The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
The discussion revealed three points of view, namely:
1. Mr. Aida1's point of view. I'm propose to drink the NARKOM's hundred grams for the point of view of Mr. Aida1 and definitely a good snack;
2. Mr. MarkN's point of view. I propose to drink hundred grams to Mr. MarkN's point of view and be sure to have a good snack;
3. Mr. ljadw's point of view. I propose to drink hundred grams to the point of view of Mr. ljadw and be sure to have a good snack.
Now it can be argued with a probability close to 100% that the parties will come to a consensus.
And after which all together will drink a hundred grams for the Red Army and its Supreme Commander, comrade Stalin.
1. Mr. Aida1's point of view. I'm propose to drink the NARKOM's hundred grams for the point of view of Mr. Aida1 and definitely a good snack;
2. Mr. MarkN's point of view. I propose to drink hundred grams to Mr. MarkN's point of view and be sure to have a good snack;
3. Mr. ljadw's point of view. I propose to drink hundred grams to the point of view of Mr. ljadw and be sure to have a good snack.
Now it can be argued with a probability close to 100% that the parties will come to a consensus.
And after which all together will drink a hundred grams for the Red Army and its Supreme Commander, comrade Stalin.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
How ironic that you would accuse Halder of hybris. Look in the mirror. Given how many sources contradict you, you should be more modest.MarkN wrote: ↑17 Oct 2019, 20:27Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Oct 2019, 14:35You still have no clue about the difference between maneuver and attrition. It is always about destroying the enemy force. In maneuver you do it by surprise, movement , speed and forcing the enemy in a battle of reversed fronts. Was always done on an operational level during Barbarossa.
You have clearly done a little reading but failed to do any understanding.
I have no interested in proving anything to you. I've written what the details are and in which documents they can be found. If you're interested in understanding, you'll look them up. If all you're interested in is maintaining your self denial, you'll just keep denying historical evidence and reality.
Strange. I'm pretty sure you will find in several of my posts recognition that the numbers the briefed were not accurate and have also written the total after mobilization was overestimated.
Not my problem you suffer Halder's affliction of only believing what you want to believe.
Making up history is great for comic effect. Keep at it....Aida1 wrote: ↑17 Oct 2019, 14:35You are also ignoring that the FHO estimated that the 390 divisions identified we're down to a combat strength of somewhat more than a fourth of that in the beginning of august. And the 200 Halder mentioned must have been the strength at the beginning.
Plans are never carved in stone, certainly not in the German army which was always good at improvising.. There was no necessaty of winning in one bound given the timeframe available. Even your alleged 500 Force could be defeated in 1941.
Fact is that because of limited data the FHO far underestimated the Soviet military and economic power and that did influence decision-making. Given your postings i can still assume that Halder is far more competent than you pretend. Get off your cloud.
I have done a vast amount of reading but i do not feel the need to brag about it. At least i know what the difference between maneuver and attrition is. You clearly do not. And there were other things you did not understand.
You have not proved anything here. A rather clumsy attempt to make heavy accusations against officers who were not stupid or deluded, just misinformed.
As if it really matters wether an estimate of 500 of 390 divisions was made. The numbers were far wrong. The only document you showed here proved how wrong the FHO was.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I'm not trying to.
Halder, in his own words from his diary, shows surprise that the Red Army has more than 200 divisions. He seems to indicate 360 is a number too great for the Heer to overcome. And yet, he was briefed 6 months before the start of BARBAROSSA that the Red Army could be over 400 divisions after mobilization. Just before the start, that estimation had risen to over 500.
Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?
The FHO was certainly not 100% accurate. That has never been a point of difference between us. But for some reason you think that if you keep repeating the this line readers will falsehoods you post such as...
Which sources? The only source you have provided that quantifies what FHO briefed explicity contradicts you!!!!
You want me to 'prove' that the FHO briefed over 500. Where is you 'proof' of "far underestimated". You've pointed to a couple of sentences written by others that you have taken completely out of context. What numbers do you think the FHO briefed?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
While I am enjoying the normal spectacle here of secondary sources competing for primacy over primary sources, I think the evidence is the answer is not FHO incompetence or Halder incompetence, but simply flawed critical thinking.
