The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 21 Oct 2019 15:45

MarkN wrote:
21 Oct 2019 14:59
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 10:20
Yadda yadda yadda.

I'm posting all this yadda to deflect attention away from historical evidence that l am trying to deny the existance of.

Yadda yadda yadda.
The FHO briefing on 8 August shows how they estimated very broadly the likely military strength of a foe. Namely, for every 1 million population, 2 'notional divisions' can be assumed. Now, in this document the FHO uses the term 'kriegstarke Division' which is an error or unforunately misleading term to use and thus may well have caused them problems later.

The FHO, using a Soviet population of 190 million sets the potential post-mobilization strength at 370 'notional divisions' for the 11-12 million that they believe can be put in uniform from the 190 million population pool.

The 'notional division' is not a rifle, pantser or cavalry division, it is a notional strategic planning unit which embodies a number including a division of whatever flavour AND a slice of all the non-divisional assets that would also need to be formed. It is purely a planning number to give a broad idea of an opposition. It has no tactical value whatsoever. From the information given in the FHO comprehensive briefing of January 1941 (numbers repeated in Thomas), we can deduct that the 'notional division' constitutes 28,000 troops. The 370 'notional divisions' represents a field army over 10,000,000 million strong.

In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops.

That briefing was distributed down to corps level headquarters. How many Heer staff officers read it and grasped the significance?
You are clearly manipulating here as the divisions the germans are facing in the field are real divisions with a particular strength and not notional divisions . Notional divisions do not exist. That is an invention of yourself, intending to overstate what FHO said in its Lagebericht. It said what it said and that is that the combat strength of the combat units facing the germans in the field is that of 65 divisons .And reducing the combat strength of a division by 80 % means exactly that. The non combat strength of the divison is not erased from orbit and even less any other support unit above the level of the divison. What a stupid assertion that you can ignore units that are far down in strength. Ridiculous. These divisions are still fighting units with a reduced combat effectivity which can be refilled with men and materiel , something the red army could do given its large human reserves and its(underestimated) war production . The german army was not so rich . Its ability to replace its losses in men was much lower. It is very rare that you canot refit a division at all.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 21 Oct 2019 16:24

Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
You are clearly manipulating here as the divisions the germans are facing in the field are real divisions with a particular strength and not notional divisions .
Correct. The Heer formations were not facing 'notional divisions', a tool in strategic planning, they were facing very real tactical divisions and other tactical formations.

After the paragraph on how they calculated the notional strength of a fully mobilized Red Army of 370 'notional divisions', they then had a paragraph detailing their count of the actual tactical divisions identified.

The FHO then made the cardinal sin of merging two separate data sets into the same calculation without modifying one or the other to make them compatible.

Garbage in > garbage out.

How many of the hundreds of Heer staff officers reading this briefing saw the problem?
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
Notional divisions do not exist.
No they don't. They are a basic strategic planning tool. Nothing to do with tactical formations.
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
It said what it said and that is that the combat strength of the combat units facing the germans in the field is that of 65 divisons .
Garbage in > garbage out.

Before the invasion had begun, FHO overstated the strength of the Red Army after mobilization. FHO claimed the Soviets could field 11-12 million troops after mobilization. The Red Army never got to that figure within the planned BARBAROSSA timeframe.

Later underestimates of remaining Red Army strength were based on significant - threefold or greater - overstatements of what the Heer had supposedly dealt with. The overstated notional maximum strength remained constant.

How could such gross errors occur? How could they pass unnoticed? Hubris and delusion, incompetence ir stupidity?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 21 Oct 2019 19:14

MarkN wrote:
21 Oct 2019 16:24
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
You are clearly manipulating here as the divisions the germans are facing in the field are real divisions with a particular strength and not notional divisions .
Correct. The Heer formations were not facing 'notional divisions', a tool in strategic planning, they were facing very real tactical divisions and other tactical formations.

After the paragraph on how they calculated the notional strength of a fully mobilized Red Army of 370 'notional divisions', they then had a paragraph detailing their count of the actual tactical divisions identified.

The FHO then made the cardinal sin of merging two separate data sets into the same calculation without modifying one or the other to make them compatible.

Garbage in > garbage out.

How many of the hundreds of Heer staff officers reading this briefing saw the problem?
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
Notional divisions do not exist.
No they don't. They are a basic strategic planning tool. Nothing to do with tactical formations.
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 15:45
It said what it said and that is that the combat strength of the combat units facing the germans in the field is that of 65 divisons .
Garbage in > garbage out.

