in November and can hold it over the winter? Not clear to me that they would be so decisive.

There are other areas of the front besides Moscow where serious logistical changes could have had potentially decisive impact.
Foremost, IMO, is AGS's sector during its Fall '41 trans-Dniepr drive. AGS almost completely lacked rail transport east of the Dniepr and this seems to have been decisive in, e.g., forcing Kleist to abandon Rostov in late fall. AGS's logistics were so bad that Bock had to send Rundstedt 5,000 tons of Grosstransportraum just ahead of Taifun (source is Creveld's chapter on Barbarossa). With all those additional trucks still under AGC, the Panzer Groups probably get closer to their objectives and maybe Guderian succeeds in pinching off Tula. AGS could have been able to take Voroshilovgrad (Luhansk) and Slovyansk during '41, along with more of Southwest Russia.

The foregoing would place AGS 100-200 miles farther East in spring '42 than OTL, giving a better launchpad for Blau and depriving SU of the whole Donets basin during latter 41 and early 42. In OTL the SU was still producing lots of industrial goods from Ukraine right up until Blau (Voroshilovgrad, for instance, required thousands of railcars to evacuate plant during the Summer '42 retreat). Combine lower industrial output with lower agricultural output in the critical period between Barbarossa and Blau and maybe we're approaching a point where Blau succeeds. I think we agree the '42 has to be the year of decision.
Appleknocker27 wrote:I acknowledge the casualties of the OTL
German replacements were adequate up to Taifun. As Liedtke discusses in "Enduring the Whirlwind," AGC's battalions were at 92-93% of their authorized strength by the end of September. Thereafter, replacements were thin of course.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 27 Jan 2020 07:46

Richard Anderson wrote: strategic assessment actually exaggerated overall Soviet force generation capability.
What's your source?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 27 Jan 2020 18:57

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
27 Jan 2020 07:22
Appleknocker27 wrote:The ultimate aim is an encirclement or outright seizure of the Moscow communications and transport hub, which cripples the Soviet ability to launch a counter-attack that winter.
You still haven't addressed the point that every line **TO** the Moscow area would have remained operational, only transit **THROUGH** Moscow would have been knocked out. That probably means Stavka is forced to concentrate its winter counteroffensive on Moscow rather than dissipating forces as in OTL, which would have been very bad for AGC's prospects of holding Moscow. Plus absent the Kiev kessel, AGC has an additional ~800k soldiers on its right flank. 2nd army will have to reinforced to deal with this threat, further denuding the forces holding Moscow.
Appleknocker27 wrote:this is one small secondary effect or part of what I had stated regarding Wehrmacht logistics enabling greater operational reach. Why such interest in a tangent that seems rather obvious?
I'd be really interested to hear you say more about the primary aspect of your proposal - better logistics in general.
I think one reason for the focus on the mob centers is it's a very discrete outcome and the impact of destroying the mobilizing forces - assuming for now this happens - is easy to judge as potentially decisive.
That's less true of better logistics in general. I understand that better logistics would have amplified the fighting power of Ostheer, especially during the months when logistics were particularly bad OTL (i.e. from November when the rail transport crisis started).

But how much more combat power from better logistics? 5%? 10%? 15%? 20%?
If it's 10%, that's like adding 6-7 divisions with logistics similar to OTL (i.e. bad). 6 divisions would certainly have helped but is it decisive? I.e. do six divisions mean the Germans take Moscow in November and can hold it over the winter? Not clear to me that they would be so decisive.

There are other areas of the front besides Moscow where serious logistical changes could have had potentially decisive impact.
Foremost, IMO, is AGS's sector during its Fall '41 trans-Dniepr drive. AGS almost completely lacked rail transport east of the Dniepr and this seems to have been decisive in, e.g., forcing Kleist to abandon Rostov in late fall. AGS's logistics were so bad that Bock had to send Rundstedt 5,000 tons of Grosstransportraum just ahead of Taifun (source is Creveld's chapter on Barbarossa). With all those additional trucks still under AGC, the Panzer Groups probably get closer to their objectives and maybe Guderian succeeds in pinching off Tula. AGS could have been able to take Voroshilovgrad (Luhansk) and Slovyansk during '41, along with more of Southwest Russia.

