The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[MarkN]

But, of course, they would never admit their own mistakes so mud gets a bad rap.

Continue your 80 year war against the "they" if you wish, but don't twist my words to make your lazy argument.

That the Heer accepted the challenge of the climate, and chose to continue regardless is not the same as the effects of the climate on the participants. The rainy season certainly benefited the Russians more then the Germans, and to say otherwise is at best ignorant, at worst dishonest.

You know this or you would have posted something relevant to dispute me, which makes me assume to the latter.

Mud does not take sides.

Since we can only speculate what would have occured if the rainy season had miraculously not occured, it is impossible to know whether the mud benefited one side more than another. To say otherwise is at best ignorant, at worst dishonest.

The Heer, they, failed. They failed before the mud came. The premise of their invasion plan failed. Their military doctrine failed to deliver the battlefield success that their plan was predicated upon. The house did not collapse when they kicked in the door.

When failure to deliver their plan was evident, they failed to adapt doctrinally and tactically. When known natural phenomena hit, the failed to adapt doctrinally and tactically - and then blamed the mud for their failure.

Mud does not take sides.

You know this or you would have posted something relevant to dispute me, which makes me assume the latter

[ljadw]

Advance to the AA line would be possible only after the Soviets were defeated west of Moscow,and such an advance is not an active operation .
If Ivan was on the run, he would not destroy the railway lines .
The mud did not stop Faustschlag,thus the mud would not stop the advance to Moscow .
Besides, the mud did also not prevent the German victories of Briansk and Viazma .
The victories of Briansk and Viazma did not result in the collapse of the Red Army because the Soviets had still reserves and could move them west of Moscow. If they did not have these reserves, it was over and the mud would not help them .

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

WRONG.

[Peter89]

Guys, it is obvious that the mud / cold / snow didn't defeat the Wehrmacht; the Red Army did.

But floods, excessive rains, mud, extreme cold or hot always helps the defender, like wide rivers, mountains with narrow passes, swamps, etc. Especially when the defender has many a lot of room to maneuver. And especially when the invasion plan is built on timing. The weather had an impact on the results of the German invasion, but it wasn't a decisive factor.

[MarkN]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

[Peter89]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

[MarkN]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

????

Your first paragraph argues that military failure was due to an intelligence failure. But halfway through you contradict yourself. Had Guderian deluded himself by 1941?

Your second paragraph contradicts the first and implies that decisions were made ignoring a reasonable accurate intelligence picture? Delusion, hubris or plain stupidity?

Your third paragraph then depicts an excellent example of that delusion.

:roll:

[Peter89]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

????

Your first paragraph argues that military failure was due to an intelligence failure. But halfway through you contradict yourself. Had Guderian deluded himself by 1941?

Your second paragraph contradicts the first and implies that decisions were made ignoring a reasonable accurate intelligence picture? Delusion, hubris or plain stupidity?

Your third paragraph then depicts an excellent example of that delusion.

:roll:

Let's rephrase it, because you didn't get my point.

1.) The German High Command was more or less aware of the SU's strength and potential.

2.) They've got an order from the Führer: attack the SU.

3.) They received faulty intelligence reports of the SU's strength and potential. Btw the latest Soviet engagements implied a bad command.

4.) They devised a plan based on those reports, not on their former professional insights. The plan was wrong, because the German military intelligence failed in 1941 and continued to do so in 1942... etc. See my cited sources.

5.) My point is to make a distinction between the German generals (at least some of them) and German military intelligence.

+6.) I can name any number of Guderian's mistakes, underestimating the Soviets isn't one of them.

[ljadw]

The failure of FHO had no influence on the outcome of the war in the east .The Germans would not be stronger if they knew that the Soviets were stronger .
The Soviets had to be weak for the Germans to win . Thus everyone in Berlin/Rastenburg started from the assumption that the Soviets were weak,because this was the conditio sine qua non for a German victory .
It was the same assumption needed by the Allies to win at Market Garden : they could only win if the Germans would rise both hands and shout ''comrade '' . Thus everyone assumed that this would happen .

[ljadw]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

Stolfi is not a serious source .Neither are the claims from Guderian : the truth is that in June 1941 the situation of the Soviet tank units was abysmal .

[MarkN]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

????

Your first paragraph argues that military failure was due to an intelligence failure. But halfway through you contradict yourself. Had Guderian deluded himself by 1941?