Before the invasion had begun, FHO overstated the strength of the Red Army after mobilization. FHO claimed the Soviets could field 11-12 million troops after mobilization. The Red Army never got to that figure within the planned BARBAROSSA timeframe.

Later underestimates of remaining Red Army strength were based on significant - threefold or greater - overstatements of what the Heer had supposedly dealt with. The overstated notional maximum strength remained constant.

How could such gross errors occur? How could they pass unnoticed? Hubris and delusion, incompetence ir stupidity?
The simple truth is that the estimate of losses inflicted was applied on the combat strength of the units one effectively faced and then you end up with an estimate of the combat strength that is left.. You tried to overstate that.
What the estimate of the number of divisions that could be set up is concerned, FHO made a wild guess and fell victim to it's underestimating of the Soviet war production. The capacity to arm and equip new divisions and refit existing ones is determined by war production. The FHO knew that the USSR had large Manpower reserves but far underestimated the extent to which you could equip them(Pahl Fremde Heere Ost p 88)
And there is not such a thing as a notional division. Would not mean a thing.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 21 Oct 2019 19:48

Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 19:14
The simple truth is ....
I'm now going to write a whole load of nonsense and falsehoods to try and deflect attention away from historical evidence which I am so desperate to deny.

Yadda yadda yadda.
Garbage in >>> garbage out.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 21 Oct 2019 20:47

MarkN wrote:
21 Oct 2019 19:48
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 19:14
The simple truth is ....
I'm now going to write a whole load of nonsense and falsehoods to try and deflect attention away from historical evidence which I am so desperate to deny.

Yadda yadda yadda.
Garbage in >>> garbage out.
At last i have succeeded in reducing you to this type of diatribe.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 21 Oct 2019 21:56

Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 20:47
At last i have succeeded in reducing you to this type of diatribe.
Ah. So that was your agenda.... ...wind up posters hoping to get them banned when they explode in frustration.

I was finding it difficult to believe that anybody could be so blinkered as to post so much repetitive garbage and blatant falsehoods and at the same time think they could be taken seriously. All makes sense now.

But yes, l have grown weary of your nonsensical posts and your agenda driven falsehoods.

:welcome:

Once again an axishistory thread becomes the preserve of history deniers and falsehood tellers.

If the site owners cannot be bothered to intervene with your attempts to pervert historical understanding, l'm certainly not going to waste time once the fun has run out.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 22 Oct 2019 08:45

MarkN wrote:
21 Oct 2019 21:56
Aida1 wrote:
21 Oct 2019 20:47
At last i have succeeded in reducing you to this type of diatribe.
Ah. So that was your agenda.... ...wind up posters hoping to get them banned when they explode in frustration.

I was finding it difficult to believe that anybody could be so blinkered as to post so much repetitive garbage and blatant falsehoods and at the same time think they could be taken seriously. All makes sense now.

But yes, l have grown weary of your nonsensical posts and your agenda driven falsehoods.

:welcome:

Once again an axishistory thread becomes the preserve of history deniers and falsehood tellers.

If the site owners cannot be bothered to intervene with your attempts to pervert historical understanding, l'm certainly not going to waste time once the fun has run out.
You have a pet theory for which you can give no source. And you get frustrated when not taken seriously and contradicted. And then you come up with nonsense like notional divisions.
The simple truth is that FHO underestimated the regenerative capacity of the red army mainly because of underestimating war production as it admitted itself in december 1941 in the revised edition of it's manual (Pahl
Fremde Heere Ost p 88).

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Re: RE: The Logistics Of Barbarossa (Or Lack Of It)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 22 Oct 2019 11:58

Robert Rojas wrote:
20 Oct 2019 16:37
...
Now, following this train of thought, I am starkly reminded of the all knowing Bohemian Corporal's slice of rhetorical braggadocio prior HIS assault upon the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. " YOU ONLY HAVE TO KICK IN THE DOOR AND THE WHOLE ROTTEN STRUCTURE WILL COME CRASHING DOWN". Given the veracity of that statement, one could easily conclude that Der Führer was anticipating the internal collapse of First Secretary Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili's regime along with the entire apparatus of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union once the Wehrmacht and its disparate allies merely crossed the frontier on June 22, 1941.
...
Hello, sir! The Bohemian corporal was extremely talkative and spoke a lot. In particular, on February 2, 1940, he said: "Although Russia did not succeed in Finland at first, the power of the Russian Armed Forces cannot be underestimated." As for the party apparatus of the Kremlin highlander Dzhugashvili, it nevertheless began to collapse.
Accept the assurance of my deepest respect!
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 22 Oct 2019 13:48

Aida1 wrote:
22 Oct 2019 08:45
...
The simple truth is that FHO underestimated the regenerative capacity of the red army mainly because of underestimating war production as it admitted itself in december 1941 in the revised edition of it's manual (Pahl
Fremde Heere Ost p 88).
"The simple truth" is that you too peremptorily stated at the beginning of this discussion:
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.

