The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 08 Oct 2019 15:58

ljadw wrote:
06 Oct 2019 11:33
Barbarossa had no territorial aim and that some ''Russian '' entity was going to remain in the non captured part is questionable and irrelevant .
Barbarossa was not a campaign to go to the Volga : it was a campaign to destroy the Soviet state by destroying the Soviet army, followed by an advance to the Volga, but this advance was not the aim of Barbarossa .
Read carefully! MarkN showed a direct quote from Barbarossa, which clearly defines the purpose of the operation. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to defeat Russia. The rout of the Red Army is a means to reach those territorial aim. Stop writing nonsense!
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Russland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Russland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden
"The ultimate aim of the operation is the shield against the Asian Russia from the general line Volga-Arkhangelsk."
" Конечная цель операции - создание защитного барьера от азиатской части России по линии Волга-Архангельск".
It is written in three languages. Is it really hard to remember? :o
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 08 Oct 2019 16:04

MarkN wrote:
07 Oct 2019 12:09
...
One requires at least four pieces of information/data sets to draw any conclusion on the matter. Marcks offers nothing on three and only offers data on one which is almost 12 months out of date.
...
What outdated information do you mean specifically?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 08 Oct 2019 16:26

Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019 08:24
...
Wrong.And no source given.FHO had a pretty clear idea of what was in the West of the USSR but not of the Total strength and the ability to generate new divisions.The estimate of the enemy strength is of enormous importance when working out a plan for a campaign.
If you believe that the OKH did not evaluate the strength of the enemy at all, you're wrong. Kinzel had given regular reports, and Halder made a general assessment of the Red Army divisions' quantity based on the population of Russia. And how would you assess the military power of Russia in the place of Halder?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 08 Oct 2019 19:02

AbollonPolweder wrote:
08 Oct 2019 15:58
ljadw wrote:
06 Oct 2019 11:33
Barbarossa had no territorial aim and that some ''Russian '' entity was going to remain in the non captured part is questionable and irrelevant .
Barbarossa was not a campaign to go to the Volga : it was a campaign to destroy the Soviet state by destroying the Soviet army, followed by an advance to the Volga, but this advance was not the aim of Barbarossa .
Read carefully! MarkN showed a direct quote from Barbarossa, which clearly defines the purpose of the operation. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to defeat Russia. The rout of the Red Army is a means to reach those territorial aim. Stop writing nonsense!
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Russland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Russland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden
"The ultimate aim of the operation is the shield against the Asian Russia from the general line Volga-Arkhangelsk."
" Конечная цель операции - создание защитного барьера от азиатской части России по линии Волга-Архангельск".
It is written in three languages. Is it really hard to remember? :o
NO : wrong interpretation.Ultimate aim does not mean that the aim was going to the Volga .The ultimate aim was the protection against Asian Russia .The ultimate aim was subordinated to the first aim .
Besides, what you are quoting ,is debunked/contradicted by the first sentence of Weisung 21 ,which is that the WM had as mission to destroy Soviet Russia in a short campaign. If this happened, there would be no need for a protection against Asian Russia .
Other point :aujs der algemeine Linie Wolga/Archangelsk can mean that the Germans would go to the AA line, it can also mean that Asian Russia would threaten Germany from the AA line . Besides:Asian Russia does not start east from the AA line, but east from the Urals .Going to the Volga would not give a protection against Asian Russia .
The Germans would try to go to the AA line,because they could not go farther .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 08 Oct 2019 21:38

Here we go again...

8-)
ljadw wrote:
08 Oct 2019 19:02
NO : wrong interpretation.
Yadda, yadda, yadda.
Only my misinterpretations, fantasies, falsehoods and nonsensical analysis and commentary is right.
Yadda, yadda, yadda.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 09 Oct 2019 07:18

As usual you want the text to prove your interpretation.And the text does not say what you want it to say : the text does not say that the aim of Barbarossa was to go to the AA line,to be protected against attacks from Asian Russia .The text is saying that the ultimate aim is the protection against Asian Russia from the AA line .It is unclear that AUS der algemeinen Linie Wolga-Archangelsk is indicating a protection against Asian Russia or attacks from Asian Russia .
The reason to go to the AA line was not to protect Germany against air attacks, as the SU had no aircraft that could attack Germany from Moscow ( west of the AA line ) and could return .
The reason is also not that the AA line would protect against Asian Russia, as if this was so, there would be no reason for the LW to destroy the factories of the Urals .
The only reason to go to the AA line was that the WM could not go farther than the AA line .
Germany would be protected against Asian Russia if the SU was crushed and the SU would be crushed if the Germans were at the AA line ,and the Germans could be at the AA line if/ after the SU was crushed .
The first sentence said that the aim was to crush the SU in a fast campaign .
Nothing less,nothing more .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 08:01

