ljadw wrote: ↑
19 Feb 2019 14:18
The ammunition consumption of the Ostheer in 1941 was some 850 million bullets of pistols and rifles . Thus what was consumed to kill the Jews in the SU was meaningless .Besides, there is no proof that the consumption of the Einsatzgruppen resulted in an shortage of ammunition for the military .
https://www.tracesofwar.com/articles/38 ... n.htm?c=gw
Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑
19 Feb 2019 16:10
This is complete nonsense. The Einzatsgruppen fulfilled a role that was needed, unless you think all they did was go around killing people. The support they required was so negligible that the only reason to use it in a discussion on logistics is to say, "look how stupid the Germans were to kill Jews." Forget the fact that it was artillery ammunition that was most valuable, not pistol/rifle ammo. So dumb.
707 ID provided the munitions for execution of 19000 jews. 850 million consumption, was 0.8 per man per day. On one day the Einzatsgruppen dispatched 19000 they expended min 19 per man per day. So each member had the logistical burden of 24 men in munition consumption, so the 1000 had the logistical consumption of 124000 riflemen. ie 2 to 3 ID worth. The only means of munitions for this, and other events of mass shootings was to draw on the logistics of local troops.
Konig_pilsner wrote: ↑
19 Feb 2019 16:10
MarkN is right anyway, whole thread is a red herring.
Not one major operation was delayed due to faults in the logistics. The biggest limiting factor was the speed at which the infantry could advance, which they would have to do on foot before any infrastructure could be built behind them.
Halder's diary July 8th
Now look at what he writes later "To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied" A deficit of 8 trains a day, and from there, "Grosstruppen 50% operational" only half the planned ability to forward lift from the rail head.Army Group South. As the quartermaster’s war diary records, ‘For the intended replenishment period of ten days it is necessary that the panzer group is provided with fourteen supply trains a day, for the whole of AGS 6 trains arrived.
‘When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which ?rst required that strong elements be pulled back out of the Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength"
Now look at trucks "Lack of truck replacements. Gen QM has nothing" 10th July 25% lost. 19Th 50% non operational.29Th "Replacemnet trucks urgently needed" Quartermaster-General, Major-General Eduard Wagner, explained to Halder on 26 August, ‘Truck situation is beginning to become diffcult. Replacements only possible in exceedingly small quantities. September 1941, more than half of the truck fleet was no longer operational.
starts with 60,000 tons forward lift from a rail head, by 10th july 25% of thats gone, so 45,000, by 19th half of thats out of action, so the only way to create a forward supply depot is to use the 22500 tons remaining, so its taking 3 time as long as planned to it as there is a third of the assets to perform the task. Trucks actually at the front instead have to go to the rail head which takes twice as long to do.
Effect of that on a Div, July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
Armeelager - - distance - - loading - - unloading - - Days from departure to return
Mogilew - - - - - 100 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 days
Orscha - - - - - - 120 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 1/2 days
Borriosow - - - - 250 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 4 days
Minsk - - - - - - 300 - - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 4 1/2 days
Bobruisk - - - - - 200 - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 3 days
As we can see, supplies/times taken was dependent on where the depots where.
Mogoliew 3 July, Orscha went live 31 July, for the entire period, 28 days, the formation required 31 units munition supplies, and had recieved 17. So that Div was conducting operations with half its authorised munitions.
Look at page 53, then move to page 141 on wards, look for words like logistically impossible, 32 trains a day required but only 13 arriving.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... ns&f=false
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