This is your pet theory but it is also complete nonsense. The German army never underestimated the losses they had effectively inflicted on the red army . They underestimated the total strength of the red army that was effectively in the field and even much more its regenerative capacity because the war production of the USSR was underestimated. If the red army had had the effective strength (far below your ghost 500 divisions)and regenerative capacity as estimated then the losses inflicted on it would have finished it off as not much would be left and the capacity to refit was insufficient to replace the huge losses. So not surprising that that is exactly what the FHO estimated to be the case in august.MarkN wrote: ↑27 Oct 2019, 14:20Broadly speaking, in the first bound the Heer fought the Red Army's covering forces. In the second bound they fought the remnants of the covering forces, the Front tactical (counter-offense) reserve and the initial STAVKA (counter-offense) reserve. Notwithstanding the hope to have destroyed all that in the first bound, for BARBAROSSA to have worked according to Heer expectations, that was supposed to be the end of the Red Army and they could thus motor relatively freely to the Volga before the full weight of the Red Army could mobilize.BDV wrote: ↑26 Oct 2019, 20:47What does not follow, is that the Barbarossa plan, and following it, was the only option in this predicament. On the immediate "tactical" level (next 8-12 weeks) FHO info was correct. In June, in August, and in November. And the logistical troubles of Barbarossa can be traced DIRRECTLY to GROFAZ's & deskjockeys' & field commander's decision to straight up ignore these data.
However, hubris and delusion were in play. Or was it incompetence or stupidity? The Heer formations and FHO reps were busy gathering and studying captured documents. They quickly had a very good picture of the number and types of formations they had encounteted and 'destroyed'. Something upwards of 200 divisions. The problem was with their belief about 'destroyed' and what the consequences were. In very broad terms, the formations that they had 'destroyed' were still at peacetime manning levels. The reserves to take them up to wartime establishment had not had time to join their units. Across the board, divisions were only about 50% strength in manpower and little better in equipment.
The 50% of troops and equipment that had not got forward in time still had to be defeated. When the Heer surmised the job was nearly done, at best they'd done 50%. But they couldn't see it. Then when you add the FHO conflation of strategic planning 'notional divisions' with actual tactical divisions, the problem just gets worse as the calculatuon the FHO produced suggests they had removed from the orbat 3 or more times the forces actually dealt with.
By the third bound, they may have been facing 'new' divisions that they had not previously identified. But the reality was that they were fighting the manpower of the border divisions that they had not given time to reach their units.
The FHO briefed the Red Army being able to field after mobilization over 500 divisions with 11-12 million troops. They did not brief that this number should be reduced due to lack of equipment due to an underestimation of industrial capacity. Any underestimation of industrial capacity that the FHO may have admitted to later is another indication of collective Heer failings. The Heer would have assumed - or should have - that the full weight of the Red Army needed to be dealt with.
Up to November/December 1941, in reality, the Red Army was not filling out formations with manpower and equipment that the FHO had missed from a study of industrial capacity, they were filling them out with manpower and equipment that could/should have been at the border - but didn't have time to get there. It was the manpower and equipment of divisions the Heer had already written off the orbat as completely destroyed.
According to you, it was all about not having fought your whole ghost red army in the border area in one imagined unrealistic giant battle of destruction completely foregoing the element of surprise . No. You need to surprise your enemy and catch him below strength and spread all over the place. There is no need to defeat the whole enemy force in one battle. Actually works better defeating it piecemeal .So the red army as estimated could perfectly be defeated in several bounds.
You are also conveniently forgetting that as you advance fast and deep , you also capture part of the recruiting base and Industrial capacity of your enemy. You cannot join your unit anymore if you are in enemy occupied terrain.
Fundamentally, there were more divivsions than estimated and the capacity to refit existing divisions and set up new ones was largely underestimated and the latter had a lot to do with underestimating the capability of the USSR to produce weapons and equipment.
So your accusations of stupidity and incompetence against highly experienced professionals are unfounded .