The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Hanny]

So dumb, learn how to count. The munitions used from 707, would sustain 2 to 3 Full strength 8000 man ID in combat. 707 ID had no munitions left, all its combat loads were used, and could perform no duty, thats the scale of the event.

LoL,

So what combat ID didn't get their allotment because of that "event?"
What task did the 707 ID not perform by having no munitions?
If the munitions were needed how would it get to the front?

The answer.... the munitions weren't needed, which is why they were given, and it didn't cause repercussions for anything going on anywhere else.

Its the logistical burden, mass shootings by relatively few personnel, were logistical burdens that could only be met by munitions being drawn from Army stocks, which had to be replaced, which is what logistics is all about, being able to effectively perform the tactics involved of the strategy being employed. When any mass shooting occurred its logistical foot print is in what had to be replaced. The einsatzgruppen existed to mass execute the jews, and your holocaust denial is not appreciated.https://www.theholocaustexplained.org/t ... tzgruppen/

Einsatzgruppen may be 0.001% of the total force, but when they conduct a mass shooting the logistical burden of that action, its not the same as the fraction of the armed forces they represented. 850 million rnds expended, i was informed, means each day the logistics dept expect to deliver 0.8 rnds per person, per day, on the day of the mass execution that jumps to 19 for the formations involved.

The answer is you have no clue, it occurred during the drive to Moscow, when every effort to maintain the combat power at the front was being made.

[Hanny]

First, remember Halder was against going to Kiev, so he criticized everything during this period. More importantly, despite the losses in trucks, they still did attack and achieve a breakthrough at Vyazma, only being slowed down by the weather. It was only the second phase of Typhoon that became a disaster due to supply and maintenance issues.

Because he understood the Red Army was there in front of it, having failed to destroy it in the first operational bound. He wanted to try again, but could not for logistical reasons. AH otoh said look at the plan, i told you where im going after the red army is destroyed on the border, it is, and we are sticking with then plan, and went to kiev.

Except before they started the TOE was down by around 50% because it was not logistically possible to get it higher than that. Why?, because pre war logistical planning by wagner, explained the ability to reach 500klm was all that was logistically supportable. If they have not won by then, they in for a long war for which no provision has been made. Just because they won most of the tactical engagements, which were fought not to just win them, but to produce the political collapse from winning them, does not mean they have won, except at the tactical level, in fact they have failed strategically.

The point isn't if supply requirements met demands, it is if the supply limited operations. I am sure that at times lack of fuel/ammo effected combat performance, but so did the weather and personnel/ vehicle losses. I am still unaware of a large operation that was delayed, or failed before Typhoon.

The point is you dont known what logistics is. Its in part the ability to maintain forces in tactical operations by resupply that allows those tactics to function as expected. Those tactics failed to achieve the destruction of the ed Army before it could withdraw, and so from Halder point of view, and the plan, the soviet state did not collapse because the principle military objective had failed. he wanted to try again, AH said no the plans worked, im now building an airforce and a navy, this war is over. It failed tactically because it was beyond the logistically ability to maintain at the expected level of combat performance as shown by the pre invasion wargames, which predicted if logistics failed, then forces could reach Moscow but be without the means to defend themselves. which is exactly what happened to them, just as their own pre war planns showed would be happen.

Plan called for defeating 150 in the field and 100 more being raised, it run up against 150 and 800 more raised, logistically the plan for defeating 250/950 has assigned a quarter of the resources to do the job, even if there was no logistical issues.

“The Russian colossus…has been underestimated by us…whenever a dozen divisions are destroyed the Russians replace them with another dozen.” -Franz Halder

“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” – General Dwight D. Eisenhower US was rather good at logistics, nazi Germany not so much, there best went into ops not supply, and AH marched to a different drum in any event.

[Hanny]

Never said it was, but you are obviously unaware of the other duties they were tasked with.

So are you, post war they were determined to be an illegal entity because they existed to commit the holacaust. They were a principle part of the General plan for the East, which required the population to lose some 30 million persons.

[ljadw]

Halder was lying when he said : ''we'' (he meant : Kinzel ) underestimated the Soviets , Underestimating has nothing to do
with logistics . Besides, what Halder called wrongly "underestimated '' did not cause the failure of Barbarossa .The Germans attacked with 150 divisions, not because they underestimated the Soviets, but because they had only 150 divisions , and they could have won with these divisions, except for the fact that the Soviets were stronger . What the Germans thought,or assumed was irrelevant . It was the same for MG : the loser lost,not because he made mistakes, but because the other was too strong .

