The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 10 Feb 2020 19:34

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
04 Feb 2020 15:55
Max Payload wrote:
02 Feb 2020 01:34

That is true, but logistic capabilities are to a large extent a function of the resources a nation or alliance is able or prepared to make available to its military for a particular operation or campaign and of the timescale over which those capabilities can be developed prior to being deployed. So while operational plans need to take account of, indeed are constrained by, the logistical support that would be available, the nature and extent of the logistical support can, within resource and timescale limits, be adjusted to meet the needs of operational objectives.
I do not understand. I think we already know logistics influence strategic and operation decisions. My question is how much was logistics affect strategic decisions. Germany decide for destroy Red Army in stage 1. Why only in stage 1. Was it because logistics can only support all army in stage 1?
Because it was impossible to go in a few months with an army of 150 divisions from Warsaw to the Volga .Such an advance could be done only with small forces, and this implies that the Red Army had to be defeated before the advance to the Volga . As even Halder admitted that the Red Army could not be defeated east of the DD line,the result was that the Red Army had to be defeated (totally !) west of the DD line .And as the Germans did not know how this could be done, they said that something ( a Deus ex Machina ) would appear that would make victory possible west of the DD line .
Thus, logistics did not determine the outcome of Barbarossa .
Why ? Because if the SU had collapsed during the border battles, there would be no logistic problems that could stop the advance to the Volga .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Feb 2020 20:42

ljadw wrote:
10 Feb 2020 19:34
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
04 Feb 2020 15:55
Max Payload wrote:
02 Feb 2020 01:34

That is true, but logistic capabilities are to a large extent a function of the resources a nation or alliance is able or prepared to make available to its military for a particular operation or campaign and of the timescale over which those capabilities can be developed prior to being deployed. So while operational plans need to take account of, indeed are constrained by, the logistical support that would be available, the nature and extent of the logistical support can, within resource and timescale limits, be adjusted to meet the needs of operational objectives.
I do not understand. I think we already know logistics influence strategic and operation decisions. My question is how much was logistics affect strategic decisions. Germany decide for destroy Red Army in stage 1. Why only in stage 1. Was it because logistics can only support all army in stage 1?
Because it was impossible to go in a few months with an army of 150 divisions from Warsaw to the Volga .Such an advance could be done only with small forces, and this implies that the Red Army had to be defeated before the advance to the Volga . As even Halder admitted that the Red Army could not be defeated east of the DD line,the result was that the Red Army had to be defeated (totally !) west of the DD line .And as the Germans did not know how this could be done, they said that something ( a Deus ex Machina ) would appear that would make victory possible west of the DD line .
Thus, logistics did not determine the outcome of Barbarossa .
Why ? Because if the SU had collapsed during the border battles, there would be no logistic problems that could stop the advance to the Volga .
If you made the effort to read the Marcks study, you would see that it was all more complex than you are depicting here.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/ ... heeres-okh

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 10 Feb 2020 21:25

Do you say that Halder did not say what he said ? Yes or no ?
Three years later, the Allies were faced by the same problem,although their situation was much better than that of the Germans .
Why do you think that Eisenhower chose a broad front strategy? Why do you think that he approved Market Garden ?Why do you think that the Allies did not succeed to cross the Rhine in 1944 ?
Last point : the Barbarossa Plan was not made by Marcks,thus the Marcks study is not decisive .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 10 Feb 2020 22:14

ljadw wrote:
10 Feb 2020 21:25
Do you say that Halder did not say what he said ? Yes or no ?
Three years later, the Allies were faced by the same problem,although their situation was much better than that of the Germans .
Why do you think that Eisenhower chose a broad front strategy? Why do you think that he approved Market Garden ?Why do you think that the Allies did not succeed to cross the Rhine in 1944 ?
Last point : the Barbarossa Plan was not made by Marcks,thus the Marcks study is not decisive .
You are oversimplifying and making invalid camparisons .The german army had 4 months to achieve the objective so there was time to do it in several phases if necessary with a pause inbetween for bringing forward the logistical base as explained by Marcks..

