The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2019 11:53

ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 11:43
What Bayerlein said was nonsense and it is also disingenuous: ...
ljadw says Bayerlein lies. What a surprise!!! :roll:

Why is it that they only evidence that is not a lie is that which fits your fantasy narrative perfectly?

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 22 May 2019 12:04

ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 11:51
jesk wrote:
22 May 2019 09:24
ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 08:44
From June to October 1941,the Axis sent some 500000 tons of supplies to NA of which 82000 tons were lost by Malta Forces = some 16,4 % .
For the whole of 1941 1015000 tons were sent,of which 165000 tons were lost by Malta forces = some 16 % .
Source :Malta and British Strategic Policy 1925-1943 by Douglas Austin .
In 1935 the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta for Alexandria .( Same source ) .
Fighting was conducted until May 1943. The source speaks about sinking of 3/4 transport ships.
Lieutenant-General Fritz Bayerlane wrote:
“Delivery of supplies through the Mediterranean to Rommel’s army was reduced to an average of 6,000 tons per month, meeting only about one-fifth of our usual needs.
Three-quarters of our transports, which transferred supplies from Italy to North Africa, were sunk by British aircraft or the navy. Since we could not create the necessary supplies for the future, any possibility of a decisive battle fell away.
Bayerlein is totally wrong : he said that the monthly Axis needs were 30000 tons of which only 20 % (6000 ) arrived . If this was so, why did the Axis send 500000 ton in 5 month ( June-October 1941 ) of which 133000 ton in June ?
If you need 30000 ton monthly, why sending 133000 ton ?
Besides, if only 20 % of the needed Axis supplies arrived, why could they fight during 3 years in NA ?
You showed the year 1941. It is interesting to see the selection for April 1943.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2019 14:58

April 1943
Shipping losses : 11
Supplies :
sent 48000 tons thus some 25 ships
lost 20000 tons

arrived : 28000
Here also the losses were marginal
The supply losses by Malta forces in 1943 were ; January : 18000 ton, February 17000 ton, March 28000,April 20000, May 11000

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2019 15:00

MarkN wrote:
22 May 2019 11:53
ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 11:43
What Bayerlein said was nonsense and it is also disingenuous: ...
ljadw says Bayerlein lies. What a surprise!!! :roll:

Why is it that they only evidence that is not a lie is that which fits your fantasy narrative perfectly?
Of course he was disingenuous,as he tried to make the Italians responsible for his failure .Something the Germans were very good in .
I am not at all surprised that you agree with Bayerlein .

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 22 May 2019 19:03

ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 15:00
MarkN wrote:
22 May 2019 11:53
ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 11:43
What Bayerlein said was nonsense and it is also disingenuous: ...
ljadw says Bayerlein lies. What a surprise!!! :roll:

Why is it that they only evidence that is not a lie is that which fits your fantasy narrative perfectly?
Of course he was disingenuous,as he tried to make the Italians responsible for his failure .Something the Germans were very good in .
I am not at all surprised that you agree with Bayerlein .
Did I write that I agree with Bayerlein? No, I didn't. :roll:

Did I make an observation that, once again, you conveniently disregard anything that contradicts your fantasy narratives as a lie? Yes, I did.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2019 06:14

I said that the Germans were very good in blaming the Italians for their failures .You said that this is a fantasy .
Thus , you agree with Bayerlein .
Or Bayerlein was right, or he was wrong : you said that it is a fantasy to say that he was wrong, that means that for you he was right .
QED .

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 23 May 2019 11:09

ljadw wrote:
23 May 2019 06:14
I said that the Germans were very good in blaming the Italians for their failures .You said that this is a fantasy .
Thus , you agree with Bayerlein .
Or Bayerlein was right, or he was wrong : you said that it is a fantasy to say that he was wrong, that means that for you he was right .
QED .
I guess this is an excellent example of how you create falsehoods which you then twist illogically to create a fantasy narrative where the QED only works in your head.

