The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[MarkN]

These are the conclusions from somebody who did serious research on the subject. I only need to give a source. You do not like his conclusions . The article gives a clear description of the lack of intelligence data.

Indeed. A lack of intelligence and intelligence data.

You posted:

The statement by FHO means that it saw a red army with an amount of equipment that implied a much higher war production than it had suspected. It says so explicitly. You are in denial of a historica fact.

Where are the numbers that the FHO used/estimated to make this statement? Without the numbers it is just an unsubstantiated handwave. It is impossible to determine whether it was accurate and truthful.

How did Pahl analyse this statement? Did he review the data to confirm it was true and accurate? Or did he just quote the handwave and assume it to be valid?

Have you, poster Aida1, checked the estimates/data and analysed it to confirm whether the statement is true and accurate? Or are you just repeating the same unsubstantiated handwave again and again?

[BDV]

Where are the numbers that the FHO used/estimated to make this statement? Without the numbers it is just an unsubstantiated handwave. It is impossible to determine whether it was accurate and truthful.

How did Pahl analyse this statement? Did he review the data to confirm it was true and accurate? Or did he just quote the handwave and assume it to be valid?

For me, completely amateurisch on this issue, the 9 million number alleged previously upthread as STAVKA's figure for fully mobilized RKKA is awfully close to the 500 divisions x 18000 men/division of FHO's estimate.

But again, even if the strategic level FHO estimate was wrong, the immediate/"tactical" was correct, and the Logistics of Barbarossa was FUBARed by the "tactical" decisions of August and November that were taken against the CORRECT (in hindsight) FHO evaluation.

[MarkN]

Indeed the problem is all your end with a lack of understanding of the subject of how the SU mobilisation plan worked, to increase the number of existing formations, and to increase the TOE of existing ones towards full wartime strength, by creeping to wartime TOE is stages for existing formations, and raising of new formations.

12000 was authorised in the mobilisation plan, planned to be in effect in June, 8000 was authorised in the mobilisation plan, planned to be in effect in May, both done by order of stalin, in accordance with the SU mobilisation plan, in addition over 00 new Divs were also formed, and existing ones moved forward for use to be replaced by newly mobilised ones.

Whilst you seem to be in a frenzy to call everybody stupid, perhaps we're getting somewhere after all.

Now since l'm stupid, l'll post this in babysteps which l hope you will confirm which are right or wrong to help me find the exact scale of my stupidity.

Several times Zhukov went to Stalin to ask for permission to call up reserves to stengthen formations against the probable German attack. Right or wrong?

In May 1941, Stalin twice gave his permission. Once for approx. 500,000 and once for approx. 300,000. Right or wrong?

Zhukov says the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 8,000 level. You claimed the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?

You have also posted that the 1 June numbers posted by "Chuck" were subsequently increased in an attempt to get to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?

I'm going through this process to understand where the 500,000 were on 22 June 1941 and how many, when and where, others were called up.

If Zhukov is right, and "Chuck's" numbers are right, then those from the 500,000 allocated to the border formations have already reached their units. It doesn't seem too much of a stretch to assume those from the 500,000 allocated to non-border formations have also reached their units. Not so?

If Zhukov is right, then any subsequent increases in manpower after 1 June must have come from further call ups of reservists which have not been well documented in English language narratives? Not so? Isaev, for example identifies the manpower strength of each of the rifle divisions along the border in KOVO and the average looks to be nearer 10,000 than 8,000. So, how many more reservists were called up and when?

If you are right about the 500,000 being to take divisions up to the 12,000 level, and that that was occuring during June not earlier, then Isaev's numbers are explained - from 8,000 on the way to 12,000. However, the implication of this is that a significant chunk of the 500,000 are still not yet with their units and still lurking somewhere else. Not so? Where are they? Did they ever make it to their units or where they regrouped into 'new' units elsewhere?

[MarkN]

For me, completely amateurisch on this issue, the 9 million number alleged previously upthread as STAVKA's figure for fully mobilized RKKA is awfully close to the 500 divisions x 18000 men/division of FHO's estimate.

But again, even if the strategic level FHO estimate was wrong, the immediate/"tactical" was correct, and the Logistics of Barbarossa was FUBARed by the "tactical" decisions of August and November that were taken against the CORRECT (in hindsight) FHO evaluation.

Poster Aida1's originally claim went like this...

You are still in denial of the fact that the red army was bigger than estimated and that it's regeneration capacity was even more underestimated.

The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.

With the wonderful benefit that hindsight and open archives provides us, we can compare data to establish the veracity of such handwaves.

Comparing what the FHO actually briefed from FHO documents with Soviet documentation, the FHO estimates/briefings were about right with the number of tactical divisions in the western border area but overestimated their manpower strength. Their estimates of the Red Army size after general mobilization were overestimates in both number of tactical divisions and total manpower.

