The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Volyn
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Volyn » 19 Feb 2019 18:28

Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
Konig_pilsner you need to pay attention to what was written
Perhaps you should pay attention to what you wrote. The very title of the thread you created implies a "lack" of adequate logistics.
There is no implication, it is only to give an account for both sides of the issue.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
Volyn wrote:
19 Feb 2019 17:29
Ammunition taken away from front-line combatants can only be considered a "waste"
I have seen numerous reports in the later months of Barbarossa of AG's in want of artillery ammo, fuel, spares,... never once have I seen a lack of rifle ammunition being mentioned. Even if it did occur, an infantryman at Klin would not be without bullets because it was diverted to the Einsatzgruppen, it would be because he had advanced beyond the supply capabilities of the columns.
This is what was written, perhaps Hanny can provide the context -
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 11:30
One Germany division was unable to be deployed as the munitions it had and required,were used to execute on an industrial scale, you can try Hitlers willing executioners.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
nothing that the Einzatsgruppen did in 1941 warranted a single tactical or strategic advantage to Operation Barbarossa
You failed to mention the NKVD, Commissars, or Communist functionaries. You might not like the Einsatzgruppen, and perhaps their actions didn't contribute to the success of Barbarossa, but they certainly didn't hinder it. The reason you would bring it up in a discussion on the logistics of Barbarossa is known only to you.
We are not discussing Soviet operations only German, so of course I would not bring them into this discussion. Again, I say that the Einzatsgruppen did nothing to assist in the success of Barbarossa and therefore anything they were doing should be considered a waste in terms of military actions; therefore, any resources sent to them should have gone to the actual combat forces. If you contrast this against the overall affairs of the military, then yes it is small. However, as Hanny pointed out, at least 1 Division had to wait around while their ammo was sent to someone else.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 19 Feb 2019 19:06

We are not discussing Soviet operations only German, so of course I would not bring them into this discussion.
Neither was I. I was referring to people who were targeted by the Einsatzgruppen.

Since you are so interested in logistics, explain to me the logic in allowing thousands of people who are hostile to you, and you are hostile to them, to remain unmolested behind your front line. Do you believe these non combatants would remain so, in light of their knowledge of the conquerors antisemitism?

Their was a reason why the Germans believed the Einsatzgruppen was necessary. One could argue the Nazi's created there own problem, if they weren't antisemitic then they wouldn't have to worry about the Jewish population in the East. But then they wouldn't be Nazi's.

While their actions were despicable, from a logistical stand point the Einsatzgruppen was inconsequential, and did safe guard the rear areas to some extent.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 19 Feb 2019 19:37

ljadw wrote:
19 Feb 2019 14:18
The ammunition consumption of the Ostheer in 1941 was some 850 million bullets of pistols and rifles . Thus what was consumed to kill the Jews in the SU was meaningless .Besides, there is no proof that the consumption of the Einsatzgruppen resulted in an shortage of ammunition for the military .
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 16:10


This is complete nonsense. The Einzatsgruppen fulfilled a role that was needed, unless you think all they did was go around killing people. The support they required was so negligible that the only reason to use it in a discussion on logistics is to say, "look how stupid the Germans were to kill Jews." Forget the fact that it was artillery ammunition that was most valuable, not pistol/rifle ammo. So dumb.
https://www.tracesofwar.com/articles/38 ... n.htm?c=gw 707 ID provided the munitions for execution of 19000 jews. 850 million consumption, was 0.8 per man per day. On one day the Einzatsgruppen dispatched 19000 they expended min 19 per man per day. So each member had the logistical burden of 24 men in munition consumption, so the 1000 had the logistical consumption of 124000 riflemen. ie 2 to 3 ID worth. The only means of munitions for this, and other events of mass shootings was to draw on the logistics of local troops.

Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 16:10
MarkN is right anyway, whole thread is a red herring.

Not one major operation was delayed due to faults in the logistics. The biggest limiting factor was the speed at which the infantry could advance, which they would have to do on foot before any infrastructure could be built behind them.