[Volyn]

The Germans attacked with 150 divisions, not because they underestimated the Soviets, but because they had only 150 divisions , and they could have won with these divisions, except for the fact that the Soviets were stronger . What the Germans thought,or assumed was irrelevant.

The failure of Barbarossa is not the topic of this thread, only the logistics of the operation and its functioning from June - December 1941. Nobody blames logistics for the failure of Barbarossa, we only want to better understand what the Germans logistical strengths/weaknesses were during this period of the war. Therefore, what the Germans thought is relevant to this discussion because they made their plans based on the priorities of the Nazi leadership's desires. Hitler wanted to occupy the USSR all the way up to the Urals in a single operation, somebody needed to think about how to accomplish that.

It was the same for MG : the loser lost,not because he made mistakes, but because the other was too strong.

Yes, but the Soviet strength was greatly compromised by their own inept actions and poor management of resources, throwing away millions of soldiers (KIA and POW) before December 1941. However, the Germans could not fully capitalize on the Soviet errors because they were making so many of their own! Although they could claim several important victories on the battlefield, they were losing time in the process, because each advance was taking longer (for a number of reasons) and they were receiving fewer tonnage of supplies for each kilometer advanced.

When the number of trains required to resupply the German armies continued to decrease the farther they move into the USSR, there could only be one outcome - defeat. The Soviets also made a few brilliant strategic decisions in 1941, probably the most important was to move their industries East using civilians and soldiers - the factories of Kharkov were dismantled by Soviet reserves forces while the Battle of Kiev was being fought. The reserve units were not committed to that battle, but instead they were used to move factories and it saved the USSR in the long-run: Several of the factories in Kharkov built the T-34 and its accompanying equipment, they became part of the Tankograd complex in Chelyabinsk.

It is the German's short-term mindset that lost them the war on the Eastern Front, prioritizing quick tactical victories in the USSR could not supplement for a lack of a long-term strategic planning. The Germans took a gamble, their logistic structure was stretched to the breaking point and when it finally broke in late-1941/early-1942 there was no follow up plan on how to really fix it. The Germans could still move people around and bring in supplies, but not to the point where they could maintain offensive operations for all 3 Army Groups, and the Soviets knew this. That is why the Soviets were holding their breath waiting for the German offensive in 1942, they knew it could only be 1 Group based on the supply problems, they just did not know it would be AGS (they had expected Leningrad or Moscow to be the main target of 1942).

[Konig_pilsner]

The einsatzgruppen existed to mass execute the jews, and your holocaust denial is not appreciated.

Stop acting like a child. Embarrassing.

The answer is you have no clue, it occurred during the drive to Moscow, when every effort to maintain the combat power at the front was being made

Wrong. I read yesterday that it was in Belorussia, far behind the front, in an area easily supplied from Poland. The fact that you believe anything in this sector would influence operations at Klin, Tikhven, or Tula is baffling. Show me a report from an ID complaining of lack of rifle ammo just once, I'll wait. Show me that German industry was under producing small arms ammo, and it was the execution of Jews that created the shortfall. If you can I may agree.

I did not say the partisans were there in 1941, only that the Einzatzgruppen activities helped to foment their creation.

I don't mean to give you such a hard time Volyn, but it just isn't true.

The Einsatzgruppen did administration, intelligence gathering, as well as killing Communists and Jews, people who were either threats or undesirable to the occupation. The local population couldn't have cared less about the killings and actively assisted/participated in many of the actions. Partisan activity was caused by occupation policy, ie. exploitation of resources, reprisals, and most importantly the deportations. Hanny even mentioned that the Wehrmacht was told to live off the land, which required expropriating housing and livestock.

Despite the growing partisan activities, it would have been worse for the Germans had they not exploited them. Manpower shortage in the Reich was so acute that Himmler even lamented allowing all the Russian POW's to die was a mistake. Again, killing people or working them to death is evil, but it wasn't stupid. In fact it allowed the Germans to fight the war far longer then they anticipated.

[Konig_pilsner]

I am confused as what to Halder is bellyaching about. Were Guderian Panzers in worse shape than vKleist's? vKleist made it to Rostov-on-Don and back to Mius.

