The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 12:44

Aida1 wrote:
10 Oct 2019 20:38
The total number of divisions was far underestimated ...
...
The regenerative power was massively underestimated...
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 10:06
They were convinced most of the red army was in the western districts and would fight there.Obviously there was theoretically the possibility of the red army doing a 1812 but that was not expected to happen and it did not happen. Political leaders never like to give up terrain, even temporarily.
With the information available, it was certainly not dumb or a sign of hybris that one was convinced the red army could be finished off quickly. What saved the USSR from the same fate as France and Poland was space and large reserves.Hindsight is always easy.
:lol:
Max Payload wrote:
11 Oct 2019 10:13
I don’t know much about FHO methodology and have never seen the raw data on which its assessments were made. In terms of the pre-invasion assessments, FHO grossly miscalculated the Infantry/Cavalry divisional ratio and while designating Soviet tank divisions as mechanised brigades, underestimated unit numbers by around 20%. But the key point is that on 22 June the Wehrmacht expected to face around 200 Soviet divisions in ‘European Russia’ and on 22 June there were in fact around 200 Soviet divisions deployed west of the Leningrad-Rostov line. Consequently, whatever influence the FHO estimate had on decision-making before Barbarossa, it could not have been a particularly adverse one.
Quite so.

The FHO briefed on 22 June 1941 that the Red Army in European CCCP alone consisted of 154 Schutzen Div, 25 Kavallerie Div, 10 Panzer Div, 37 Pz or Mech Bde and 7-8 Fallshirm Bdes. In reality, the 37 Pz/Mech brigades had been redesignated as divisions within the reformed Mechanized Corps recreated in late May. The FHO does not seem to have picked up this late reorganisation.

Earlier the FHO had briefed a mobilization would add a further 209 Schutzeddivision and at least 36 mechanized brigades ddivisions).

How does that compare to reality? Far underestimation?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 12:50

Double post.... :cry:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 12:54

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 11:32
Yadda yadda yadda...
:roll:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 13:59

He means that Halder, Hitler, Brauchitsch, Paulus were saying Yadda,Yadda, Yadda.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Oct 2019 16:20

ljadw wrote: All depended on the elimination of the Red army west of the DD line , everything else would result from this .
But the Red Army, was not eliminated west of DD line. No one lost their position despite this (that RKKA was NOT eliminated west of the DD line). So it is incorrect to state that German Reich leadership linked ALL their goals in the East for that.

That was their best case scenario, but Schicklgruber et Co did not give up because their best case scenario failed.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 16:24

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 13:59
He means that Halder, Hitler, Brauchitsch, Paulus were saying Yadda,Yadda, Yadda.
No I don't. It looked like a typical wall of ljadw drivel.

But if you want readers to accept you are quoting Hitler, Brauchitsch and/or Paulus then how about referencing these quotes.

:roll:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Max Payload » 11 Oct 2019 16:39

MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 12:44
Earlier the FHO had briefed a mobilization would add a further 209 Schutzeddivision and at least 36 mechanized brigades ddivisions).

How does that compare to reality? Far underestimation?
As relevant as the reserve potential may have been, equally relevant was the rate at which it could be committed to action - 46 new armies in the second half of 1941. That, I think, is what FHO and the Wehrmacht generally failed to anticipate and why through the summer of ‘41 they consistently underestimated the number of ‘residual’ divisions left to the RA.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Oct 2019 16:43

Max Payload wrote:
11 Oct 2019 10:13
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 08:37
FHO made an estimate based on far insufficient data so it could only be incorrect. And that did influence decision-making before and during Barbarossa.
I don’t know much about FHO methodology and have never seen the raw data on which its assessments were made. In terms of the pre-invasion assessments, FHO grossly miscalculated the Infantry/Cavalry divisional ratio and while designating Soviet tank divisions as mechanised brigades, underestimated unit numbers by around 20%. But the key point is that on 22 June the Wehrmacht expected to face around 200 Soviet divisions in ‘European Russia’ and on 22 June there were in fact around 200 Soviet divisions deployed west of the Leningrad-Rostov line. Consequently, whatever influence the FHO estimate had on decision-making before Barbarossa, it could not have been a particularly adverse one.
The issue is that it had insufficient date on whatever was in the rest of the USSR. Most of what the red army had was supposed to be in the west of the USSR and the regenerative power was underestimated too . In those circonstances it is not abnormal to think one could destroy the red army in a relatively short campaign.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 11 Oct 2019 17:15