AbollonPolweder wrote:
08 Oct 2019 16:26
Aida1 wrote:
08 Oct 2019 08:24
...
Wrong.And no source given.FHO had a pretty clear idea of what was in the West of the USSR but not of the Total strength and the ability to generate new divisions.The estimate of the enemy strength is of enormous importance when working out a plan for a campaign.
If you believe that the OKH did not evaluate the strength of the enemy at all, you're wrong. Kinzel had given regular reports, and Halder made a general assessment of the Red Army divisions' quantity based on the population of Russia. And how would you assess the military power of Russia in the place of Halder?
I did not say that so you did not read my posting properly.The qualitative and quantitative estimate was wrong.There seem to have been deficiencies in the intelligence gathering so it is not impossible that a more accurate pucture could have been obtained.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 11:20

ljadw wrote:
09 Oct 2019 07:18
As usual ....
:roll: :roll: :roll:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 09 Oct 2019 11:29

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 08:01
The qualitative and quantitative estimate was wrong.
This is true of all intelligence ever produced by everyone. Intelligence can never be perfect. Intelligence will always be a best guess. A thorough analysis of intelligence after the fact will always uncover inaccuracies.

But can you evidence your claims:
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 15:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 11:41

MarkN wrote:
09 Oct 2019 11:29
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 08:01
The qualitative and quantitative estimate was wrong.
This is true of all intelligence ever produced by everyone. Intelligence can never be perfect. Intelligence will always be a best guess. A thorough analysis of intelligence after the fact will always uncover inaccuracies.

But can you evidence your claims:
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 15:43
If one had had a correct estimate of the Soviet military power one could 'not have believed that this could be destroyed in one blitzkrieg campaign.
Aida1 wrote:
06 Oct 2019 19:09
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.
Intelligence can certainly not be completely correct and other intelligence services underestimated the USSR too.
If you are as wellinformed as you pretend then you know by how far the FHO got it wrong and it was by very far.And it did not only concern red army strength.
Starting from a much higher estimate,it would have been difficult to think one could destroy most of that in one campaign.And with the estimate as it was,it is not surprising one kept stubbornly pushing on in the belief that nothing much was left of the red army.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 09 Oct 2019 12:07

ljadw wrote:
08 Oct 2019 19:02
...
NO : wrong interpretation.Ultimate aim does not mean that the aim was going to the Volga .The ultimate aim was the protection against Asian Russia .The ultimate aim was subordinated to the first aim .
Besides, what you are quoting ,is debunked/contradicted by the first sentence of Weisung 21 ,which is that the WM had as mission to destroy Soviet Russia in a short campaign. If this happened, there would be no need for a protection against Asian Russia .
Other point :aujs der algemeine Linie Wolga/Archangelsk can mean that the Germans would go to the AA line, it can also mean that Asian Russia would threaten Germany from the AA line . Besides:Asian Russia does not start east from the AA line, but east from the Urals .Going to the Volga would not give a protection against Asian Russia .
The Germans would try to go to the AA line,because they could not go farther .
Yea! First aim, second aim, twentyth. :)
In this way, you can reach the 122nd goal. For example:
Die im westlichen Russland stehende Masse des russischen Heeres soll in kühnen Operationen unter weitem Vortreiben von Panzerkeilen vernichtet, der Abzug kampfkräftiger Teile in die Weite des russischen Raumes verhindert werden.

