Nonsense. Germany did suffer from a lack of strategic intelligence on the USSR which is well documented.Yuri wrote: ↑30 Jan 2020, 23:29It's not a mistake of German intelligence, intelligence reported accurately, especially since the Soviet Union did not hide anything, but on the contrary everywhere advertised their achievements.
It's all about the old European song "Russian subhuman", which Europeans have been singing in different languages for more than 300 years.
Here is the German version of the song «Russischer Untermensch»
12480-158 Memo about SU.jpg
translation from German
Command of the 4th air fleet
1C management Department
#2300/41 top secret
Reminder
About Soviet Russia x)
(Special attention is paid to the South-Western regions)
Printed on May 1, 1941
____________________________________________
x) the Memo was found on a downed German plane,
part of it was burned and therefore there are a number of omissions in the translation.
The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Re: Logistics or Intelligence Failure
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Yuri wrote: The Russian people are characterized by their clumsiness, lack of initiative, schematism, fear of being responsible and lack of determination. The experience of the Russian-Finnish war confirmed this once again.
You can expect that the command staff will not have enough initiative, and operations will be carried out according to the template and clumsily. The possibility of using and operating certain types of weapons is not properly evaluated.
The Russians are not demanding in themselves, they are very brave in the offensive, but unenterprising, and they are extremely persistent in the defense. Significant progress has been made in training commanders and fighters by establishing a unified command and raising discipline.
A v i a t i o n:
There is a lack of technically prepared personnel. It is also necessary to take into account insufficient stocks of parts. It is obvious that only 50% of the aircraft are ready for immediate launch. As the experience of the Russian-Finnish war has shown, minor repairs are not made on the spot and therefore in a short time you can only count on 25% of combat-ready aircraft.
There is also a lack of technically trained personnel in other types of weapons, in the Railways and in the defense industry. In all these industries, you can expect a significant failure of machines, motors, devices, etc., even with small damages.
The Russian army only meets modern requirements to some extent.
Not that unreasonable, though a bit rough, and certainly offensive for a Russian national (but this was a German writing for Germans). Groks with the general perception.
German officers insisted on obedience as a distinctive trait of the Russian/Soviet soldier even after the war:
Though, if the quoted document was a pre-Barbarossa document, it raises further serious questions about German decision-making in Barbarossa. LJADW fatalismus may carry the day ("the attack was going to succeed because it had to succeed, there was no alternative"), but Axis did not fail in the East for lack of data or UNEXPECTED logistics issues.Thus the Soviet soldier stands out for four qualities : bravery, discipline and obedience, insensitivity to hardships, and a love for the homeland.
-Fritz Schlieper, Military Review, Volume 42
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
A simple back of the envelope computation gives for 200 divisions, of which 40 engaged in heavy fighting about 20,000 tons of supplies per day (40x250 + 160x50). That's about 50 trains (400 ton/german military train), plus 25 more for troop movements, medical, and miscellaneous. That's 3 double track (24 train pairs per day) or 6 single track (12/day) rail-lines. I think that that the Soviet railway system would be reasonably able to accommodate that, with room to spare; looks like the limiting factor was repair assets, especially bridges.Ружичасти Слон wrote: But l have connected second enquiry for your military logistic expertise. How much did logistic considerations go into original Barbarossa plan? Wagner arranged logistic wargames alongside Paulus's operational staff wargames. How much do you think logistic capacities and capabilities influenced the plan? I read in a unpublished study that the choice to try and defeat bulk of the Red Army in first stage was based on logistic considerations that they couldn't support major combat operations beyond that point. But most people think it was Hitler's idea in fight with army high command. What do you think?
