The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 16:04

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 13:13
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 12:57
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 12:38
Or we can look at what primary objective was,..
We can....
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 12:38
"The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented."
... and that's NOT what it was.

Of course, if you are using the word "primary" in the sense of initial, you are correct. However, being initial is just a intermediate task on the way to the objective.

If you are using "primary" to mean main or principle, then you are wrong.
Very first thing on AH to do list, ...
Being first thing on the to do list does not make it the objective.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 13:13
...its odd you know more about what AH ment than he did himself.
... it's odd that you cannot comprehend that being on a to do list does not equate to an objective.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 13:13
I. General Purpose:The mass of the Russian Army in western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.
Indeed. Now, where in that sentance does it say that it is an objective or the objective? It doesn't.

Now read the second paragraph
In rascher Verfolgung ist dann eine Linie zu erreichen, aus der die russische Luftwaffe reichsdeutsches Gebiet nicht mehr angreifen kann. Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga - Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Rußland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden.
Notice the words "Endziel der Operation ...". There's the objective.

Paragraph 1 that you posted a translation of describes an intermediate task on the way to achieving the objective.
Last edited by MarkN on 18 Feb 2019 16:38, edited 1 time in total.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 18 Feb 2019 16:12

SloveneLiberal wrote:
18 Feb 2019 09:33
Hitler's decision to attack Soviet union in June 1941 was in fact strategically the quite right one. Of course from the point of view that he started war of conquest in 1939. Germany had not enough oil and an energy crisis emerged in 1940. They were very limited in fighting long war. This was because of British blocade, Since Hitler was not able to convince the UK for peace agreement it was for him a good option to attack SU and get his hand on oil of Caucasus, destroy soviet war industry and get food resources of Ukraine.

On the other hand Germans knew very well how vonurable Romanian oil fields were for a Soviet attack. They had informations that Soviets are building their army at Pripyat marshes. Yet they thought Red army is much less strong as it really was. Soviet war industry was building their armor very quickly and in 1942 Hitler would have much less chances. On the contrary Red army would be much better prepared plus war between Britain and Germany would exhaust both, specially Germany.
The point is that the Germans did not plan for a long war,because it would lose such a war ,as in 1914-1918 .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 16:19

I'm just going to deal with this one as I cannot be bothered to explain multiple times how a wheel goes round...
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 13:19
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 12:33
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 11:18
Logistic failures include, failure to predict oil consumption, 6 fold consumption put 1800 Panzers out of action when engines seized up from lack of oil.
That's not a failure of logistics.
Yes it is.
The manufacturer of a vehicle writes in the user manual the expected consumption rates under various conditions.
The vehicle user advises how far he expects that vehicle to travel.
The logistician does a set of primary school level math equations to determine what the supply quantity and rate is.

The logistic system is at fault if you can evidence that the math he did was wrong.
The logistic system is at fault if you can evidence that he sent the wrong supplies to the wrong unit.

If the consumption data was wrong, it's not the fault of the logistic system.
If the user uses the vehicle more than advised, it's not the fault of the logistic system.
If the user neglects to advise that consumption rates being experienced are higher than written in the user manual, it's not the fault of the logistic system.

And so on....

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 16:20

ljadw wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:12
SloveneLiberal wrote:
18 Feb 2019 09:33
Hitler's decision to attack Soviet union in June 1941 was in fact strategically the quite right one. Of course from the point of view that he started war of conquest in 1939. Germany had not enough oil and an energy crisis emerged in 1940. They were very limited in fighting long war. This was because of British blocade, Since Hitler was not able to convince the UK for peace agreement it was for him a good option to attack SU and get his hand on oil of Caucasus, destroy soviet war industry and get food resources of Ukraine.

