The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Aida1]

Massively underestimating the regenerative power of the red army is the most fundamental error of the FHO.

But they didn't, so it wasn't.

The FHO briefed in January 1941 that the Red Army could mobilize an additional 209 SchutzDiv and at least 36 mot.mech.Brig (ie divs) to add to their standing army. The Soviets did not manage to mobilize that many before the end of 1941. The FHO overestimated, they did not "massively underestimate".

That Lagebericht you posted proves that.

It does nothing of the sort. If anything, it's demonstrating an overestimation as they now (8 August) the Red Army can put less into the field than their previous guesses.

the FHO was convinced the red army was essentially defeated by the beginning of august 1941. It seems to me that Halders alleged diatribe was closer to the truth.

How can it be closer to the truth? He's claiming he (OKH) was expecting only 200 divisions. The FHO had briefed to expect over 260 in the field and another 240 to be mobilized. At the very least it's suggesting the OKH/Heer planners did not take any notice of what the FHO was briefing.

Ooops. Now l get it. When you say Halder's words are closer to the truth you agree there was collective delusion that they were only going to face 200 divs in total - even though the FHO had briefed up to 500.

The Lagebericht is crystal clear.It gives a guess about the number of divisions which can be mobilised which is completely wrong. It also stated literally that the red army is finished which was also wrong. The FHO gave wrong numbers. You try to evade that in your Halder blaming game.

[ljadw]

Logistic situation was depending on ...the Soviets .

There were simply not enough railways east of the DD line to make possible a victorious advance of 150 divisions to the Volga/the Urals , neither had the Germans sufficient waggons,locs,... to do it . And neither had the German industry the capacity to produce what was needed for such an advance .

That is simply not true. Not only was the German industry capable, the Wehrmacht HAD the resources for an advance to Wolga, as proven by the distances fought on and traveled by PzGr 1, 2, and 3. It was Schicklgruber et Co's decision to burn these resources up (while simultaneously and at the same time reducing the speed of operations) by engaging the non-defeated RKKA in the Luga Basin bogs, the forested Smolensk-Moscow upland, and in the intervening marshes.

(But Guderian and the rest of the PanzerJockey gang were yielping how a great victory was lost by OldFart Runstedt by not sending the Panzers into the Belgian coastal marshland, ergo into the BigMuddy the panzerkampfwagen went)

The AA line was 2600 km ,thus indefendable. Thus the only protection would be the collaps of the SU. Thus there was no need to go to the AA line or to the Urals. Germany went to the AA line for the same reason that Rome did not invade Scotland: they could not go farther. The wall of Hadrian did not save Rome, neither would do the AA line or the Urals.

For collapse of SU there were two (mostly) successive conditions:

1. Eliminate RKKA as a fighting force
2. Occupy the centers of economic production and political power.

Russian Heartland, centered on the Wolga between Rzhev and Kazan, has been invaded successfully, historically, but from the South. Invasions from the West have failed ignominiously, historically. In the South it is also the open plain in which the maneuver could conceivably eliminate the RKKA, if it had not been eliminated west of DD line(*). Of course in the unrealistic scenario of "kick the door and the structure crumbles" driving to Moscow and Leningrad will not consume more benzin than driving to Voronezh.

In the setting of persistent Sovjet military resistance, fighting in peat bogs and sub-tundra forests was a double self-goal by the Axis attacker.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________
*Ye olde softe underbelly strikes again!

I said : 150 divisions, I did not talk about the 3 PzGr.The German industry was not capable in 1941 to supply a victorious advance of 150 divisions to the AA line .And even if it could supply such an advance, the railway situation in European Russia would make this advance impossible .70 divisions were committed for Typhoon ( not all participated ) ,if more were available, this does not mean that more would participate ,and,if Taiphoon succeeded, it is not so that 70 divisions would/could advance to the Volga .
2 "Occupy the centers of economic production and political power '' was not a condition for the collaps of the SU, it would result from the collaps of the SU .Even if the SU collapsed,the Germans could not go to the Urals with 150 divisions ,and if the SU collapsed, it was not needed to go to the Urals with 150 divisions . The only way to go to the Urals would be with small forces using for their advance the railways,and the farther they went, the less forces and supplies the railways could support .That's why everything depended on the border battle and on the possibility that kicking the door would cause the structure to crumble.That this would happen was very unrealistic, bu it was the only possibility,thus everyone convinced himself that it would happen : that's why Halder,taking his wishes for reality,exclaimed on July 3 : the war has been won .
About the attack of the Russian heartland by he south : this was impossible for Germany as Germany was not located south of this heartland, but west of it .An attack with starting from Romania was out of the question .