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 11 Feb 2020 07:01

Aida1 wrote:
10 Feb 2020 22:14
ljadw wrote:
10 Feb 2020 21:25
Do you say that Halder did not say what he said ? Yes or no ?
Three years later, the Allies were faced by the same problem,although their situation was much better than that of the Germans .
Why do you think that Eisenhower chose a broad front strategy? Why do you think that he approved Market Garden ?Why do you think that the Allies did not succeed to cross the Rhine in 1944 ?
Last point : the Barbarossa Plan was not made by Marcks,thus the Marcks study is not decisive .
You are oversimplifying and making invalid camparisons .The german army had 4 months to achieve the objective so there was time to do it in several phases if necessary with a pause inbetween for bringing forward the logistical base as explained by Marcks..
There is no evidence that General Marcks received consent from the Stavka And the red Army that:
1. The Stavka and the Red Army agreed to be defeated in four months;
2. Stavka and the Red Army agreed to provide the necessary pause for "for bringing forward the logistic base" of the European armies.
Conclusion: the Marcks's Plan is worth no more than the paper on which this plan is drawn up.

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 11 Feb 2020 07:09

Aida1 wrote:
10 Feb 2020 22:14
ljadw wrote:
10 Feb 2020 21:25
Do you say that Halder did not say what he said ? Yes or no ?
Three years later, the Allies were faced by the same problem,although their situation was much better than that of the Germans .
Why do you think that Eisenhower chose a broad front strategy? Why do you think that he approved Market Garden ?Why do you think that the Allies did not succeed to cross the Rhine in 1944 ?
Last point : the Barbarossa Plan was not made by Marcks,thus the Marcks study is not decisive .
You are oversimplifying and making invalid camparisons .The german army had 4 months to achieve the objective so there was time to do it in several phases if necessary with a pause inbetween for bringing forward the logistical base as explained by Marcks..
There is no evidence that General Marcks received consent from the Stavka And the red Army that:
1. The Stavka and the Red Army agreed to be defeated in four months;
2. Stavka and the Red Army agreed to provide the necessary pause "for bringing forward the logistic base" of the European armies.
Conclusion: the Marcks's Plan is worth no more than the paper on which this plan is drawn up.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Feb 2020 08:27

The German army had not 4 months to achieve its objective, the objective was to defeat the standing Soviet forces west of the DD line. This would be followed by the exploitation= pursuit of the defeated Soviets ,and this could only be done by small forces.
They had only 4/6 weeks for the deciding phase .
As it was impossible to defeat the Soviets at Moscow, the only possibility was to defeat them at the border,and hoping that this would cause the collaps of the regime .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Feb 2020 09:51

Yuri wrote:
11 Feb 2020 07:09
Aida1 wrote:
10 Feb 2020 22:14
ljadw wrote:
10 Feb 2020 21:25
Do you say that Halder did not say what he said ? Yes or no ?
Three years later, the Allies were faced by the same problem,although their situation was much better than that of the Germans .
Why do you think that Eisenhower chose a broad front strategy? Why do you think that he approved Market Garden ?Why do you think that the Allies did not succeed to cross the Rhine in 1944 ?
Last point : the Barbarossa Plan was not made by Marcks,thus the Marcks study is not decisive .
You are oversimplifying and making invalid camparisons .The german army had 4 months to achieve the objective so there was time to do it in several phases if necessary with a pause inbetween for bringing forward the logistical base as explained by Marcks..
There is no evidence that General Marcks received consent from the Stavka And the red Army that:
1. The Stavka and the Red Army agreed to be defeated in four months;
2. Stavka and the Red Army agreed to provide the necessary pause "for bringing forward the logistic base" of the European armies.
Conclusion: the Marcks's Plan is worth no more than the paper on which this plan is drawn up.
What nonsense is this :lol: A plan is a general intent. German officers never took plans as a dogma , rather the contrary. Once the campaign starts, you always have to improvise.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Feb 2020 09:52

ljadw wrote:
11 Feb 2020 08:27
The German army had not 4 months to achieve its objective, the objective was to defeat the standing Soviet forces west of the DD line. This would be followed by the exploitation= pursuit of the defeated Soviets ,and this could only be done by small forces.
They had only 4/6 weeks for the deciding phase .
As it was impossible to defeat the Soviets at Moscow, the only possibility was to defeat them at the border,and hoping that this would cause the collaps of the regime .
Untrue. That is how you misrepresent things because of your agenda. The studies by Marcks and Lossberg showed a lot of variables and several phases with pauses depending on how the situation developed. (Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion Klink Fischer 1991 pp 271-285 ) . German army planning was never dogmatic contrary to your way of thinking. The job needed preferably to be done in 1941 and finished towards october because of the weather deteriorating.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Feb 2020 13:06