Hey BDV,

Halder's diary is really good and I trust a lot in it, but not everything. In mid July he says the war was almost won, in early August he says the war is lost, then after Vyasma he says the capture of Moscow is assured. (right before he gets thrown off his horse and is hospitalized for a few weeks) When he anticipated the traffic jam at Rostov (Blau) he wouldn't stop going on about it, but when he was wrong about something you never heard of it again.

As for the Panzers, there are frequent entries on the air filters being a problem with the engines. In fact the three things he complained most about were operational changes originating from OKW, Russian artillery, and then probably the engines. Logistics was rarely mentioned as a concern in the sense that it was stalling operations, although I do remember him saying AGS was slowed due to having to rebuild bridges and bringing supplies forward.

As for Guderian, and the Kiev operation, like I said earlier he complained the whole time since he was against it. So while all the Panzers in each AG suffered from constant wear, he would focus on this case as he considered it a waste. Or at least that is my opinion.

[Konig_pilsner]

The point is you dont known what logistics is.

Yes, since I don't agree with you I am a holocaust denier and an idiot:)

Why?, because pre war logistical planning by wagner, explained the ability to reach 500klm was all that was logistically supportable.

You do realize that from Brest to Smolensk is 700km, to Moscow 1000km. According to you and Wagner all the history books must be wrong, since the Panzers couldn't be supported past Orsha...

Do you see yet that your arguments are confusing, in light that in October the Germans were able to launch an all out offensive across the whole front?

[MarkN]

The failure of Barbarossa is not the topic of this thread, only the logistics of the operation and its functioning from June - December 1941.

OK. But was it not you whining earlier that you wanted to discuss the logistic situation in 1942-45????

Nobody blames logistics for the failure of Barbarossa, ...

Actually, quite alot of people do exactly that. And even greater number try to find as much fault and failure in logistics as they can. Observe the efforts of one poster in this thread obsessing with the 'diversion' of logistic effort from supposed frontline troops to rear area clearup and murder.

... we only want to better understand what the Germans logistical strengths/weaknesses were during this period of the war.

The 'strength' was that they were pretty efficient organisers and thus got more out of the infrastructure and 'the system' than other militaries would likely achieve.

The 'weakness' was the way they were compelled to set up their logistic system to support their deep penetration battle approach to warfare. The maximization of this effort was at the direct expense of the ability to sustain long term/great distance logistic support. If the war was not over within the planned (and assumed doable) time/cost-frame, they are caught with their pants down. To shift from the deep penetration battle logistic requirement to the sustainable logistic requirement required huge (often self-defeating) restructuring. Restructuring that had to occur every time the Wehrmacht decided to go on the offensive or back to the defensive!!!!

BARBAROSSA was such a deep operation that they would have to switch from their deep penetration battle logistic structure to one that could sustain them into the strategic depth battle. This switch would need, according to their planning, after about 300 miles. In otherwords, the Heer would need to adapt its approach to the offensive battle at this point if they were to remain within logistical capabilities. They chose not to.

Therefore, what the Germans thought is relevant to this discussion because they made their plans based on the priorities of the Nazi leadership's desires.

No. The Heer logistic system was entirely predicated upon how the Heer wanted to do war. Whether Hitler wanted to go left or right, up or down, long or short, the logistic system would be the same.

Hitler wanted to occupy the USSR all the way up to the Urals in a single operation, somebody needed to think about how to accomplish that.

Hitler asked for his generals to study the concept of invading the Soviet Union. The generals came up with the Urals as the doable (and necdessary) objective. The generals decided they could do it. Hitler was an ideological sociopath. His generals were deluded as to their own (military) capability/invincibility.

[BDV]

The Einsatzgruppen did administration, intelligence gathering, as well as killing Communists and Jews, people who were either threats or undesirable to the occupation. The local population couldn't have cared less about the killings and actively assisted/participated in many of the actions.

The local populace attitude and participation towards the mass killings is a much more nuanced issue.

I can tell you that the middle class "plusvalue" producers like my Grandfather were not amused about Nazis slaughtering their business partners, and even they were somewhat looking forward to Soviet takeover (well, until Soviets featured their own version of liberation). Carpetbaggers were mostly evacuated. The fact that the invading army had to organize extermination groups from its own troops proves the level of populace "enthusiasm" for this crime. 'Local" anti-jewish vigilantes always turn out to be in the direct employ of Wehrmacht.

