The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#721

Post by Aida1 » 27 Oct 2019, 15:38

MarkN wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 14:20
BDV wrote:
26 Oct 2019, 20:47
What does not follow, is that the Barbarossa plan, and following it, was the only option in this predicament. On the immediate "tactical" level (next 8-12 weeks) FHO info was correct. In June, in August, and in November. And the logistical troubles of Barbarossa can be traced DIRRECTLY to GROFAZ's & deskjockeys' & field commander's decision to straight up ignore these data.
Broadly speaking, in the first bound the Heer fought the Red Army's covering forces. In the second bound they fought the remnants of the covering forces, the Front tactical (counter-offense) reserve and the initial STAVKA (counter-offense) reserve. Notwithstanding the hope to have destroyed all that in the first bound, for BARBAROSSA to have worked according to Heer expectations, that was supposed to be the end of the Red Army and they could thus motor relatively freely to the Volga before the full weight of the Red Army could mobilize.

However, hubris and delusion were in play. Or was it incompetence or stupidity? The Heer formations and FHO reps were busy gathering and studying captured documents. They quickly had a very good picture of the number and types of formations they had encounteted and 'destroyed'. Something upwards of 200 divisions. The problem was with their belief about 'destroyed' and what the consequences were. In very broad terms, the formations that they had 'destroyed' were still at peacetime manning levels. The reserves to take them up to wartime establishment had not had time to join their units. Across the board, divisions were only about 50% strength in manpower and little better in equipment.

The 50% of troops and equipment that had not got forward in time still had to be defeated. When the Heer surmised the job was nearly done, at best they'd done 50%. But they couldn't see it. Then when you add the FHO conflation of strategic planning 'notional divisions' with actual tactical divisions, the problem just gets worse as the calculatuon the FHO produced suggests they had removed from the orbat 3 or more times the forces actually dealt with.

By the third bound, they may have been facing 'new' divisions that they had not previously identified. But the reality was that they were fighting the manpower of the border divisions that they had not given time to reach their units.

The FHO briefed the Red Army being able to field after mobilization over 500 divisions with 11-12 million troops. They did not brief that this number should be reduced due to lack of equipment due to an underestimation of industrial capacity. Any underestimation of industrial capacity that the FHO may have admitted to later is another indication of collective Heer failings. The Heer would have assumed - or should have - that the full weight of the Red Army needed to be dealt with.

Up to November/December 1941, in reality, the Red Army was not filling out formations with manpower and equipment that the FHO had missed from a study of industrial capacity, they were filling them out with manpower and equipment that could/should have been at the border - but didn't have time to get there. It was the manpower and equipment of divisions the Heer had already written off the orbat as completely destroyed.
This is your pet theory but it is also complete nonsense. The German army never underestimated the losses they had effectively inflicted on the red army . They underestimated the total strength of the red army that was effectively in the field and even much more its regenerative capacity because the war production of the USSR was underestimated. If the red army had had the effective strength (far below your ghost 500 divisions)and regenerative capacity as estimated then the losses inflicted on it would have finished it off as not much would be left and the capacity to refit was insufficient to replace the huge losses. So not surprising that that is exactly what the FHO estimated to be the case in august.
According to you, it was all about not having fought your whole ghost red army in the border area in one imagined unrealistic giant battle of destruction completely foregoing the element of surprise :lol: . No. You need to surprise your enemy and catch him below strength and spread all over the place. There is no need to defeat the whole enemy force in one battle. Actually works better defeating it piecemeal .So the red army as estimated could perfectly be defeated in several bounds.
You are also conveniently forgetting that as you advance fast and deep , you also capture part of the recruiting base and Industrial capacity of your enemy. You cannot join your unit anymore if you are in enemy occupied terrain.
Fundamentally, there were more divivsions than estimated and the capacity to refit existing divisions and set up new ones was largely underestimated and the latter had a lot to do with underestimating the capability of the USSR to produce weapons and equipment.
So your accusations of stupidity and incompetence against highly experienced professionals are unfounded .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#722