It did ot finnish in October and it did not finish because of the weather .
It had already failed in July when Hitler hoped that Japan would save him .
Marcks neither Lossberg decided the operational part of Barbarossa .Brauchitz,Halder, Hitler and the Soviets did it .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Feb 2020 13:42

ljadw wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:06
It did ot finnish in October and it did not finish because of the weather .
It had already failed in July when Hitler hoped that Japan would save him .
Marcks neither Lossberg decided the operational part of Barbarossa .Brauchitz,Halder, Hitler and the Soviets did it .
Totally besides the question. There were 4 months to do the job and Halder knew that too. Marcks' study was made for him after all. :roll: Contrary to what you imply, german military thinking was flexible. Halder certainly did not believe the operation had failed in july because it did not. It going very quickly was only one possible variable as outlined by Marcks.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 11 Feb 2020 14:10

Ok.

To much fight.

Germany army must to win in stage 1 or Germany army must to win in 4 months?

Germany army must to destroy all Red Army is stage 1 or Germany army must to win in many stages?

It seems to me Germany army make plan to win as much as possible in stage 1 because logistics reason. At end of stage 1, if win or not win, must to be pause on invasion for to have best logistics on stage 2.

But Germany army not have pause. Just to invade invade invade. That is most biggest problem for logistics then fighting capabilitys. Decision not to pause was cause many problems.

Is it possible Germany army plan was for deus ex masina? Mostest stupid plan.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Feb 2020 15:51

Ружичасти Слон wrote: Is it possible Germany army plan was for deus ex masina?
The German PLAN was to mount a "solid" attack ("You only have to kick the door").

During that attack unexpected opportunities (the "Deus Ex Machina") would arise. The one with initiative (i.e. the Germans) would exploit these opportunities and voila! EndSieg:
"the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."


===========================================


The method to the madness of "quick'n'cheap OstFront" is that Adolf&Co were expecting the AngloAmerican invasion of the Continent in 1942, and that was going to be expensive to defend against (ships, airplanes, extensive fortifications). A methodical and fully committed invasion of Soviet Russia would have achieved more BUT would have left Germany under-prepared to deal with the WAllies, who were always the main concern ("the occupied [Western] territories must be secured against surprise attacks." - starts Directive 21).

So Deus Ex Machina would show up because:
a) It always did before
b) Otherwise war was lost anyways
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 11 Feb 2020 17:51

BDV wrote:
11 Feb 2020 15:51


So Deus Ex Machina would show up because:
a) It always did before
b) Otherwise war was lost anyways
I not understand.

Germany army never have Deus ex masina. War not lost on 21 june 1941. Maybe war lost on 22 june 1941 when Germany invade Soviet Union with mad strategy and mad army plan.

Germany invade Czekoslovakia and win because stronger army and nobody to help Czekoslovakia. Not need deus ex masina.

Germany invade Poland and win because stronger army and nobody to help Poland. Only country to help Poland decide to be ally with Nazis. Not need deus ex masina.

Germany invade Denmark and Norway and win because stronger army and nobody strong enough to stop. Not need deus ex masina.

Germany invade Belgia Luxemburg Niederlands and win because stronger army and nobody strong enough to stop. Not need deus ex masina.

Germany invade France and win because stronger army and nobody strong enough to stop. Not need deus ex masina. France surrender after army beated.

Same for Greece and Jugoslavija.

Where is deus ex masina?

Some peoples say Germany always and only worried about Amerika. All decisions about invading Soviet Union and other countrys because of Amerika. But Amerika only interested after Germany start wars.

Germany strategy was mad.

Germany army was good and always win against not so good armys. But why to invade Soviet Union ally with mad plan? How to think they win if destroy 2 millions mens or 4 millions mens in stage 1? How to think they win if not pause to make logistics good for stage 2? How to think to win if never consider Red Army mobilization? Completeley madnesses.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Feb 2020 19:28

Aida1 wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:42
ljadw wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:06
It did ot finnish in October and it did not finish because of the weather .
It had already failed in July when Hitler hoped that Japan would save him .
Marcks neither Lossberg decided the operational part of Barbarossa .Brauchitz,Halder, Hitler and the Soviets did it .
Totally besides the question. There were 4 months to do the job and Halder knew that too. Marcks' study was made for him after all. :roll: Contrary to what you imply, german military thinking was flexible. Halder certainly did not believe the operation had failed in july because it did not. It going very quickly was only one possible variable as outlined by Marcks.
The operation HAD failed in July .And, flexibility is only useful , if there are alternatives . Such alternatives did not exist . The Red Army could not be defeated decisively east of the DD line . Typhoon is a proof .

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