On the other hand Germans knew very well how vonurable Romanian oil fields were for a Soviet attack. They had informations that Soviets are building their army at Pripyat marshes. Yet they thought Red army is much less strong as it really was. Soviet war industry was building their armor very quickly and in 1942 Hitler would have much less chances. On the contrary Red army would be much better prepared plus war between Britain and Germany would exhaust both, specially Germany.
The point is that the Germans did not plan for a long war,because it would lose such a war ,as in 1914-1918 .
Making it up again. :roll:

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 18 Feb 2019 16:38

Barbarossa was planned as a short war,of a few months, which would be decided in a few weeks .
Idem for Fall Gelb and Fall Rot .
Idem for the Schlieffen plan .
Germany could not afford a long war, not in 1914, not in 1939 .
It was too weak .
In the autumn of 1940 it had the choice between a long war of attrition against Britain and the US,which it could not win,or a short campaign to eliminate the SU .
No wonder that Hitler preferred Barbarossa .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 16:41

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 13:19
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 12:33

I have not seen anywhere what they consider to be the maximum distance or time that logistical support was practical
Thats a failure to read the required reading literature.
So what was the geographical line or point in time that the Wehrmacht logistical gurus said they could support and beyond it they couldn't?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 16:46

ljadw wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:38
Barbarossa was planned as a short war,of a few months, which would be decided in a few weeks .
Idem for Fall Gelb and Fall Rot .
Idem for the Schlieffen plan .
Germany could not afford a long war, not in 1914, not in 1939 .
It was too weak .
In the autumn of 1940 it had the choice between a long war of attrition against Britain and the US,which it could not win,or a short campaign to eliminate the SU .
No wonder that Hitler preferred Barbarossa .
Making it up again.

Barbarossa was not "planned as a short war".

Planners were asked to prepare a plan to achieve an objective. They were not asked to prepare a plan of short duration.

Their response included a timeframe. That timeframe was neither short nor long. It was the timeframe they thought they could achieve the objective.

The idea of short and long only comes into play after BARBAROSSA had failed and, instead of hugs and kisses at the Urals in November 1941, it was tears and sorrow at Berlin in 1945.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019 17:05

MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
Being first thing on the to do list does not make it the objective.
It does, because thats what AH told them it was. It was the principle objective in the Marcks plan and the Paulus plan. Secondry was the geographical/economic objects that procede from that.
General Halder's war diary of 22 July
1940, Hitler's intention was: "...the defeat of the Russian Army,
Hitler emphasized that the basic principle inconducting the operations was to destroy enemy forces wherever they were encountered.

Which is why its in all the teaching texts on the subject.https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf
Example
Army Group Center's primary mission was to eliminate the Russian salients that were protruding far into its flanks. After this had been successfully accomplished and the armored groups had been rehabilitated, the army group forces were to jump off for the Moscow offensive on a wide front.

Primary Missions of the Ground Forces. The primary mission of Army Group South was to destroy the Russians in the western Ukraine and to establish bridgeheads across the Dnepr from which the army group forces could continue eastward or northeastward.
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
I'm just going to deal with this one as I cannot be bothered to explain multiple times how a wheel goes round...
Again the school boy error of answering the wrong question.

The dust overwhelmed the inadequate air filters of the vehicles, requiring 6 times oil consumption to clear, when exhusted, ultimately destroying the engines altogether.
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
The logistic system is at fault if you can evidence that the math he did was wrong..

Considering the corrosive effects of moving such enormous distances on Soviet roads, with their notoriously uneven surfaces as well as the all-pervasive clouds of dust that overwhelmed air filters and ruined engines, it is not surprising that by early September Panzer Group 2 was experiencing shortages in trucks and supplies. Indeed supplies were being ferried hundreds of kilometres for an individual load. It was around 350 kilometres from the Soviet border town of Brest to Minsk, 500 kilometres to the Dnepr River and some 700 kilometres to Smolensk. Not only did the trucks have to bridge the ever-growing distance between the railheads and the spearhead of the attack, but with the capacity of the railways proving grossly inadequate, there were more than a few instances in which the Quartermaster-General was bypassed altogether and the panzer groups independently dispatched trucks back to Germany to obtain what was required. This ensured that the trucks endured enormous wear and tear for a comparatively diminutive yield in supplies. Under such circumstances there was a manifest difference between what the statisticians were projecting in the distant army headquarters and the reality of conducting operations at the front.

The planned math was to resupply from grosstruppen depots ever 24 hours, reality was it took 48+. logistics failure.


