The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 19:21

Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 18:28
ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 18:22
BDV wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:20
ljadw wrote: All depended on the elimination of the Red army west of the DD line , everything else would result from this .
But the Red Army, was not eliminated west of DD line. No one lost their position despite this (that RKKA was NOT eliminated west of the DD line). So it is incorrect to state that German Reich leadership linked ALL their goals in the East for that.

That was their best case scenario, but Schicklgruber et Co did not give up because their best case scenario failed.
The existing forces were eliminated,but these were peplaced by mobilised forces ,on a scale no one in Berlin could/wanted to foresee.
On July 3 Halder said :'' the war has been won '', which means that the existing Soviet forces were eliminated .A few weeks later, he said : '' we '' ( he meant FHO ) have underestimated the enemy ( he meant : if we did not underestimate the enemy,the Soviet Untermenschen would be defeated ).But ,at that moment ,the existing Soviet forces were defeated .
Brauchitz said before June 22 : a few weeks of fighting on the border ( which means : the existing Soviet forces will be defeated ) and this will be followed by a mop up ( which means : the Sopviets will not be able to mobilise sufficient new forces ).
Berlin was convinced that the farther the Germans would go, the less the Soviet resistance would be .
When this proved to be an illusion, their argument was : that the Soviets would collaps in July is a mistake, it will happen in August, and when it did not happen in August,they said : it will happen in September ,etc .That's why they did not give up . They did not give up after the Marne,although they knew that victory on the Marne would not save them . In WWI also,they expected a miracle because they needed one .
And when someone asked for proofs that it would happen in August, September,etc ,the answer was that it had to happen and thus would happen .
When they were planning the attack,they knew that only a Deus ex Machina would save them , thus they said to everyone that suddenly a miracle would happen ,because a miracle was needed .
The Germans were as a pilote who jumped from an aircraft and whose parachute refused to open . The pilot was convinced that the parachute would finally open,because otherwise he would die .
The only sensible thing in here is the first phase.The rest is pure irrational nonsense.
You are saying that Brauchitsch and Halder said irrational nonsense ? Halder who said that envelopping operations east of the DD line would have no propspect of success ?Is this irrational nonsense .
Is Christian Gerlach witing nonsense when he wrote about
''die Hoffnung auf einen sowjetischen Zusammenbruch wie auf einen deus ex machina ''.
Was Hitler saying irrational nonsense when after one month of fighting,he hoped that Japan would save him , while he had forbidden to inform Japan about Barbarossa ?
Was Hitler talking nonsense when on August 21 he said that it would be impossible to capture Moscow in 1941 ,and the OKH agreed ?
And when the OKH admitted on September 13 that the war would continue after 1941,is this also irrational nonsense ? That the OKH admitted that the battles of Viazma and Briansk would decide nothing,is this irrational nonsense ?
And is it irrational nonsense that ,immediately before the Marne Battle,Moltke said that the objective of the Schlieffen PLan could not be realised,even if they won at the Marne, but still gave the order to start the battle ?

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Oct 2019 19:23

ljadw wrote:
When they were planning the attack,they knew that only a Deus ex Machina would save them , thus they said to everyone that suddenly a miracle would happen ,because a miracle was needed.

The Germans were as a pilote who jumped from an aircraft and whose parachute refused to open. The pilot was convinced that the parachute would finally open, because otherwise he would die.
To paraphrase your metaphor, one can review the error of the pilot of not packing own parachute properly, the error in using a system without reserve, and the error of continuing to act after failure of deployment of parachute without altering the course of action.

In this case, following failure of destroying RKKA west of Dniepr-Dvina line, the Wehrmacht continued to press* across unfavourable terrain (Smolensk-Moscow Upland forest and Luga Basin swamp-forest) with a high attending cost in time and resources played.

IMO, the metaphor most applicable to Wehrmacht actions post crossing the DD line is Waist Deep in Big Muddy. The push towards Moscow was ill advised (I am coming around to seeing some method to the Early Moscow madness). That towards Leningrad (and Murmansk) was sheer lunacy.

______________________________________________
* Successfully!
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Oct 2019 19:47

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:00
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:24
ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 13:59
He means that Halder, Hitler, Brauchitsch, Paulus were saying Yadda,Yadda, Yadda.
No I don't. It looked like a typical wall of ljadw drivel.

But if you want readers to accept you are quoting Hitler, Brauchitsch and/or Paulus then how about referencing these quotes.