The same thing is in the topic starter:
5. German Intelligence grotesquely underestimated the true Soviet military situation pre-Barbarossa, was the Logistics planning equally awful?
If at the very beginning you would refer to your sources, I am sure that the discussion would have taken a more calm character. The Germans themselves were quite critical of their conclusions regarding the regenerative ability of the USSR. For example, from the document referenced by Boby, you can read the following: «During the war and during the general mobilization, a significantly larger number of divisions can be added.
Their number due to incomplete and conflicting data can only be estimated approximately.»
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... ect/zoom/6
The specified document is executed in Gothic, but you can read it if you wish.
Whereas: 1) Colonel Kinzel very roughly estimated the strength of the Red Army,
2) perhaps there are other documents with updated data,
3) so far no one has cited Soviet data on this topic - I propose to continue the topic of logistics.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 22 Oct 2019 15:38

AbollonPolweder wrote:
22 Oct 2019 13:48
Aida1 wrote:
22 Oct 2019 08:45
...
The simple truth is that FHO underestimated the regenerative capacity of the red army mainly because of underestimating war production as it admitted itself in december 1941 in the revised edition of it's manual (Pahl
Fremde Heere Ost p 88).
"The simple truth" is that you too peremptorily stated at the beginning of this discussion:
The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.

The same thing is in the topic starter:
5. German Intelligence grotesquely underestimated the true Soviet military situation pre-Barbarossa, was the Logistics planning equally awful?
If at the very beginning you would refer to your sources, I am sure that the discussion would have taken a more calm character. The Germans themselves were quite critical of their conclusions regarding the regenerative ability of the USSR. For example, from the document referenced by Boby, you can read the following: «During the war and during the general mobilization, a significantly larger number of divisions can be added.
Their number due to incomplete and conflicting data can only be estimated approximately.»
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... ect/zoom/6
The specified document is executed in Gothic, but you can read it if you wish.
Whereas: 1) Colonel Kinzel very roughly estimated the strength of the Red Army,
2) perhaps there are other documents with updated data,
3) so far no one has cited Soviet data on this topic - I propose to continue the topic of logistics.
It has been stated here many times that FHO was suffering from a serious lack of data. So it's estimates could only be a rough guess. In it's revised manual in december 1941 it admitted having underestimated war production.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 22 Oct 2019 19:19

MarkN wrote:
In the 8 August briefing, the FHO is estimating that (only) 60-65 'notional divisions' face them, that's 1,68 - 1,82 million troops, with another 40 'notional divisions' (1,12 million) behind them. [A] In otherwords, 265-270 'notional divisions' have been erased from the orbat. That's 7,42 - 7,56 million troops. {B}
I don't think that {B} follows from [A]. Sure, some of the 7.5 million troops may have been eliminated (dead, wounded, or PoW).
About the remainder (4-5 million) all that such statement reveals is that they were simply not mobilized, (possibly non-mobilizable from the vintage point of August 1941 - subsequent events proved otherwise).

But, it shows that Wehrmacht understood that it was facing at least 3 million strong army, armed with modern weaponry, and falling back on its favourable supply network, while Axis units were pulling away from the their base of supply, in terrain unfavourable to maneuver warfare.

And that is the disconnect. Germans continued to push according to the original plan despite the knowledge that in-field developments were completely against their prewar suppositions.

