The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 20 Apr 2019 20:16

jesk wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:45
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 08:59
You don't need anti-tank guns to stop a PzD .
Never heard of snipers ? Of anti-tank mines ? Besides, without the support of the ID, the PzD were unable to do anything . See what happened at Dunkirk .Tanks without the support of infantry and artillery are good for under the bus .
And , it is obvious that you even don't know what happened in August 1941 : the Germans lost 200000 men, 200000 men .
Not bad for paper divisions .
90+% loss of tanks from artillery fire. Sniper why? Well, not 200, 100 thousand in small operations around Smolensk. Von Bock didn’t like them and he suggested moving on. And in the tank divisions own infantry. On machines, unlike horse infantry divisions. It is so easy to logically calculate infantry in tank divisions! What happened in Dunkirk? :lol:
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:01
I asked for a proof for the claim by Manstein . Not for an unproved claim by Guderian .
Besides : Manstein was not involved in Fall Gelb .
Manstein repeated for Guderian. The first order to stop May 17. All the German generals already on May 17 knew about Hitler’s stop-order.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/05.html
After the brilliant success of May 16 and the successful battles of the 41st Army Corps, I couldn’t even think that my bosses were still thinking of consolidating on the bridgehead at the Meuse and waiting for the arrival of the infantry corps. I was completely overwhelmed by the idea that I expressed in March on a report from Hitler, namely, to complete the breakthrough and not stop all the way to the English Channel. I absolutely could not imagine that Hitler himself, endorsing Manstein’s bold plan of attack and not protesting against my plan to make a breakthrough, could be afraid of his own courage and stop the offensive. However, I was terribly mistaken, it became clear to me the next morning.
On the morning of May 17, I was told from the headquarters of the tank group that the offensive should be stopped, and I should appear at 7 o'clock. on the landing pad for a personal conversation with General von Kleist. The latter appeared exactly at the appointed time and, not responding to my greeting, began to sharply accuse me of ignoring the plans of the high command. He did not say a word about the success of my troops. When the first storm had passed and there was a lull, I asked to be removed from command. General von Kleist was surprised, then nodded his head and ordered me to transfer the command of the corps to my senior commander. At this point our conversation was over. I went to the command post, summoned General Feiel, and gave him command of the corps.
Most tank losses did not happen by artillery, but were non combat losses : mechanical breakdowns .
About Guderian : there is no proof that the stop order from 17 May was the work of Hitler : we only know that Kleist attacked Guderian for insubordination and that Guderian, a SOB who in other armies would have been court-martialled,did not support the criticism of his superior and asked to be removed from command .On 14 and 15 May Guderian had already refused to obey the orders from his superior .

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 20 Apr 2019 20:32

jesk wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:45
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 08:59
You don't need anti-tank guns to stop a PzD .
Never heard of snipers ? Of anti-tank mines ? Besides, without the support of the ID, the PzD were unable to do anything . See what happened at Dunkirk .Tanks without the support of infantry and artillery are good for under the bus .
And , it is obvious that you even don't know what happened in August 1941 : the Germans lost 200000 men, 200000 men .
Not bad for paper divisions .
90+% loss of tanks from artillery fire. Sniper why? Well, not 200, 100 thousand in small operations around Smolensk. Von Bock didn’t like them and he suggested moving on. And in the tank divisions own infantry. On machines, unlike horse infantry divisions. It is so easy to logically calculate infantry in tank divisions! What happened in Dunkirk? :lol:
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:01
I asked for a proof for the claim by Manstein . Not for an unproved claim by Guderian .
Besides : Manstein was not involved in Fall Gelb .
Manstein repeated for Guderian. The first order to stop May 17. All the German generals already on May 17 knew about Hitler’s stop-order.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/05.html
After the brilliant success of May 16 and the successful battles of the 41st Army Corps, I couldn’t even think that my bosses were still thinking of consolidating on the bridgehead at the Meuse and waiting for the arrival of the infantry corps. I was completely overwhelmed by the idea that I expressed in March on a report from Hitler, namely, to complete the breakthrough and not stop all the way to the English Channel. I absolutely could not imagine that Hitler himself, endorsing Manstein’s bold plan of attack and not protesting against my plan to make a breakthrough, could be afraid of his own courage and stop the offensive. However, I was terribly mistaken, it became clear to me the next morning.
On the morning of May 17, I was told from the headquarters of the tank group that the offensive should be stopped, and I should appear at 7 o'clock. on the landing pad for a personal conversation with General von Kleist. The latter appeared exactly at the appointed time and, not responding to my greeting, began to sharply accuse me of ignoring the plans of the high command. He did not say a word about the success of my troops. When the first storm had passed and there was a lull, I asked to be removed from command. General von Kleist was surprised, then nodded his head and ordered me to transfer the command of the corps to my senior commander. At this point our conversation was over. I went to the command post, summoned General Feiel, and gave him command of the corps.
Most tank losses did not happen by artillery, but were non combat losses : mechanical breakdowns .
About Guderian : there is no proof that the stop order from 17 May was the work of Hitler : we only know that Kleist attacked Guderian for insubordination and that Guderian, a SOB who in other armies would have been court-martialled,did not support the criticism of his superior and asked to be removed from command .On 14 and 15 May Guderian had already refused to obey the orders from his superior .
2 other points : The Dunkirk halt order was on 24 May, a week ! after what Guderian described and on 17 May, Guderian was still more than 150 km away from Abbeville which is 150 km away from Dunkirk .Guderian was not going to Dunkirk but to Abbeville ,and the incident that happened on 17 May had no influence on the successful evacuation of Dunkirk .
You are wrong again .