There is also a BIG gap between what Germans said they would do, what they planned to do, and what they actually did historically.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
BDV, excellent post and thanks for the info. I was reading a first hand account of the eastern front recently, and it mentions how the Soviets had systematically destroyed a lot of their own railways in territories the Germans had either conquered or were about to. So, to further your point, repair assets would be a massive factor. The Soviet railway system, especially with armored trains, was sufficient for supplying the Red Army, when fully operational.BDV wrote: ↑31 Jan 2020, 23:21A simple back of the envelope computation gives for 200 divisions, of which 40 engaged in heavy fighting about 20,000 tons of supplies per day (40x250 + 160x50). That's about 50 trains (400 ton/german military train), plus 25 more for troop movements, medical, and miscellaneous. That's 3 double track (24 train pairs per day) or 6 single track (12/day) rail-lines. I think that that the Soviet railway system would be reasonably able to accommodate that, with room to spare; looks like the limiting factor was repair assets, especially bridges.Ружичасти Слон wrote: But l have connected second enquiry for your military logistic expertise. How much did logistic considerations go into original Barbarossa plan? Wagner arranged logistic wargames alongside Paulus's operational staff wargames. How much do you think logistic capacities and capabilities influenced the plan? I read in a unpublished study that the choice to try and defeat bulk of the Red Army in first stage was based on logistic considerations that they couldn't support major combat operations beyond that point. But most people think it was Hitler's idea in fight with army high command. What do you think?
There is also a BIG gap between what Germans said they would do, what they planned to do, and what they actually did historically.
"History doesn't repeat itself, but it often rhymes." – Mark Twain.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Thank you for making time to answer my question.BDV wrote: ↑31 Jan 2020, 23:21
A simple back of the envelope computation gives for 200 divisions, of which 40 engaged in heavy fighting about 20,000 tons of supplies per day (40x250 + 160x50). That's about 50 trains (400 ton/german military train), plus 25 more for troop movements, medical, and miscellaneous. That's 3 double track (24 train pairs per day) or 6 single track (12/day) rail-lines. I think that that the Soviet railway system would be reasonably able to accommodate that, with room to spare; looks like the limiting factor was repair assets, especially bridges.
There is also a BIG gap between what Germans said they would do, what they planned to do, and what they actually did historically.
Unfortunately that was not the type of information that interested me. Perhaps it was my bad English. I will try again and hope you or appleknocker or somebody else can help.
On first page is this.
Van Creveld in supplying war also was writing that logistic planning was based on first stage about 500km then pause needed to build stocks for next advance.Hanny wrote: ↑16 Feb 2019, 22:44Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.
It seems a bit of coincidence that extent of stage 1 was approximately the same as the logistic capacity. Or maybe not.
It seems to me problem was not railway that determined how far the German army could advance but the ability of the motor vehicles to carry supplies from the railhead to the frontline. The rebuilding the Russian railway would decide how quickly each stage could begin after a pause. Of course the two are interconnected.
The German, Polish, Hungarian and Romanian railways could get enough supplies to the start point, but every km the army advanced the lower the daily capacity the motor transport could deliver. At 500km the motor could not deliver enough supplies to support offensive operations. They needed time to build up a stock in advance of the next advance.
At the same time the Russian rail network would be repaired and the railheads moved forward. That allows greater supplies to be delivered and quicker, but it was motor transport that decided how far the army could go from the railhead.
My question is ... Does anyone know whether the decision to try and defeat the Red Army in first stage was because the logistic experts said they could only support that distance before a pause was needed? A pause the German army did not want because it gave time for Soviets to mobilize better.
I read very often that it was Hitlers decision because to have encirclements at the border and army was against this. To me it seems that it was army that decided for encirclements at the border to destroy as much as possible because they decided it was best way inside logistic capability.
Why worry about winning in stage 1 if it was just a Hitler decision?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Logistics experts would not have set the strategy, but logistic considerations would have played a major role in the operational planning. That operational planning was decided in broad outline over a few days in late July / early August 1940. It was obvious to everyone that attempting to drive the Red Army back 1,500 km along a steadily lengthening frontline was not a good plan. Far better to destroy the combat capability of the Red Army near the frontier so that the final 1,200 km advance need be little more than a pursuit by mechanised forces. Other considerations apart, such a strategy greatly simplified the logistical issues at the planning stage. As for who was responsible for what decisions, that has been extensively discussed in other threads.Ружичасти Слон wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 00:36My question is ... Does anyone know whether the decision to try and defeat the Red Army in first stage was because the logistic experts said they could only support that distance before a pause was needed? A pause the German army did not want because it gave time for Soviets to mobilize better.