In rascher Verfolgung ist dann eine Linie zu erreichen, aus der die russische Luftwaffe reichsdeutsches Gebiet nicht mehr angreifen kann. Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Russland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Russland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden.
Prevention of Soviet air raids can be considered the goal of the operation? Why not?
The defeat of the Red Army and the prevention of the withdrawal of combat-ready units to the east does not guarantee the protection of the Reich from Soviet air raids. What does “defeat” mean? Who guarantees that combat-ready formations have not gone east? But the achievement of a certain point or line is a firm guarantee, taking into account the distance and then capabilities of Soviet aviation. So what for was Hitler planning Barbarossa? For the sake of reaching the Arkhangelsk-Volga line. He confirmed this with his signature. And when we talk about intentions and the ultimate goal, we mean Hitler's goal, not ljadw's one. :milwink: Right?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 09 Oct 2019 12:40

Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 08:01
...
I did not say that so you did not read my posting properly.The qualitative and quantitative estimate was wrong.There seem to have been deficiencies in the intelligence gathering so it is not impossible that a more accurate pucture could have been obtained.
"There seem to have been deficiencies ...". OK! The second time I ask you about the same question that MarkN asked you: how would you assess the military power of Russia? For example, Halder used the following formula when assessing the mobilization capabilities of the USSR: 1 division per 1 million population (I may be wrong in the accuracy of the numbers). Do you think Halder used the wrong formula? And how would you count? Have you read the reports of Colonel Kinzel? What specific intelligence report of the FHO do you consider to be erroneous?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 09 Oct 2019 13:30

AbollonPolweder wrote:
09 Oct 2019 12:07
ljadw wrote:
08 Oct 2019 19:02
...
NO : wrong interpretation.Ultimate aim does not mean that the aim was going to the Volga .The ultimate aim was the protection against Asian Russia .The ultimate aim was subordinated to the first aim .
Besides, what you are quoting ,is debunked/contradicted by the first sentence of Weisung 21 ,which is that the WM had as mission to destroy Soviet Russia in a short campaign. If this happened, there would be no need for a protection against Asian Russia .
Other point :aujs der algemeine Linie Wolga/Archangelsk can mean that the Germans would go to the AA line, it can also mean that Asian Russia would threaten Germany from the AA line . Besides:Asian Russia does not start east from the AA line, but east from the Urals .Going to the Volga would not give a protection against Asian Russia .
The Germans would try to go to the AA line,because they could not go farther .
Yea! First aim, second aim, twentyth. :)
In this way, you can reach the 122nd goal. For example:
Die im westlichen Russland stehende Masse des russischen Heeres soll in kühnen Operationen unter weitem Vortreiben von Panzerkeilen vernichtet, der Abzug kampfkräftiger Teile in die Weite des russischen Raumes verhindert werden.

In rascher Verfolgung ist dann eine Linie zu erreichen, aus der die russische Luftwaffe reichsdeutsches Gebiet nicht mehr angreifen kann. Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Russland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga—Archangelsk. So kann erforderlichenfalls das letzte Russland verbleibende Industriegebiet am Ural durch die Luftwaffe ausgeschaltet werden.
Prevention of Soviet air raids can be considered the goal of the operation? Why not?
The defeat of the Red Army and the prevention of the withdrawal of combat-ready units to the east does not guarantee the protection of the Reich from Soviet air raids. What does “defeat” mean? Who guarantees that combat-ready formations have not gone east? But the achievement of a certain point or line is a firm guarantee, taking into account the distance and then capabilities of Soviet aviation. So what for was Hitler planning Barbarossa? For the sake of reaching the Arkhangelsk-Volga line. He confirmed this with his signature. And when we talk about intentions and the ultimate goal, we mean Hitler's goal, not ljadw's one. :milwink: Right?
The aim was to crush ,destroy the Soviet state, not to protect Germany against Soviet air raids .The destruction of the Soviet state would have as RESULT that Germany could not be attacked by the Soviet airforce .You continue to confound aim and result .
The aim was to crush the SU in a quick campaign, the reason for this was that this was the only possibility,following Hitler,to eliminate Britain before the US could intervene .
The SU was not a danger, the US were a danger .
It was not needed to go as far as the AA line to protect Germany from Soviet air attacks . Going to Moscow would suffice .It is not mentioned that being at the AA line would be sufficient as protection against the Soviet airforce,and it is not so that the AA line would protect Germany against Asian Russia : it is the opposite : the Germans admitted that when they were at the AA line, they still could be forced to attack targets in the east ,thus that the AA line would not protect them . The targets in the east would be attacked by the LW,because the army could not go farther than the AA line .
The only way to protect Germany against Asian Russia and against Soviet air attacks,was to crush the Soviet state, something which,following Berlin,could only happen by the destruction of the Red army in a fast campaign west of the DD line .All the rest would result from this .The SU would not be crushed because the Germans were at the AA line,or an other line . The Germans would be at the AA line/an other line after/if the SU was crushed .
All depended on the elimination of the Red army west of the DD line , everything else would result from this .
If the Red army was eliminated west of the DD line,there would be no air attacks, no danger from Asian Russia .
This was what Brauchitz, Halder, Hitler were saying .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Duncan_M » 09 Oct 2019 16:24