Max Payload wrote:
11 Oct 2019 10:13
...
I don’t know much about FHO methodology and have never seen the raw data on which its assessments were made. In terms of the pre-invasion assessments, FHO grossly miscalculated the Infantry/Cavalry divisional ratio and while designating Soviet tank divisions as mechanised brigades, underestimated unit numbers by around 20%. But the key point is that on 22 June the Wehrmacht expected to face around 200 Soviet divisions in ‘European Russia’ and on 22 June there were in fact around 200 Soviet divisions deployed west of the Leningrad-Rostov line. Consequently, whatever influence the FHO estimate had on decision-making before Barbarossa, it could not have been a particularly adverse one.
The "methodology " was called "empirical yardstick ".
For further operations the enemy has only limited forces left. If we use the empirical yardstick that two Divs. can be raised for every million of population, the number of enemy Divs. which have appeared todate is the maxiisuin that can be put up, and we need not anticipate any further large-scale activations.
(Halder, 8/8/1941)
No methodology could help the Germans correctly assess the power of the Red Army, because the Soviet generals themselves did not know it. :milwink: You can see the so-called plan of the Soviet General Staff from May 1941 (Considerations for a strategic deployment plan for the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies)
We read section III, paragraph 1, subparagraph a) of the “Considerations ...”: “... of them in the Northern, North-Western, Western and South-Western fronts - 136 infd, 44 td, 23 md, 7 cd (210 divisions in total) ... " Ask your child to add four numbers. I am sure that most of the children will cope with the task, put it up in a column and get 210. Then go to section IV, where the composition is painted on each of the four fronts and let the child put together such a group of numbers: “Northern Front - 21d; North-Western Front - 23 d; Western Front - 45 d; South-Western Front - 122 d.
Of course, you know the answer, but it is interesting to check your child’s abilities in arithmetic. When the child shows you the result of his calculations, you, of course, will be upset, for he will have 211 as a result. Though small, but still a mistake, you will think, and making a claim to the child, send him in addition to solving problems in mathematics. But if you have the patience to add these few numbers yourself, you will experience, as they say, an ambivalent feeling. On the one hand, it turns out that the child is right, and the four fronts in the aggregate really did have 211 divisions.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941 ... -pomilovat
A division more, a division less - what's the difference if, as ljadw says, the USSR will win anyway. :thumbsup:
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Oct 2019 17:26

MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 12:30
Silly me.

I thought you had decided to have a serious discussion about historical reality. But no. Back to the handwaving and grand statements to mislead others.

:roll:
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 08:37
You know these numbers as you claim to have read the article i mentioned and they are in there. You are blatantly disregarding the content of that article where the lack of data is concerned . FHO never had the data to correctly estimate red army military strength and that is explained in detail in there..It also did underestimate the arms production of the USSR which leads to underestimating the ability to set up new divisions.
Your pet theory is not about the FHO after all. It is about the alleged lack of success of Barbarossa where you are completely wrong.
FHO made an estimate based on far insufficient data so it could only be incorrect. And that did influence decision-making before and during Barbarossa.
On the qualitative side FHO was closer to the truth as the red army was qualitiatively far inferior in 1941. It got better over time but not in all aspects as it's losses we're still too high later in the war.
At least i sourced what i stated with a wellresearched article. It gives you a detailed explanation of why FHO had insufficient data to make a correct estimate . "the poor performance of FHO" are David Thomas' words ,not mine.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 17:52

Max Payload wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:39
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 12:44
Earlier the FHO had briefed a mobilization would add a further 209 Schutzeddivision and at least 36 mechanized brigades ddivisions).

How does that compare to reality? Far underestimation?
As relevant as the reserve potential may have been, equally relevant was the rate at which it could be committed to action - 46 new armies in the second half of 1941. That, I think, is what FHO and the Wehrmacht generally failed to anticipate and why through the summer of ‘41 they consistently underestimated the number of ‘residual’ divisions left to the RA.
Absolutely! Whilst the FHO briefed the 209 divs as coming in 3 waves, they made no statement upon the timescales. In otherwords, they didn't provide dodgy or misleading information. Any misunderstanding or poor analysis was thus a Heer-wide phenomena.