:roll:
On June 23 !! Paulus said that the campaign would be of short duration and Brauchitsch answered :you may be right,we shall probably need 6 to 8 weeks for finishing Russia .
Source : Niepold : Plan Barbarossa P 70 ,cited by Stahel on P 157 of Operation Barbarossa and Germany's defeat in the East .
In 6/8 weeks the Germans could not be at the Volga or at Moscow, thus the capture of Moscow and the Volga would not decide,neither influence the outcome of the war . And if ,following Brauchitsch, the Soviets would be finished before September, therre would be no danger of air attacks by the Soviet air force,neither a threat from Asian Russia .The Germans would try to go to the Volga,because they could not go farther,even if the expectations from Brauchitsch were realised .
The same day Halder said that they would achieve soon ''full operational freedom '' behind the shattered Soviet front .
Source : Halder's diary III P7-8 . Also cited by Stahel on P 156 .
Full operational freedom means that the Soviets would have no forces to oppose a German advance .
10 days later, we have the famous declaration of Halder that the war was won in 14 days, but that there would still be isolated cases of localised resistance by fanatics .
And Hitler agreed with Halder .
And also from Stahel P 76 :
there was on January 31 1941 a meeting between Brauchitsch, Halder, Leeb, Bock, Witzleben and Rundstedt and the assumption was that the Red Army could be engaged and defeated before the DD line.
In November 1940 Halder wrote in his diary that the commitments around Europe suggested a limitation of the operations in the Eastto the DD line .And he added that,while one could attempt an envelopping operation starting from the DD line,this would have no prospect of success ,

All this proves that the Germans were rightly convinced that success of Barbarossa depended on
the willingness of the Soviets to be defeated west of the DD line and on their inability to continue the war east of the DD line .
When Bock asked what would happen if the Soviets did not advance to the border but retreated to the east,he got no answer,because everyone knew that this scenario meant defeat for Germany .
The last few phrases have some sense in them.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 20:47

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:00
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 16:24
ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 13:59
He means that Halder, Hitler, Brauchitsch, Paulus were saying Yadda,Yadda, Yadda.
No I don't. It looked like a typical wall of ljadw drivel.

But if you want readers to accept you are quoting Hitler, Brauchitsch and/or Paulus then how about referencing these quotes.
Yadda, yadda, yadda...
I got pulled up for posting my nonsensical yadda earlier.
I tried to regain some internet warrior points by saying it was quotes by important German generals.
I got called out to reference the quotes.
And this is my yadda, yadda, yadda on something different to dig myself deeper into the yadder, yadder, yadder mud.
Yours yadda yadda sincerely
ljadw
:lol:

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Oct 2019 20:50

ljadw wrote:All this proves that the Germans were rightly convinced that success of Barbarossa depended on the willingness of the Soviets to be defeated west of the DD line and on their inability to continue the war east of the DD line.

When Bock asked what would happen if the Soviets did not advance to the border but retreated to the east, he got no answer, because everyone knew that this scenario meant defeat for Germany.
Poland in 2 weeks, France in 2 months, Russia in 2 years

and Italy?

... in 2 days!
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 20:53

BDV wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:23
ljadw wrote:
When they were planning the attack,they knew that only a Deus ex Machina would save them , thus they said to everyone that suddenly a miracle would happen ,because a miracle was needed.

The Germans were as a pilote who jumped from an aircraft and whose parachute refused to open. The pilot was convinced that the parachute would finally open, because otherwise he would die.


In this case, following failure of destroying RKKA west of Dniepr-Dvina line, the Wehrmacht continued to press* across unfavourable terrain (Smolensk-Moscow Upland forest and Luga Basin swamp-forest) with a high attending cost in time and resources played.

IMO, the metaphor most applicable to Wehrmacht actions post crossing the DD line is Waist Deep in Big Muddy. The push towards Moscow was ill advised (I am coming around to seeing some method to the Early Moscow madness). That towards Leningrad (and Murmansk) was sheer lunacy.

______________________________________________
* Successfully!
What else should they have done ? Capitulation ?

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Oct 2019 20:54

BDV wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:50
ljadw wrote:All this proves that the Germans were rightly convinced that success of Barbarossa depended on the willingness of the Soviets to be defeated west of the DD line and on their inability to continue the war east of the DD line.

When Bock asked what would happen if the Soviets did not advance to the border but retreated to the east, he got no answer, because everyone knew that this scenario meant defeat for Germany.
Poland in 2 weeks, France in 2 months, Russia in 2 years

and Italy?

... in 2 days!
Halder said that they could not win if the war continued east of the DD line .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 20:55

Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Oct 2019 21:12

ljadw wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:54
Halder said that they could not win if the war continued east of the DD line .
Halder said alot of things about BARBAROSSA. Not much of it turned out to be right.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 12 Oct 2019 09:29

MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?
Not a realistic option. Was not likely to happen.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 12 Oct 2019 11:15

Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 09:29
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?
Not a realistic option. Was not likely to happen.
And yet, paradoxically, the plan that the Heer embraced and implemented was all but guaranreed to deliver an outcome that mirrored Soviet strategic withdrawal. The Heer plan didn't allow the Red Army time to get their troops to the border. The Heer plan guaranteed that it became a war of attrition.