[MarkN]

The Lagebericht is crystal clear.It gives a guess about the number of divisions which can be mobilised which is completely wrong. It also stated literally that the red army is finished which was also wrong. The FHO gave wrong numbers. You try to evade that in your Halder blaming game.

I do no evasion of the sort. I posted the excerpt as an example of how the FHO was no less, no more, deluded than the Heer as a collective. That excerpt is a excellent example of how 'best guess' had more to do with briefing what they hoped was the situation - driven by their own hubris and delusion - rather than reality.

Now compare Halder to FHO.

FHO briefed approx 260 divs in the standing army and a further 240 divs after general mobilization: total approx 500 divs in the Red Army. Halder ignores all that it seems and is fixated on 200 divs in total.

You accuse the FHO falsely of "far underestimation" of Red Army strength. Where does that leave Halder, the OKH Chief of Staff's understanding? Hubris and delusion, incompetent or just plain stupid?

[Aida1]

The Lagebericht is crystal clear.It gives a guess about the number of divisions which can be mobilised which is completely wrong. It also stated literally that the red army is finished which was also wrong. The FHO gave wrong numbers. You try to evade that in your Halder blaming game.

I do no evasion of the sort. I posted the excerpt as an example of how the FHO was no less, no more, deluded than the Heer as a collective. That excerpt is a excellent example of how 'best guess' had more to do with briefing what they hoped was the situation - driven by their own hubris and delusion - rather than reality.

Now compare Halder to FHO.

FHO briefed approx 260 divs in the standing army and a further 240 divs after general mobilization: total approx 500 divs in the Red Army. Halder ignores all that it seems and is fixated on 200 divs in total.

You accuse the FHO falsely of "far underestimation" of Red Army strength. Where does that leave Halder, the OKH Chief of Staff's understanding? Hubris and delusion, incompetent or just plain stupid?

That Lagebericht proves that FHO made a rough guess because of the lack of data and got it completely wrong. So the OKH was misinformed. Contrary to what you pretend, general staff officers are never incompetent or stupid. Does not mean they cannot make mistakes. I am not a fan of Halder but he was not stupid.

[MarkN]

That Lagebericht proves that FHO made a rough guess because of the lack of data and got it completely wrong. So the OKH was misinformed. Contrary to what you pretend, general staff officers are never incompetent or stupid. Does not mean they cannot make mistakes. I am not a fan of Halder but he was not stupid.

By the beginning of August, the senior Heer generals and staff at the OKH had grasped that their plan had failed. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound. Instead of freedom of movement, they were still being fought at every turn in the road. Panzerwaffe doctrine was incompatible with their desire for an Entscheidungsschlacht. They had not given the Red Army enough time to get to the battle. Now they were fighting a war of attrition which the Entscheidungsschlacht was supposed to prevent.

But how could it have failed? They were senior German military officers. How could they have got it so wrong? When deluded in question, deluded in answer.

The FHO came up with their answer: the Red Army is on their last legs. Just 1 more battle and it's victory. Their briefing was more about finding the answer they wanted than military reality.

Halder, according to his own diary words - or at least the US Army translation - decided it wss all somebody else's fault. Originally told they had 200 divs, now l'm told 360!

Utter nonsense the lot of it. FHO briefed about 500 divs after general mobilization prior to BARBAROSSA starting. Why, on 8 August, are they briefing less than 400? Why is Halder complaining? He was briefed about 500 total, why is he surprised by 360? Why is he fixated on 200?

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?