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 24 May 2019 07:58

ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 14:58
April 1943
Shipping losses : 11
Supplies :
sent 48000 tons thus some 25 ships
lost 20000 tons

arrived : 28000
Here also the losses were marginal
The supply losses by Malta forces in 1943 were ;April 20000,
Do you understand what you wrote? 42% loss "by Malta forces". To 1942 the number of group grew. In response to the introduction in war of the USA. The ships are few, the supply is not enough.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 May 2019 14:02

jesk wrote:
24 May 2019 07:58
ljadw wrote:
22 May 2019 14:58
April 1943
Shipping losses : 11
Supplies :
sent 48000 tons thus some 25 ships
lost 20000 tons

arrived : 28000
Here also the losses were marginal
The supply losses by Malta forces in 1943 were ;April 20000,
Do you understand what you wrote? 42% loss "by Malta forces". To 1942 the number of group grew. In response to the introduction in war of the USA. The ships are few, the supply is not enough.
Wrong answer : % of losses are irrelevant : It is even more than possible that 42 % means lower losses than 20% .
ONE example: September 1941: sent 94000 tons, arrived 67000 ton, lost 28 % or 27000 tons ,
42 % in April 1943 meant 20000 tons ,while 28 % in September 1941 meant 27000 ton .
What was important was what arrived,and what arrived was not determined by what was lost underway, but by what was sent .
In December 1942 98000 tons were sent to NA,of which 67000 tons arrived,31000 tons were lost some 32 % .But if 50 % was lost, still 49000 tons would arrive , more than in April 1943 . If 0% was lost in April 1943, only 48000 tons would arrive, less than in September 1941,if in this month 50 % was lost .
Besides what was arriving in April 1943 was irrelevant, as the dies were cast already .
The supplies arriving in NA were sufficient, otherwise the Axis could not invade Egypt and could not fight in NA during 3 years .
Other point, there is no proof that the amount of supplies that arrived in NA had an influence on the fighting :
June 1942 : Tobruk big Axis victory : 32000 tons of supplies arrived
November 1942 : Alamein : big British victory : 63000 ton arrived .
If supplies are that important, why did the Axis lose at Alamein when the double of supplies arrived than in June when the Axis won at Tobruk ?
It is the same for the boms dropped on Malta :
January 1942 : 669 tons of bombs were dropped and 66000 tons of supplies arrived
February : 1020 tons of bombs and 59000 tons of supplies
March :2170 and 47000
April : 6700 and 150000
May : 520 and 86000
In May only the half of the amount of Bombs were dropped of February but the number of supplies increased by 50 % .
Thus we have here : less bombings and more supplies .The reason is simple : in May more supplies were sent than in February .

jesk
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 26 May 2019 19:50

ljadw wrote:
24 May 2019 14:02
The supplies arriving in NA were sufficient, otherwise the Axis could not invade Egypt and could not fight in NA during 3 years .
Other point, there is no proof that the amount of supplies that arrived in NA had an influence on the fighting :
June 1942 : Tobruk big Axis victory : 32000 tons of supplies arrived
November 1942 : Alamein : big British victory : 63000 ton arrived .
If supplies are that important, why did the Axis lose at Alamein when the double of supplies arrived than in June when the Axis won at Tobruk ?
It is logic on the basis of limited information. Supply in Africa trubut more detailed analysis.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 16 Sep 2019 16:59

When discussing the early Typhoon and its logistic component in this and other topics, the mistake was the projection onto the entire Army Group Center. 2,4,9 armies, 2 and 3 tank groups must storm. But why so much? Following Hitler’s wishes to strengthen Kiev’s direction, on July 23, Halder drew up a plan of attack on Moscow with the forces of 2, 9 armies and 3 tank group. 4 army and 2 tank group are moving in the direction of the Caucasus. According to the plan, 60% of the number on June 22, between August 5 and 10 were supposed to attack Moscow. Halder considered such a quantity sufficient to carry out the tasks.
Already on July 15, 2 supply bases functioned in Molodechno and on the Dnieper. And it was possible to ensure the advance to Moscow of 7-8 motorized, 20 infantry divisions. That was exactly what Halder needed. By August 10, the supply situation had improved.
The 4th army and the 2nd tank group would already be replenished through Kiev and other supply points of Army Group South. Given the rout of the Soviet armies in central direction, the Wehrmacht did not need any operational pauses. 20 divisions could reach Moscow always and under any circumstances.