In mid-summer when Paulus began his initial study, FHO's estimate was 188 Soviet divisions, of which 50-75 were considered by them to be "good". Then, as the work by Paulus went on, so did the FHO work, steadily revising its estimate upwards, until it reached the "c. 500-division fully mobilized plateau". The problem was, to make the Führer's plan work, the original FHO estimate needed to be correct, so that is what Halder focused on. Halder suffered from three typical cognitive biases, anchoring, confirmation, and conformation. He anchored on Kinzel's initial brief (transmogrifying 188 to the easier to recall "200", which is also typical cognitive biases working) and since it confirmed the Soviet forces were of a size enabling their defeat, every subsequent bit of information he took in needed to conform to that bias. I suspect that in following briefings he simply could not cognitively accept the revised FHO estimates, so he never "heard" them, while any little bit speaking to a perceived Soviet weakness conforming to his belief confirmed what was then "his" initial estimate of Soviet strength. It is also typical that when he was forced to accept the realities of Soviet strength, he did not blame his own cognitive failing, but rather FHO.
Anecdotally, one area where FHO did underestimate Soviet capability was in its productive resources and ability to maintain production of critical munitions after its industry was interrupted by the invasion.
Meanwhile, it might be valuable to look at the actual FHO documentation on its analysis of Soviet strength.
OKH/FHO H 3/83.3a
OKH/FHO H 3/82
OKH/FHO H 3/129
OKH/FHO H 3/468.1
OKH/FHO H 3/517
Otherwise, crack on with the did so, did not, exercise.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
200 (well, 188)-360-400-500. That would seem (for the customer) like an CYA move. If a 390 (or even a 420) follows the 400 that would be more credible. As such it surely looked (at the time) like the spooks didn't know their arsch from a hole in the ground.MarkN wrote: Halder, in his own words from his diary, shows surprise that the Red Army has more than 200 divisions. He seems to indicate 360 is a number too great for the Heer to overcome. And yet, he was briefed 6 months before the start of BARBAROSSA that the Red Army could be over 400 divisions after mobilization. Just before the start, that estimation had risen to over 500.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
An advance to the Northern half of the AA line was impossible; it requires advance in difficult terrain against a non-destroyed RKKA. An advance to the Southern half, improbable, but within the bounds of the logistical historical effort of the Axis.ljadw wrote: I said : 150 divisions, I did not talk about the 3 PzGr. The German industry was not capable in 1941 to supply a victorious advance of 150 divisions to the AA line. And even if it could supply such an advance, the railway situation in European Russia would make this advance impossible.
With Taifun, the pooch had been irreversibly screwed; Wehrmach hochos and GROFAZ had learned absolutely NOTHING from the tribulations in July and August. Case Blau was again too little to late, but suggest what would have been achievable if the attacker would have stuck to terrain where his assets had the upper hand.70 divisions were committed for Typhoon ( not all participated ) ,if more were available, this does not mean that more would participate ,and,if Taiphoon succeeded, it is not so that 70 divisions would/could advance to the Volga.
Attack towards the South does not have to come from Romania, can come from White Russia along the a Gomel-Konotop axis. However, Germans (the 11th Army) did attack from Romanian territory. Also, AFAIK, before Maritsa, a panzer force was planned to attack from Iasi area, before some of it was used in Maritsa, and the rest was used to shore up Von Kleist's force.About the attack of the Russian heartland by he south: this was impossible for Germany as Germany was not located south of this heartland, but west of it. An attack with starting from Romania was out of the question .
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑18 Oct 2019, 19:19While I am enjoying the normal spectacle here of secondary sources competing for primacy over primary sources, I think the evidence is the answer is not FHO incompetence or Halder incompetence, but simply flawed critical thinking.
Primary evidence shows FHO briefed Red Army intention after general mobilization totalled 11-12 million but cautions this may not be reached because of X, Y and Z.
Secondary narrative (Thomas) states FHO briefed Red Army intention after general mobilization totalled 11-12 million but cautions this may not be reached because of X, Y and Z.
Anonymous internet peddler of agenda driven falsehoods states FHO "massively underestimating the regenerative power of the red army is the most fundamental error of the FHO" and tries to bluff his/her opinion as being backed by Thomas.