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 20 Apr 2019 20:44

ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 20:32
jesk wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:45
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 08:59
You don't need anti-tank guns to stop a PzD .
Never heard of snipers ? Of anti-tank mines ? Besides, without the support of the ID, the PzD were unable to do anything . See what happened at Dunkirk .Tanks without the support of infantry and artillery are good for under the bus .
And , it is obvious that you even don't know what happened in August 1941 : the Germans lost 200000 men, 200000 men .
Not bad for paper divisions .
90+% loss of tanks from artillery fire. Sniper why? Well, not 200, 100 thousand in small operations around Smolensk. Von Bock didn’t like them and he suggested moving on. And in the tank divisions own infantry. On machines, unlike horse infantry divisions. It is so easy to logically calculate infantry in tank divisions! What happened in Dunkirk? :lol:
ljadw wrote:
20 Apr 2019 09:01
I asked for a proof for the claim by Manstein . Not for an unproved claim by Guderian .
Besides : Manstein was not involved in Fall Gelb .
Manstein repeated for Guderian. The first order to stop May 17. All the German generals already on May 17 knew about Hitler’s stop-order.

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/05.html
After the brilliant success of May 16 and the successful battles of the 41st Army Corps, I couldn’t even think that my bosses were still thinking of consolidating on the bridgehead at the Meuse and waiting for the arrival of the infantry corps. I was completely overwhelmed by the idea that I expressed in March on a report from Hitler, namely, to complete the breakthrough and not stop all the way to the English Channel. I absolutely could not imagine that Hitler himself, endorsing Manstein’s bold plan of attack and not protesting against my plan to make a breakthrough, could be afraid of his own courage and stop the offensive. However, I was terribly mistaken, it became clear to me the next morning.
On the morning of May 17, I was told from the headquarters of the tank group that the offensive should be stopped, and I should appear at 7 o'clock. on the landing pad for a personal conversation with General von Kleist. The latter appeared exactly at the appointed time and, not responding to my greeting, began to sharply accuse me of ignoring the plans of the high command. He did not say a word about the success of my troops. When the first storm had passed and there was a lull, I asked to be removed from command. General von Kleist was surprised, then nodded his head and ordered me to transfer the command of the corps to my senior commander. At this point our conversation was over. I went to the command post, summoned General Feiel, and gave him command of the corps.
Most tank losses did not happen by artillery, but were non combat losses : mechanical breakdowns .
About Guderian : there is no proof that the stop order from 17 May was the work of Hitler : we only know that Kleist attacked Guderian for insubordination and that Guderian, a SOB who in other armies would have been court-martialled,did not support the criticism of his superior and asked to be removed from command .On 14 and 15 May Guderian had already refused to obey the orders from his superior .
2 other points : The Dunkirk halt order was on 24 May, a week ! after what Guderian described and on 17 May, Guderian was still more than 150 km away from Abbeville which is 150 km away from Dunkirk .Guderian was not going to Dunkirk but to Abbeville ,and the incident that happened on 17 May had no influence on the successful evacuation of Dunkirk .
You are wrong again .
In your posts porridge. Breakdowns do not mean the resistance of the enemy. Mines, snipers, now logic has seen breakdowns.
As for the order of May 17, sort it out. Halder tips.

Image

american1975
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by american1975 » 28 Apr 2019 20:46

Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019 11:22
viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
FDR was a jew. he was the only one in america that wanted to go to war.

viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
My first girlfriend was a skinhead and she brought me into her circle of friends. Since my parents are German, they all loved me and I got to know them well. Amongst them they had 2 copies of MK, and no one had read the whole thing.
And this has what to do with the supply situation June through the end of the year of 1941 on the Eastern Front?