The foregoing would place AGS 100-200 miles farther East in spring '42 than OTL, giving a better launchpad for Blau and depriving SU of the whole Donets basin during latter 41 and early 42. In OTL the SU was still producing lots of industrial goods from Ukraine right up until Blau (Voroshilovgrad, for instance, required thousands of railcars to evacuate plant during the Summer '42 retreat). Combine lower industrial output with lower agricultural output in the critical period between Barbarossa and Blau and maybe we're approaching a point where Blau succeeds. I think we agree the '42 has to be the year of decision.
Appleknocker27 wrote:I acknowledge the casualties of the OTL
German replacements were adequate up to Taifun. As Liedtke discusses in "Enduring the Whirlwind," AGC's battalions were at 92-93% of their authorized strength by the end of September. Thereafter, replacements were thin of course.
Success could never depend on just being a bit further east. It can never be as easy as that.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 28 Jan 2020 00:14

Yuri wrote:
26 Jan 2020 19:30
Excerpt from the testimony of a prisoner of war about Russian flamethrowers.

Praydak George, born in 1913, a native of Chernigov, Ukrainian, a collective farmer, a Separate 20th chemical company (flamethrower).

Praydak was mobilized in July and sent to a collection point in the Moscow region.
-snip-
So, the city of Chernigov /this is Ukraine/ is located South-West of the Smolensk-Vyazma region.
A resident of the Chernigov region drafted in July 1941.
According to one of the members of AHF forum, this person should be sent to the division that is being formed in the Smolensk-Vyazma area.
In fact, as we can see, from the area southwest of Vyazma, this recruit is sent to Moscow, that is, 500 km to the East of the place of residence.
And only in mid-September 1941, the Red Army soldier Praydak was sent to Novgorod, that is, to the North-Western front.
Was this recruit a "trained reservist" called to the colors? Called to report to his unit? Sounds like a fresh conscript ordered to report to initial training, receive initial issue of personal equipment, and the training unit, personnel and equipment were already there at that Moscow location.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 28 Jan 2020 00:57

Appleknocker27 wrote:
26 Jan 2020 02:23
No it doesn't address the nat's ass detail...nope. That kind of detail requires a very substantial amount of personal time to prove a point that is obvious in the mechanics of military force generation in the context of the campaign timeline.
I had about an hour spare this afternoon so l thought l find out a bit of detail on this especially in respect of your "in the context of the campaign timeline".

Vyasma is only a small town. The HQ of 108.sd was garrisoned there prior to the war with one of its rifle regiments. The majority of the division was based outside the town in 3 separate locations.

Prior to June 1941, it is reported to have received an allocation of 1.000 campers - part of the 'secret' mobilization and another 5.000 was due to arrive on 1 June. What the total population of the division was by then, l cannot find, but it was being reinforced up to the 12.000 mark. By 22 June it had already deployed forward to the outskirts of Minsk.

It seems reasonable to assume the 6.000 campers were taken from local mobilization lists and mobilized through the Vjasma 'reporting and mobilization center'.

Given that was the only major unit garrisonned in Vjasma, mobilization stocks were probably now pretty depleted. The mobilization center warehouses emptyish. Unless, of course, they held an excess of equipment which seems unlikely given the general shortage.

I have found documentation starting 2 July from the Moscow Military District (MBO) to the rear party of 108.sd to form the nucleas of an admin staff for a 'new' division: 248.sd. I wrote 'new' because this was a formation to be created outside/beyond the terms of MP-41. Already mobilization is proceeding in an adhoc (unprepared and untrained) fashion. It seems reasonable to assume the manpower for this was drawn from the local area. It seems likely the equipment for them was brought forward from strategic stocks. But there is no data that l found during the hour to support any speculation. It seems 248.sd was operational as of 15 July as part of 45.sk/13.A.

There does not appear to be any further formations mobilized at Vyasma.

I found an orbat for the Vjasma garrison for 22 July with a little over 2.000 tps made up of several sub-units.

