The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 18 Sep 2019 21:04

Duncan_M wrote:
18 Sep 2019 20:52
First, its funny you keep pulling out Halder's diary. Why not mention the week before when he declared that the war was already won?

Second, what had not even happened by July 13? The Battle of Smolensk wasn't even close to being over, it had barely even begun. A bit early to start planning an even deeper drive when Army Group Center was on the verge of being smashed east of the Dnieper, right?

As for July 13, again I ask, so what?

What was the point of taking Moscow? Was it the center of gravity? Could it even be taken? Was nobody defending it? Even if it was taken, could it be held? Would Stalin had surrendered if it was taken? Did no other possibilities exist? Did Stalin not already evacuate Moscow in light of it possibly be taken? What about all those hundreds of Red Army divisions that weren't destroyed west of the Dnieper? Were they all going to surrender because Moscow fell?

Halder had a hard on for Moscow during the entire planning and execution stage of Barbarossa. But Halder did not dictate strategy. Nor was Halder's strategic understanding even correct. As it became grossly apparent that all intel and political/strategic assumptions that Barbarossa was based on were utter nonsense, why is it that Halder refused to adjust and face reality? Because he, like you, was obsessed with a city that actually held little importance at the time.
I do not see the sense in your comment. Well, for example, on July 30, 1941, Hitler gave the order to Army Group Center on the transition to defense. The battle of Smolensk from that day is German defense, without the desire to advance forward. Earlier, von Bock protested against spraying 3 tank group to strike at Great Luki. Collect tanks into a fist to strike at Moscow.
Halder's criticism is meaningless. The Germans could easily win the war.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 18 Sep 2019 21:12

Duncan_M wrote:
18 Sep 2019 20:51
jesk wrote:
18 Sep 2019 19:52
Duncan_M wrote:
18 Sep 2019 18:39
Why are you even mentioning mid July when touching on Typhoon? At the dates in question the Smolensk encirclement wasn't even sealed yet. Guderian had just discarded the plan to seal the pocket and instead took Yelnya as a jump off point for later operations, allowing tens of thousands of Red Army troops to escape the encirclement. By the 23 all of the forward German panzer corps were all subject to ferocious counterattacks that weakened them severely. Only after repelling those counterattacks, finally sealing the pocket, allowing the infantry armies to catch up to help reduce the pocket, Hoth and Guderian insisting all of their divisions be relieved for rest/reconstitution/maintenance from a dwindling supply line, then the splitting of AGM's panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev, was Moscow back on the table.
This has also been discussed. On July 13, von Bock wanted to hit Moscow with two tank groups. Smolensk’s pockets; Soviet attacks in July are not serious. The Germans fought off them like annoying flies. Do not argue with von Bock! He knew his job.

Halder's diary. July 13

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf
Again. So what?

I ask again: What was the point of taking Moscow? Was it the center of gravity? Could it even be taken? Was nobody defending it? Even if it was taken, could it be held? Would Stalin had surrendered if it was taken? Did no other possibilities exist? Did Stalin not already evacuate Moscow in light of it possibly be taken? What about all those hundreds of Red Army divisions that weren't destroyed west of the Dnieper? Were they all going to surrender because Moscow fell?

Halder had a hard on for Moscow during the entire planning and execution stage of Barbarossa. But Halder did not dictate strategy. Nor was Halder's strategic understanding even correct. As it became grossly apparent that all intel and political/strategic assumptions that Barbarossa was based on were utter nonsense, why is it that Halder refused to adjust and face reality? Because he, like you, was obsessed with a city that actually held little importance at the time.
Halder did not want pauses. On July 30, Hitler ordered the Center group to defend themselves. 2 months the Germans did not move forward. And that's bad. Kiev and Moscow. Hitler came up with a plan: first Kiev, then Moscow?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 18 Sep 2019 21:17

Note by the German editor. There was essentially no disagreement between Hitler and Halder. The only difference is a pause in the Moscow direction.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/app3a.html#290

{283} This document should be regarded as a reaction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) to Hitler’s order issued to them on 22.7 after Brauchitsch’s report and drawn up on 23.7 as an addendum to OKV directive No. 33 of 19.7 1941 (see: “Top Secret! For command only! ”, Pp. 265-267). The “Fundamental Principles for Making Further Decisions,” set forth by Halder 23.7 on a report to Hitler, did not affect the content of the amendments to Directive No. 33, since their essence was basically the same. OKW and OKH were optimistic and believed that the goals set in the Barbarossa plan would be achieved in the near future. The deadlines for achieving these goals were: Moscow and Leningrad - 25.8, that is, about a month later; the boundary of the Volga - early October; Baku and Batumi - early November (see section IV of this document - “Conclusions”, paragraph “c”). The discrepancies between OKH and OKW were only in the order of further use of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups of Army Group Center. - Note ed.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 18 Sep 2019 21:30

jesk wrote:
18 Sep 2019 21:12

Halder did not want pauses. On July 30, Hitler ordered the Center group to defend themselves. 2 months the Germans did not move forward. And that's bad. Kiev and Moscow. Hitler came up with a plan: first Kiev, then Moscow?
It didn't matter what Halder wanted, he had zero clue what was happening in the war. In early July he announced the war was already won, remember?

By mid July he was alreaady planning to take Moscow before AGM had even crossed the Dnieper and fought the battle of Smolensk.

Hitler never prioritized Moscow because even he, a total neophyte, understood that it was not a major strategic objective. And it wasn't. The chief objective for the success of Barbarossa wasn't even a region, it was an operational goal, the complete destruction of the Red Army before crossing the Dnieper and Dvina, WHICH DID NOT HAPPEN. You claim the war could easily have been won, and yet right there Barbarossa was doomed to fail.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 18 Sep 2019 22:22

What was the point of taking Moscow? Was it the center of gravity?