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 28 Apr 2019 21:18

american1975 wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:46
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019 11:22
viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
FDR was a jew. he was the only one in america that wanted to go to war.

viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
My first girlfriend was a skinhead and she brought me into her circle of friends. Since my parents are German, they all loved me and I got to know them well. Amongst them they had 2 copies of MK, and no one had read the whole thing.
And this has what to do with the supply situation June through the end of the year of 1941 on the Eastern Front?
You have only written 6 posts. Your remarks look inappropriate.

american1975
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by american1975 » 28 Apr 2019 21:24

MarkN wrote:
22 Feb 2019 13:53
Here is an example of a logistics screw up (US Army translation) - Wagner to Halder 3 August 1941:
Ammunition situation: In North, ammunition arrivals have suddenly stopped. On 2 Aug., of nineteen supply trains only three were ammunition. On an average there should be seven or eight. It has been definitely established that on 1 August a call was sent to Railroad Operations for 10 ammunition trains, including four trains of Artillery ammunition. The Supply Area offered eighteen ammunition trains, including eight of Artillery. These eighteen trains would have amply covered all requirements. But the requisitioned 10 amunition trains just got lost in the Marshaling Area, and no one can locate them now. Today four trains have been found in the Marshaling Area ( Warsaw - Frankfurt/Oder). Ifow nine trains are on their way across the frontier. Together with the trains received today North will have twelve trains by tomorrow morning. Twenty-five more ammunition trains in the ZI are ready to be dispatched. They will be run with highest priority under supervision directly to Minsk-Molodeczno; 25 more trains are being assembled.
Nobody is denying logistic problems existed.
Nobody is denying logistic screw ups occured.
Nobody is denying frontline units often had less than they expected.

The point is, was logistics a component of BARBAROSSA failure? Or, did BARBAROSSA fail because of logistics? The answer is no.

BARBAROSSA failed because it was beyond the capability of the Heer to be successful. The Heer had set themselves an objective that was beyond their capability to deliver. They even failed in their first intermediate task - which some, such as you - have convinced themselves was the objective of BARBAROSSA. And that failure occured long before logistic issues began to bite.

The outcome of BARBAROSSA can not be changed from spectacular failure to success by tweaking logistics. Many have tried. None have succeeded. One attempt on this forum involved transferring non-existent GTR from Africa to BARBAROSSA. Converting murder squads into POW reception teams is one of the more barking out there!
I have read that Rommel in arguing for more motorized transport to support his over stretched supply lines had as many trucks supplying him as an entire Army Group on the Soviet Eastern Front. Would assume this would be in 1942 but does raise a valid question of resource drain from the theater of decision in Russia. Will consider this question moot if I see it answered in detail later in the thread... :D

american1975
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by american1975 » 28 Apr 2019 21:30

jesk wrote:
28 Apr 2019 21:18
american1975 wrote:
28 Apr 2019 20:46
Hanny wrote:
22 Feb 2019 11:22
viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
FDR was a jew. he was the only one in america that wanted to go to war.

viewtopic.php?f=6&t=49973
Konig_pilsner wrote:
15 May 2004 20:09
My first girlfriend was a skinhead and she brought me into her circle of friends. Since my parents are German, they all loved me and I got to know them well. Amongst them they had 2 copies of MK, and no one had read the whole thing.
And this has what to do with the supply situation June through the end of the year of 1941 on the Eastern Front?
You have only written 6 posts. Your remarks look inappropriate.
I am replying to posts as I am reading through this interesting thread. The personal argument is disjointed from the point of the thread- the supply situation for Barbarossa. I hate it when otherwise interesting and intelligent discussions get derailed with personal attacks- but If am doing likewise here I shall delete the post if you wish. :thumbsup:

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 28 Apr 2019 21:35

I do not need it. Wanted to tell in a subject, Hitler played Mussolini. He forced him to send an army to Russia. And this was the beginning of the end of the duce.

"The Italian participation in operations in Russia proved extremely costly. Losses of the 8. Army from 20 August 1942-20 February 1943 totaled 87,795 killed and missing (3,168 officers and 84,627 NCOs and soldiers) and 34,474 wounded and frostbitten (1,527 officers and 32,947 NCOs and soldiers).
In March-April 1943, the remnants of the army returned to Italy for rest and reorganization. Upon the surrender of Italy in September 1943, the army was disbanded."

Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 29 Apr 2019 09:38

american1975 wrote:
28 Apr 2019 21:24


I have read that Rommel in arguing for more motorized transport to support his over stretched supply lines had as many trucks supplying him as an entire Army Group on the Soviet Eastern Front. Would assume this would be in 1942 but does raise a valid question of resource drain from the theater of decision in Russia. Will consider this question moot if I see it answered in detail later in the thread... :D
Depends what question your looking for clarification on. Brest-Litovsk to Moscow is around 600 miles, generally poor roads but good rail that required conversion, Tripoli to Alexander is twice that distance, almost no roads except a poor one along the coast, no rail.