Local rebel groups even forbade to different extents cooperating with the Germany on the "jewish question."

In any case, it is a very delicate issue (made moreso by the PC purity police), but it was obviously a German concept, and the attempt to pass it as "local outrage against judeobolsheviks" failed miserably.

[Volyn]

I did not say the partisans were there in 1941, only that the Einzatzgruppen activities helped to foment their creation.

I don't mean to give you such a hard time Volyn, but it just isn't true.

The Einsatzgruppen did administration, intelligence gathering, as well as killing Communists and Jews, people who were either threats or undesirable to the occupation. The local population couldn't have cared less about the killings and actively assisted/participated in many of the actions. Partisan activity was caused by occupation policy, ie. exploitation of resources, reprisals, and most importantly the deportations. Hanny even mentioned that the Wehrmacht was told to live off the land, which required expropriating housing and livestock.

Despite the growing partisan activities, it would have been worse for the Germans had they not exploited them. Manpower shortage in the Reich was so acute that Himmler even lamented allowing all the Russian POW's to die was a mistake. Again, killing people or working them to death is evil, but it wasn't stupid. In fact it allowed the Germans to fight the war far longer then they anticipated.

You bring up an interesting point, slaves were part of the logistics system and this was a perverse "logical" use of manpower to augment the labor shortage crisis. I also agree with you about the point that the Einzatzgruppen were not the main instigators for the creation of partisans, and they did have significant local help in the killing of "undesirables".

However, this is the point of the Einzatzgruppen - they did ultimately create a massive drain on the logistics later, because the personnel suffered from severe psychotic breakdowns, suicides, etc. which led to the Wannsee Conference (post-Barbarossa) because they realized these methods were not efficient. As a result even more trains, trucks and manpower were removed from potential use on the Eastern Front as they were siphoned off for use in round-ups and transportation to the extermination camps. At no time during the planning of Operation Barbarossa were these particular scenarios envisioned and calculated for, because the military planners were only looking 4 or 5 months into the future. However, the war planners would have to deal with these consequences, and they are not unforeseeable.

In reality Barbarossa was a 2-part plan being conducted simultaneously, they can be called "Invasion Barbarossa" and "Occupation Barbarossa". We can see in retrospect that the Einzatzgruppen were well prepared (pre-invasion) both mentally and physically for their role in the merciless security measures that they instigated immediately. That means there were plans put into place which the German High Command had to consider as part of their logistics burden. However, meager it may seem to the overall "Invasion Barbarossa" phase, they were a significant part of "Occupation Barbarossa": We need to consider the consequences of both as equals when it comes to priorities. Hitler intentionally wanted to use Barbarossa as his cover for mass murder and genocide, the soldiers would participate when needed, but mostly they would be fighting too far up front to notice.

It appears that "Occupation Barbarossa" was not correctly planned for, and any use/misuse of resources needed to perpetuate this were actually draining "Invasion Barbarossa", just enough, to eventually stall them a critical points along the way. Recall that in AGS it was the 6. Armee that was used to kill at Babi Yar in 29-30 SEP 1941 and this was done with the full blessing of Generalfeldmarschall Reichenau. That is time spent not fighting against the RKKA, and used thousands of soldiers firing tens of thousands of bullets. Then he issues his "Severity Order" on 10 OCT 1941, which has absolutely nothing to do with "Invasion Barbarossa". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Severity_Order

The Army has to aim at another purpose, i. e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

This directive begins consuming resources at an accelerated rate, which becomes more difficult to replenish over time as AGS continues moving farther East.

Barbarossa's timetables are so tight that 1 or 2 days could actually be counted as a week lost; the weather hinders everything later. Think of a centipede as it is crawling, the head knows exactly where the tail is, because the whole body is known. Initially Germany moves successfully like this, however, as the larger numbers of POWs are taken it becomes clear that they were not adequately planned for either (yes they did plan for them to starve, etc.) but it still took a toll on an already fragile system because they had to guard them, move them and pen them up somewhere. Add up all of these "problems" and we see that the "German ecological system of logistics" was simply incapable of achieving the full intended measure for both parts of this operation.

[Hanny]

Stop acting like a child. Embarrassing.

