Most tank losses did not happen by artillery, but were non combat losses : mechanical breakdowns .jesk wrote: ↑20 Apr 2019 09:4590+% loss of tanks from artillery fire. Sniper why? Well, not 200, 100 thousand in small operations around Smolensk. Von Bock didn’t like them and he suggested moving on. And in the tank divisions own infantry. On machines, unlike horse infantry divisions. It is so easy to logically calculate infantry in tank divisions! What happened in Dunkirk?ljadw wrote: ↑20 Apr 2019 08:59You don't need anti-tank guns to stop a PzD .
Never heard of snipers ? Of anti-tank mines ? Besides, without the support of the ID, the PzD were unable to do anything . See what happened at Dunkirk .Tanks without the support of infantry and artillery are good for under the bus .
And , it is obvious that you even don't know what happened in August 1941 : the Germans lost 200000 men, 200000 men .
Not bad for paper divisions .
Manstein repeated for Guderian. The first order to stop May 17. All the German generals already on May 17 knew about Hitler’s stop-order.
After the brilliant success of May 16 and the successful battles of the 41st Army Corps, I couldn’t even think that my bosses were still thinking of consolidating on the bridgehead at the Meuse and waiting for the arrival of the infantry corps. I was completely overwhelmed by the idea that I expressed in March on a report from Hitler, namely, to complete the breakthrough and not stop all the way to the English Channel. I absolutely could not imagine that Hitler himself, endorsing Manstein’s bold plan of attack and not protesting against my plan to make a breakthrough, could be afraid of his own courage and stop the offensive. However, I was terribly mistaken, it became clear to me the next morning.
On the morning of May 17, I was told from the headquarters of the tank group that the offensive should be stopped, and I should appear at 7 o'clock. on the landing pad for a personal conversation with General von Kleist. The latter appeared exactly at the appointed time and, not responding to my greeting, began to sharply accuse me of ignoring the plans of the high command. He did not say a word about the success of my troops. When the first storm had passed and there was a lull, I asked to be removed from command. General von Kleist was surprised, then nodded his head and ordered me to transfer the command of the corps to my senior commander. At this point our conversation was over. I went to the command post, summoned General Feiel, and gave him command of the corps.
About Guderian : there is no proof that the stop order from 17 May was the work of Hitler : we only know that Kleist attacked Guderian for insubordination and that Guderian, a SOB who in other armies would have been court-martialled,did not support the criticism of his superior and asked to be removed from command .On 14 and 15 May Guderian had already refused to obey the orders from his superior .