Post by AbollonPolweder » 27 Oct 2019, 20:18

Aida1 wrote:
25 Oct 2019, 14:55
AbollonPolweder wrote:
25 Oct 2019, 13:38
Aida1 wrote:
24 Oct 2019, 20:51
[...
This is nonsense as that is exactly what is stated. You are turning things upside down .The FHO makes estimates based on intelligence data and these were largely insufficient. Even intelligence services of other countries suffered from a lack of data on the USSR. All explained in detail by Pahl.
"turning things upside down" is nothing compared to your logical schemes, such as lack of data - underestimation. So? A surplus then there will be an overestimation. :lol: Wonderful logic! There are people who believe in Jesus Christ. Do you believe in Pahl. Jedem das seine!
At least he did his research and explains in detail why there was such a lack of intelligence data on the USSR. You seem to have difficulty in accepting that.
Now I will try to show you the results of my own research, and we will see how "detailed" the studies of your "protege" are. We look at the document from 01/15. 41. where the FHO estimates the population of the USSR at 193 million people. Of these, about 23 million were added after the capture of western Ukraine and western Belarus in the fall of 1939, Finland in the spring of 1940, Romania and the Baltic states in the summer of 1940.
And the Germans estimated the total human mobilization potential of the USSR in January 1939 at 11-12 million people. At that time, the total population of the USSR was about 170 million. So? By January 1941, the population of the USSR increased. Has the mobilization capacity of the USSR increased so much? What does Pahl write about this? So that's not all! On September 1, 1939, the USSR adopted the Law on General Military Duty. The age of the reservists was raised on 10 years. If earlier in the USSR the age of the reserve was from 30 to 40, then from the autumn of 1939 it became from 30 to 50 years.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=191
If earlier, in fact, the young men were drafted into the army from the age of 19, but now it has become possible to call in peacetime at 17. What can we say about wartime !? Plus, a call for women was introduced.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=187
That is, approximately, the mobilization potential of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 increased by 50% and should have been not 11-12 million, but 16-18 million. What does Pahl write in his "detailed" studies about this subject?
Last edited by AbollonPolweder on 27 Oct 2019, 20:32, edited 2 times in total.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#723

Post by AbollonPolweder » 27 Oct 2019, 20:28

MarkN wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 14:20
...
. The problem was with their belief about 'destroyed' and what the consequences were. In very broad terms, the formations that they had 'destroyed' were still at peacetime manning levels. The reserves to take them up to wartime establishment had not had time to join their units. Across the board, divisions were only about 50% strength in manpower and little better in equipment.
...
Sir! Name some divisions of, say, the Baltic Special District (ПрибОВО), which had 50% strength in manpower on 22 June 41.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#724

Post by Aida1 » 27 Oct 2019, 22:15

AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:18
Aida1 wrote:
25 Oct 2019, 14:55
AbollonPolweder wrote:
25 Oct 2019, 13:38
Aida1 wrote:
24 Oct 2019, 20:51
[...
This is nonsense as that is exactly what is stated. You are turning things upside down .The FHO makes estimates based on intelligence data and these were largely insufficient. Even intelligence services of other countries suffered from a lack of data on the USSR. All explained in detail by Pahl.
"turning things upside down" is nothing compared to your logical schemes, such as lack of data - underestimation. So? A surplus then there will be an overestimation. :lol: Wonderful logic! There are people who believe in Jesus Christ. Do you believe in Pahl. Jedem das seine!
At least he did his research and explains in detail why there was such a lack of intelligence data on the USSR. You seem to have difficulty in accepting that.
Now I will try to show you the results of my own research, and we will see how "detailed" the studies of your "protege" are. We look at the document from 01/15. 41. where the FHO estimates the population of the USSR at 193 million people. Of these, about 23 million were added after the capture of western Ukraine and western Belarus in the fall of 1939, Finland in the spring of 1940, Romania and the Baltic states in the summer of 1940.
And the Germans estimated the total human mobilization potential of the USSR in January 1939 at 11-12 million people. At that time, the total population of the USSR was about 170 million. So? By January 1941, the population of the USSR increased. Has the mobilization capacity of the USSR increased so much? What does Pahl write about this? So that's not all! On September 1, 1939, the USSR adopted the Law on General Military Duty. The age of the reservists was raised on 10 years. If earlier in the USSR the age of the reserve was from 30 to 40, then from the autumn of 1939 it became from 30 to 50 years.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=191
If earlier, in fact, the young men were drafted into the army from the age of 19, but now it has become possible to call in peacetime at 17. What can we say about wartime !? Plus, a call for women was introduced.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=187
That is, approximately, the mobilization potential of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 increased by 50% and should have been not 11-12 million, but 16-18 million. What does Pahl write in his "detailed" studies about this subject?
Pahl could hardly be my protégé. And he did write a detailed work which you clearly did not read so it is funny you make disparaging comments about it. He wrote a work about the FHO with a chapter about the underestimation of red army strength and the reasons why. You seem to have difficulty to accept that there was a serious lack of intelligence data on the USSR. What you mention on population numbers means not a thing as the important point is how many men you can actually equip and that was underestimated as FHO itself admitted later. You seem to have forgotten also that part of the red army recruiting base was taken by the German army in the summer of 1941.
Last edited by Aida1 on 27 Oct 2019, 22:28, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#725