This is complete nonsense. The Einzatsgruppen fulfilled a role that was needed, unless you think all they did was go around killing people.

look at your first post in the thread, act like what you expect to be treated as.
Stop posting like a holocaust denier.

Wrong. I read yesterday that it was in Belorussia, far behind the front, in an area easily supplied from Poland. The fact that you believe anything in this sector would influence operations at Klin, Tikhven, or Tula is baffling. Show me a report from an ID complaining of lack of rifle ammo just once, I'll wait. Show me that German industry was under producing small arms ammo, and it was the execution of Jews that created the shortfall. If you can I may agree.

No correct, NE of Minsk in Oct, no German is near Klin, Tikhven, or Tula in Oct. I showed the level of consumption and resupply as it influences logistical resupply, for the advance on Moscow whose main LOS comes through Minsk by rail.

The Einsatzgruppen did administration, intelligence gathering, as well as killing Communists and Jews, people who were either threats or undesirable to the occupation.

Yes they did do admin, its the best documented account of the Holocaust we have because of their administration records. Their intelligence gathering was on who to execute next. As shown at Nuremburg.

You do realize that from Brest to Smolensk is 700km, to Moscow 1000km. According to you and Wagner all the history books must be wrong, since the Panzers couldn't be supported past Orsha...

You do realise Vol 1V of the German official history points this out right?, or that its used to in Supplying War, logistics from Wallenstein to Patton?, explain g the failure of logistics or that "Already in the planning stages of Barbarossa it was made clear that the truck based logistic system could only operate effectively up to 500 kilometres inside the Soviet Union, which by chance coincided with the Dvina–Dnepr line". Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East Stahel

Do you see yet that your arguments are confusing, in light that in October the Germans were able to launch an all out offensive across the whole front?

Wagner" Even on the most optimistic estimates of consumption, stocks of some kinds are dangerously low and their supply to the front uncertain. Whether under these conditions even the attemp to reach Moscow was warranted let alone further away objectives was warranted appears questionable."

Not launched because the QM of the army thought it was prudent.

[Volyn]

The failure of Barbarossa is not the topic of this thread, only the logistics of the operation and its functioning from June - December 1941.

OK. But was it not you whining earlier that you wanted to discuss the logistic situation in 1942-45????

You are too emotionally invested in trying to defend something, learn to handle the subject with maturity. The side question about 1942-1945 was to add a little depth to the subject because those events could only occur with Barbarossa's failure.

Nobody blames logistics for the failure of Barbarossa, ...

Actually, quite alot of people do exactly that. And even greater number try to find as much fault and failure in logistics as they can. Observe the efforts of one poster in this thread obsessing with the 'diversion' of logistic effort from supposed frontline troops to rear area clearup and murder.

"Nobody" is relative to this thread - that is why it is important not to read into it what you want to. See my previous post, I explain the difference between "Invasion Barbarossa" and "Occupation Barbarossa".

... we only want to better understand what the Germans logistical strengths/weaknesses were during this period of the war.

The 'strength' was that they were pretty efficient organisers and thus got more out of the infrastructure and 'the system' than other militaries would likely achieve.

The 'weakness' was the way they were compelled to set up their logistic system to support their deep penetration battle approach to warfare. The maximization of this effort was at the direct expense of the ability to sustain long term/great distance logistic support. If the war was not over within the planned (and assumed doable) time/cost-frame, they are caught with their pants down. To shift from the deep penetration battle logistic requirement to the sustainable logistic requirement required huge (often self-defeating) restructuring. Restructuring that had to occur every time the Wehrmacht decided to go on the offensive or back to the defensive!!!!

BARBAROSSA was such a deep operation that they would have to switch from their deep penetration battle logistic structure to one that could sustain them into the strategic depth battle. This switch would need, according to their planning, after about 300 miles. In otherwords, the Heer would need to adapt its approach to the offensive battle at this point if they were to remain within logistical capabilities. They chose not to.

Good, I am glad that you can articulate this, the different battle phases that you mention should be seen in this context: The Germans did not plan on switching, therefore, their logistic planning was structurally unsound for the tasks assigned.

Therefore, what the Germans thought is relevant to this discussion because they made their plans based on the priorities of the Nazi leadership's desires.

No. The Heer logistic system was entirely predicated upon how the Heer wanted to do war. Whether Hitler wanted to go left or right, up or down, long or short, the logistic system would be the same.

