The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Max Payload
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Max Payload » 22 Feb 2020 23:56

Art wrote:
22 Feb 2020 12:06
Sometimes a coincidence is just a coincidence.
So it would seem.
A very detailed response.
Thanks.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 23 Feb 2020 16:15

BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51
ljadw wrote:4 The collapse of the regime could only happen if the Red army was defeated west of the DD line
5 The defeat of the Red Army west of the DD line depended on the willingness of Stalin to send the Red Army west of the DD line.
That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
The big question is : WHY did the Germans abandon the battle west of NN-Dniepr line after 3 weeks of fighting, while they knew that decisive battles east of the NN-Dniepr line were impossible ?
Other point is : was this that important and created it big logistical problems ?

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 23 Feb 2020 16:31

BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51
ljadw wrote:4 The collapse of the regime could only happen if the Red army was defeated west of the DD line
5 The defeat of the Red Army west of the DD line depended on the willingness of Stalin to send the Red Army west of the DD line.
That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
Nonsense. There were always going to be different phases. Completely defeating the red army in the border area was the most optimistic scenario but not the only one.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 23 Feb 2020 20:12

Defeating the Red Army in the border area was the only possible scenario.
Sources : Hitler, BRauchitz, Halder, etc, the whole gang .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 23 Feb 2020 20:44

ljadw wrote:
23 Feb 2020 20:12
Defeating the Red Army in the border area was the only possible scenario.
Sources : Hitler, BRauchitz, Halder, etc, the whole gang .
Perfectly untrue and the reason why one kept pushing on very late in the season in the conviction that the red army was near collapse.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 23 Feb 2020 21:03

BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

What was 7-10 July Germany army need for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 23 Feb 2020 21:13

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
23 Feb 2020 21:03
BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

What was 7-10 July Germany army need for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?
The logistical base needed to be pushed forward after the first phase of operations which required particularly working on the rail lines. .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2020 09:02

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
23 Feb 2020 21:03
BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

There was no such plan : the logistic needs would depend on the number of divisions that would be needed to advance from the DD line to the Volga and,as only a small number could do this, it would depend on the Soviet resistance : if the Soviets collapsed west of the DD line, there would be no logic problems ;if not ,....

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020 13:09

ljadw wrote:
24 Feb 2020 09:02
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
23 Feb 2020 21:03
BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

There was no such plan : the logistic needs would depend on the number of divisions that would be needed to advance from the DD line to the Volga and,as only a small number could do this, it would depend on the Soviet resistance : if the Soviets collapsed west of the DD line, there would be no logic problems ;if not ,....
Obviously not true. The logistical base is moved forward after the first phase . Always needed to happen in any scenario; even the most optimistic one.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2020 14:06

The amount of the logistical base would depend on what was available, possible, needed and on what could be transported .
A big logistical base east of the DD line would prove that the war was lost , a very small logistical base would prove that the war was won .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020 15:02

ljadw wrote:
24 Feb 2020 14:06
The amount of the logistical base would depend on what was available, possible, needed and on what could be transported .
A big logistical base east of the DD line would prove that the war was lost , a very small logistical base would prove that the war was won .
Untrue as there was no need to win in the first phase.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 24 Feb 2020 19:17

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
23 Feb 2020 21:03
BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

What was 7-10 July Germany army need for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?
Nobody have some datas on this?

General Marcks was write in study that must to be pause after stage 2. That is about NN-Dniepr line. Pause for to repair mechanized vehicles and for to restock logistics. Pause was to be 3-6 weeks was depend on estimation of Red Army force left to destroy. If small short pause. If big long pause.

Fugate was write Paulus war games was show to need pause for 3 weeks for logistics at about NN-Dniepr line.

No datas on what forces and what logistics was to need after NN-Dniepr line. It seems to me nobody was make calculations and study. Everybody was wait until get to NN-Dniepr line then to decide.

When Germany army was get to NN-Dniepr line decision was to keep invading. No pause.

Very strange.

Maybe somebody know Germany army calculation for logistics for after NN-Dniepr line with no pause.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2020 21:24

Aida1 wrote:
24 Feb 2020 15:02
ljadw wrote:
24 Feb 2020 14:06
The amount of the logistical base would depend on what was available, possible, needed and on what could be transported .
A big logistical base east of the DD line would prove that the war was lost , a very small logistical base would prove that the war was won .
Untrue as there was no need to win in the first phase.
Halder disagrees with you.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020 21:30

ljadw wrote:
24 Feb 2020 21:24
Aida1 wrote:
24 Feb 2020 15:02
ljadw wrote:
24 Feb 2020 14:06
The amount of the logistical base would depend on what was available, possible, needed and on what could be transported .
A big logistical base east of the DD line would prove that the war was lost , a very small logistical base would prove that the war was won .
Untrue as there was no need to win in the first phase.
Halder disagrees with you.
He did not as he kept pushing the attack until very late because he believed a decision could be obtained.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Feb 2020 21:34

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
24 Feb 2020 19:17
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
23 Feb 2020 21:03
BDV wrote:
21 Feb 2020 19:51

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.
What was before start invasion Germany army plan for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?

What was 7-10 July Germany army need for logistics after NN-Dniepr line?
Nobody have some datas on this?

General Marcks was write in study that must to be pause after stage 2. That is about NN-Dniepr line. Pause for to repair mechanized vehicles and for to restock logistics. Pause was to be 3-6 weeks was depend on estimation of Red Army force left to destroy. If small short pause. If big long pause.

Fugate was write Paulus war games was show to need pause for 3 weeks for logistics at about NN-Dniepr line.

No datas on what forces and what logistics was to need after NN-Dniepr line. It seems to me nobody was make calculations and study. Everybody was wait until get to NN-Dniepr line then to decide.

When Germany army was get to NN-Dniepr line decision was to keep invading. No pause.

Very strange.

Maybe somebody know Germany army calculation for logistics for after NN-Dniepr line with no pause.
The best ( and only good ) situation was : no pause needed, advance by small forces with what was available .
Nobody could make calculations and study for something hypothetical that if it happened,would prove that Barbarossa had failed .There was no need to repair mechanized vehicles, as it was impossible to go to the Volga with mechanized vehicles, besides,if it was possible, there was no need for it .It was impossible to go in a few months with mechanised vehicles from Tripoli to the Canal, it was also impossible to go in a few months from Normandy to Berlin,or from Minsk to Berlin ,thus it was also impossible to go with mechanised vehicles from Brest Litowsk to the Volga in a few months .

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