[Aida1]

That Lagebericht proves that FHO made a rough guess because of the lack of data and got it completely wrong. So the OKH was misinformed. Contrary to what you pretend, general staff officers are never incompetent or stupid. Does not mean they cannot make mistakes. I am not a fan of Halder but he was not stupid.

By the beginning of August, the senior Heer generals and staff at the OKH had grasped that their plan had failed. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound. Instead of freedom of movement, they were still being fought at every turn in the road. Panzerwaffe doctrine was incompatible with their desire for an Entscheidungsschlacht. They had not given the Red Army enough time to get to the battle. Now they were fighting a war of attrition which the Entscheidungsschlacht was supposed to prevent.

But how could it have failed? They were senior German military officers. How could they have got it so wrong? When deluded in question, deluded in answer.

The FHO came up with their answer: the Red Army is on their last legs. Just 1 more battle and it's victory. Their briefing was more about finding the answer they wanted than military reality.

Halder, according to his own diary words - or at least the US Army translation - decided it wss all somebody else's fault. Originally told they had 200 divs, now l'm told 360!

Utter nonsense the lot of it. FHO briefed about 500 divs after general mobilization prior to BARBAROSSA starting. Why, on 8 August, are they briefing less than 400? Why is Halder complaining? He was briefed about 500 total, why is he surprised by 360? Why is he fixated on 200?

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?

You are spinning the Lagebericht you posted. . You are turning things upside down. Fact is that FHO gave wrong information from the beginning because of insufficient data and that did influence decision-making ,not the other way around. Period. It is your delusion that it is all the fault.of Halder. You are on a witch hunt.
The difference between maneuver and attrition is still not clear to you. It was always maneuver. Defeating the red army does not absolutely need to be done in one bound. There can be several. As long as the regenerative capacity of the red army was as limited as FHO 'guessed then that will still defeat the red army. Your suggestion of foregoing surprise is therefore ridiculous. One can therefore safely assume that Halder knew more about planning a campaign than you.

[ljadw]

. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound.

This is not correct .

[MarkN]

You are spinning the Lagebericht you posted. . You are turning things upside down. Fact is that FHO gave wrong information from the beginning because of insufficient data and that did influence decision-making ,not the other way around. Period. It is your delusion that it is all the fault.of Halder. You are on a witch hunt.

Whilst ever tedious, your attempts to deny historical reality retain a comical element.

Yes, before the invasion started, the FHO briefings on the size of the Red Army to be faced after mobilization was overstated. They were not perfect. Strangely, 6-7 weeks into offensive, they revised their number down by at least 20%.

Or perhaps it's not strange. Do the research. Do the math. Do the analysis. Perhaps the error is not in the total number of divisions but in the delusion of how many they've already despatched.

The difference between maneuver and attrition is still not clear to you. It was always maneuver.

After the failure of the first bound, the Heer was using tactical manouver to deliver strategic attrition.

Defeating the red army does not absolutely need to be done in one bound.

No. It does not. But that was the Heer's plan and they failed to deliver it.

As long as the regenerative capacity of the red army was as limited as FHO 'guessed then that will still defeat the red army. Your suggestion of foregoing surprise is therefore ridiculous. One can therefore safely assume that Halder knew more about planning a campaign than you.

Prior to the start of the invasion, the FHO briefed the Red Army being able to field about 500 divisions after general mobilization. That's not limited at all. In reality, the FHO briefed, in manpower terms, more than a doubling of the Red Army or, more pertinantly, the ability of the Red Army to bring 5 or 6 times the force actually encountered in the first bound.

Why, on 8 August, do you think they have revised this down to less than 400?

Why, on 11 August, does Halder write of surprise that there is more than 200? He was briefed 500. Even 360 should be no surprise.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?

[MarkN]

. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound.

This is not correct .

BARBAROSSA, as a plan, failed in the first bound. It failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army there as they desired, planned and expected. There was no Entscheidungsschlacht.

Whether an invasion of the CCCP could have succeeded with an alternative plan, be it from the very start or implemented after the failure of the first bound, is impossible to say. Many have tried to come up with a solution. None are truely convincing.