Was it not Hitler himself who said it had to be a 3-pronged attack? Therefore, Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, SS, etc. needed to provide their input based on what they could do or provide in order to assist with this plan. Trickle-down: Hitler issues his grand scheme and everyone else must try to fulfill it.

Conversely, in order for a plan to really work it has to be based on what can actually be achieved with what is available: Huge dreams do not make up for the lack of capacity required to accomplish them.

Hitler wanted to occupy the USSR all the way up to the Urals in a single operation, somebody needed to think about how to accomplish that.

Hitler asked for his generals to study the concept of invading the Soviet Union. The generals came up with the Urals as the doable (and necdessary) objective. The generals decided they could do it. Hitler was an ideological sociopath. His generals were deluded as to their own (military) capability/invincibility.

Yes - so they should have done a better job at recognizing in advance what the real "on the ground" problems would be. Germany had already fought in this exact same terrain 20 years before, is it not shocking to see how unprepared they really were?

Deep forests, large plains, highly mobile movements - this was Germany/Imperial Russia WW1. Yes, the battlefield moved farther East in WW2, but it was only more of the same geographical features including - more bad roads, incompatible rail gauges, inaccurate maps, scorched earth, missing bridges, etc. There is no way the German logistic structure was prepared for what was asked of them, although they made a great attempt, they never understood what they really should have been planning for.

The logistics personnel are not the reason for these failings, it is the people involved in the decision making who are the ones that bear responsibility for not recognizing this reality.

[Hanny]

How much ammo interested me.
Each Div at front excepted to have a basic combat load
Basic combat load (Gew 98 5.8 lbs weight for 100 rnds/carried at Bttn/Reg/Div supply 261 rnds).
weight of combat load 15 lbs.Individual load 60 rnds.

104 ID 8000 Riflemen 832000 total
19AD 5500 104500
15Mot 7000 105000
3E 1000 3000

Total rifle equipped on East front:1044500
Einsatzgruppe:3000


Basic combat load for East Front in weight:1044500*15lbs=15667500lbs, or 7834 tons.
Basic combat load for East Front in rnds:1044500*261=272614500 rnds.
Munition expenditure per year, 850000000=3.1 combat loads.

[MarkN]

You are too emotionally invested in trying to defend something, learn to handle the subject with maturity.

I have zero emotional attachment to this subject. You need to have the maturity to accept you've been called out!

.... the different battle phases that you mention should be seen in this context: The Germans did not plan on switching, therefore, their logistic planning was structurally unsound for the tasks assigned.

Disagree. The logistics planning was sound. The actual performance was greater than could be reasonably expected. The Heer decision to continue with the same maximum effort offensive approach was unsound.

Was it not Hitler himself who said it had to be a 3-pronged attack?

Based upon his own planning and initiative? I doubt it. Weisung 21 may bear his signature, but it the political directive to get on with the military plan that the military (in particular the Heer) had presented him.

III. Die Führung der Operationen:
A. Heer (in Genehmigung der mir vorgetragenen Absichten):

Therefore, Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, SS, etc. needed to provide their input based on what they could do or provide in order to assist with this plan. Trickle-down: Hitler issues his grand scheme and everyone else must try to fulfill it.

Grand scheme: Invade Russia.
Trickle down: Military does ALL the planning thereon.

Of course, once things started to go pear shaped, there is a lot of evidence of Hitler starting to issue orders of a tactical nature: go left, go right, no retreat etc etc.

Conversely, in order for a plan to really work it has to be based on what can actually be achieved with what is available: Huge dreams do not make up for the lack of capacity required to accomplish them.

The Heer as a whole needed to listen to the advise of its own logistic experts. They didn't. They carried on BARBAROSSA as if logistics would magically move materiel to the right place, in the right quantity at the right time.

Yes - so they should have done a better job at recognizing in advance what the real "on the ground" problems would be. Germany had already fought in this exact same terrain 20 years before, is it not shocking to see how unprepared they really were?

No. The did all of what you suggest. They planned, they war gamed, they saw the problems and they received the advice that they did not have the combat power to succeed. But the generals at the top of the tree decided not to listen.

The logistics personnel are not the reason for these failings, it is the people involved in the decision making who are the ones that bear responsibility for not recognizing this reality.

Exactly. The logistic system did not fail the Heer. The Heer failed. The Heer decided to conduct operations that they had been advised were beyond their logistic (and other) capabilities.