I doubt the Germans overrunning Vjasma towards the end of July (as per your hypothesis) would have had any effect on the Red Army mobilization process in Vjasma. And certainly none of any profound scale.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 28 Jan 2020 02:03

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Jan 2020 00:37

I'm not so sure that is the case? Casualties were severe throughout BARBAROSSA, with some of the severest coming during the first weeks (22 June-6 July)...the first two weeks of so much success resulted in 63,675 casualties, with "only" 23,188 in HG-Mitte. The trend continued over the next month, 6 Jul-3 August, with 184,090 casualties of which 70,412 were HG-M. Losses 3-30 August in the opening stages of the Kiev encirclement, when HG-Mitte was starting its month-long "pause" were 154,828, with HG-Mitte incurring 64,940, while 1-30 September losses decreased to 131,575, with HG-Mitte suffering 40,518. The problem was by then the damage to the Ostheer was done...all the readily available replacements were used up and the Heer was forced to scramble for more. Half a million casualties in just over the first three months of the campaign...any "savings" after 26 November or 3 December are essentially moot, since the campaign was already lost by then and the initiative for the winter was with the Soviets.

I don't think the problem was accurate intel for medical services, it was crap medical services. See for example the scathing review of German medical practices at the end of the war as surveyed by the U.S. Army Medical Corps. After nearly six years of fighting, the Germans were still struggling with typhus, mostly due to poor sanitary practices, and hospital standards were considered sub-par to say the least. If you are familiar with the history of medicine in the U.S. and Europe that is an astonishing turnaround from the first two decades of the century, when German medical care and knowledge was considered best in the world, while American medicine was still in the dark ages. It was not a logistical issue, which could be improved by tweaking; it was a systemic issue.

Agreed...except that it started when the senior command decided to ignore intelligence assessments that contradicted their assumptions. As we have seen, the operational intelligence on Soviet forces on the frontier to a depth of about 700-1000 kilometers was reasonably accurate, while the strategic assessment actually exaggerated overall Soviet force generation capability. Despite that the decision was to go ahead and then it became easy to blame events on an "intel failure".
Fair points...especially concerning AGC personnel losses and medical services (never studied medical at all). Those more or less make any reasonable re-work of Barbarossa just as untenable as the OTL's plan. Someone should have advised OKH what Joshua learned:
Joshua.gif
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 28 Jan 2020 02:09

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
28 Jan 2020 00:57
Appleknocker27 wrote:
26 Jan 2020 02:23
No it doesn't address the nat's ass detail...nope. That kind of detail requires a very substantial amount of personal time to prove a point that is obvious in the mechanics of military force generation in the context of the campaign timeline.
I had about an hour spare this afternoon so l thought l find out a bit of detail on this especially in respect of your "in the context of the campaign timeline".

Vyasma is only a small town. The HQ of 108.sd was garrisoned there prior to the war with one of its rifle regiments. The majority of the division was based outside the town in 3 separate locations.

Prior to June 1941, it is reported to have received an allocation of 1.000 campers - part of the 'secret' mobilization and another 5.000 was due to arrive on 1 June. What the total population of the division was by then, l cannot find, but it was being reinforced up to the 12.000 mark. By 22 June it had already deployed forward to the outskirts of Minsk.

It seems reasonable to assume the 6.000 campers were taken from local mobilization lists and mobilized through the Vjasma 'reporting and mobilization center'.

Given that was the only major unit garrisonned in Vjasma, mobilization stocks were probably now pretty depleted. The mobilization center warehouses emptyish. Unless, of course, they held an excess of equipment which seems unlikely given the general shortage.

I have found documentation starting 2 July from the Moscow Military District (MBO) to the rear party of 108.sd to form the nucleas of an admin staff for a 'new' division: 248.sd. I wrote 'new' because this was a formation to be created outside/beyond the terms of MP-41. Already mobilization is proceeding in an adhoc (unprepared and untrained) fashion. It seems reasonable to assume the manpower for this was drawn from the local area. It seems likely the equipment for them was brought forward from strategic stocks. But there is no data that l found during the hour to support any speculation. It seems 248.sd was operational as of 15 July as part of 45.sk/13.A.