Halder's diary July 8th
Now look at what he writes later "To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied" A deficit of 8 trains a day, and from there, "Grosstruppen 50% operational" only half the planned ability to forward lift from the rail head.Army Group South. As the quartermaster’s war diary records, ‘For the intended replenishment period of ten days it is necessary that the panzer group is provided with fourteen supply trains a day, for the whole of AGS 6 trains arrived.

Halder
‘When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which ?rst required that strong elements be pulled back out of the Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength"

Now look at trucks "Lack of truck replacements. Gen QM has nothing" 10th July 25% lost. 19Th 50% non operational.29Th "Replacemnet trucks urgently needed" Quartermaster-General, Major-General Eduard Wagner, explained to Halder on 26 August, ‘Truck situation is beginning to become diffcult. Replacements only possible in exceedingly small quantities. September 1941, more than half of the truck fleet was no longer operational.

starts with 60,000 tons forward lift from a rail head, by 10th july 25% of thats gone, so 45,000, by 19th half of thats out of action, so the only way to create a forward supply depot is to use the 22500 tons remaining, so its taking 3 time as long as planned to it as there is a third of the assets to perform the task. Trucks actually at the front instead have to go to the rail head which takes twice as long to do.

Effect of that on a Div, July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
Armeelager - - distance - - loading - - unloading - - Days from departure to return
Mogilew - - - - - 100 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 days
Orscha - - - - - - 120 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 1/2 days
Borriosow - - - - 250 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 4 days
Minsk - - - - - - 300 - - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 4 1/2 days
Bobruisk - - - - - 200 - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 3 days


As we can see, supplies/times taken was dependent on where the depots where.

Mogoliew 3 July, Orscha went live 31 July, for the entire period, 28 days, the formation required 31 units munition supplies, and had recieved 17. So that Div was conducting operations with half its authorised munitions.




Look at page 53, then move to page 141 on wards, look for words like logistically impossible, 32 trains a day required but only 13 arriving.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... ns&f=false
Last edited by Hanny on 19 Feb 2019 20:17, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 19 Feb 2019 20:17

Hi Hanny,
707 ID provided the munitions for execution of 19000 jews. 850 million consumption, was 0.8 per man per day. On one day the Einzatsgruppen dispatched 19000 they expended min 19 per man per day. So each member had the logistical burden of 19 men in munition consumption, so the 1000 had the logistical consumption of 19000 riflemen. ie 2 ID worth. The only means of munitions for this, and other events of mass shootings was to draw on the logistics of local troops.
This is very misleading. The 707 ID was unfit for combat, and was used an a security detachment.
The 707th Infantry Division was raised at Munich on 2 May 1941, and subsequently undertook training in the region.[1][2] Historian Ben H. Shepherd has described the unit as "an extremely substandard division of the fifteenth wave" to be raised by the German Army during the war, with its personnel being "overaged, undertrained and underequipped".[3] The 707th Infantry Division was also much smaller than the standard size of German infantry divisions, comprising just 5,000 soldiers. All of the division's initial officers, other than its commanding officer until February 1943, Major General Gustav von Bechtolsheim, were reservists. Most soldiers in the division were aged over 30, and the officers were typically even older.[4] Major General von Bechtolsheim and his operations officer were deeply committed Nazis.[5]
An assertion was made that the Germans could have equipped another ID with the ammunition it gave to kill Jews, which in reality ammunition was taken from a security division and used to kill Jews. Again this doesn't show that there were ID's sitting around waiting to advance but couldn't because of ammunition allotments to the Einsatzgruppen. It does however show Wehrmacht complicity with the killings.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Volyn » 19 Feb 2019 20:18

Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 19:06
We are not discussing Soviet operations only German, so of course I would not bring them into this discussion.
Neither was I. I was referring to people who were targeted by the Einsatzgruppen.
Ok fair enough, if they were prisoners then why shoot them?
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 19:06
Since you are so interested in logistics, explain to me the logic in allowing thousands of people who are hostile to you, and you are hostile to them, to remain unmolested behind your front line. Do you believe these non combatants would remain so, in light of their knowledge of the conquerors antisemitism?
The Einsatzgruppen in Operation Barbarossa were not conducting anti-partisan operations, they were simply rounding up civilians and prisoners in order to shoot them en masse. This is why virtually everything these units were engaged in were a waste of resources (trucks, fuel, food, ammo, uniforms, etc.) to use on a para-military force that is not engaged in the overall military objectives of Barbarossa. This part of the logistic burden was not taken into account by the military planners and they were consuming resources from each Army Groups area of operations, unless you have information that says otherwise?
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 19:06
Their was a reason why the Germans believed the Einsatzgruppen was necessary. One could argue the Nazi's created there own problem, if they weren't antisemitic then they wouldn't have to worry about the Jewish population in the East. But then they wouldn't be Nazi's.

While their actions were despicable, from a logistical stand point the Einsatzgruppen was inconsequential, and did safe guard the rear areas to some extent.
Not exactly, as a direct result of the Einsatzgruppen "special activities" they help to create the future hardcore anti-partisans that also took a huge toll on Post-Barbarossa events. It is certain that the use of the Einsatzgruppen actually had the perverse effect of motivating the Soviets to fight even harder and longer during each successive battle, because now it was for survival. Longer battles mean more resources consumed, now it becomes a logistical issue since the RKKA will fight to the bitter end, which was not planned for in the beginning (quick victories over prolonged conflict was the goal of Barbarossa).

Logistics is more than knowing how much fuel or ammo is required to move from point A to point B - there is also the preemptive analysis that must be considered - How long is the intended Operation supposed to last? Nobody can plan for an indefinite struggle, so artificial timespans are created in order to "best guess" how prepared they should to be.

Hitler may have believed the Soviets would collapse in weeks, but someone else who actually needs to plan all of this would be forced to see things differently. This is where Intelligence is supposed to assist the Logistic efforts (but we know they were inept on that end), which allowed for overall poor planning as they failed to anticipate the real logistical burdens that Barbarossa would actually create.

My interest is in how the Germans sat down and carefully planned out this massively complex and detailed project without realizing what they were really getting themselves into?

It seems like political hubris took hold of everyone involved, they were using a series of fairy-tale projections until reality finally convinced the High Command that they were insufficiently prepared to fight the USSR.



Nice Hanny, these are facts that point to the issues I was hoping to bring up -
Hanny wrote:
19 Feb 2019 19:37
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 16:10
MarkN is right anyway, whole thread is a red herring.

Not one major operation was delayed due to faults in the logistics. The biggest limiting factor was the speed at which the infantry could advance, which they would have to do on foot before any infrastructure could be built behind them.

Halder's diary July 8th
Now look at what he writes later "To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied" A deficit of 8 trains a day, and from there, "Grosstruppen 50% operational" only half the planned ability to forward lift from the rail head.Army Group South. As the quartermaster’s war diary records, ‘For the intended replenishment period of ten days it is necessary that the panzer group is provided with fourteen supply trains a day, for the whole of AGS 6 trains arrived.

Halder
‘When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which ?rst required that strong elements be pulled back out of the Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength"

Now look at trucks "Lack of truck replacements. Gen QM has nothing" 10th July 25% lost. 19Th 50% non operational.29Th "Replacemnet trucks urgently needed" Quartermaster-General, Major-General Eduard Wagner, explained to Halder on 26 August, ‘Truck situation is beginning to become diffcult. Replacements only possible in exceedingly small quantities. September 1941, more than half of the truck fleet was no longer operational.

starts with 60,000 tons forward lift from a rail head, by 10th july 25% of thats gone, so 45,000, by 19th half of thats out of action, so the only way to create a forward supply depot is to use the 22500 tons remaining, so its taking 3 time as long as planned to it as there is a third of the assets to perform the task. Trucks actually at the front instead have to go to the rail head which takes twice as long to do.

Effect of that on a Div, July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
Armeelager - - distance - - loading - - unloading - - Days from departure to return
Mogilew - - - - - 100 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 days
Orscha - - - - - - 120 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 1/2 days
Borriosow - - - - 250 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 4 days
Minsk - - - - - - 300 - - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 4 1/2 days
Bobruisk - - - - - 200 - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 3 days


As we can see, supplies/times taken was dependent on where the depots where.