When/if the anonymous internet peddler of agenda driven falsehoods presents some credible evidence/data demonstrating that 11-12 million was a "massive underestimate" of how many the Red Army actually fielded before December 1941, then l will start to consider his/her posts seriously.
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑18 Oct 2019, 19:19In mid-summer when Paulus began his initial study, FHO's estimate was 188 Soviet divisions, of which 50-75 were considered by them to be "good". Then, as the work by Paulus went on, so did the FHO work, steadily revising its estimate upwards, until it reached the "c. 500-division fully mobilized plateau". The problem was, to make the Führer's plan work, the original FHO estimate needed to be correct, so that is what Halder focused on. Halder suffered from three typical cognitive biases, anchoring, confirmation, and conformation. He anchored on Kinzel's initial brief (transmogrifying 188 to the easier to recall "200", which is also typical cognitive biases working) and since it confirmed the Soviet forces were of a size enabling their defeat, every subsequent bit of information he took in needed to conform to that bias. I suspect that in following briefings he simply could not cognitively accept the revised FHO estimates, so he never "heard" them, while any little bit speaking to a perceived Soviet weakness conforming to his belief confirmed what was then "his" initial estimate of Soviet strength. It is also typical that when he was forced to accept the realities of Soviet strength, he did not blame his own cognitive failing, but rather FHO.
Anecdotally, one area where FHO did underestimate Soviet capability was in its productive resources and ability to maintain production of critical munitions after its industry was interrupted by the invasion.
Meanwhile, it might be valuable to look at the actual FHO documentation on its analysis of Soviet strength.
OKH/FHO H 3/83.3a
OKH/FHO H 3/82
OKH/FHO H 3/129
OKH/FHO H 3/468.1
OKH/FHO H 3/517
Otherwise, crack on with the did so, did not, exercise.
Indeed. Where you argue a critical thinking issue, I agree but suggest that that critical thinking failure was a product of hubris and delusion.
How do you describe the fundamental flaw/contradiction in the premise of the Heer's plan? How do they square Panzerwaffe determination to get on and the element of surprise with the demands of giving the 'incompetent' Red Army commanders the time to concentrate their forces to be destroyed at the border? How could such a contradiction pass scrutiny? Did they really miss it? Or was it a deliberate compromise between more traditional thought and Panzerwaffe thought followed by crossed fingers?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
I would argue that hubris and delusion are the handmaidens of cognitive bias. If you want another good example, look at the cognitive bias, hubris, and delusions associated with the American actions prior to Pearl Harbor. We used to teach that as a wonderful example of biases in action.
I doubt that anyone at the time even noticed the fallacy they were operating with. Once the boss says "go" it behooves the minions to only ask "how fast?" The Germans did destroy much of the forces deployed on the border, but then had to deal with the second echelon of formations in depth and had no means whatsoever to defeat the Soviet force generation capability. I suppose they could have waited, rattled sabers, and seen who else showed up for the party, but that just wasn't their style, nor do I think it would have changed the outcome.How do you describe the fundamental flaw/contradiction in the premise of the Heer's plan? How do they square Panzerwaffe determination to get on and the element of surprise with the demands of giving the 'incompetent' Red Army commanders the time to concentrate their forces to be destroyed at the border? How could such a contradiction pass scrutiny? Did they really miss it? Or was it a deliberate compromise between more traditional thought and Panzerwaffe thought followed by crossed fingers?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
Where can one access such documents? I mean aside from the Alexandria, VA microfilm archives?Richard Anderson wrote:Meanwhile, it might be valuable to look at the actual FHO documentation on its analysis of Soviet strength.
OKH/FHO H 3/83.3a
OKH/FHO H 3/82
OKH/FHO H 3/129
OKH/FHO H 3/468.1
OKH/FHO H 3/517
Only in one sector - AGCenter's - did Germany destroy much of its opposition. Everywhere else the RKKA retreated in decent order, albeit with heavy equipment losses.RichardAnderson wrote:The Germans did destroy much of the forces deployed on the border, but then had to deal with the second echelon of formations in depth and had no means whatsoever to defeat the Soviet force generation capability.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
The Soviet forces who were able to escape to the regions east of the DD line could not save the SU . Only a successful Soviet mobilisation could do this .Once this mobilisation started,it was over for the Germans .They could not be at the Urals before the Soviet mobilisation was going on .And they knew this . Their only hope was that the destruction of the standing Soviet forces west of the DD line would cause the collaps of the regime,and that the collaps of the regime would prevent the Soviet mobilisation .