Given that reality, poster Aida1 has decided to go on about an alleged underestimate of Soviet war production.

When asked what numbers/data he/she is using to substantiate those latest handwaves, he/she for some strange reason thinks he can refer back to Thomas' numbers which show his handwaves about manpower and formations were wrong. Nothing to do with war production!!!!

[Aida1]

These are the conclusions from somebody who did serious research on the subject. I only need to give a source. You do not like his conclusions . The article gives a clear description of the lack of intelligence data.

Indeed. A lack of intelligence and intelligence data.

You posted:

The statement by FHO means that it saw a red army with an amount of equipment that implied a much higher war production than it had suspected. It says so explicitly. You are in denial of a historica fact.

Where are the numbers that the FHO used/estimated to make this statement? Without the numbers it is just an unsubstantiated handwave. It is impossible to determine whether it was accurate and truthful.

How did Pahl analyse this statement? Did he review the data to confirm it was true and accurate? Or did he just quote the handwave and assume it to be valid?

Have you, poster Aida1, checked the estimates/data and analysed it to confirm whether the statement is true and accurate? Or are you just repeating the same unsubstantiated handwave again and again?

You are still in denial. There is zero reason to doubt the statement by FHO in december 1941 . It was facing reality. Given the lack of data it had made rough guesses on the red army before the war and these turned out be wrong both qualitatively and quantitavely and so it revised its reference work on the red army based on what was experienced in the first 6 months of the war. Given what is explained by Pahl and Thomas on the total inadequacy of intelligence data on the USSR ,it is ironic you would try to put into doubt the revised edition of the reference work on the red army which was a more realistic assessment of the red army. So you put into doubt the judgment based on reality and give more credence to the prewar rough guessing. Very funny.
That has all to do with your pet theory to which reality must be adapted.

[Aida1]

For me, completely amateurisch on this issue, the 9 million number alleged previously upthread as STAVKA's figure for fully mobilized RKKA is awfully close to the 500 divisions x 18000 men/division of FHO's estimate.

But again, even if the strategic level FHO estimate was wrong, the immediate/"tactical" was correct, and the Logistics of Barbarossa was FUBARed by the "tactical" decisions of August and November that were taken against the CORRECT (in hindsight) FHO evaluation.

Poster Aida1's originally claim went like this...

You are still in denial of the fact that the red army was bigger than estimated and that it's regeneration capacity was even more underestimated.

The problem was that Soviet military strength and regenerative power were far underestimated.

With the wonderful benefit that hindsight and open archives provides us, we can compare data to establish the veracity of such handwaves.

Comparing what the FHO actually briefed from FHO documents with Soviet documentation, the FHO estimates/briefings were about right with the number of tactical divisions in the western border area but overestimated their manpower strength. Their estimates of the Red Army size after general mobilization were overestimates in both number of tactical divisions and total manpower.

Given that reality, poster Aida1 has decided to go on about an alleged underestimate of Soviet war production.

When asked what numbers/data he/she is using to substantiate those latest handwaves, he/she for some strange reason thinks he can refer back to Thomas' numbers which show his handwaves about manpower and formations were wrong. Nothing to do with war production!!!!

Which is a load of nonsense. How ridiculous that you think FHO got it right without data. They must have been good at guessing. How strange then that FHO stated later that it guessed wrong where the war production was concerned and not by a little bit either.
Thomas' article is very clear and it totally contradicts you. I have given enough quotes to illustrate that.
You cannot escape the fact that FHO had guessed the red army could not really mobilise 11 million men because of labour shortages, lack of officers and materiel. I gave a quote about that.

[AbollonPolweder]

In addition to Zhukov, many wrote about this including Vasilevsky and Zakharov.
....
And they all lied. However, it is difficult to accuse Zhukov of lying, for it is known that he did not write his book. Therefore it is difficult to convict him of a lie. The lie, of course, was not in numbers. All these marshals lied about the gathering of reservists (BUS). In fact, in the spring and summer of 1941 there was a hidden mobilization. You can read about it in this document:
Документ № 272
As can be seen from the document - BUS is a hidden mobilization.

...
But Dokument 272 tells us nothing about how many were actually mobilized, where and for what purpose. So it does nothing to suggest anybody lied about the 500,000 in March nor that there were any other call-ups other than what is written by Zhukov et al.

Absolutely right! I cited this document to prove that in the USSR in the spring and summer of 1941 there was a hidden mobilization under the guise of training camps. Mobilization!!! And this means that they called not only reservists and not only in May-June as the marshals had written.
One document from the Russian side is the report of the commander of the 32nd Panzer Division, Colonel Pushkin, about drafts in April-May 1941. I am uploading another document now. This is a summary of another Colonel, the German named Kinzel "Lagebericht No. 4," May 15, 1941:

3) Calls to the army.