Logistical requirement of a MOT formation sent to Libya in late 41 was calculated by OKH in Feb 41 to be 350 tons per day, which required 39 columns of 32 trucks for each 300 mile forward lift. So 1250 trucks per Div per 300 mile bound. To maintain a Div at 4 such bounds therfore required 5000 trucks. OKH was against this proposed burden, as it was 10 times greater requirement than that of a similar formation assigned for Barbarossa, and argued a max of 4 such formations was all that could be supplied to the Nile. Which was largely why Rommel was given a defensive instruction in the begging.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 29 Apr 2019 16:47

Germans themselves estimated the supply of 200 tons a day. Problems mainly arose in the island of Malta.

http://maxpark.com/community/129/content/5256392

Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlane wrote:

“Delivery of supplies through the Mediterranean to Rommel’s army was reduced to an average of 6,000 tons per month, meeting only about one-fifth of our usual needs.

Three-quarters of our transports, which transferred supplies from Italy to North Africa, were sunk by British aircraft or the navy. Since we could not create the necessary supplies for the future, any possibility of a decisive battle fell away.

The power of the British air force has now, more than ever, increased both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the shock power of Kesselring aviation steadily declined. Replenishments did not arrive - almost all German aviation was concentrated by Hitler on the Russian front. The number of German fighter aircraft has become extremely small. The king of the African sky, Captain Marcel, the winner in 158 air battles, was killed.

Malta again became the most important base from which strikes were carried out on convoys of ships cruising between Italy and North Africa.

Most of the transports were now heading from Sicily to Benghazi, the main port for unloading German-Italian troops, and this route was within the reach of British aircraft based in Malta.

The capacity of the Tobruk port was completely inadequate. In connection with this, endless columns of trucks stretched from Benghazi and other remote ports of unloading to the Alameinian positions, and were constantly threatened by British aviation. A lot of fuel was spent on fueling vehicles that carried cargo.

At the same time, our troops experienced a great need for road transport. It was about 500 kilometers from Tobruk to the front, 1,000 kilometers from Benghazi and more than 2,000 kilometers from Tripoli, where a large number of supplies were also unloaded. The British supply bases were not far from the troops of the 8th Army: 90 kilometers from Alexandria, and a little more than 350 kilometers from Suez.

While Malta was in the hands of the British, it was impossible, without increasing the Kesselring air force several times, to deliver the necessary quantity of supplies to our troops in Africa. But even now Hitler did not think about taking this fortress.

He believed that the German troops in the area of ​​El Alamein could be successfully supplied through Crete and that Malta only needed to be neutralized with powerful strikes from bomber aircraft.

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 30 Apr 2019 07:44

I did not see the numbers. How many trucks did Rommel have? In comparison with Russia?

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 30 Apr 2019 16:30

Rommel was keen to push on and take Egypt. He had the DAK planners look into it and sent of a request to OKH for the resources he required. Even Wagner at OKH waded into the issue with a 9 page logistics calculation in late August 1941.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 30 Apr 2019 18:02

I am replying to posts as I am reading through this interesting thread. The personal argument is disjointed from the point of the thread- the supply situation for Barbarossa. I hate it when otherwise interesting and intelligent discussions get derailed with personal attacks- but If am doing likewise here I shall delete the post if you wish. :thumbsup:
No worries american1975. WW2 is a sensitive topic and Hanny perceived I was defending the Einsatgruppen, when in fact I was debunking his baseless assertions. Happens sometimes, everyone wants to be right.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 01 May 2019 04:02

MarkN wrote:
30 Apr 2019 16:30
Rommel was keen to push on and take Egypt. He had the DAK planners look into it and sent of a request to OKH for the resources he required. Even Wagner at OKH waded into the issue with a 9 page logistics calculation in late August 1941.

Is Wagner's document available online anywhere?
The "ignore user" function is essential to AHF/internet sanity and I use it liberally. Feel free to raise another poster's point if I've ignored them.

TheMarcksPlan
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 01 May 2019 04:08

This thread has grown long and taken detours as usually happens.

To return somewhat to the original question, what feasible improvements to Barbarossa logistics do we think were possible? Like would doubling the number and equipment of Eisenbahntruppen have allowed the Ostheer to be fully supplied near Moscow and - perhaps more importantly - at/beyond Rostov in late 41 and thereafter?
The "ignore user" function is essential to AHF/internet sanity and I use it liberally. Feel free to raise another poster's point if I've ignored them.

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