Halder's diary. July 23, 1941

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/1941_07.html

Tasks: Army Group “South”: Capture of Ukraine (together with Crimea), later - the lower reaches of the Volga and the Caucasus. The allocation of forces to capture the coast (Romanian, 11th Army) {286}.
Industrial areas: Partisan activities unlikely {287}.
The offensive for the Dnieper - only in the second half of August.
To protect the coast, occupation of the industrial region of the Donetsk basin, flanking cover in the north (given the importance of the Caucasus), reinforcement (4th Army, 2nd Tank Group) is necessary.

Army Group Center: The Hardest Challenge. The enemy is the most powerful here, the best base (means of communication), the actions of the partisans, the problem of Moscow has been created here. How and when the Moscow problem can be resolved depends on political considerations.
Militarily, the solution is presented in the form of an offensive on a wide front with the provision of this offensive through the deep separation of troops on the flanks. For this purpose, it is necessary to use motorized and tank troops, which will cut communications around Moscow. After transferring the troops of the 2nd and 9th armies to the southeast and transferring [175] the Goth’s tank group to the Army Group “North”, there will be insufficient forces {289}.

Since the limited capabilities of the railway network do not allow supplying everything necessary for the 2nd and 9th armies simultaneously to 3 or 5.8, to solve this problem it will be necessary first of all to pull the 9th army to the level of the 3rd tank group in order to free the latter for breakthrough. Then it will be possible to launch an offensive in the center of the front by the forces of two armies between 5 and 10 August.

18.00 - Report at the Führer: I reported on the position of the enemy and raised the question of the ultimate goals of the operation. The Führer sets himself the goals that were formulated in yesterday’s OKW directive {297}, and continues to stick to them stubbornly, ignoring the enemy and other factors. Thus, von Bock would have to give up his tank groups and continue the attack on Moscow with one infantry. In general, at the moment, the Führer is not at all interested in Moscow, and all his attention is focused on Leningrad, which caused a long debate on how to conduct the operation of Army Group North and why von Leeu should be transferred to the 3rd Panzer Group for execution tasks to destroy the enemy in the Leningrad region. The Fuhrer sees the purpose of the operation in the destruction of the enemy’s forces, which he considers possible to achieve even before entering the Moscow region {298}.
He believes that by the period of autumn rains our mobile units will be able to reach the Volga and enter the Caucasus. It remains only to wish that this calculation [178] is correct. In general, it is a pity for the time lost on this report.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 18 Sep 2019 18:39

jesk wrote:
16 Sep 2019 16:59
When discussing the early Typhoon and its logistic component in this and other topics, the mistake was the projection onto the entire Army Group Center. 2,4,9 armies, 2 and 3 tank groups must storm. But why so much? Following Hitler’s wishes to strengthen Kiev’s direction, on July 23, Halder drew up a plan of attack on Moscow with the forces of 2, 9 armies and 3 tank group. 4 army and 2 tank group are moving in the direction of the Caucasus. According to the plan, 60% of the number on June 22, between August 5 and 10 were supposed to attack Moscow. Halder considered such a quantity sufficient to carry out the tasks.
Already on July 15, 2 supply bases functioned in Molodechno and on the Dnieper. And it was possible to ensure the advance to Moscow of 7-8 motorized, 20 infantry divisions. That was exactly what Halder needed. By August 10, the supply situation had improved.
The 4th army and the 2nd tank group would already be replenished through Kiev and other supply points of Army Group South. Given the rout of the Soviet armies in central direction, the Wehrmacht did not need any operational pauses. 20 divisions could reach Moscow always and under any circumstances.