Signs of general mobilization have not yet been found. Individual calls continue as before. In general, presumably, at the moment, the following groups of ages are called:

a) reservists born 1913-1921

b) specialists of all ages, especially serving and non-serving drivers, so far in a limited number, further, civil engineers, construction workers, probably for building fortifications.

c) Scheduled calls for reservists for summer training (6-8 weeks).

e) the extraordinary appeal of the 1941 recruits, in whole or in part, possibly as labor for the construction of defensive structures.
The total number of calls that have been going on for several weeks now, see par. A) to e), is estimated at least at 500,000.

Individual appeals that have been going on for a long time probably have the goal of leading to a significant strengthening of the Red Army without unmasking this process.

http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/5
Please note that FHO in May has been recording individual calls for a long time.
And the number of 500,000, which Kinzel gave May 15, 1941? Absolutely coincides with the Zhukov data published in 1969. Cool! That is the level of work of a real "scout"! Or is it Zhukov who borrowed data from the Kinzel's report?

[Aida1]

Nonense. Hè had already mentioned the numbers before. Hè had read the article.

Ergo he was seeing if you were going to continue to be dishonest after being caught being dishonest.

There was no doubt about that.

I have no doubt when you were caught by Mark and others, being dishonest, Mark then gave you an opportunity to be honest or not going forwards.

And the author did thorough research on the FHO and came to very damning conclusions concerning the lack of intelligence data on the USSR.

Er, no, his opinion on the data contained in the archives is not the point, its what data is in the FHO archives, and that he is comparing to post glasnost su archival data that the FHO had no knowledge of. Pahl is critical with hindsight based knowledge of post glasnost data that the FHO had no means to be aware of. Any idiot can be critical with hindsight. AH saw the same data and simply said it did not matter as the campaign will be over before any of that long term stuff becomes an issue to be concerned with. Hubris and arrogance but not ignorance of the facts, just a refusal to let them bother him.

So i have 2 perfectly good sources to support what i stated. You are again ignoring that FHO doubted the USSR could mobilise the 11 million men it mentioned.You cannot get away from the fact that FHO got it completetely wrong because of a lack of data on a lot of aspects like war production and admitted that itself.

Nope there is only the FHO archive, ( which rather accurately has the SU start strength in Divs and manpower despite your instance to the opposite, gives 11/12 million able to be mobolised and 6 million in the field so roughly 17/18 million participation ) its a single source from which Pahl and Thomposon then use alongside the more recent soviet archive material, and form hind sighted opinions of data accuracy. Basically Pahl comment on production is that the FHO were fools not to be able to predict the massive SU industrial military output in wartime, the idiots based their projections of past outputs, the fools should have known the SU was going to move decimal places on military output indexes, more MG in 12 months than the last 10 years is one example.

FHO Intel data on military production was based on past production data sets, sadly FHO lacked a time machine to see what would happen in the future production of the SU wartime economy.

It rather accurately gave the SU Div numbers, Appendix A https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EBl ... on&f=false

FACT is that FHO had few intelligence data so it was guessing a lot and also being influenced by prejudice. One of it's own officers said that that what they got from the Abwehr was rubbish. This is no trial of the FHO as it is not really responsible for the lack of intelligence data .
This is not a blame game.

[Hanny]

Now since l'm stupid, l'll post this in babysteps which l hope you will confirm which are right or wrong to help me find the exact scale of my stupidity.

Several times Zhukov went to Stalin to ask for permission to call up reserves to stengthen formations against the probable German attack. Right or wrong?

Depends who you ask. Stalin did it when he allied with Yugoslavia in May to be on the safe side.

Zhukov did propose a pre-emptive strike on 15 May 1941, Stalin did not approve this plan. The next day Zhukov ordered a defensive deployment, which remained largely unchanged until 22 June. See https://www.jstor.org/stable/40110360?s ... b_contents

In May 1941, Stalin twice gave his permission. Once for approx. 500,000 and once for approx. 300,000. Right or wrong?

Wrong. see post 748. See Glantz When titans clashed page 26. Stalin ordered the partial mobilisation (400k) in April to defend with, due to a"threatening period of war", this was increased in May by another 800k. see https://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300077920

Zhukov says the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 8,000 level. You claimed the 500,000 were called up to increase rifle divisions to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?

Wrong. I noted C Sharp in June has 500k ( post 750) of the 1.2 million reservist called up in April and May ( post 748) assigned to Rifle Div to bring them up to 12000 strength by June 1. Rifle Div strength increase to planned 8k ( May)and then 12k (june) from the two intakes. Also round a hundred new formations were established from the remaining reservists.