There does not appear to be any further formations mobilized at Vyasma.

I found an orbat for the Vjasma garrison for 22 July with a little over 2.000 tps made up of several sub-units.

I doubt the Germans overrunning Vjasma towards the end of July (as per your hypothesis) would have had any effect on the Red Army mobilization process in Vjasma. And certainly none of any profound scale.
Try this instead: http://libryansk.ru/bryanskij-rajonperv ... oda.11723/

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 28 Jan 2020 02:35

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
27 Jan 2020 07:22
You still haven't addressed the point that every line **TO** the Moscow area would have remained operational, only transit **THROUGH** Moscow would have been knocked out. That probably means Stavka is forced to concentrate its winter counteroffensive on Moscow rather than dissipating forces as in OTL, which would have been very bad for AGC's prospects of holding Moscow. Plus absent the Kiev kessel, AGC has an additional ~800k soldiers on its right flank. 2nd army will have to reinforced to deal with this threat, further denuding the forces holding Moscow.
Fair points, but the rail lines (assuming a double tracked line with an ad-hoc loop built) can only be useful in getting troops/supplies to a fixed point, it doesn't provide tactical mobility to move anywhere but that fixed point, unlike a metropolis with a road net, or provide a well developed communications hub, airfields, living quarters and other infrastructure need to stage and mass for major operations.
The Kiev-right flank is obviously a major concern. AGS is still going to be at the gates of Kiev regardless of what AGC is doing, so those Soviet formations have the primary task of defending Kiev. AGC's flank is several hundred kms from Kiev in the middle of winter and Soviet tactical mobility is abysmal, so it remains what threat level they could realistically produce (think Winter War 1940).
But how much more combat power from better logistics? 5%? 10%? 15%? 20%?
If it's 10%, that's like adding 6-7 divisions with logistics similar to OTL (i.e. bad). 6 divisions would certainly have helped but is it decisive? I.e. do six divisions mean the Germans take Moscow in November and can hold it over the winter? Not clear to me that they would be so decisive.
That's a good question, tough to answer since Neo (Mr. Anderson) interjected a harsh dose of personnel loss reality on the idea. Perhaps the best course of action would be to end Taifun after the Vyazma-Briansk pockets are reduced and dig in. I have thought that for quite some time, the loss of motor vehicles reached a fever pitch for the Wehrmacht when Taifun bogged down in the mud.
There are other areas of the front besides Moscow where serious logistical changes could have had potentially decisive impact. -snip-
I think we agree the '42 has to be the year of decision.
Again, fair points. I'm more perplexed by the losses brought up by R Anderson though. If 1942 was to be the year of decision the Heer personnel office/replacement army needs to be radically re-thought and losses in the OTL mitigated.
Appleknocker27 wrote:I acknowledge the casualties of the OTL
German replacements were adequate up to Taifun. As Liedtke discusses in "Enduring the Whirlwind," AGC's battalions were at 92-93% of their authorized strength by the end of September. Thereafter, replacements were thin of course.
Right, that was based on the original personnel replacement plan, which obviously failed to feed AGC's Infantry battalions/regiments through Oct/Nov. Its a major issue and likely THE issue with Barbarossa, but I'm not sure how or if that could be mitigated.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 28 Jan 2020 03:00

Appleknocker27 wrote: I have thought that for quite some time, the loss of motor vehicles reached a fever pitch for the Wehrmacht when Taifun bogged down in the mud.
This is the impression one gets from the standard histories though I can't cite any specific stats on vehicle loss rates to make it stick analytically.
Seems just as likely that Taifun's vehicular attrition, as with personnel attrition, wasn't anomalous but was simply the culmination of a long attrition process that finally tipped the scales towards RKKA.
tough to answer since Neo (Mr. Anderson) interjected a harsh dose of personnel loss reality on the idea. Perhaps the best course of action would be to end Taifun after the Vyazma-Briansk pockets are reduced and dig in.
If 1942 was to be the year of decision the Heer personnel office/replacement army needs to be radically re-thought and losses in the OTL mitigated.
Right, that was based on the original personnel replacement plan, which obviously failed to feed AGC's Infantry battalions/regiments through Oct/Nov. Its a major issue and likely THE issue with Barbarossa, but I'm not sure how or if that could be mitigated.
An immediate fix is to fully induct the class of 1922 as replacements for Barbarossa.
A longer term "fix" is to scale up the use of foreign labor earlier to free some of the millions of UK-gestellte Germans later mobilized. I have a long post on that missed opportunity here: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&start=45#p2216965
Any discussion of the inability of Germany to recover from Barbarossa's casualties is missing a glaringly obvious fact: The Heer was stronger in 1943 than '41, despite all the disasters of intervening years.