I read very often that it was Hitlers decision because to have encirclements at the border and army was against this. To me it seems that it was army that decided for encirclements at the border to destroy as much as possible because they decided it was best way inside logistic capability.
Why worry about winning in stage 1 if it was just a Hitler decision?
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I don't think there is anything offensive here for a Russian person. A small amount of this kind of statements about the enemy is acceptable, even in the guidance document.BDV wrote: ↑31 Jan 2020, 16:17Not that unreasonable, though a bit rough, and certainly offensive for a Russian national (but this was a German writing for Germans). Groks with the general perception.
German officers insisted on obedience as a distinctive trait of the Russian/Soviet soldier even after the war:Though, if the quoted document was a pre-Barbarossa document, it raises further serious questions about German decision-making in Barbarossa. LJADW fatalismus may carry the day ("the attack was going to succeed because it had to succeed, there was no alternative"), but Axis did not fail in the East for lack of data or UNEXPECTED logistics issues.Thus the Soviet soldier stands out for four qualities : bravery, discipline and obedience, insensitivity to hardships, and a love for the homeland.
-Fritz Schlieper, Military Review, Volume 42
But it's all about the last three paragraphs. In my opinion, it was right to expect that your future opponent will make every effort to increase the available energy/capacity/resources/capabilities/potential. However, instead, it is proposed to introduce the "Russischer untermensch" coefficient - Krum = 0.25. In this case, the value of the coefficient does not matter how many divisions are actually available in the red army and how many more can be mobilized.
According to the document (compiled before the start of Barbarossa), in Barbarossa, the balance of forces looks like this (in round numbers):
The 3rd Reich has 80 million;
The 3rd Reich and its European allies and collaborators have a minimum - 110 million;
The USSR has 200 million.
Enter the "Russischer untermensch" coefficient Krum=0.25 into the equation for the USSR:
USSR * Krum=200*0.25=50.
Total taking into account the Krum coefficient the ratio of forces will be as follows:
a) 3rd Reich : Soviet Union = 80 : 50 = 8 : 5 = 1.6 : 1;
b) (3rd Reich + Allies + Collaborators) : USSR = 110 : 50 = 2.2 : 1.
It is generally assumed that the ratio of forces:
a) 1.5 : 1 in your favor, you need to be a big fool to lose;
b) when the power ratio is over 2 : 1, you need to be both a big fool and a round idiot at the same time in order not to win.
If the German intelligence Agency had an initiative to apply the coefficient Krum=0.25, the blame is on it. However, OKH will be equally to blame since only OKH makes the final decision to accept or not to accept a particular value of Krum coefficient.
If intelligence did not offer to enter Krum coefficient into the calculation of forces, then the culprit will be one - OKH.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I heard that when you attack, the ratio needs to be 2:1 to win like 100% of the time.Yuri wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 16:24I don't think there is anything offensive here for a Russian person. A small amount of this kind of statements about the enemy is acceptable, even in the guidance document.BDV wrote: ↑31 Jan 2020, 16:17Not that unreasonable, though a bit rough, and certainly offensive for a Russian national (but this was a German writing for Germans). Groks with the general perception.
German officers insisted on obedience as a distinctive trait of the Russian/Soviet soldier even after the war:Though, if the quoted document was a pre-Barbarossa document, it raises further serious questions about German decision-making in Barbarossa. LJADW fatalismus may carry the day ("the attack was going to succeed because it had to succeed, there was no alternative"), but Axis did not fail in the East for lack of data or UNEXPECTED logistics issues.Thus the Soviet soldier stands out for four qualities : bravery, discipline and obedience, insensitivity to hardships, and a love for the homeland.
-Fritz Schlieper, Military Review, Volume 42
But it's all about the last three paragraphs. In my opinion, it was right to expect that your future opponent will make every effort to increase the available energy/capacity/resources/capabilities/potential. However, instead, it is proposed to introduce the "Russischer untermensch" coefficient - Krum = 0.25. In this case, the value of the coefficient does not matter how many divisions are actually available in the red army and how many more can be mobilized.
According to the document (compiled before the start of Barbarossa), in Barbarossa, the balance of forces looks like this (in round numbers):
The 3rd Reich has 80 million;
The 3rd Reich and its European allies and collaborators have a minimum - 110 million;
The USSR has 200 million.