[ljadw]

. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound.

This is not correct .

BARBAROSSA, as a plan, failed in the first bound. It failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army there as they desired, planned and expected. There was no Entscheidungsschlacht.

Whether an invasion of the CCCP could have succeeded with an alternative plan, be it from the very start or implemented after the failure of the first bound, is impossible to say. Many have tried to come up with a solution. None are truely convincing.

Barbarossa as a plan failed because the Soviet regime succeeded during the border battle to raise additional armies which the Germans could not defeat . Something the Germans knew .
Without the arrival of the militia divisions, the SU was lost .
In his diary Halder admitted the fact that the Soviet mobilisation saved the Soviet Union .
As there was no way that Germany could prevent this mobilisation,this means that success or failure was in the hands of the Soviets, not in the hands of the Germans .
Germany was in the same situation as Japan : victory/defeat of Japan depended on the US.
Alternative plans would not save Germany or Japan .

[Aida1]

You are spinning the Lagebericht you posted. . You are turning things upside down. Fact is that FHO gave wrong information from the beginning because of insufficient data and that did influence decision-making ,not the other way around. Period. It is your delusion that it is all the fault.of Halder. You are on a witch hunt.

Whilst ever tedious, your attempts to deny historical reality retain a comical element.

Yes, before the invasion started, the FHO briefings on the size of the Red Army to be faced after mobilization was overstated. They were not perfect. Strangely, 6-7 weeks into offensive, they revised their number down by at least 20%.

Or perhaps it's not strange. Do the research. Do the math. Do the analysis. Perhaps the error is not in the total number of divisions but in the delusion of how many they've already despatched.

The difference between maneuver and attrition is still not clear to you. It was always maneuver.

After the failure of the first bound, the Heer was using tactical manouver to deliver strategic attrition.

Defeating the red army does not absolutely need to be done in one bound.

No. It does not. But that was the Heer's plan and they failed to deliver it.

As long as the regenerative capacity of the red army was as limited as FHO 'guessed then that will still defeat the red army. Your suggestion of foregoing surprise is therefore ridiculous. One can therefore safely assume that Halder knew more about planning a campaign than you.

Prior to the start of the invasion, the FHO briefed the Red Army being able to field about 500 divisions after general mobilization. That's not limited at all. In reality, the FHO briefed, in manpower terms, more than a doubling of the Red Army or, more pertinantly, the ability of the Red Army to bring 5 or 6 times the force actually encountered in the first bound.

Why, on 8 August, do you think they have revised this down to less than 400?

Why, on 11 August, does Halder write of surprise that there is more than 200? He was briefed 500. Even 360 should be no surprise.

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?

You still have no clue about the difference between maneuver and attrition. It is always about destroying the enemy force. In maneuver you do it by surprise, movement , speed and forcing the enemy in a battle of reversed fronts. Was always done on an operational level during Barbarossa.
You have not even attempted to prove the alleged 500 estimate. You only proved the 360 estimate. The difference between these 2 numbers is not even the difference between success and failure of Barbarossa.
And you are always 'forgetting" that the FHO got the original strength wrong. You are also ignoring that the FHO estimated that the 390 divisions identified we're down to a combat strength of somewhat more than a fourth of that in the beginning of august. And the 200 Halder mentioned must have been the strength at the beginning.
Plans are never carved in stone, certainly not in the German army which was always good at improvising.. There was no necessaty of winning in one bound given the timeframe available. Even your alleged 500 Force could be defeated in 1941.
Fact is that because of limited data the FHO far underestimated the Soviet military and economic power and that did influence decision-making. Given your postings i can still assume that Halder is far more competent than you pretend. Get off your cloud.

[Aida1]

. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound.

This is not correct .

BARBAROSSA, as a plan, failed in the first bound. It failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army there as they desired, planned and expected. There was no Entscheidungsschlacht.

Whether an invasion of the CCCP could have succeeded with an alternative plan, be it from the very start or implemented after the failure of the first bound, is impossible to say. Many have tried to come up with a solution. None are truely convincing.

