Because it was impossible to go in a few months with an army of 150 divisions from Warsaw to the Volga .Such an advance could be done only with small forces, and this implies that the Red Army had to be defeated before the advance to the Volga . As even Halder admitted that the Red Army could not be defeated east of the DD line,the result was that the Red Army had to be defeated (totally !) west of the DD line .And as the Germans did not know how this could be done, they said that something ( a Deus ex Machina ) would appear that would make victory possible west of the DD line .Ружичасти Слон wrote: ↑04 Feb 2020 15:55I do not understand. I think we already know logistics influence strategic and operation decisions. My question is how much was logistics affect strategic decisions. Germany decide for destroy Red Army in stage 1. Why only in stage 1. Was it because logistics can only support all army in stage 1?Max Payload wrote: ↑02 Feb 2020 01:34
That is true, but logistic capabilities are to a large extent a function of the resources a nation or alliance is able or prepared to make available to its military for a particular operation or campaign and of the timescale over which those capabilities can be developed prior to being deployed. So while operational plans need to take account of, indeed are constrained by, the logistical support that would be available, the nature and extent of the logistical support can, within resource and timescale limits, be adjusted to meet the needs of operational objectives.
Thus, logistics did not determine the outcome of Barbarossa .
Why ? Because if the SU had collapsed during the border battles, there would be no logistic problems that could stop the advance to the Volga .