Your second paragraph contradicts the first and implies that decisions were made ignoring a reasonable accurate intelligence picture? Delusion, hubris or plain stupidity?

Your third paragraph then depicts an excellent example of that delusion.

Let's rephrase it, because you didn't get my point.

1.) The German High Command was more or less aware of the SU's strength and potential.

2.) They've got an order from the Führer: attack the SU.

3.) They received faulty intelligence reports of the SU's strength and potential. Btw the latest Soviet engagements implied a bad command.

4.) They devised a plan based on those reports, not on their former professional insights. The plan was wrong, because the German military intelligence failed in 1941 and continued to do so in 1942... etc. See my cited sources.

Again, you conteive to strengthen my point whilst convincing yourself of something else.

Let's rephrase it, because you didn't get my point.

A reasonably accurate picture of Soviet strength and capacity was well known and understood by the OKW/OKH.

So was it delusion, hubris or stupidity that lead them to follow later dodgy intelligence taken out of context?

In my opinion, they wanted to invade, they believed they were unbeatable and victory a foregone conclusion (hubris) and thus chose to believe whatever intelligence and information that suited their beliefs (delusion). Alternatively, one could argue they were all as stupid as stupid could be and thought that ignoring years of knowledge and understanding was a wise choice.

5.) My point is to make a distinction between the German generals (at least some of them) and German military intelligence.

My first point, before you set the discussion off on a tangent, was the the Heer took the wrong lessons forward from Fall Weiss, Gelb and Rot. Their doctrine and tactical approach was not unbeatable, not infallable and not a panacea.
My second point, addressing your tangental commentary, is to highlight that 'intelligence' in itself is just data. How individuals interpret that data, and how they act upon it are the causes of subsequent operational failure. BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of faulty intelligence, it failed because the Heer collectively chose to weave the intelligence into a narrative that suited their delusion.

Edited to add.
My last point is very badly worded. BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of the weaving of intelligence into a suitable narrative, it failed because it was a mission beyond the Wehrmacht's capabilities. The decision to undertake that mission, the planning process and the belief that victory would ensue was based upon delusion and hubris - principally within the higher echelons of the OKH but prevalent elsewhere in the Heer. The misreading of intelligence was just part of the self delusion process.

[Aida1]

But, of course, they would never admit their own mistakes so mud gets a bad rap.

Continue your 80 year war against the "they" if you wish, but don't twist my words to make your lazy argument.

That the Heer accepted the challenge of the climate, and chose to continue regardless is not the same as the effects of the climate on the participants. The rainy season certainly benefited the Russians more then the Germans, and to say otherwise is at best ignorant, at worst dishonest.

You know this or you would have posted something relevant to dispute me, which makes me assume to the latter.

Mud does not take sides.

Since we can only speculate what would have occured if the rainy season had miraculously not occured, it is impossible to know whether the mud benefited one side more than another. To say otherwise is at best ignorant, at worst dishonest.

The Heer, they, failed. They failed before the mud came. The premise of their invasion plan failed. Their military doctrine failed to deliver the battlefield success that their plan was predicated upon. The house did not collapse when they kicked in the door.

When failure to deliver their plan was evident, they failed to adapt doctrinally and tactically. When known natural phenomena hit, the failed to adapt doctrinally and tactically - and then blamed the mud for their failure.

Mud does not take sides.

You know this or you would have posted something relevant to dispute me, which makes me assume the latter

Does not make any sense at all.Mud works to the advantage of the defenders as the attacking mobile units ability to exploit breakthroughs in depth is sharply reduced .So you try to avoid attacking in muddy conditions which is why the army high command wanted to attack towards Moscow in august.

[Aida1]

Advance to the AA line would be possible only after the Soviets were defeated west of Moscow,and such an advance is not an active operation .
If Ivan was on the run, he would not destroy the railway lines .
The mud did not stop Faustschlag,thus the mud would not stop the advance to Moscow .
Besides, the mud did also not prevent the German victories of Briansk and Viazma .
The victories of Briansk and Viazma did not result in the collapse of the Red Army because the Soviets had still reserves and could move them west of Moscow. If they did not have these reserves, it was over and the mud would not help them .

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

WRONG.

So,according to you,mobile units are not hampered by mud.Ridiculous.