They never needed to do what you pretend. You are taking the word "Entscheidungsschlacht much too literally. So Barbarossa did not fail in the first bound. It failed because, even with several bounds- the real red army strength was difficult to destroy in 1941 . Some things could have been done better but that was mostly due to Hitler interfering.

[Aida1]

. It had failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the first bound.

This is not correct .

BARBAROSSA, as a plan, failed in the first bound. It failed because the Heer had failed to destroy the bulk of the Red Army there as they desired, planned and expected. There was no Entscheidungsschlacht.

Whether an invasion of the CCCP could have succeeded with an alternative plan, be it from the very start or implemented after the failure of the first bound, is impossible to say. Many have tried to come up with a solution. None are truely convincing.

Barbarossa as a plan failed because the Soviet regime succeeded during the border battle to raise additional armies which the Germans could not defeat . Something the Germans knew .
Without the arrival of the militia divisions, the SU was lost .
In his diary Halder admitted the fact that the Soviet mobilisation saved the Soviet Union .
As there was no way that Germany could prevent this mobilisation,this means that success or failure was in the hands of the Soviets, not in the hands of the Germans .
Germany was in the same situation as Japan : victory/defeat of Japan depended on the US.
Alternative plans would not save Germany or Japan .

There is some sense in this. The regenerative power of the red army was far underestimated due to a lack of data.

[ljadw]

Not to a lack of data .It was irrelevant as the Germans could do nothing to prevent the Soviet mobilisation : already in June the Soviets mobilised 5+ million men . An the Germans could not prevent this .
If the Germans knew that the Soviets were able to mobilise 5 million men in June, what was the benefit ?
It was the same for Japan : the only way not to lose was to fight til the last man and hoping that US could not afford the same human losses Japan could afford : if the conquest of Guadalcanal would cost both parties 500000 men ,there was a chance that the White House would say : the game is not worth the candle and that it would ask for/accept a peace of compromise . But that was something Japan could not control .
At the end Japan said : we are 80 million willing to fight to the last man . As the Americans can't kill us all, they will be forced to accept/ask for negotiations .
But if Japan knew that US could avoid such big losses,this would not help them,as they had no alternative .
If the Germans knew that the SU could mobilise 20 million + men, it would not help them, as there was no alternative .
The only chance for Japan was if the US moral would collaps,thus they started the war with the conviction that the US moral would collaps .
The only chance for the Germans was that in the summer the Soviet regime would collaps, thus they started the war with the conviction that the Soviet rgime would collaps in the summer .

[MarkN]

You still have no clue about the difference between maneuver and attrition. It is always about destroying the enemy force. In maneuver you do it by surprise, movement , speed and forcing the enemy in a battle of reversed fronts. Was always done on an operational level during Barbarossa.

:roll:

You have clearly done a little reading but failed to do any understanding.

You have not even attempted to prove the alleged 500 estimate. You only proved the 360 estimate. The difference between these 2 numbers is not even the difference between success and failure of Barbarossa.

I have no interested in proving anything to you. I've written what the details are and in which documents they can be found. If you're interested in understanding, you'll look them up. If all you're interested in is maintaining your self denial, you'll just keep denying historical evidence and reality.

And you are always 'forgetting" that the FHO got the original strength wrong.

Strange. I'm pretty sure you will find in several of my posts recognition that the numbers the briefed were not accurate and have also written the total after mobilization was overestimated.

Not my problem you suffer Halder's affliction of only believing what you want to believe.

You are also ignoring that the FHO estimated that the 390 divisions identified we're down to a combat strength of somewhat more than a fourth of that in the beginning of august. And the 200 Halder mentioned must have been the strength at the beginning.
Plans are never carved in stone, certainly not in the German army which was always good at improvising.. There was no necessaty of winning in one bound given the timeframe available. Even your alleged 500 Force could be defeated in 1941.
Fact is that because of limited data the FHO far underestimated the Soviet military and economic power and that did influence decision-making. Given your postings i can still assume that Halder is far more competent than you pretend. Get off your cloud.

Making up history is great for comic effect. Keep at it....