Post by ljadw » 27 Oct 2019, 22:26

AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:28
MarkN wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 14:20
...
. The problem was with their belief about 'destroyed' and what the consequences were. In very broad terms, the formations that they had 'destroyed' were still at peacetime manning levels. The reserves to take them up to wartime establishment had not had time to join their units. Across the board, divisions were only about 50% strength in manpower and little better in equipment.
...
Sir! Name some divisions of, say, the Baltic Special District (ПрибОВО), which had 50% strength in manpower on 22 June 41.
There was in the Western Military District a tank division without tanks .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#726

Post by ljadw » 27 Oct 2019, 22:43

From poster donwhite on this forum (Size of WW2 Red Divisions )
June 1941
Average strength of the Soviet rifle divisions in June 1941
Leningrad : 11595
Baltic : 8712
Western : 9327
Kiew : 8792
Odessa : 8400
Or the divisions of the Baltic, Western, Kiew and Odessa MD were understrength,or those from the Leningrad MD were overstrength .
And as these are average strengths,this means that a lot of divisions had less than the average strength, thus less than 8400 .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#727

Post by Yuri » 28 Oct 2019, 10:12

AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:18
On September 1, 1939, the USSR adopted the Law on General Military Duty. The age of the reservists was raised on 10 years. If earlier in the USSR the age of the reserve was from 30 to 40, then from the autumn of 1939 it became from 30 to 50 years.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=191
If earlier, in fact, the young men were drafted into the army from the age of 19, but now it has become possible to call in peacetime at 17. What can we say about wartime !? Plus, a call for women was introduced.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=187
That is, approximately, the mobilization potential of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 increased by 50% and should have been not 11-12 million, but 16-18 million. What does Pahl write in his "detailed" studies about this subject?
When a message contains part of the truth, it is called propaganda. In this case, there is anti-Soviet propaganda. At the same time, in this message, some truthful facts are mixed with outright lies.
About the call of seventeen-year-olds. Before the adoption of the law on universal military duty in the red army, the call was made on September 1 and therefore young men were called, who at the time of the call were 19 years and 8 months old (actually twenty years old).
The new law did not change this provision for those who did not have a full average education. The new law changed the situation for those who completed a full average school (that is, finished 10 classes).Under this the young man routinely received respite from call on service until achievements 20 years, if him more 18 years, but he still continued learns in school. For example, until September 1, 1939, the situation was as follows: who studied in a full average school received a deferment from the draft to 25 years. Thus, under the new law, only those who: a) were more than 17 years and 8 months old; b) had an education of 10 classes were called to the service. The main meaning of this change in the law is not to increase the number of the red army, and filling its ranks with intelligence. This innovation added in red army just 145 thousands of man adjusted for call and all, who previously received respite from call until 25 years.
Women were not conscripted. Women were taken on military registration: doctors, paramedics and veterinarians. To put on the military account and to call for service are different things.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#728