Enter the "Russischer untermensch" coefficient Krum=0.25 into the equation for the USSR:
USSR * Krum=200*0.25=50.
Total taking into account the Krum coefficient the ratio of forces will be as follows:
a) 3rd Reich : Soviet Union = 80 : 50 = 8 : 5 = 1.6 : 1;
b) (3rd Reich + Allies + Collaborators) : USSR = 110 : 50 = 2.2 : 1.
It is generally assumed that the ratio of forces:
a) 1.5 : 1 in your favor, you need to be a big fool to lose;
b) when the power ratio is over 2 : 1, you need to be both a big fool and a round idiot at the same time in order not to win.
If the German intelligence Agency had an initiative to apply the coefficient Krum=0.25, the blame is on it. However, OKH will be equally to blame since only OKH makes the final decision to accept or not to accept a particular value of Krum coefficient.
If intelligence did not offer to enter Krum coefficient into the calculation of forces, then the culprit will be one - OKH.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Thank you.Max Payload wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 11:09
Logistics experts would not have set the strategy, but logistic considerations would have played a major role in the operational planning. That operational planning was decided in broad outline over a few days in late July / early August 1940. It was obvious to everyone that attempting to drive the Red Army back 1,500 km along a steadily lengthening frontline was not a good plan. Far better to destroy the combat capability of the Red Army near the frontier so that the final 1,200 km advance need be little more than a pursuit by mechanised forces. Other considerations apart, such a strategy greatly simplified the logistical issues at the planning stage. As for who was responsible for what decisions, that has been extensively discussed in other threads.
I do not understand you complete. I know logistic experts do not decide strategy but logistic capabilities can determine what is possible and what is not. For example if there is no possibility to support 200 divisions all the way to the Volga, then the operational plan cannot have 200 divisions going to the Volga.
It seems to me it was logistics was first factor in decision to have 100% effort in stage 1 and then only much small forces afterwards. For me that is strategic issue. Operational issue is what to do in stage 1. Decision for maximum effort along whole front in stage 1 is operation decision. Decision for encirclements is operation decision. Etc.
Before on page 71 is this.
German military intelligence says up to 12 millions in Red Army in war times but says only about 2 millions in peace times.MarkN wrote: ↑19 Dec 2019, 15:28I have a copy of the original FHO January 1941 document and l am reading direct from that. It is a document that can be found online. A link to it was put in this thread by another poster.
That document does NOT, l repeat, DOES NOT state the total strength of the Red Army was estimated at 6,2 million.
That document states they believe the peacetime Red Army is about 2 million strong and that they can mobilize 11-12 million for war.
Do Germany plan to destroy 2 millions peace times or 12 millions war times in stage 1?
Option A ... 2 millions peace times
How did Germany think to destroy 10 millions with small forces after stage 1? Did Germany think Soviet Union will not mobilize as many as possible as quick as possible?
Option B ... 12 millions war times
How did Germany think Soviets to get 12 millions to border areas? Did Germany think Soviets had fastest and quickest mobilization and tranport systems?
To me German strategy was everything about logistics. Operation planning was deciding what is best inside logistic capabilities.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I think you probably mean the ratio of forces on the battlefield (at the tactical or operational level).DavidFrankenberg wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 16:50I heard that when you attack, the ratio needs to be 2:1 to win like 100% of the time.
If you have a 2 : 1 advantage at the global (strategic) level, then in the tactical or operational zone you can temporarily create a 5 : 1 or even 10 : 1 ratio of forces.
With a global force ratio of 1.5 : 1, creating a 3 : 1 force ratio in the operational zone is not a problem.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I mean on the battlefield.Yuri wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 17:16I think you probably mean the ratio of forces on the battlefield (at the tactical or operational level).DavidFrankenberg wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 16:50I heard that when you attack, the ratio needs to be 2:1 to win like 100% of the time.
If you have a 2 : 1 advantage at the global (strategic) level, then in the tactical or operational zone you can temporarily create a 5 : 1 or even 10 : 1 ratio of forces.