If the Germans plan for '42 to be the year of decision, so many of the problems discussed here would have been addressed:
  • Germans plan to build out the rail network to support deep operations by the whole Ostheer, rather than a small post-collapse exploitation/occupation force.
  • Germans adequately plan for winter sustenance/shelter of the Ostheer.
  • Germans build up their replacement base as discussed above.
  • Germans probably deploy stronger initial forces.
  • Germans resolve the Balkans earlier, even if it means a sub-optimal winter campaign, allowing Barbarossa to start in May.
It is fashionable to conclude that Soviet victory was inevitable but that gives short shrift to the strategic stupidity of Hitler, Halder, et. al. in planning to conquer the world's largest country and army in a few weeks. The fact of Soviet victory doesn't demonstrate inevitability, we have to consider what Germany would have done had it taken the SU seriously.
the rail lines (assuming a double tracked line with an ad-hoc loop built) can only be useful in getting troops/supplies to a fixed point, it doesn't provide tactical mobility to move anywhere but that fixed point, unlike a metropolis with a road net, or provide a well developed communications hub, airfields, living quarters and other infrastructure need to stage and mass for major operations.
Fair. But the area between Moscow and Gorkiy on the east-west axis and for some distance north-south is one of the densest, most industrialized parts of Russia. It would matter how deep the "Moscow Salient" was in November '41, i.e. whether it encompassed the whole of the dense areas or just the immediate area around Moscow.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 28 Jan 2020 12:32

Thank you. An interesting read. And one that resoundingly refutes your hypothesis.

Beginning of second paragraph:
В первую неделю войны около 10 тысяч мужчин Брянского района были призваны в действующую армию. Таким образом, вся тяжесть сельскохозяйственных работ легла на плечи женщин и стариков. Техника осталась без механизаторов.
The manpower of the Bryansk region had already been mobilized into the Red Army in the first week of the war. The work of the 'reporting and mobilization center' was done. No further formations were mobilized in Bryansk.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 28 Jan 2020 18:57

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
28 Jan 2020 12:32
Thank you. An interesting read. And one that resoundingly refutes your hypothesis.

Beginning of second paragraph:
В первую неделю войны около 10 тысяч мужчин Брянского района были призваны в действующую армию. Таким образом, вся тяжесть сельскохозяйственных работ легла на плечи женщин и стариков. Техника осталась без механизаторов.
The manpower of the Bryansk region had already been mobilized into the Red Army in the first week of the war. The work of the 'reporting and mobilization center' was done. No further formations were mobilized in Bryansk.
For completeness.

89th rifle division
The division was formed in 1939 in the Moscow military district.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic war, it was stationed in the Oryol military district in Kursk.
On July 1, 1941, she began moving to the Bryansk region.
On July 15, the division was relocated by rail and road to the area southwest of Vyazma.
By the evening of July 22, 89 SD concentrated in the area Retase and Ivanino, after which it took part in the offensive of Soviet operational groups on Smolensk (as part of the group of Lieutenant General Kalinin).
At the beginning of August 1941, it became part of the 19th Army and participated in the Dukhovshchinsky operation


120th rifle division
Formed in Orel and Livny by the spring of 1940.
From June 28, 1941, she began moving to Bryansk and by July 10, 1941, she was almost completely concentrated in the Novoselka area, where she began creating a defensive line.
On July 15, 1941, it was moved to the area 20 km South-East of Yelnya,
July 22, 1941 takes the first battle in the area Pronino.
During July — September 1941, she participated in counterattacks and Yelnya offensive operations.
On September 16, 1941, at the stations Pavlinovo and Spas-Demensk, she was loaded into trains and sent to the reserve of the Stavka VGK.
On September 26, 1941, it was converted into the 6th Guards rifle division.