QM XXIVPanzerCorps reported ‘Every panzer is only provisionally fit for service. As a result of oil shortages no oil changes can be undertaken. If the panzers are committed to a large-scale operation in their current condition then the total loss of most must be expected
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
The logistic system is at fault if you can evidence that he sent the wrong supplies to the wrong unit.
Guderian’s Chief of Staff, noted in his diary, ‘Resupply is often senseless. For instance, sometimes we receive mortar ammunition which contains a high percentage of concrete bombs, or mudguards instead of spare parts for engines.’

Considering the corrosive effects of moving such enormous distances on Soviet roads, with their notoriously uneven surfaces as well as the all-pervasive clouds of dust that overwhelmed air filters and ruined engines, it is not surprising that by early September Panzer Group 2 was experiencing shortages in trucks and supplies. Indeed supplies were being ferried hundreds of kilometres for an individual load. It was around 350 kilometres from the Soviet border town of Brest to Minsk, 500 kilometres to the Dnepr River and some 700 kilometres to Smolensk. Not only did the trucks have to bridge the ever-growing distance between the railheads and the spearhead of the attack, but with the capacity of the railways proving grossly inadequate, there were more than a few instances in which the Quartermaster-General was bypassed altogether and the panzer groups independently dispatched trucks back to Germany to obtain what was required. This ensured that the trucks endured enormous wear and tear for a comparatively diminutive yield in supplies. Under such circumstances there was a manifest difference between what the statisticians were projecting in the distant army headquarters and the reality of conducting operations at the front.
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
So what was the geographical line or point in time that the Wehrmacht logistical gurus said they could support and beyond it they couldn't?
Already provided.
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MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 17:44

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
Being first thing on the to do list does not make it the objective.
It does, because thats what AH told them it was. It was the principle objective in the Marcks plan and the Paulus plan. Secondry was the geographical/economic objects that procede from that.
Weissung 21 is the political directive to the military. It is what you used as your evidence.

It deos NOT indicate that defeating the Red Army is the objective.

It DOES state: Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga - Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Rußland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden. The objective of Barbarossa is geographical - get to the Urals.

It is a schoolboy error to ignore the evidence and regurgitate what you want to believe is true.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
Hitler emphasized that the basic principle inconducting the operations was to destroy enemy forces wherever they were encountered.
Which is pretty much a given in war, but has NOTHING to do with Das Endziel der Operation.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
I'm just going to deal with this one as I cannot be bothered to explain multiple times how a wheel goes round...
Again the school boy error of answering the wrong question.
Common practice on AHF. However, one which I did not commit on this occasion - but do sometimes.

On the otherhand, you do seem to have selective reading qualities.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
The dust overwhelmed the inadequate air filters of the vehicles, requiring 6 times oil consumption to clear, when exhusted, ultimately destroying the engines altogether.
If the user neglects to advise that consumption rates being experienced are higher than written in the user manual, it's not the fault of the logistic system.
Even if the user advises that consumption rates being experienced are higher than written in the user manual, and where the logistic system is already working to maximum effort, it's not the fault of the logistic system that they cannot react to the new state of affairs.

The logistic system is at fault if it has spare capacity in the system and wilfully choses not to use that spare capacity for the new state of affairs.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
Considering the corrosive effects .... blah blah blah snipped.
Not a failure of logistics, a failure of military planners across the board to understand the task they were about to commence.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
Guderian’s Chief of Staff, noted in his diary, ‘Resupply is often senseless. For instance, sometimes we receive mortar ammunition which contains a high percentage of concrete bombs, or mudguards instead of spare parts for engines.’
Nobody in their right mind would try to argue that the logistic system was perfect and mistakes were never made. Please feel free to waste your time evidencing that mistakes were made if it makes feel good. But that's not the issue - see schoolboy errors are prevalent here.

The question is, was logistics the, or a, reason for overall failure of BARBAROSSA.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:19
So what was the geographical line or point in time that the Wehrmacht logistical gurus said they could support and beyond it they couldn't?
Already provided.
Hmmmm!

OK. If you are referring to your post on page 1 of this thread, that is not the answer the question. See, schoolboy errors really are prevalent here.

You seem to hint that the tipping point between doable and not doable is the completion of the first 300 mile bound. But at the same time, you also hint that that tipping point can be extended if they have a pause in their advance AND/OR use of the rail network. So, was that THE tipping point or just a normal staging point that all armies have to go thorough on long advances?