When considering the impact of newly mobilized Red Army formations, we need to take the original Heer BARBAROSSA timelines into consideration.

Taking the Weisung 32 timescale for BARBAROSSA - running post-BARBAROSSA campaigns against the British from late autumn or early winter onwards - and marrying that the Marcks most pessimistic timescale of 17 weeks, the Heer should have been on the Volga by mid-October and Leningrad-Moscow-Kursk-Rostov line all done and dusted by mid-September.

Which of those 46 reserve armies mobilized after 22 June 1941 would have been ready according to that timescale? Where and what effects can one expect?

When certain Heer generals were bemoaning the scale of Red Army forces in the second bound, it wasn't newly mobilized armies it was facing, it was dealing with the forces Plan BARBAROSSA assumed had been eliminated in the first bound.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 18:22

BDV wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:20
ljadw wrote: All depended on the elimination of the Red army west of the DD line , everything else would result from this .
But the Red Army, was not eliminated west of DD line. No one lost their position despite this (that RKKA was NOT eliminated west of the DD line). So it is incorrect to state that German Reich leadership linked ALL their goals in the East for that.

That was their best case scenario, but Schicklgruber et Co did not give up because their best case scenario failed.
The existing forces were eliminated,but these were peplaced by mobilised forces ,on a scale no one in Berlin could/wanted to foresee.
On July 3 Halder said :'' the war has been won '', which means that the existing Soviet forces were eliminated .A few weeks later, he said : '' we '' ( he meant FHO ) have underestimated the enemy ( he meant : if we did not underestimate the enemy,the Soviet Untermenschen would be defeated ).But ,at that moment ,the existing Soviet forces were defeated .
Brauchitz said before June 22 : a few weeks of fighting on the border ( which means : the existing Soviet forces will be defeated ) and this will be followed by a mop up ( which means : the Sopviets will not be able to mobilise sufficient new forces ).
Berlin was convinced that the farther the Germans would go, the less the Soviet resistance would be .
When this proved to be an illusion, their argument was : that the Soviets would collaps in July is a mistake, it will happen in August, and when it did not happen in August,they said : it will happen in September ,etc .That's why they did not give up . They did not give up after the Marne,although they knew that victory on the Marne would not save them . In WWI also,they expected a miracle because they needed one .
And when someone asked for proofs that it would happen in August, September,etc ,the answer was that it had to happen and thus would happen .
When they were planning the attack,they knew that only a Deus ex Machina would save them , thus they said to everyone that suddenly a miracle would happen ,because a miracle was needed .
The Germans were as a pilote who jumped from an aircraft and whose parachute refused to open . The pilot was convinced that the parachute would finally open,because otherwise he would die .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Oct 2019 18:26

MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 17:52
Max Payload wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:39
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 12:44
Earlier the FHO had briefed a mobilization would add a further 209 Schutzeddivision and at least 36 mechanized brigades ddivisions).

How does that compare to reality? Far underestimation?
As relevant as the reserve potential may have been, equally relevant was the rate at which it could be committed to action - 46 new armies in the second half of 1941. That, I think, is what FHO and the Wehrmacht generally failed to anticipate and why through the summer of ‘41 they consistently underestimated the number of ‘residual’ divisions left to the RA.
Absolutely! Whilst the FHO briefed the 209 divs as coming in 3 waves, they made no statement upon the timescales. In otherwords, they didn't provide dodgy or misleading information. Any misunderstanding or poor analysis was thus a Heer-wide phenomena.

When considering the impact of newly mobilized Red Army formations, we need to take the original Heer BARBAROSSA timelines into consideration.

Taking the Weisung 32 timescale for BARBAROSSA - running post-BARBAROSSA campaigns against the British from late autumn or early winter onwards - and marrying that the Marcks most pessimistic timescale of 17 weeks, the Heer should have been on the Volga by mid-October and Leningrad-Moscow-Kursk-Rostov line all done and dusted by mid-September.

Which of those 46 reserve armies mobilized after 22 June 1941 would have been ready according to that timescale? Where and what effects can one expect?