The 145th rifle division was formed in 1939.
Participated in the liberation campaign in the Western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.
On 22.06.1941 was part of the 33rd SK the Oryol Military district was stationed in Belgorod while in summer camps near Kursk.
Initially, the division, according to the Directive of the civil code of 25.06.1941, the place of unloading was determined by Gorodnya, but already on 27.06.1941 it was redirected to Sukhinichi.
On June 29, 1941, she began to leave for the front.
Unloaded in Bryansk in early July 1941.
By 10.07.1941, she arrived in the area Zhukovka (50 km North-West of Bryansk) and started creating a 40-kilometer defense line. By July 12, 31 echelons from the division had arrived.
The division took a turn Zagorje, Krizeva (65-85 km southwest of Roslavl).
By July 17, the division had reached Roslavl.
From 18.07.1941, the division made a March along The Roslavl—Pochinok highway with the task: straddling the railway and highway, go to the hard defense at the village Vaskovo, prevent the enemy from breaking through in the direction of the city Roslavl, located in the main strategic direction.


The 217th rifle division.
Division was formed in April-June 1941 in the cities Borisoglebsk, Buturlinovka, and Novohopersk (500 km South-East of Moscow)-
June 30-July 3, 1941 in the number of 33 echelons, in full strength, left for the front, in the area Bryansk and was included in the 33rd Rifle Corps of 28th Army.
On July 13, 1941, she arrived in the DESNA river area, where she was located and performed defensive work, without conducting any combat operations until the enemy's approach to the DESNA river.
After arriving at the front, 217 SD began defensive work on the Eastern Bank of the Desna river, on the Frolovo-Seshcha front.
In the course of mid-July, she began to conduct active reconnaissance operations on the Western Bank of the DESNA river.
Military operations began in August 1941.


Again, if you do not use Soviet books and documents, the picture of the Soviet-European war of 1941-1945 will be distorted to the point of ugliness.

Ружичасти Слон
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 28 Jan 2020 19:30

Yuri wrote:
28 Jan 2020 18:57
For completeness.
Yes. Many divisions were sent to the Bryansk area in July, August and September. But they were all mobilized somewhere else.

Ружичасти Слон
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 28 Jan 2020 19:50

MarkN wrote:
19 Dec 2019 18:38

The FHO generated assessments that included data for both tactical planning and strategic. For example, they assessed how many actual divisions existed in the peacetime Red Army and how many actual divisions they thought would be mobilized from the reserve - 209 rifle divisions in three waves is an example of that. The 200 divisions calculation example is an example of strategic planning, so is the 11-12 million and the 370 divisions total.

On 8 August, the FHO committed the fundamental error of mixing strategic with tactical. The OKH readers failed to spot this.
The Red Army mobilization plan valid up to February 1941 was based upon a total establishment of 6.826.642. There were to be 159 rifle, 13 mountain rifle, 1 motorized rifle and 29 kavalry divisions (202 total) and lots of brigades of various types. This plan had received several updates from when it was first issued in 1938 and by February 1941 envisioned a total establishment of 7.068.900.

In February 1941 a completely new plan was approved. This had a total establishment of 8.682.827. Mechanized formations were massively increased, airforce and rifle formations too. Kavalry was decreased. The new plan had 198 rifle, 10 mountain rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 60 tank, 30 mechanized and 14 kavalry divisions (314 total).

But not all the new divisions had been created by 22 June. On 13 June Vatutin sent out a справка detailing how the actual divisions that existed were to deploy according to the actual threat. He notes a total of 303 divisions. 198 rifle (including mountain rifle and motorized rifle), 61 tank, 31 mechanized and 13 kavalry divisions. Some of the planned divisions still had not been created.

If the German army intelligence estimated up to 12 million after mobilization and 370 divisions, that is much bigger than the Soviet plan.

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