Would that be Oryol? Lipetsk? Voronezh? Tula?

Tula is 900 km from Rostov-on-Don, Kazan, St. Petersburg. 700 km from Saratov and Vologda.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by jesk » 18 Sep 2019 22:36

Moscow occupies a central position. There it is necessary to come. The depth of advance of the Wehrmacht is not impressive. Why not Chelyabinsk, what got in the way? Logistics. :lol:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by David Thompson » 18 Sep 2019 23:19

A taunting post by Duncan M, and two posts by jesk containing insulting personal remarks were removed pursuant to forum rules and (in jesk's case), prior warnings.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 19 Sep 2019 14:33

jesk wrote:
18 Sep 2019 22:36
Moscow occupies a central position. There it is necessary to come. The depth of advance of the Wehrmacht is not impressive. Why not Chelyabinsk, what got in the way?
Obviously, the RKKA got in the way. Whenever RKKA did not get into the way, infantry advanced 30 km/day and mechanized units 90 km/day. That's 20 week Byalistok-Chelyabinsk (with weekend breaks). 12 weeks Byalistok-Saratov (AA line).

What happened? RKKA got in the way, a small detail Schicklgruber-badmouthing generals overlook.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 20 Sep 2019 13:52

BDV wrote:
19 Sep 2019 14:33
...
Obviously, the RKKA got in the way. Whenever RKKA did not get into the way, infantry advanced 30 km/day and mechanized units 90 km/day. That's 20 week Byalistok-Chelyabinsk (with weekend breaks). 12 weeks Byalistok-Saratov (AA line).

What happened? RKKA got in the way, a small detail Schicklgruber-badmouthing generals overlook.
It's obviosly for you, sir, but not for OKW and von Bock for instance.
OKW 26 October : Imageimagehost
"2 Army: The troops are almost motionless due to the terrible condition of the roads."
von Bock 21/10/41: " We are less worried about Russians than about slush and mud."
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RE: The Logistics Of Barbarossa - (Or Lack Of It).

Post by Robert Rojas » 20 Sep 2019 20:38

Greetings to both citizen Abollon Polwederand the community as a whole. Howdy Abollon! Well sir, in reference to your posting of Thursday - September 19, 2019 - 4:52am, when it comes to operations after October 01, 1941, old yours truly often finds it incredulous when I read how the RASPUTITSA, issues of SUPPLY, and the sheer presence and tenacious resistance of the RED ARMY are treated in such a contemptuous and cavalier manner. On a purely incidental matter, I see where tovarish Jesk has been taken out and summarily shot by the forum's equivalent of State Security. Shit happens! Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this continuing saga into DRANG NACH ÖSTEN - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the Motherland. Dos Vedanya!

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 20 Sep 2019 23:32

The Rasputitsa produces the same effect as slow-motion viewing.
The same actions and the same result, but only time is spent more.
The German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies stopped and pushed back the third strategic echelon of the Red Army.
Without the Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies moved faster and at the same time just as quickly moved the troops of the third strategic echelon of the Red Army. Thus the place of meeting and the result would be the same as in reality. This is at best for the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies.
Winter saved the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies from heavier losses in both men and territory.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 21 Sep 2019 18:47

Yuri wrote:
20 Sep 2019 23:32
The Rasputitsa produces the same effect as slow-motion viewing.
The same actions and the same result, but only time is spent more.
The German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies stopped and pushed back the third strategic echelon of the Red Army.
Without the Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies moved faster and at the same time just as quickly moved the troops of the third strategic echelon of the Red Army. Thus the place of meeting and the result would be the same as in reality. This is at best for the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies.
Winter saved the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies from heavier losses in both men and territory.
The Red Army dealt with the exact same conditions, not only in October but also the other mud spells during intermittent rains of the summer too. How come nobody uses the mud as an excuse for them losing?

The autumn rasputitsa started in Army Group Center AO on Oct 7. If the excuse is valid, then the mud should have nearly completely stalled movement until it ended with the frost in mid November. So go pull up a map and see how far Army Group Center moved during that time.

They managed to pull off the Briank encirclement at the beginning, then drive from there to Kalinin and Tula.

Panzer Group 2 was in Briansk itself after mud started. Tula outskirts were reached late Oct, at height of mud. 300 kilometers away.

Panzer Group 3 was at Zhizdra when mud started, managed to get to Klin, 360 km away by the time it ended.

To put those distances in context, especially in terms of logistics, from Panzer Group 2 jump off point in June to its culmination point in the end of the mud season they traveled nearly 1,100 km in six months.

How far of a distance did German logisticians say they could properly support Barbarossa? And for how many weeks did they say they say they could support with munitions? If memory serves it was 500-800 km max, and about five weeks.

Are we really going to blame mud because the Germans couldn't reach Moscow? Or was Moscow about out of their reach as the Moon?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 21 Sep 2019 20:53

Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 22 Sep 2019 17:41

Yuri wrote:
20 Sep 2019 23:32
The Rasputitsa produces the same effect as slow-motion viewing.
The same actions and the same result, but only time is spent more.
The German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies stopped and pushed back the third strategic echelon of the Red Army.
Without the Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies moved faster and at the same time just as quickly moved the troops of the third strategic echelon of the Red Army. Thus the place of meeting and the result would be the same as in reality. This is at best for the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies.
Winter saved the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies from heavier losses in both men and territory.
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
Mud is neutral : there was also mud on the Soviet side .The Germans also could use rail movement to move units . How did Guderian return from Kiev to the north ?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 23 Sep 2019 15:27

Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
I don't get it. If logistics wasn't an issue and mud was, why couldn't Germany ignore it like you think the Red Army could with trains? :lol:

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