Halder's diary. July 23, 1941

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/1941_07.html

Tasks: Army Group “South”: Capture of Ukraine (together with Crimea), later - the lower reaches of the Volga and the Caucasus. The allocation of forces to capture the coast (Romanian, 11th Army) {286}.
Industrial areas: Partisan activities unlikely {287}.
The offensive for the Dnieper - only in the second half of August.
To protect the coast, occupation of the industrial region of the Donetsk basin, flanking cover in the north (given the importance of the Caucasus), reinforcement (4th Army, 2nd Tank Group) is necessary.

Army Group Center: The Hardest Challenge. The enemy is the most powerful here, the best base (means of communication), the actions of the partisans, the problem of Moscow has been created here. How and when the Moscow problem can be resolved depends on political considerations.
Militarily, the solution is presented in the form of an offensive on a wide front with the provision of this offensive through the deep separation of troops on the flanks. For this purpose, it is necessary to use motorized and tank troops, which will cut communications around Moscow. After transferring the troops of the 2nd and 9th armies to the southeast and transferring [175] the Goth’s tank group to the Army Group “North”, there will be insufficient forces {289}.

Since the limited capabilities of the railway network do not allow supplying everything necessary for the 2nd and 9th armies simultaneously to 3 or 5.8, to solve this problem it will be necessary first of all to pull the 9th army to the level of the 3rd tank group in order to free the latter for breakthrough. Then it will be possible to launch an offensive in the center of the front by the forces of two armies between 5 and 10 August.

18.00 - Report at the Führer: I reported on the position of the enemy and raised the question of the ultimate goals of the operation. The Führer sets himself the goals that were formulated in yesterday’s OKW directive {297}, and continues to stick to them stubbornly, ignoring the enemy and other factors. Thus, von Bock would have to give up his tank groups and continue the attack on Moscow with one infantry. In general, at the moment, the Führer is not at all interested in Moscow, and all his attention is focused on Leningrad, which caused a long debate on how to conduct the operation of Army Group North and why von Leeu should be transferred to the 3rd Panzer Group for execution tasks to destroy the enemy in the Leningrad region. The Fuhrer sees the purpose of the operation in the destruction of the enemy’s forces, which he considers possible to achieve even before entering the Moscow region {298}.
He believes that by the period of autumn rains our mobile units will be able to reach the Volga and enter the Caucasus. It remains only to wish that this calculation [178] is correct. In general, it is a pity for the time lost on this report.
Why are you even mentioning mid July when touching on Typhoon? At the dates in question the Smolensk encirclement wasn't even sealed yet. Guderian had just discarded the plan to seal the pocket and instead took Yelnya as a jump off point for later operations, allowing tens of thousands of Red Army troops to escape the encirclement. By the 23 all of the forward German panzer corps were all subject to ferocious counterattacks that weakened them severely. Only after repelling those counterattacks, finally sealing the pocket, allowing the infantry armies to catch up to help reduce the pocket, Hoth and Guderian insisting all of their divisions be relieved for rest/reconstitution/maintenance from a dwindling supply line, then the splitting of AGM's panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev, was Moscow back on the table.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 18 Sep 2019 19:52

Duncan_M wrote:
18 Sep 2019 18:39
Why are you even mentioning mid July when touching on Typhoon? At the dates in question the Smolensk encirclement wasn't even sealed yet. Guderian had just discarded the plan to seal the pocket and instead took Yelnya as a jump off point for later operations, allowing tens of thousands of Red Army troops to escape the encirclement. By the 23 all of the forward German panzer corps were all subject to ferocious counterattacks that weakened them severely. Only after repelling those counterattacks, finally sealing the pocket, allowing the infantry armies to catch up to help reduce the pocket, Hoth and Guderian insisting all of their divisions be relieved for rest/reconstitution/maintenance from a dwindling supply line, then the splitting of AGM's panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev, was Moscow back on the table.
This has also been discussed. On July 13, von Bock wanted to hit Moscow with two tank groups. Smolensk’s pockets; Soviet attacks in July are not serious. The Germans fought off them like annoying flies. Do not argue with von Bock! He knew his job.