Post by Aida1 » 28 Oct 2019, 10:35

Yuri wrote:
28 Oct 2019, 10:12
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:18
On September 1, 1939, the USSR adopted the Law on General Military Duty. The age of the reservists was raised on 10 years. If earlier in the USSR the age of the reserve was from 30 to 40, then from the autumn of 1939 it became from 30 to 50 years.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=191
If earlier, in fact, the young men were drafted into the army from the age of 19, but now it has become possible to call in peacetime at 17. What can we say about wartime !? Plus, a call for women was introduced.
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=187
That is, approximately, the mobilization potential of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 increased by 50% and should have been not 11-12 million, but 16-18 million. What does Pahl write in his "detailed" studies about this subject?
When a message contains part of the truth, it is called propaganda. In this case, there is anti-Soviet propaganda. At the same time, in this message, some truthful facts are mixed with outright lies.
About the call of seventeen-year-olds. Before the adoption of the law on universal military duty in the red army, the call was made on September 1 and therefore young men were called, who at the time of the call were 19 years and 8 months old (actually twenty years old).
The new law did not change this provision for those who did not have a full average education. The new law changed the situation for those who completed a full average school (that is, finished 10 classes).Under this the young man routinely received respite from call on service until achievements 20 years, if him more 18 years, but he still continued learns in school. For example, until September 1, 1939, the situation was as follows: who studied in a full average school received a deferment from the draft to 25 years. Thus, under the new law, only those who: a) were more than 17 years and 8 months old; b) had an education of 10 classes were called to the service. The main meaning of this change in the law is not to increase the number of the red army, and filling its ranks with intelligence. This innovation added in red army just 145 thousands of man adjusted for call and all, who previously received respite from call until 25 years.
Women were not conscripted. Women were taken on military registration: doctors, paramedics and veterinarians. To put on the military account and to call for service are different things.
Him being misinformed is not the same as intentional disinformation.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#729

Post by Art » 28 Oct 2019, 12:00

AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:18
And the Germans estimated the total human mobilization potential of the USSR in January 1939 at 11-12 million people.
The number of potential reservists or the size of the Army which can be fielded?
That is, approximately, the mobilization potential of the USSR by the beginning of 1941 increased by 50% and should have been not 11-12 million, but 16-18 million
The number of registered reservists by the start of 1941 was approaching 25 million. Not counting men already on active service in military.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#730

Post by MarkN » 28 Oct 2019, 15:26

The Heer did not have a copy of the STAVKA mobilization plan and thus had to estimate the likely size and combat power of a fully mobilized Red Army. That estimate was a very simple calculation that for every X million population, Y million can be mobilized into the military. The Y is factored so that industry and agriculture etc are not denuded to the deteriment of the state. It was not an estimate of the total number in the pool of reservists.

The FHO calculated the Red Army could field 11-12 million after mobilization. STAVKA's mobilization plan extent only planned for a Red Army of 9.1 million. FHO's calculation was thus an overestimate of 2-3 million.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#731

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Oct 2019, 15:28

Yuri wrote:
28 Oct 2019, 10:12
...
When a message contains part of the truth, it is called propaganda. In this case, there is anti-Soviet propaganda. At the same time, in this message, some truthful facts are mixed with outright lies.
About the call of seventeen-year-olds. Before the adoption of the law on universal military duty in the red army, the call was made on September 1 and therefore young men were called, who at the time of the call were 19 years and 8 months old (actually twenty years old).
The new law did not change this provision for those who did not have a full average education. The new law changed the situation for those who completed a full average school (that is, finished 10 classes).Under this the young man routinely received respite from call on service until achievements 20 years, if him more 18 years, but he still continued learns in school. For example, until September 1, 1939, the situation was as follows: who studied in a full average school received a deferment from the draft to 25 years. Thus, under the new law, only those who: a) were more than 17 years and 8 months old; b) had an education of 10 classes were called to the service. The main meaning of this change in the law is not to increase the number of the red army, and filling its ranks with intelligence. This innovation added in red army just 145 thousands of man adjusted for call and all, who previously received respite from call until 25 years.
Women were not conscripted. Women were taken on military registration: doctors, paramedics and veterinarians. To put on the military account and to call for service are different things.
I would like to remind the specialist in Soviet propaganda that we are talking about the mobilization potential of the USSR’s human resources. And this means that during the war there will already be their own laws and conscriptions will not be held on September 1, but constantly, as necessary. Especially for the "specialist" I give the document:
«4. By the time of hostilities, the division was equipped with:
by commanding staff - by 50.3%;
junior commanding staff -42.9%;
by ordinary composition - 105%.
The rank and file mainly consisted of the April and May draft of 1941.»
http://bdsa.ru/iyun-1941-arkhiv/139-194 ... 22-14-1941
There is no war yet, but the Law is already being violated, and the call held until September 1. What will happen to the law when the war begins?
At one time, Tsar Peter I forbade officials to speak on notes so that everyone’s stupidity was visible. Now there are no such laws, people write and say what they want, so to speak, commit coming out. But do not worry, you are not the only one here.
Read on:
«Article 14. Citizens who are nineteen years old in the year of conscription (from January 1 to December 31) are called up for active service, and who graduated from high school and its corresponding educational institutions are eighteen years old.»
http://rkka.ru/docs/all/z010939.htm
If a young man turned 18, let’s say, in November of the 41st, he could have been taken in July.
In 1939, 145 thousand people with secondary education were called up. And how many were called up in 1941, because the level of education in the USSR was constantly increasing. So?
Now about women.
«Article 13. The People’s Commissars of Defense and the Navy are given the right to register and accept for service in the Army and Navy women who have medical, veterinary and special technical training, as well as attract them to training camps.
In wartime, women with this training can be drafted into the Army and Navy to carry out auxiliary and special services.»
Does the specialist in Soviet propaganda know how many women in the USSR were drafted into the army? Did all of them have “special” training before the draft?
In September 1939, a law was passed in the USSR that turned the country into a supermilitarist state. It should be added to the aforementioned that this law abolished the deferment of students, because now it was possible to enter a university only after serving in the army. The privileges on family status were canceled. If, before the new law, a person was not subject to draft in case of disability of at least one of the parents, now only if both parents were disabled.
«Chapter VIII
ABOUT INITIAL AND EXTRUSION MILITARY TRAINING OF YOUTH
Article 75. Initial military training of students is carried out in all schools, starting from 5 to 7th grade inclusively.