With a global force ratio of 1.5 : 1, creating a 3 : 1 force ratio in the operational zone is not a problem.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
That is true, but logistic capabilities are to a large extent a function of the resources a nation or alliance is able or prepared to make available to its military for a particular operation or campaign and of the timescale over which those capabilities can be developed prior to being deployed. So while operational plans need to take account of, indeed are constrained by, the logistical support that would be available, the nature and extent of the logistical support can, within resource and timescale limits, be adjusted to meet the needs of operational objectives.Ружичасти Слон wrote: ↑01 Feb 2020, 16:55
I do not understand you complete. I know logistic experts do not decide strategy but logistic capabilities can determine what is possible and what is not.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I do not understand. I think we already know logistics influence strategic and operation decisions. My question is how much was logistics affect strategic decisions. Germany decide for destroy Red Army in stage 1. Why only in stage 1. Was it because logistics can only support all army in stage 1?Max Payload wrote: ↑02 Feb 2020, 02:34
That is true, but logistic capabilities are to a large extent a function of the resources a nation or alliance is able or prepared to make available to its military for a particular operation or campaign and of the timescale over which those capabilities can be developed prior to being deployed. So while operational plans need to take account of, indeed are constrained by, the logistical support that would be available, the nature and extent of the logistical support can, within resource and timescale limits, be adjusted to meet the needs of operational objectives.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I think you're in the ballpark regarding what the rail network should have been able to provide. As a small revision I'd suggest that most train traffic would be for replacements and movements, meaning you'd want something more like low-100's trains per day. That's still well within the track capacity of even Polish gap if the tracks were properly set up.BDV wrote:A simple back of the envelope computation gives for 200 divisions, of which 40 engaged in heavy fighting about 20,000 tons of supplies per day (40x250 + 160x50). That's about 50 trains (400 ton/german military train), plus 25 more for troop movements, medical, and miscellaneous. That's 3 double track (24 train pairs per day) or 6 single track (12/day) rail-lines. I think that that the Soviet railway system would be reasonably able to accommodate that, with room to spare; looks like the limiting factor was repair assets, especially bridges.
There is also a BIG gap between what Germans said they would do, what they planned to do, and what they actually did historically.
The problem is worse than you make it out, however, as the Germans neither planned to upgrade the tracks adequately nor said they would. Halder stated in his diary something like "It's all about speed, don't expect rail support." The rail planning matched this ridiculous "strategy.":
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945The Eisenbahnpioniere had been rapidly changing the gauge and undertaking basic repairs of bridges but were not repairing signaling or telephone communications or restoring the engine depots because they were focused on keeping within seven days58 of the advancing armies. These tasks were being left to the FED and the HBD, who did not possess sufficient equipment to build this infrastructure nor an organizational structure to manage the work
...if you plan to destroy the whole Red Army within range of truck supply from the Polish border, then fight only remnants in the depths of the SU, you don't really need a robust rail network. Thus the Germans lacked not only adequate bridge repair (you're right about that) but also everything else to run a real rail network for a massive army (e.g. signals equipment, building stores and labor for water tower and shed construction, materials for sidings).
IMO we need to re-contextualize Barbarossa's logistical failure as strategic failure. The logistics actually worked better than they were supposed to. The problem was strategic - planning to defeat the world's largest army and country in a few weeks.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Basically, the Wehrmacht was going to attack and then Deus ex Machina would show up like it did in August 1939 (Molotoff-Ribentropp) and May 1940 (The Crossing of Ardennes+Miracle at Sedan+French 1st foray into Belgium) and in Norway (Britisher retreat from Narvik).Ружичасти Слон wrote: I do not understand. I think we already know logistics influence strategic and operation decisions. My question is how much was logistics affect strategic decisions. Germany decide for destroy Red Army in stage 1. Why only in stage 1. Was it because logistics can only support all army in stage 1?
The Panzer jump forward of July 10 was such an attempt to conjure Deus ex Machina, and likewise the post-Taifun spray-and-pray (simultaneously attacking towards Crimea, Rostov-on-Don, Donets, Tula, Moscow, Tver, and Tikhvin).
The only way to win was for Deus ex Machina to show up, and the only way to conjure Deus ex Machina was to attack.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion