The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2019 17:12

Duncan_M wrote:
23 Sep 2019 15:27
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
I don't get it. If logistics wasn't an issue and mud was, why couldn't Germany ignore it like you think the Red Army could with trains? :lol:
The red army could still move reserves forward by train while German mobile units were slowed down seriously by the mud.So the muddy conditions favoured the red army.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Sep 2019 17:17

ljadw wrote:
22 Sep 2019 17:41
Yuri wrote:
20 Sep 2019 23:32
The Rasputitsa produces the same effect as slow-motion viewing.
The same actions and the same result, but only time is spent more.
The German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies stopped and pushed back the third strategic echelon of the Red Army.
Without the Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies moved faster and at the same time just as quickly moved the troops of the third strategic echelon of the Red Army. Thus the place of meeting and the result would be the same as in reality. This is at best for the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies.
Winter saved the German Wehrmacht and its numerous the European allies from heavier losses in both men and territory.
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
Mud is neutral : there was also mud on the Soviet side .The Germans also could use rail movement to move units . How did Guderian return from Kiev to the north ?
The German advancing units could hardly move by rail.You make no sense here.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Sep 2019 18:30

Why could the Germans not move by rail ?
Answer : not because of the mud,but because the Soviets were not defeated .

Duncan_M
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 24 Sep 2019 19:21

Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2019 17:12
Duncan_M wrote:
23 Sep 2019 15:27
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
I don't get it. If logistics wasn't an issue and mud was, why couldn't Germany ignore it like you think the Red Army could with trains? :lol:
The red army could still move reserves forward by train while German mobile units were slowed down seriously by the mud.So the muddy conditions favoured the red army.
You just repeated the original incorrect statement, but by repeating doesn't make an incorrect statement suddenly correct.

You and a few other are promoting the idea that OKH planned logistics was not the problem, but that it was Hitler's fault, since he launched Typhoon too late, well into the Rasputitsa season. Forgetting for a single second that the Red Army also had to deal with this, and also entirely discounting the grand maneuver done by all three German army groups during the month of Oct to mid Nov, and seeing how far all drove deep into Soviet territory. Forgetting the ridiculous statement that all Red Army troops were somehow dismounting a few miles from the front line by train, as if many hadn't already been fighting for months, some managing to escape numerous encirlements, while others that had been dismounted from train then spent the better part of weeks or months moving hundreds of kilometers largely by foot, similar to the Germans. Forget all that, and let's just focus on your statement that the trains that weren't being intercepted by the Luftwaffe that were disgorging the Asian hordes only a few kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area were the prime advantage and reason that the Rasputitsa didn't affect the Red Army.

If that is true it points out that the Germans had a a lack of rail transport, not only in length of travel to the front, but also in cargo load. That not only would hinder mobility of moving units that were not supposed to be conducting tactical and operational movement by rail anyway, but primarily that lack of supply by rail, which is what they were chiefly being used for (people and animals can walk, vehicles can drive, but an arty shell or can of fuel can't transport itself to the front).

So was German logistics, caused by lack of proper rail lines, a major problem in Barbarossa, yes or no?
Last edited by Duncan_M on 24 Sep 2019 20:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Yuri
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 24 Sep 2019 19:29

Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2019 17:17
ljadw wrote:
22 Sep 2019 17:41
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
Mud is neutral : there was also mud on the Soviet side .The Germans also could use rail movement to move units . How did Guderian return from Kiev to the north ?
The German advancing units could hardly move by rail.You make no sense here.
The third strategic echelon was formed between Moscow and the Volga, and not in Siberia as stated in the popular myth.
Evacuated factories and plants, workers, engineers, specialists and their wives and children were transported by rail from West to East. Shells, guns, planes were carried to the West, and the Red Army Men and their commanders mostly walked. In dry weather, they were 50 km per day, and in the period of Rasputitsa depending on the weather from 0 km per day to 12 km per day. When frosts have come they have stopped in settlements: in buildings of schools, kindergartens, cinemas, sanatorium and so forth and so forth.
When they brought winter clothes they went on. At this time, their comrades from the second strategic echelon were killed in battles with the German Wehrmacht and its many European allies, supporters and admirers. With their freedom and life, they gave time to their comrades from the third strategic echelon, so that they could get weapons, dress in warm winter clothes, so that when they came to Tikhvin, Kalinin, Moscow, Tula and Rostov, they could knock down the German Wehrmacht and its many European allies, admirers and supporters.
This is the picture if you want to describe it in a few sentences.
The Red Army Men without the Rasputitsa could drive, but on the Rasputitsa the Russian cars can't move. The German Wehrmacht and its many European allies, supporters and admirers were half-track tractors, and the Red Army such equipment was very small. Therefore in Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous European allies, admirers advocates had advantage before Red Army.
A tank without the infantry and artillery support is easy prey for an experienced soldier.
The infantryman and artilleryman without warm clothes in winter, easy prey to frost.

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: RE: The Logistics Of Barbarossa - (Or Lack Of It).

Post by AbollonPolweder » 25 Sep 2019 11:01

Robert Rojas wrote:
20 Sep 2019 20:38
Greetings to both citizen Abollon Polwederand the community as a whole. Howdy Abollon! Well sir, in reference to your posting of Thursday - September 19, 2019 - 4:52am, when it comes to operations after October 01, 1941, old yours truly often finds it incredulous when I read how the RASPUTITSA, issues of SUPPLY, and the sheer presence and tenacious resistance of the RED ARMY are treated in such a contemptuous and cavalier manner. On a purely incidental matter, I see where tovarish Jesk has been taken out and summarily shot by the forum's equivalent of State Security. Shit happens! Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this continuing saga into DRANG NACH ÖSTEN - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the Motherland. Dos Vedanya!

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :idea: :|
Thank you, sir, for your witty remarks and pleasant wishes. Write more often, do not deprive us of the pleasure of reading your lapidary but accurate posts.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 25 Sep 2019 11:41

Yuri wrote:
24 Sep 2019 19:29
Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2019 17:17
ljadw wrote:
22 Sep 2019 17:41
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
Mud is neutral : there was also mud on the Soviet side .The Germans also could use rail movement to move units . How did Guderian return from Kiev to the north ?
The German advancing units could hardly move by rail.You make no sense here.
...
This is the picture if you want to describe it in a few sentences.
The Red Army Men without the Rasputitsa could drive, but on the Rasputitsa the Russian cars can't move. The German Wehrmacht and its many European allies, supporters and admirers were half-track tractors, and the Red Army such equipment was very small. Therefore in Rasputitsa the German Wehrmacht and its numerous European allies, admirers advocates had advantage before Red Army.
A tank without the infantry and artillery support is easy prey for an experienced soldier.
The infantryman and artilleryman without warm clothes in winter, easy prey to frost.
The picture you drew is believable. But I have to upset you: you are not in the Louvre but at a historical forum. Here, your artistic images and "paintings" must be confirmed with documents if you want to be taken seriously.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

Art
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Art » 25 Sep 2019 12:06

Looks like the same things (weather and roads) has already been discussed before. This and following pages in the topic:
viewtopic.php?f=55&t=218429
I would also recommend an article "Was it the mud" by Radey and Sharp:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... 15.1094940

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 25 Sep 2019 15:22

One can not blame general Mud for the failure of Typhoon, as the Germans failed also in the summer, when there was no mud .
One can also not blame railway problems for the failure of Typhoon, as no railway problems would not send more men and supplies to the front .
On November 27 1941, Wagner, QMG, said : We are at the end of our resources, both personnel and materiel . ...
That means that Germany had no longer the replacements and supplies available that were needed for a successful advance .And that without railway problems,the situation would be the same .The problems were located in Germany , not along the railways in the East .
The reason why Typhoon failed is simple : the Soviets were stronger .
All the rest are excuses to not be forced to admit that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets .
Typhoon could only succeed if the Soviets had only very weak reserves . Briansk/Viazma proved that this was not the case .