Or that the destruction of the Soviet forces west of the DD line would prevent the Soviet mobilisation,and that this would cause the collaps of the regime.But this was unlikely .
Whatever, in both cases the decision was in the hands of the Soviets .
That's why the endless speculation how the Germans could have won/could have avoided defeat,and who was the German culprit : Hitler,Halder, etc,etc is only a wast of time dating from the Cold War,when almost everyone in the West, intoxicated by the German propaganda,refused to believe that the Germans could have been defeated in a fair fighting by the Soviets .
The only way the Germans could avoid defeat was not to attack the Soviets .That Paul Carrell was saying the opposite is not a serious argument .
Or that the destruction of the Soviet forces west of the DD line would prevent the Soviet mobilisation,and that this would cause the collaps of the regime.But this was unlikely .
Whatever, in both cases the decision was in the hands of the Soviets .
That's why the endless speculation how the Germans could have won/could have avoided defeat,and who was the German culprit : Hitler,Halder, etc,etc is only a wast of time dating from the Cold War,when almost everyone in the West, intoxicated by the German propaganda,refused to believe that the Germans could have been defeated in a fair fighting by the Soviets .
The only way the Germans could avoid defeat was not to attack the Soviets .That Paul Carrell was saying the opposite is not a serious argument .
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
This is something l have difficulty getting on board with. The Army and Heeresgruppe war gamed BARBAROSSA under Paulus' direction and then independently. That nobody spotted this contradiction would be remarkable. Moreover, l've always assumed Bock's conversations with Brauchitsch circa end January / beginning February were born from such an observation.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 01:42I doubt that anyone at the time even noticed the fallacy they were operating with. Once the boss says "go" it behooves the minions to only ask "how fast?"
The Heer smashed up much of what they came across. Repeatedly. And therein lies the problem The success of BARBAROSSA was predicated upon have the freedom (speed) of movement to get to the Volga that only a single battle at the frontier could deliver. The Heer - as well as legions of post-war narrators and commenators - have been seduced by the big numbers smashed up and told stories of wonderous success and failed to recognise the repeated nature was itself a sign of failure.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 01:42The Germans did destroy much of the forces deployed on the border, but then had to deal with the second echelon of formations in depth and had no means whatsoever to defeat the Soviet force generation capability. I suppose they could have waited, rattled sabers, and seen who else showed up for the party, but that just wasn't their style, nor do I think it would have changed the outcome.
The first bound was supposed to be the battle that destroyed the mass of the Red Army, the NKVD border guards, the Fronts' first and second echalon covering forces, the Fronts' tactical reserve AND the STAVKA strategic reserve. The directives clearly state a need to make sure they don't escape eastwards. In reality, because they didn't give the Red Army time to get to the battle, they came up against them in waves as they were moving westwards.
I posted the FHO excerpt of 8 August and the Halder diary entry to demonstrate how delusion and cognative reasoning flaws were still prevalent (to convince theselves it was not their fault) AND how the post-war narrative has been so skewed by this reasoning. The go to answer/understanding on how the Heer failed has been, and is, that the Red Army just had very, very deep manpower reserves. Halder and the FHO are reasoning that continued opposition is based upon more and more reserve formations being met. They have deluded themselves that they have already smashed up 300 divisions. They hadn't.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
You are the one contradicting very explicit statements in the article I quoted.MarkN wrote: ↑18 Oct 2019, 12:23I'm not trying to.
Halder, in his own words from his diary, shows surprise that the Red Army has more than 200 divisions. He seems to indicate 360 is a number too great for the Heer to overcome. And yet, he was briefed 6 months before the start of BARBAROSSA that the Red Army could be over 400 divisions after mobilization. Just before the start, that estimation had risen to over 500.
Hubris and delusion, incompetence or just plain stupid?
The FHO was certainly not 100% accurate. That has never been a point of difference between us. But for some reason you think that if you keep repeating the this line readers will falsehoods you post such as...Which sources? The only source you have provided that quantifies what FHO briefed explicity contradicts you!!!!