When certain Heer generals were bemoaning the scale of Red Army forces in the second bound, it wasn't newly mobilized armies it was facing, it was dealing with the forces Plan BARBAROSSA assumed had been eliminated in the first bound.
You are still in denial of the fact that FHO did not have sufficient data to correctly estimate red army strength. So the assessment given could only be wrong.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Oct 2019 18:28

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 18:22
BDV wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:20
ljadw wrote: All depended on the elimination of the Red army west of the DD line , everything else would result from this .
But the Red Army, was not eliminated west of DD line. No one lost their position despite this (that RKKA was NOT eliminated west of the DD line). So it is incorrect to state that German Reich leadership linked ALL their goals in the East for that.

That was their best case scenario, but Schicklgruber et Co did not give up because their best case scenario failed.
The existing forces were eliminated,but these were peplaced by mobilised forces ,on a scale no one in Berlin could/wanted to foresee.
On July 3 Halder said :'' the war has been won '', which means that the existing Soviet forces were eliminated .A few weeks later, he said : '' we '' ( he meant FHO ) have underestimated the enemy ( he meant : if we did not underestimate the enemy,the Soviet Untermenschen would be defeated ).But ,at that moment ,the existing Soviet forces were defeated .
Brauchitz said before June 22 : a few weeks of fighting on the border ( which means : the existing Soviet forces will be defeated ) and this will be followed by a mop up ( which means : the Sopviets will not be able to mobilise sufficient new forces ).
Berlin was convinced that the farther the Germans would go, the less the Soviet resistance would be .
When this proved to be an illusion, their argument was : that the Soviets would collaps in July is a mistake, it will happen in August, and when it did not happen in August,they said : it will happen in September ,etc .That's why they did not give up . They did not give up after the Marne,although they knew that victory on the Marne would not save them . In WWI also,they expected a miracle because they needed one .
And when someone asked for proofs that it would happen in August, September,etc ,the answer was that it had to happen and thus would happen .
When they were planning the attack,they knew that only a Deus ex Machina would save them , thus they said to everyone that suddenly a miracle would happen ,because a miracle was needed .
The Germans were as a pilote who jumped from an aircraft and whose parachute refused to open . The pilot was convinced that the parachute would finally open,because otherwise he would die .
The only sensible thing in here is the first phase.The rest is pure irrational nonsense.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 19:00

MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:24
ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 13:59
He means that Halder, Hitler, Brauchitsch, Paulus were saying Yadda,Yadda, Yadda.
No I don't. It looked like a typical wall of ljadw drivel.

But if you want readers to accept you are quoting Hitler, Brauchitsch and/or Paulus then how about referencing these quotes.

:roll:
On June 23 !! Paulus said that the campaign would be of short duration and Brauchitsch answered :you may be right,we shall probably need 6 to 8 weeks for finishing Russia .
Source : Niepold : Plan Barbarossa P 70 ,cited by Stahel on P 157 of Operation Barbarossa and Germany's defeat in the East .
In 6/8 weeks the Germans could not be at the Volga or at Moscow, thus the capture of Moscow and the Volga would not decide,neither influence the outcome of the war . And if ,following Brauchitsch, the Soviets would be finished before September, therre would be no danger of air attacks by the Soviet air force,neither a threat from Asian Russia .The Germans would try to go to the Volga,because they could not go farther,even if the expectations from Brauchitsch were realised .
The same day Halder said that they would achieve soon ''full operational freedom '' behind the shattered Soviet front .
Source : Halder's diary III P7-8 . Also cited by Stahel on P 156 .
Full operational freedom means that the Soviets would have no forces to oppose a German advance .
10 days later, we have the famous declaration of Halder that the war was won in 14 days, but that there would still be isolated cases of localised resistance by fanatics .
And Hitler agreed with Halder .
And also from Stahel P 76 :
there was on January 31 1941 a meeting between Brauchitsch, Halder, Leeb, Bock, Witzleben and Rundstedt and the assumption was that the Red Army could be engaged and defeated before the DD line.
In November 1940 Halder wrote in his diary that the commitments around Europe suggested a limitation of the operations in the Eastto the DD line .And he added that,while one could attempt an envelopping operation starting from the DD line,this would have no prospect of success ,

All this proves that the Germans were rightly convinced that success of Barbarossa depended on
the willingness of the Soviets to be defeated west of the DD line and on their inability to continue the war east of the DD line .
When Bock asked what would happen if the Soviets did not advance to the border but retreated to the east,he got no answer,because everyone knew that this scenario meant defeat for Germany .

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