Mogoliew 3 July, Orscha went live 31 July, for the entire period, 28 days, the formation required 31 units munition supplies, and had recieved 17. So that Div was conducting operations with half its authorised munitions.


Look at page 53, then move to page 141 on wards, look for words like logistically impossible, 32 trains a day required but only 13 arriving.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... ns&f=false

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 19 Feb 2019 20:48

Hanny wrote:
19 Feb 2019 19:37
707 ID provided the munitions for execution of 19000 jews. 850 million consumption, was 0.8 per man per day. On one day the Einzatsgruppen dispatched 19000 they expended min 19 per man per day. So each member had the logistical burden of 19 men in munition consumption, so the 1000 had the logistical consumption of 19000 riflemen. ie 2 ID worth. The only means of munitions for this, and other events of mass shootings was to draw on the logistics of local troops.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:17
This is very misleading. The 707 ID was unfit for combat, and was used an a security detachment.
Irrelevant, its their munitions that were used. The question is 6.

" Is it known what military resources were used to support German Einsatzgruppen and other occupation forces that should/could have been used elsewhere? "

You otoh in post 58 made a pigs ear of understanding the question.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:17
The 707th Infantry Division was raised at Munich on 2 May 1941, and subsequently undertook training in the region.[1][2] Historian Ben H. Shepherd has described the unit as "an extremely substandard division of the fifteenth wave" to be raised by the German Army during the war, with its personnel being "overaged, undertrained and underequipped".[3] The 707th Infantry Division was also much smaller than the standard size of German infantry divisions, comprising just 5,000 soldiers. All of the division's initial officers, other than its commanding officer until February 1943, Major General Gustav von Bechtolsheim, were reservists. Most soldiers in the division were aged over 30, and the officers were typically even older.[4] Major General von Bechtolsheim and his operations officer were deeply committed Nazis.[5]
One of the main war crimes committing formations.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h7A ... le&f=false



Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:17
An assertion was made that the Germans could have equipped another ID with the ammunition it gave to kill Jews, which in reality ammunition was taken from a security division and used to kill Jews. Again this doesn't show that there were ID's sitting around waiting to advance but couldn't because of ammunition allotments to the Einsatzgruppen. It does however show Wehrmacht complicity with the killings.
So dumb, learn how to count. The munitions used from 707, would sustain 2 to 3 Full strength 8000 man ID in combat. 707 ID had no munitions left, all its combat loads were used, and could perform no duty, thats the scale of the event.
Last edited by Hanny on 19 Feb 2019 20:54, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Hanny » 19 Feb 2019 20:50

Volyn wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:18



Nice Hanny, these are facts that point to the issues I was hoping to bring up -
Your welcome.
US Logistics with a ww2 definition for the US
https://history.army.mil/html/books/070 ... _70-29.pdf
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 19 Feb 2019 20:56

To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied" A deficit of 8 trains a day, and from there, "Grosstruppen 50% operational" only half the planned ability to forward lift from the rail head.
Halder's diary mentions numerous times rail deliveries not matching requirements, especially after a deep advance. That isn't a failure of logistics it is simply a realty, and in fact as his July 8th quote asserts, supply was exceeding expectations in the initial weeks.
‘When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which ?rst required that strong elements be pulled back out of the Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength
First, remember Halder was against going to Kiev, so he criticized everything during this period. More importantly, despite the losses in trucks, they still did attack and achieve a breakthrough at Vyazma, only being slowed down by the weather. It was only the second phase of Typhoon that became a disaster due to supply and maintenance issues.

The point isn't if supply requirements met demands, it is if the supply limited operations. I am sure that at times lack of fuel/ammo effected combat performance, but so did the weather and personnel/ vehicle losses. I am still unaware of a large operation that was delayed, or failed before Typhoon.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 19 Feb 2019 21:06

So dumb, learn how to count. The munitions used from 707, would sustain 2 to 3 Full strength 8000 man ID in combat. 707 ID had no munitions left, all its combat loads were used, and could perform no duty, thats the scale of the event.
LoL,

So what combat ID didn't get their allotment because of that "event?"
What task did the 707 ID not perform by having no munitions?
If the munitions were needed how would it get to the front?