You want me to 'prove' that the FHO briefed over 500. Where is you 'proof' of "far underestimated". You've pointed to a couple of sentences written by others that you have taken completely out of context. What numbers do you think the FHO briefed?
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
If the FHO estimate had only been slightly under, the red army would have been destroyed in the offensive and defensive battles in the summer and fall of 1941. But is regenerative capacity was far bigger than estimated so it was not.MarkN wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 13:56This is something l have difficulty getting on board with. The Army and Heeresgruppe war gamed BARBAROSSA under Paulus' direction and then independently. That nobody spotted this contradiction would be remarkable. Moreover, l've always assumed Bock's conversations with Brauchitsch circa end January / beginning February were born from such an observation.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 01:42I doubt that anyone at the time even noticed the fallacy they were operating with. Once the boss says "go" it behooves the minions to only ask "how fast?"
The Heer smashed up much of what they came across. Repeatedly. And therein lies the problem The success of BARBAROSSA was predicated upon have the freedom (speed) of movement to get to the Volga that only a single battle at the frontier could deliver. The Heer - as well as legions of post-war narrators and commenators - have been seduced by the big numbers smashed up and told stories of wonderous success and failed to recognise the repeated nature was itself a sign of failure.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 01:42The Germans did destroy much of the forces deployed on the border, but then had to deal with the second echelon of formations in depth and had no means whatsoever to defeat the Soviet force generation capability. I suppose they could have waited, rattled sabers, and seen who else showed up for the party, but that just wasn't their style, nor do I think it would have changed the outcome.
The first bound was supposed to be the battle that destroyed the mass of the Red Army, the NKVD border guards, the Fronts' first and secontd echalon covering forces, the Fronts' tactical reserve AND the STAVKA strategic reserve. The directives clearly state a need to make sure they don't escape eastwards. In reality, because they didn't give the Red Army time to get to the battle, they came up against them in waves as they were moving westwards.
I posted the FHO excerpt of 8 August and the Halder diary entry to demonstrate how delusion and cognative reasoning flaws were still prevalent (to convince theselves it was not their fault) AND how the post-war narrative has been so skewed by this reasoning. The go to answer/understanding on how the Heer failed has been, and is, that the Red Army just had very, very deep manpower reserves. Halder and the FHO are reasoning that continued opposition is based upon more and more reserve formations being met. They have deluded themselves that they have already smashed up 300 divisions. They hadn't.
You are making destroying the red army in one bound so dogmatic that you would give up surprise in order to supposedly have the whole red army near the border and annihilate it. A dumb idea.
A red army of the size estimated by FHO could be destroyed in several bounds. There was time enough for that. Plans are adaptable.
You are trying to underplay the heavy losses sustained by the red army.
Last edited by Aida1 on 19 Oct 2019, 14:50, edited 1 time in total.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
You are massively simplifying here what actually happened. Even without the encirclements, losses in men were very heavy.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 03:25Where can one access such documents? I mean aside from the Alexandria, VA microfilm archives?Richard Anderson wrote:Meanwhile, it might be valuable to look at the actual FHO documentation on its analysis of Soviet strength.
OKH/FHO H 3/83.3a
OKH/FHO H 3/82
OKH/FHO H 3/129
OKH/FHO H 3/468.1
OKH/FHO H 3/517
Only in one sector - AGCenter's - did Germany destroy much of its opposition. Everywhere else the RKKA retreated in decent order, albeit with heavy equipment losses.RichardAnderson wrote:The Germans did destroy much of the forces deployed on the border, but then had to deal with the second echelon of formations in depth and had no means whatsoever to defeat the Soviet force generation capability.
Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)
The original files can be viewed free of charge at BAMA.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑19 Oct 2019, 03:25Where can one access such documents? I mean aside from the Alexandria, VA microfilm archives?
Microfilm copies of the files can be viewed free of charge at NARA.
Duplicates of some of the documents contained within the files can be viewed free of charge at TsAMO - but be prepared to pay some backhanders to be treated properly.
Digital images of the files can be viewed at a cost on your own laptop screen without you having to move an inch. Digital images of some documents, even some complete files, can be acquired free of charge.