Max Payload wrote:
01 Oct 2019 10:46
Duncan_M wrote:
30 Sep 2019 21:32
An August launch date towards Moscow for Army Group Center has to content with the following: ...
The description of Halder as an idiot is, however, glib. Clearly neither the hierarchy of the interwar Heer nor the postwar US military subscribed to that opinion and his supposed idiocy seems to have been well hidden during the planning of Weiß, Gelb and Rot.
Early war success had so much to do with other factors than Halder's supposed competence, especially when so many of the better decisions made ran counter to his recommendations. In my opinion, he was unfit for the job he held, if for no other reason than the chief of staff of the general staff cannot have an antagonistic relationship with the boss, regardless if that person is Hitler, Stalin, Jesus, or Lucifer, holding that position requires a team player with a good relationship with the commander in chief, obedience and loyalty, and an innate understanding of the commander's intent, all of which Halder was absolutely devoid of. Forgetting his political, economic, strategic, logistical foibles (which he had many), that above was enough that he should have been relieved far earlier than he was, but Hitler didn't have cause until it became apparent Halder was blatantly not right for the job, after botching two major offensives.

Postwar Halder came across to the Western Allies as an intelligent military professional that was anti-Hitler (to the point he later claimed that he'd wanted to assassinate Hitler earlier in the war) and was able and ready to tell US Army and British officers what they wanted to hear about basically everything (Liddell-Hart being the worst), but especially about being responsible for the history of the war from perspectives unknown to the Western Allies, the Eastern Front where the Germans fought the massive Asiatic hordes of evil Russkies. He literally wrote the history of the Eastern Front for the US Army, and helped create tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy based on his advice and knowledge, which is sad and hilarious at the same time, because it was not for many decades later that it became clear everyone had been duped by him (similarly to how so many had been duped, even to this day, by a certain facially scared SS lieutenant colonel leader of commandos, who turned out to be a fraud too).

The problem we still face today because of individuals like Halder is that so much of what they gave up as history was farce, as it was their highly sanitized version of events made to favor themselves, full of blame game against Hitler and others who were no longer alive, maligned the Red Army fully (postwar US Army tactics, operational doctrine, and strategy, based on Halder's, Manstein's, and other former general's accounts of the Red Army was framed on falsehoods and racism, and had they been implemented in actual fighting would have led to disaster). Worse, it was a literal conspiracy, since it was all done in concert with other surviving generals who used the opportunity to make money, revive their reputations, earn their pensions, remove the stigma of war crimes surrounding the Wehrmacht (they created the Clean Wehrmacht Myth). They even managed to become postwar mythical heroes, super competent captains of war who would have won easily against amazing odds if not for Hitler! Its scary what they managed to accomplish, all because the Cold War forced the US and British to remilitarize West Germany.

They lost the war, badly, often through their own incompetence, and then managed to be write the history of the war. So much for "history is written by the victors."

It was only fairly recently when scholars ignored their narratives and took a more indepth and unbiased examination of the records and found that, what a surprise, incompetent Nazi allied generals with massive egos have a tendency of lying. So for that to happen, again, in my opinion at least, Halder needs to be knocked off of any historical pedestal he exists on and the actual truth acknowledged.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 09 Oct 2019 18:08

AbollonPolweder wrote:
09 Oct 2019 12:40
Aida1 wrote:
09 Oct 2019 08:01
...
I did not say that so you did not read my posting properly.The qualitative and quantitative estimate was wrong.There seem to have been deficiencies in the intelligence gathering so it is not impossible that a more accurate pucture could have been obtained.
"There seem to have been deficiencies ...". OK! The second time I ask you about the same question that MarkN asked you: how would you assess the military power of Russia? For example, Halder used the following formula when assessing the mobilization capabilities of the USSR: 1 division per 1 million population (I may be wrong in the accuracy of the numbers). Do you think Halder used the wrong formula? And how would you count? Have you read the reports of Colonel Kinzel? What specific intelligence report of the FHO do you consider to be erroneous?
The FHO has to assess the military power of the USSR based on open sources.signals intelligence,spies and air reconnaissance.From what i read it seems there was not enough data from these sources to come to a correct assessment.

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