Halder's diary. July 13

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 18 Sep 2019 20:51

jesk wrote:
18 Sep 2019 19:52
Duncan_M wrote:
18 Sep 2019 18:39
Why are you even mentioning mid July when touching on Typhoon? At the dates in question the Smolensk encirclement wasn't even sealed yet. Guderian had just discarded the plan to seal the pocket and instead took Yelnya as a jump off point for later operations, allowing tens of thousands of Red Army troops to escape the encirclement. By the 23 all of the forward German panzer corps were all subject to ferocious counterattacks that weakened them severely. Only after repelling those counterattacks, finally sealing the pocket, allowing the infantry armies to catch up to help reduce the pocket, Hoth and Guderian insisting all of their divisions be relieved for rest/reconstitution/maintenance from a dwindling supply line, then the splitting of AGM's panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev, was Moscow back on the table.
This has also been discussed. On July 13, von Bock wanted to hit Moscow with two tank groups. Smolensk’s pockets; Soviet attacks in July are not serious. The Germans fought off them like annoying flies. Do not argue with von Bock! He knew his job.

Halder's diary. July 13

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf
Again. So what?

I ask again: What was the point of taking Moscow? Was it the center of gravity? Could it even be taken? Was nobody defending it? Even if it was taken, could it be held? Would Stalin had surrendered if it was taken? Did no other possibilities exist? Did Stalin not already evacuate Moscow in light of it possibly be taken? What about all those hundreds of Red Army divisions that weren't destroyed west of the Dnieper? Were they all going to surrender because Moscow fell?

Halder had a hard on for Moscow during the entire planning and execution stage of Barbarossa. But Halder did not dictate strategy. Nor was Halder's strategic understanding even correct. As it became grossly apparent that all intel and political/strategic assumptions that Barbarossa was based on were utter nonsense, why is it that Halder refused to adjust and face reality? Because he, like you, was obsessed with a city that actually held little importance at the time.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 18 Sep 2019 20:52

jesk wrote:
18 Sep 2019 19:52
This has also been discussed. On July 13, von Bock wanted to hit Moscow with two tank groups. Smolensk’s pockets; Soviet attacks in July are not serious. The Germans fought off them like annoying flies. Do not argue with von Bock! He knew his job.

Halder's diary. July 13

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf
First, its funny you keep pulling out Halder's diary. Why not mention the week before when he declared that the war was already won?

Second, what had not even happened by July 13? The Battle of Smolensk wasn't even close to being over, it had barely even begun. A bit early to start planning an even deeper drive when Army Group Center was on the verge of being smashed east of the Dnieper, right?

As for July 13, again I ask, so what?

What was the point of taking Moscow? Was it the center of gravity? Could it even be taken? Was nobody defending it? Even if it was taken, could it be held? Would Stalin had surrendered if it was taken? Did no other possibilities exist? Did Stalin not already evacuate Moscow in light of it possibly be taken? What about all those hundreds of Red Army divisions that weren't destroyed west of the Dnieper? Were they all going to surrender because Moscow fell?

Halder had a hard on for Moscow during the entire planning and execution stage of Barbarossa. But Halder did not dictate strategy. Nor was Halder's strategic understanding even correct. As it became grossly apparent that all intel and political/strategic assumptions that Barbarossa was based on were utter nonsense, why is it that Halder refused to adjust and face reality? Because he, like you, was obsessed with a city that actually held little importance at the time.

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