Volyn
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Volyn » 25 Sep 2019 17:27

ljadw wrote:
25 Sep 2019 15:22
One can not blame general Mud for the failure of Typhoon, as the Germans failed also in the summer, when there was no mud .
One can also not blame railway problems for the failure of Typhoon, as no railway problems would not send more men and supplies to the front .
On November 27 1941, Wagner, QMG, said : We are at the end of our resources, both personnel and materiel . ...
That means that Germany had no longer the replacements and supplies available that were needed for a successful advance .And that without railway problems,the situation would be the same .The problems were located in Germany , not along the railways in the East .
The reason why Typhoon failed is simple : the Soviets were stronger .
All the rest are excuses to not be forced to admit that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets .
Typhoon could only succeed if the Soviets had only very weak reserves . Briansk/Viazma proved that this was not the case .
ljadw's post is a succinct way to explain what happened. Germany was not operating as if it was in a total war, the losses and lack of replacement personnel that Wagner describes show just how unprepared they were for the reality of events they got themselves into. The High Command must have been completely misled (or chose to ignore) their own Intelligence about how the USSR would defend itself; but it does make sense from the German point of view how they were so unprepared for war with them.

They had anticipated the invasion would help bring about a sudden collapse in the Soviet government, and it may have almost happened during Stalin's withdrawal from events in the beginning. The Germans thought poorly of the Red Army and they knew that it had been severely compromised by the purges from '37-'38. This belief was given legitimate credibility with the Soviet performance during the Winter War. If the prevailing opinion amongst the senior leaders in Berlin was that this war would be quickly and decisively won, then as ljadw states -
The problems were located in Germany.
Germany could not win with the leadership that they had; too many poor decisions made by those in power brought about their own demise. Blame the Generals where they are responsible, but they do not set national policy for armament productions, conscription, resource procurement/allotment, etc. As it relates to this topic, once the Germans missed their own preset window of opportunity to finalize the defeat of the USSR during Operation Barbarossa, the war became an increasingly unmanageable mess.

The Germans were able to defeat weaker and unprepared opponents, but when they began fighting opponents with enough soldiers, who possessed an equal or greater resolve to win, it became an impossible scenario to overcome. The only thing left for the Nazis to do was to attempt to kill and wound so many of their enemies that they would lose hope and sue for another armistice type peace settlement; it worked in Germany's favor with the Soviets in 1918, so why not try again?

It was the German atrocities during the war that made this option morally impossible for the Allies, so they made a firm commitment in 1943 to deliver a final victory over the Third Reich. For some reason the Germans always believed that they possessed a superior will to win (WW1 & WW2), and their enemies could never match or exceeded their own battlefield zealotry. Perhaps another thread could address this psychological paradox; why continue to believe your enemy is weak when they consistently demonstrate that they are strong?
Last edited by Volyn on 26 Sep 2019 00:44, edited 1 time in total.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 25 Sep 2019 18:19

ljadw wrote:
24 Sep 2019 18:30
Why could the Germans not move by rail ?
Answer : not because of the mud,but because the Soviets were not defeated .
So you pretend that advancing German units could simply put themselves on the train.Hardly possible if only because the red army would have destroyed everything.

Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 25 Sep 2019 18:28

Duncan_M wrote:
24 Sep 2019 19:21
Aida1 wrote:
24 Sep 2019 17:12
Duncan_M wrote:
23 Sep 2019 15:27
Aida1 wrote:
21 Sep 2019 20:53
Mud worked to the advantage of the red army as it slowed down the German army while the red army could still use rail movement to move units.
I don't get it. If logistics wasn't an issue and mud was, why couldn't Germany ignore it like you think the Red Army could with trains? :lol:
The red army could still move reserves forward by train while German mobile units were slowed down seriously by the mud.So the muddy conditions favoured the red army.
You just repeated the original incorrect statement, but by repeating doesn't make an incorrect statement suddenly correct.