How could they not realise that? Was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch, Halder and others part?

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 12 Oct 2019 12:57

MarkN wrote:
12 Oct 2019 11:15
Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 09:29
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.



How could they not realise that? Was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch, Halder and others part?
No only resignation ,they knew that the first condition for success was that the Red army would go to the border and that there was nothing they could do if the Red army was not going to the border .
Blaming some one on German side for the failure as you and Aida are doing, is to say that the Germans defeated themselves and to deny that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets.
There was no hubris, stupidity,incompetence,delusion on the part of Brauchitsch and Halder who were intelligent people who sought desperately an exit from the desperate situation where Germany was in in the Autumn of 1940 . The situation was desperate and only a miracle could save them , thus they were convinced that there would be a miracle .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 12 Oct 2019 15:38

MarkN wrote:
12 Oct 2019 11:15
Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 09:29
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?
Not a realistic option. Was not likely to happen.
And yet, paradoxically, the plan that the Heer embraced and implemented was all but guaranreed to deliver an outcome that mirrored Soviet strategic withdrawal. The Heer plan didn't allow the Red Army time to get their troops to the border. The Heer plan guaranteed that it became a war of attrition.

How could they not realise that? Was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch, Halder and others part?
Absutely not true. The Heer plan guarantees destruction of most what the red army was estimated to have by a war of maneuver.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 12 Oct 2019 20:59

Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 15:38
MarkN wrote:
12 Oct 2019 11:15
Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 09:29
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
Aida1 wrote:
11 Oct 2019 19:47
The last few phrases have some sense in them.
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?
Not a realistic option. Was not likely to happen.
And yet, paradoxically, the plan that the Heer embraced and implemented was all but guaranreed to deliver an outcome that mirrored Soviet strategic withdrawal. The Heer plan didn't allow the Red Army time to get their troops to the border. The Heer plan guaranteed that it became a war of attrition.

How could they not realise that? Was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch, Halder and others part?
Absutely not true. The Heer plan guarantees destruction of most what the red army was estimated to have by a war of maneuver.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

The Heer wanted to smash up the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound. But they didn't wait for the mass of the Red Army to get to the border. :lol:

On paper, the four Fronts on the border had a combined total establishment of about 3 million based upon FHO briefings. But since the Soviets had not mobilized, the Heer faced only between 1 and 1.5million - and a good amount of them managed not to be destroyed.

Instead of their planned Entscheidungsschlacht, they ended up having to fight a series of battles similar in nature to if the Red Army was conducting a strategic withdrawal. The Heer resorted to a series of envelopment battles to beat the Red Army through attrition.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 13 Oct 2019 08:42

MarkN wrote:
12 Oct 2019 20:59
Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 15:38
MarkN wrote:
12 Oct 2019 11:15
Aida1 wrote:
12 Oct 2019 09:29
MarkN wrote:
11 Oct 2019 20:55
No, they don't.

When Bock raised the question in February - what if the Red Army doesn't rush to the border as your (OKH) plan and Weisung assume, what do we do? - was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch's part to shrug his shoulders and assume it would be alright on the night?
Not a realistic option. Was not likely to happen.
And yet, paradoxically, the plan that the Heer embraced and implemented was all but guaranreed to deliver an outcome that mirrored Soviet strategic withdrawal. The Heer plan didn't allow the Red Army time to get their troops to the border. The Heer plan guaranteed that it became a war of attrition.

How could they not realise that? Was it hubris, delusion, incompetence or stupidity on Brauchitsch, Halder and others part?
Absutely not true. The Heer plan guarantees destruction of most what the red army was estimated to have by a war of maneuver.
:lol: :lol: :lol:

The Heer wanted to smash up the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound. But they didn't wait for the mass of the Red Army to get to the border. :lol:

On paper, the four Fronts on the border had a combined total establishment of about 3 million based upon FHO briefings. But since the Soviets had not mobilized, the Heer faced only between 1 and 1.5million - and a good amount of them managed not to be destroyed.

Instead of their planned Entscheidungsschlacht, they ended up having to fight a series of battles similar in nature to if the Red Army was conducting a strategic withdrawal. The Heer resorted to a series of envelopment battles to beat the Red Army through attrition.
You still do not understand the difference between attrition and maneuver. Maneuver is about envelopment. And you seem to think giving up the element of surprise would have worked better. Not likely. That would have ended up in attrition.
If the red army had had the strength and regeneration capacity as estimated by FHO, the plan would have worked.

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