[Aida1]

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Nope. It wasn't hubris and delusion, it was faulty intelligence. The military intelligence estimation of the production capabilities vastly underestimated Soviet (but most importantly, the US') strength, but Guderian himself - who visited Soviet a Soviet tank factory in 1933 - had a pretty clear picture of the Soviet mechanized forces and production. See:
Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted - R. H. S. Stolfi - P 19.

A few members of the German High command had a pretty acceptable picture of Soviet strengths, mostly from the time of their cooperation. A lot of warnings were given against the economical reasoning of the invasion as well (by gen. Georg Thomas). Which was also correct btw.

Even in 1942, the German military intelligence reported something like "the SU is on its last leg". See Robert Citino's book about 1942. The General Staff became shocked by the Soviet strength over and over again.

????

Your first paragraph argues that military failure was due to an intelligence failure. But halfway through you contradict yourself. Had Guderian deluded himself by 1941?

Your second paragraph contradicts the first and implies that decisions were made ignoring a reasonable accurate intelligence picture? Delusion, hubris or plain stupidity?

Your third paragraph then depicts an excellent example of that delusion.

Let's rephrase it, because you didn't get my point.

1.) The German High Command was more or less aware of the SU's strength and potential.

2.) They've got an order from the Führer: attack the SU.

3.) They received faulty intelligence reports of the SU's strength and potential. Btw the latest Soviet engagements implied a bad command.

4.) They devised a plan based on those reports, not on their former professional insights. The plan was wrong, because the German military intelligence failed in 1941 and continued to do so in 1942... etc. See my cited sources.

Again, you conteive to strengthen my point whilst convincing yourself of something else.

Let's rephrase it, because you didn't get my point.

A reasonably accurate picture of Soviet strength and capacity was well known and understood by the OKW/OKH.

So was it delusion, hubris or stupidity that lead them to follow later dodgy intelligence taken out of context?

In my opinion, they wanted to invade, they believed they were unbeatable and victory a foregone conclusion (hubris) and thus chose to believe whatever intelligence and information that suited their beliefs (delusion). Alternatively, one could argue they were all as stupid as stupid could be and thought that ignoring years of knowledge and understanding was a wise choice.

5.) My point is to make a distinction between the German generals (at least some of them) and German military intelligence.

My first point, before you set the discussion off on a tangent, was the the Heer took the wrong lessons forward from Fall Weiss, Gelb and Rot. Their doctrine and tactical approach was not unbeatable, not infallable and not a panacea.
My second point, addressing your tangental commentary, is to highlight that 'intelligence' in itself is just data. How individuals interpret that data, and how they act upon it are the causes of subsequent operational failure. BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of faulty intelligence, it failed because the Heer collectively chose to weave the intelligence into a narrative that suited their delusion.

Edited to add.
My last point is very badly worded. BARBAROSSA didn't fail because of the weaving of intelligence into a suitable narrative, it failed because it was a mission beyond the Wehrmacht's capabilities. The decision to undertake that mission, the planning process and the belief that victory would ensue was based upon delusion and hubris - principally within the higher echelons of the OKH but prevalent elsewhere in the Heer. The misreading of intelligence was just part of the self delusion process.

The decision to invade the USSR was made by Hitler and then the high command has to execute that decision.There was no alternative to the methods that worked before as it was certainly necessary to try to defeat the USSR quickly as a long war would always to work to the disadvantage of Germany.

[Aida1]

Without mud mobile units move faster and deeper and obtain more results.

Those tactical results lead to operational delusion and hubris followed by strategic defeat.

The Reich did not lose the war because of mud. Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was not an abject failure because of mud.

The Wehrmacht, in particular the Heer, failed to deliver what they said the could and would. They failed through delusion and hubris. Delusion and hubris because they didn't truely understand what their preferred doctrine of deep penetrations by limited motorized forces really offered. Even post war, some of the key practitioners and advocates of that doctrine still (e.g. Guderian) hadn't learned the lessons. And that was largely down to their determination to blame their own failures and failings on other things such as mud.

Deep penetrations are operational breakthroughs and lead to great results in destroying enemy units and taking terrain.There is no better way.And you are massively overstating when you say all was blamed on mud.There was a specific disagreement over what to do in late summer and that led to the attack against Moscow starting too late in the season.It was certainly possible to achieve more starting earlier. I think advocates of maneuver Warfare in all armies know more about it than you given your statements.

[ljadw]

The time of maneuver warfare was over, if this time ever existed .