You and a few other are promoting the idea that OKH planned logistics was not the problem, but that it was Hitler's fault, since he launched Typhoon too late, well into the Rasputitsa season. Forgetting for a single second that the Red Army also had to deal with this, and also entirely discounting the grand maneuver done by all three German army groups during the month of Oct to mid Nov, and seeing how far all drove deep into Soviet territory. Forgetting the ridiculous statement that all Red Army troops were somehow dismounting a few miles from the front line by train, as if many hadn't already been fighting for months, some managing to escape numerous encirlements, while others that had been dismounted from train then spent the better part of weeks or months moving hundreds of kilometers largely by foot, similar to the Germans. Forget all that, and let's just focus on your statement that the trains that weren't being intercepted by the Luftwaffe that were disgorging the Asian hordes only a few kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area were the prime advantage and reason that the Rasputitsa didn't affect the Red Army.

If that is true it points out that the Germans had a a lack of rail transport, not only in length of travel to the front, but also in cargo load. That not only would hinder mobility of moving units that were not supposed to be conducting tactical and operational movement by rail anyway, but primarily that lack of supply by rail, which is what they were chiefly being used for (people and animals can walk, vehicles can drive, but an arty shell or can of fuel can't transport itself to the front).

So was German logistics, caused by lack of proper rail lines, a major problem in Barbarossa, yes or no?
I did no more than state the obvious that an offensive started in a period with better weather will obviously be more successful than one where mud will directly and indirectly inhibit the movement of advancing units.That is exactly the reason why the German high command wanted to start the advance on Moscow before the bad weather period started.

Duncan_M
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 25 Sep 2019 23:20

Aida1 wrote:
25 Sep 2019 18:28

I did no more than state the obvious that an offensive started in a period with better weather will obviously be more successful than one where mud will directly and indirectly inhibit the movement of advancing units.That is exactly the reason why the German high command wanted to start the advance on Moscow before the bad weather period started.
Let's recap how you stated the obvious:

You are pushing the failure to take Moscow, a target that was never a military objective of the original Barbarossa plan, located about 100-300 km beyond the limit of advance that German logisticians said they could support, was actually the responsibility of Mid October mud caused by initiating Typhoon at such a late date, and thus "Hitler's Fault!" for OP Barbarossa's failure.

The best part of your trope filled post is when you claim the Soviet Union was using rail for tactical movement, and thus weren't having their own issues with mud (LOL), but then admit that the Germans had a lack of rail support themselves. At least then you're getting close to the mark as to one legit reason, not a lie created by the surviving generals in their lying memoirs, as to why Operation Barbarossa failed. You claim German lack of rail support prevented them from using them for tactical maneuverability (LOL), but what the very real lack of rail support meant was what few supplies they did have not being able to reach the front lines in a timely manner, and thus causing MAJOR supply problems that weren't going to be rectified by driving DEEPER into Russia (and further away from their supplies).

As to actual weather:

viewtopic.php?f=55&t=218429&start=375

In the above thread, at the page linked and the previous, Art did a great job in laying out the weather conditions in September, which were at some points worse than October. Since your argument is October mud caused Barbarossa to fail, and that September was better, you will be surprised to learn that the trope you've been repeating for years is false. In Army Group Center's sector, at least parts of it, the weather in the month of September was just as bad and sometimes WORSE than October.

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 26 Sep 2019 05:01

Aida1 wrote:
25 Sep 2019 18:19
ljadw wrote:
24 Sep 2019 18:30
Why could the Germans not move by rail ?
Answer : not because of the mud,but because the Soviets were not defeated .
So you pretend that advancing German units could simply put themselves on the train.Hardly possible if only because the red army would have destroyed everything.
Thus you admit that the Soviets were not defeated .

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 26 Sep 2019 05:11

If the Soviets were defeated and on the run, the Germans could advance to Moscow and even east of Moscow, as the mud is a problem for big armies, not for small units .
A German advance by train was only possible after the defeat of the Soviets .And the Soviets were not defeated because the Germans had no longer the forces/supplies to do it .
The Germans failed in the summer while there was good weather and while they were strong, thus : do not blame the weather .

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