The FHO is suggesting that the Heer has already dealt with - to the point where they can be ignored - about 7,500,000 Red Army troops.
Again, that is putting words in FHOs mouth.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 23 Oct 2019 14:18

Aida1 wrote:
22 Oct 2019 15:38
...
It has been stated here many times that FHO was suffering from a serious lack of data. So it's estimates could only be a rough guess. In it's revised manual in december 1941 it admitted having underestimated war production.
1. That is, when you spoke about the underestimation of the military potential of the USSR, did you mean only the military industry? So? In this case, you need to more accurately express your thought.
2. So in December 1941 the Germans realized that they underestimated the war production of the USSR. And in May 1945 they were enlightened that they underestimated the colossus with feet of clay and its party apparatus. So? How smart are these Germans! Really supermen! :milwink: Let’s not run in December of the 41st, but stick to the pre-war time, until June 22, 1941.
3. On the basis of what logic did you come to the conclusion that a “very rough estimation” means exactly underestimation? When answering this question, forget about December 1941, we are still in pre-war Germany. :wink:
4. On page 18 of the document dated 15.01. 41, which deals with the formation of divisions of the third "Linie" in the Red Army, is printed in clear Gothic type: "The personnel (teams) for these divisions are sufficient. Whether the appropriate number of commanders (officers and non-commissioned officers) will be found is doubtful; moreover, the creation of these divisions is, first of all, a matter of material support. "
5. And if you read page 11 of the document dated January 28, 1939 (post 20 Oct. 13:41), you would read: "Die Aufstellung neuer Verbaende und Einheiten ist erster Linie eine Materialfrage." There is no need to translate, for again this word is "Materialfrage". That is, for two years the Germans cannot evaluate the military potential. No way, neither higher nor lower than real. They do not have reliable information. How can one conclude from such documents that before the war the Germans underestimated war production? :?
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 23 Oct 2019 16:24

AbollonPolweder wrote:
23 Oct 2019 14:18
Aida1 wrote:
22 Oct 2019 15:38
...
It has been stated here many times that FHO was suffering from a serious lack of data. So it's estimates could only be a rough guess. In it's revised manual in december 1941 it admitted having underestimated war production.
1. That is, when you spoke about the underestimation of the military potential of the USSR, did you mean only the military industry? So? In this case, you need to more accurately express your thought.
2. So in December 1941 the Germans realized that they underestimated the war production of the USSR. And in May 1945 they were enlightened that they underestimated the colossus with feet of clay and its party apparatus. So? How smart are these Germans! Really supermen! :milwink: Let’s not run in December of the 41st, but stick to the pre-war time, until June 22, 1941.
3. On the basis of what logic did you come to the conclusion that a “very rough estimation” means exactly underestimation? When answering this question, forget about December 1941, we are still in pre-war Germany. :wink:
4. On page 18 of the document dated 15.01. 41, which deals with the formation of divisions of the third "Linie" in the Red Army, is printed in clear Gothic type: "The personnel (teams) for these divisions are sufficient. Whether the appropriate number of commanders (officers and non-commissioned officers) will be found is doubtful; moreover, the creation of these divisions is, first of all, a matter of material support. "
5. And if you read page 11 of the document dated January 28, 1939 (post 20 Oct. 13:41), you would read: "Die Aufstellung neuer Verbaende und Einheiten ist erster Linie eine Materialfrage." There is no need to translate, for again this word is "Materialfrage". That is, for two years the Germans cannot evaluate the military potential. No way, neither higher nor lower than real. They do not have reliable information. How can one conclude from such documents that before the war the Germans underestimated war production? :?
The word 'Materialfrage' says it all. It is a matter of equipment You need to be able to equip soldiers with rifles,machineguns,artillery, tanks etc... Being able to mobilise a huge number of men is not sufficent. You need to have the Industrial capacity to equip them. That Industrial apacity was underestimated.
I quote from Pahl Fremde Heere Ost p 88 : ' "The dictator Stalin ",so it was said not without a certain recognition of his abilities," has put to use all the capacities of the country on a surprising scale that was difficultly recognisable before the war. Given the population richness of the country it is not so much the number of units that surprised as the available supplies in weapons, equipment and clothing. The numbers of tanks and guns exceed everything that existed before in the world." This was stated in the revised edition of the reference book on the "Kriegswehrmacht der UdSSR" published in december 1941 which was meant as a handy information source for the Ic officers. Here FHO explicitly admits the underestimation of soviet war production.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 24 Oct 2019 08:58

I have no faith in revised editions whose aim is to protect the authors from criticism .Revised editions are written with hindsight .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 24 Oct 2019 14:04

ljadw wrote:
24 Oct 2019 08:58
I have no faith in revised editions whose aim is to protect the authors from criticism .Revised editions are written with hindsight .
So you would want german Ic officers to work with a reference work on the red army that was outdated. 8O Obviously, it needed to be adapted based on what was learned in the first months of the war against the USSR. One of the things that needed to be revised was the qualitative judgment on the red army.

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