The answer.... the munitions weren't needed, which is why they were given, and it didn't cause repercussions for anything going on anywhere else.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 19 Feb 2019 21:26

Volyn wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:28
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
Konig_pilsner you need to pay attention to what was written
Perhaps you should pay attention to what you wrote. The very title of the thread you created implies a "lack" of adequate logistics.
There is no implication, it is only to give an account for both sides of the issue.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
Volyn wrote:
19 Feb 2019 17:29
Ammunition taken away from front-line combatants can only be considered a "waste"
I have seen numerous reports in the later months of Barbarossa of AG's in want of artillery ammo, fuel, spares,... never once have I seen a lack of rifle ammunition being mentioned. Even if it did occur, an infantryman at Klin would not be without bullets because it was diverted to the Einsatzgruppen, it would be because he had advanced beyond the supply capabilities of the columns.
This is what was written, perhaps Hanny can provide the context -
Hanny wrote:
18 Feb 2019 11:30
One Germany division was unable to be deployed as the munitions it had and required,were used to execute on an industrial scale, you can try Hitlers willing executioners.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 18:13
nothing that the Einzatsgruppen did in 1941 warranted a single tactical or strategic advantage to Operation Barbarossa
You failed to mention the NKVD, Commissars, or Communist functionaries. You might not like the Einsatzgruppen, and perhaps their actions didn't contribute to the success of Barbarossa, but they certainly didn't hinder it. The reason you would bring it up in a discussion on the logistics of Barbarossa is known only to you.
We are not discussing Soviet operations only German, so of course I would not bring them into this discussion. Again, I say that the Einzatsgruppen did nothing to assist in the success of Barbarossa and therefore anything they were doing should be considered a waste in terms of military actions; therefore, any resources sent to them should have gone to the actual combat forces. If you contrast this against the overall affairs of the military, then yes it is small. However, as Hanny pointed out, at least 1 Division had to wait around while their ammo was sent to someone else.
1 While does not mean because
2 The difference between a security division and an Einsatzgruppe is semantics .A security division was not a combat force .
3 Why was it bad if 707 had to wait because its ammunition was going to the Einsatzgruppe ?
4 When did this happen ?
5 How long had 707 to wait ?
6 If the ammunition for 707 was not going to the Einsatzgruppe, what would 707 have done ?
There was not much difference between 707 and an Einsatzgruppe : both were killing preventively civilians who were considered as opponents of the Third Reich : Jews and non Jews .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Konig_pilsner » 19 Feb 2019 21:27

The Einsatzgruppen in Operation Barbarossa were not conducting anti-partisan operations, they were simply rounding up civilians and prisoners in order to shoot them en masse. This is why virtually everything these units were engaged in were a waste of resources (trucks, fuel, food, ammo, uniforms, etc.) to use on a para-military force that is not engaged in the overall military objectives of Barbarossa. This part of the logistic burden was not taken into account by the military planners and they were consuming resources from each Army Groups area of operations, unless you have information that says otherwise?
Never said it was, but you are obviously unaware of the other duties they were tasked with.
Not exactly, as a direct result of the Einsatzgruppen "special activities" they help to create the future hardcore anti-partisans that also took a huge toll on Post-Barbarossa events.
Completely false. Local populations had no objections and assisted the Einzatzgruppen with their task. Partisan activity at this time of the war consisted mostly of Russian stranglers who had avoided the encirclements. You are a year or two ahead of yourself.
My interest is in how the Germans sat down and carefully planned out this massively complex and detailed project without realizing what they were really getting themselves into?
Wishful thinking? Triumph of the Will? Not sure. I think in the end Russia is just a tough country to invade. The challenges and scope were so immense, I doubt it would be very easy to do much better without hind sight.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Volyn » 19 Feb 2019 21:34

Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:56
To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied" A deficit of 8 trains a day, and from there, "Grosstruppen 50% operational" only half the planned ability to forward lift from the rail head.
Halder's diary mentions numerous times rail deliveries not matching requirements, especially after a deep advance. That isn't a failure of logistics it is simply a realty, and in fact as his July 8th quote asserts, supply was exceeding expectations in the initial weeks.
It is a failure of the pre-planning side for the logistics, because the consumption of material used to attack Kiev from the North obviously was not allotted for pre-invasion. These events unfolded due to the continued successful fighting by RKKA forces in the South, which was longer than anticipated. Therefore, AGC needed to dispatch its own forces to assist AGS, which created 2 new logistical routes (1 going South + 1 going North) that had not previously been accounted for; they need to double-back North towards Moscow when they are finished.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:56
First, remember Halder was against going to Kiev, so he criticized everything during this period. More importantly, despite the losses in trucks, they still did attack and achieve a breakthrough at Vyazma, only being slowed down by the weather. It was only the second phase of Typhoon that became a disaster due to supply and maintenance issues.

The point isn't if supply requirements met demands, it is if the supply limited operations. I am sure that at times lack of fuel/ammo effected combat performance, but so did the weather and personnel/ vehicle losses. I am still unaware of a large operation that was delayed, or failed before Typhoon.
Whether Halder wanted to go to Kiev or not is irrelevant in relation to the lack of prior planning for this sort of scenario, so of course he does not want to go.

Typhoon is enabled in large part because the Germans could no longer advance towards Moscow with any coherence. Entire Divisions were lagging behind because they could not receive the supplies they required to move forward (this is a timing problem), so it appears on paper that the Germans are still moving forward but only in a haphazard and dangerous manner. It could be said that the Germans reached the end of their real logistical offensive capabilities, and since Barbarossa was a purely offensive operation, this is the line of failure that was not well planned for.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Volyn » 19 Feb 2019 21:40

Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 21:27
My interest is in how the Germans sat down and carefully planned out this massively complex and detailed project without realizing what they were really getting themselves into?
Wishful thinking? Triumph of the Will? Not sure. I think in the end Russia is just a tough country to invade. The challenges and scope were so immense, I doubt it would be very easy to do much better without hind sight.
Yes exactly, the challenges and scope were beyond what the German High Command could have conceived of, which makes this interesting to review. We can see where their success and failures were, and the pre-planned logistics were woefully lacking to match the entire scope of this particular Operation.
Konig_pilsner wrote:
19 Feb 2019 21:27
Volyn wrote:
19 Feb 2019 20:18
Not exactly, as a direct result of the Einsatzgruppen "special activities" they help to create the future hardcore anti-partisans that also took a huge toll on Post-Barbarossa events.
Completely false. Local populations had no objections and assisted the Einzatzgruppen with their task. Partisan activity at this time of the war consisted mostly of Russian stranglers who had avoided the encirclements. You are a year or two ahead of yourself.
I did not say the partisans were there in 1941, only that the Einzatzgruppen activities helped to foment their creation. From 1942 on, the partisans had a significant effect on the German logistics, a direct consequence of their poor pre-invasion planning - never shoot civilians in the middle of a war (if it is part of the conquerors agenda then it has to be done after the actual war is won).

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 19 Feb 2019 22:16

Konig_pilsner wrote:
Halder's diary mentions numerous times rail deliveries not matching requirements, especially after a deep advance. That isn't a failure of logistics it is simply a realty, and in fact as his July 8th quote asserts, supply was exceeding expectations in the initial weeks.
‘When the battle of Kiev ended, after ruthless demands on the already seriously worn motors, Hitler ordered the attack in the direction of Moscow, which ?rst required that strong elements be pulled back out of the Ukraine. Now it was too late. The motors were at the end of their strength
I am confused as what to Halder is bellyaching about. Were Guderian Panzers in worse shape than vKleist's? vKleist made it to Rostov-on-Don and back to Mius.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 19 Feb 2019 23:06

Logistic problems are NOT the same as logistic failures.

Failure to grasp that simple, commonsense reality by some is hindering sensible debate here.

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