Was that the point on the map at which the logistics gurus said BARBAROSSA was not doable from a logistics perspective, or just part of their logistics plan on how they would/could support BARBAROSSA?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019 17:44

MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 16:46


The idea of short and long only comes into play after BARBAROSSA had failed and, instead of hugs and kisses at the Urals in November 1941, it was tears and sorrow at Berlin in 1945.
Tooze wages of destruction disagrees.

Here was the perverse
logic of Barbarossa in a nutshell. The conquest of the oilfields of the
Caucasus, 2,000 kilometres deep in the Soviet Union, was not treated
as the awesome military-industrial undertaking that it was. It was
inserted as a precondition into another gargantuan industrial plan
designed to allow the Luftwaffe to fight an air war, not against the Soviet
Union, but against the looming air fleet of Britain and the United States.


Everything depended on deciding
the battle, as in France, in the first weeks of the campaign. This was the
assumption on which Barbarossa was premised. 78 A massive central
thrust towards Moscow, accompanied by flanking encirclements of the
Soviet forces trapped in the north and south, would allow the Red Army
to be broken on the Dnieper-Dvina river line within 500 kilometres of
the Polish-German border. The Dnieper-Dvina river line was critical
because beyond that point logistical constraints on the German army
were binding. 79 These limitations on Germany's new style of 'Blitzkrieg 1
had not been obvious in 1940, because the depth of operations required
by Manstein's encircling blow (Sichelschnitt) had never exceeded a few
hundred kilometres. The entire operation could therefore be supplied
by trucks shuttling back and forth from the German border. On the
basis of their experience in France, the Wehrmacht's logistical staff
calculated that the efficient total range for trucks was 600 kilometres,
giving an operational depth of 300. Beyond that point the trucks them¬
selves used up so much of the fuel they were carrying that they became
inefficient as a means of transport. Given the vast distances encountered
in the Soviet Union, an operational depth of 300 kilometres was absurdly
restrictive. To extend the range of the logistical system, the Wehrmacht
therefore split its motor pool into two segments. One set of trucks
would move forward with the Panzer units and would ferry fuel and
ammunition from intermediate dumps that would be resupplied by the
main fleet operating from the borders of the General Government. By
this expedient, it was hoped that the initial logistical range could be
extended to 500 kilometres. By happy chance, this coincided exactly
with the Dnieper-Dvina line. Haider, the army's chief of staff, was
clearly aware of the fundamental importance of this constraint. In his
diary at the end of lanuary 1941 he noted that the success of Barbarossa
depended on speed. 'Speed! No stops! Do not wait for railway! Do
everything with motor vehicles.' There must be 'no hold ups', 'that alone
guarantees victory'. 80

The doubts, interestingly, were of two kinds. There were
at least some officers who questioned the feasibility of the operation
itself. Significantly these included Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, com¬
mander of Army Group Centre, to whom fell the awesome task of
crushing the main body of the Red Army en route to Moscow. By the
end of January 1941, Bock was so concerned about the scale of the
mission assigned to his army group that he forced Haider, the chief of
army staff, to concede that there was a distinct possibility that the
Red Army might escape beyond the Dnieper-Dvina line. What would
happen in this eventuality was the key question. One of the earliest war
games done to test the Barbarossa plan concluded that unless both the
destruction of the Red Army and the capture of Moscow could be
accomplished within a matter of months, Germany would face a 'long-
drawn-out war, beyond the capacity of the German armed forces to
wage'.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019 17:52

MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44

Weissung 21 is the political directive to the military. It is what you used as your evidence.
It is a schoolboy error to ignore the evidence and regurgitate what you want to believe is true.
Asked and answered. The one doing what you suggest is yourself, defining logistics to suit your self not how its defined by the manuals, defining Fuhrer directives that contradict AH and Halder explanation of what it meant

Contradict the source itself, western worlds war colleges, AH and Halder explaining what it means all you wont, we have people like here all the time one more wont hurt.