Article 79. The leadership of the initial and pre-conscription military training is vested in the People’s Commissariat of Defense.»
Even the young children were not left alone.
As the People’s Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov said in his report at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:
«The overwhelming mass, and I would hope that all 100% of recruits now will not have their own family. (Laughter.) This is the first and important circumstance ...»
https://rusneb.ru/catalog/000202_000006 ... /?page=191
Soviet communists and propagandists did not need families; they did not need citizens. All they needed was cannon fodder.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#732

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Oct 2019, 15:40

ljadw wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 22:43
From poster donwhite on this forum (Size of WW2 Red Divisions )
June 1941
Average strength of the Soviet rifle divisions in June 1941
Leningrad : 11595
Baltic : 8712
Western : 9327
Kiew : 8792
Odessa : 8400
Or the divisions of the Baltic, Western, Kiew and Odessa MD were understrength,or those from the Leningrad MD were overstrength .
And as these are average strengths,this means that a lot of divisions had less than the average strength, thus less than 8400 .
I hope you understand English. The question was about specific division numbers as of June 22, 1941. If I am mistaken about your English, then I repeat the question in Russian: Назовите конкретные номера дивизий, скажем, ПрибОВО с половинным личным составом на 22 июня 1941.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#733

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Oct 2019, 15:58

Aida1 wrote:
28 Oct 2019, 10:35
...
Him being misinformed is not the same as intentional disinformation.
Wrong conclusion! Underinformed will be correct. I can not find many desired :milwink: documents to draw conclusions. Book "stories" are enough for you - I can only envy sach "lucky" people.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#734

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Oct 2019, 16:35

Art wrote:
28 Oct 2019, 12:00
AbollonPolweder wrote:
27 Oct 2019, 20:18
And the Germans estimated the total human mobilization potential of the USSR in January 1939 at 11-12 million people.
The number of potential reservists or the size of the Army which can be fielded?
...
It is about potential reservists called up in the event of war. German document phrase: Im Kriege können rechnerisch rund 11-12 Millionen Mann mobilisiert werden. (During the war, calculative, around 11-12 million men can be mobilized.)
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

#735

Post by Art » 28 Oct 2019, 16:42

AbollonPolweder wrote:
28 Oct 2019, 15:28
There is no war yet, but the Law is already being violated, and the call held until September 1.
Actually after September 1, because you are talking about the remainder of the class which was to be drafted in 1940. So these men were taken to military about half a year later than it was required by the letter of the law. During the war drafts of young recruits didn't follow the order established by the law, which, however, wasn't something unique. For example, during WWI Russia young recruits ahead of the normal schedule. Recruits born in 1895 were called in 1915 instead of 1916, born in 1896 - in 1915 instead of 1917 etc.
Does the specialist in Soviet propaganda know how many women in the USSR were drafted into the army? Did all of them have “special” training before the draft?
Conscription of women were ordered by GKO decrees in 1942. Since these decrees had the legal power of the law, they could amend or supersede any law adopted previously fully or partly.

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