As for your selective reading and school boy errors of answering questions not asked, see your fist post in the thread post 11
Volyn wrote: ↑17 Feb 2019 00:17
Since the Germans were able to continue to fight deep in Soviet territory for 3+ years, how did they overcome the logistical setbacks of 1941 and keep their forces "well-enough" supplied all the to the Volga and South Caucasus?
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44
BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of logistics.
He asked about 42-45, you refer to 41. But we now know you dont know when BARBAROSSA ended. :o


Moving on unless you contribute something of actual interest.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 18:42

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44
Tooze wages of destruction disagrees.
So?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 18 Feb 2019 18:47

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44
Weissung 21 is the political directive to the military. It is what you used as your evidence.
It is a schoolboy error to ignore the evidence and regurgitate what you want to believe is true.
Asked and answered.
Not asked, not answered.

You claimed the objective of BARBAROSSA was X. Weissung 21 says otherwise.

I'll leave it at that, as there is no value in going around this bouy any longer.
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
The one doing what you suggest is yourself, defining logistics to suit your self not how its defined by the manuals, defining Fuhrer directives that contradict AH and Halder explanation of what it meant
:roll:
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
Contradict the source itself, western worlds war colleges, AH and Halder explaining what it means all you wont, we have people like here all the time one more wont hurt.
:roll:
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
As for your selective reading and school boy errors of answering questions not asked, see your fist post in the thread post 11
Volyn wrote: ↑17 Feb 2019 00:17
Since the Germans were able to continue to fight deep in Soviet territory for 3+ years, how did they overcome the logistical setbacks of 1941 and keep their forces "well-enough" supplied all the to the Volga and South Caucasus?
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44
BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of logistics.
He asked about 42-45, you refer to 41. But we now know you dont know when BARBAROSSA ended. :o
Which rather highlights the nonsense of his post. 42-45 was not BARBAROSSA!
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
Moving on unless you contribute something of actual interest.
Moving on is a great idea.

Good night!

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Feb 2019 20:02

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:05
Which is why its in all the teaching texts on the subject.https://history.army.mil/html/books/104 ... 104-21.pdf
A somewhat minor point. That is not a "teaching text", nor is it "all" of them. :lol: The "teaching text" for World War II, at least for the U.S. Military Academy, is the The West Point History of World War II (two volumes), United States Military Academy, eds. Clifford J. Rogers, Ty Seidule, and Steve R. Waddell, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2015-2016. It is, like the others in the series of West Point textbooks, a modern rewriting and expansion of the old West Point "Atlas of" wars series first published under the auspices of Brigadier General Vincent Esposito in 1959. They, in turn, were based upon even earlier atlas-style texts produced at West Point at the turn of the century to accompany instruction on the Napoleonic and the American Civil War.

It does draw on The German Campaign in Russia, as well as many other sources, which is understandable given that Citino wrote chapter 2 “German Years of Victory" and Megargee chapter 4 “The Germans Turn East: Operation Barbarossa and the Beginnings of the Final Solution".
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 18 Feb 2019 20:19

Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:52
As for your selective reading and school boy errors of answering questions not asked, see your fist post in the thread post 11
Volyn wrote: ↑17 Feb 2019 00:17

Since the Germans were able to continue to fight deep in Soviet territory for 3+ years, how did they overcome the logistical setbacks of 1941 and keep their forces "well-enough" supplied all the to the Volga and South Caucasus?
MarkN wrote:
18 Feb 2019 17:44
BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of logistics.
He asked about 42-45, you refer to 41. But we now know you dont know when BARBAROSSA ended. :o
Which rather highlights the nonsense of his post. 42-45 was not BARBAROSSA!


He knows, he was asking about conditions, post Barbarossa, the only one referencing 41 and it, was yourself. Get it yet? :P


https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1039919.pdf
II.3.3 Assessment of German Military Means
Based on the guidance of Directive 21, the Army’s Operation Order (February 3, 1941)
specified the missions and objectives for the respective subordinate German Armies and Panzer
Groups in detail.
The primary mission for all three AGs was to destroy the “bulk of the Russian Army
stationed in western Russia by a series of daring operations spearheaded by armored thrusts.”57
The purpose of the initial phase was to prevent an organized withdrawal of intact units into the
vastness of interior Russia.
AG

Get it yet?
Last edited by Hanny on 18 Feb 2019 20:33, edited 1 time in total.
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