You have also posted that the 1 June numbers posted by "Chuck" were subsequently increased in an attempt to get to the 12,000 level. Right or wrong?

Wrong.

I'm going through this process to understand where the 500,000 were on 22 June 1941 and how many, when and where, others were called up.

Good luck with that, but i have made no claims for 22 June and i dont recall ever reading any author who has made such a study. Art will tell you they are all back at home having completed there 45 day visit.

If Zhukov is right, and "Chuck's" numbers are right, then those from the 500,000 allocated to the border formations have already reached their units. It doesn't seem too much of a stretch to assume those from the 500,000 allocated to non-border formations have also reached their units. Not so?

Depends, formations were raised from a region, travial distance from that region, or training centre, to where the formation was stationed on the border, could mean a lengthy train trip on a military train. one example would be the 28 Rifle Divisions tasked 13th May to move from the interior to the frontier, and complete the move by 10 July.

If Zhukov is right, then any subsequent increases in manpower after 1 June must have come from further call ups of reservists which have not been well documented in English language narratives? Not so? Isaev, for example identifies the manpower strength of each of the rifle divisions along the border in KOVO and the average looks to be nearer 10,000 than 8,000. So, how many more reservists were called up and when?

Glantz has this in most of his works.

For instance, trying to expand army divisions from their normal peacetime complement of 6,000 men to their full complement of 12,000 meant, in Glantz's analysis, that unit cohesion troughed right at the time of the German attack. With perfect hindsight, preexisting divisions might have done better in June 1941 at their peacetime levels without having to integrate reinforcements, though the author does not assert this.[5] And the horrors awaiting the brand-new divisions that would make up the reinforcing strategic echelons in 1941 are hinted at by reference to the new 251st Rifle division, formed from thousands of raw recruits, around a cadre of 400 NKVD (secret police) men. Especially with no material or rear support, life looked especially nasty, brutish and short for such a unit (p.220).

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EBl ... on&f=false

If you are right about the 500,000 being to take divisions up to the 12,000 level, and that that was occuring during June not earlier, then Isaev's numbers are explained - from 8,000 on the way to 12,000. However, the implication of this is that a significant chunk of the 500,000 are still not yet with their units and still lurking somewhere else. Not so? Where are they? Did they ever make it to their units or where they regrouped into 'new' units elsewhere?

Try Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War

https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4669

Or if your not a book person try here: as it has a lot of usfull stuff https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/de28/8 ... f23f6e.pdf

By the summer of 1940 a wartime mobilization plan existed and the strength of the active army continued to grow. In May 1940 there were 161 rifle divisions, 23 cavalry division, and 38 tank brigades.26 Of these, 34 divisions were in the Far East and 17 divisions were on the Turkish border.27 Most of the 161 rifle divisions were below strength. There were eight tables of organization for infantry divisions and three for cavalry, as follows:
14,000 man division 3 12,550 man division 15 12,000 man division 80 Motorized rifle division (12,000 men) 3 Motorized division (12,000 men) 4 9,000 man division 3 Mountain division (9,000) 10 6,000 man division 43 Total rifle divisions 161

The Soviet Union was divided into military districts, which were administrative organizations charged with inducting and training men, forming new units, and other duties, similar to the German Wehrkreis. In the mobilization plan the number of divisions allocated to each district was proportionate to the population of the district. In the 18 months before the war, each district created a number of divisions almost equal to those existing before 1940.
The restructuring of the Soviet rifle division had begun in earnest in 1938. The territorial divisions were eliminated. The plan approved by the General Staff in March 1938 called for the creation of 96 rifle divisions of four types: two levels of divisions on the borders, one level for the interior, and the mountain division. The reorganization was to be completed by the end of the year. 6 The two levels on the borders were the wartime with a shtat (table of organization and equipment) of 14,483 men and the "12,000" with a shtat of 10,291 men. The interior divisions, the "6,000, " had a shtat of 5,864 men and the mountain divisions had a shtat of 8,829 men. 7 The four tables of organization were retained until June 1941.
The wartime division shtat included three rifle regiments, two artillery regiments, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a signal battalion, an engineer battalion, a transport battalion, and a medical battalion. The equipment included 10,420 rifles, 1,204 machine pistols, 558 machine guns, 12 152mm howitzers, 20 122mm howitzers, 16 76mm guns, 66 mortars, 16 light tanks, 13 armored cars, 558 motor vehicles, 99 tractors, and 3,000 horses. 8 In January 1939, divisions on the borders averaged 6,959 men, while those in the interior had 5,220 men. 9 The shtat of the "12,000" and "6,000" divisions had fewer rifles, trucks, and horses, but had most of the weapons of the wartime division in 1939. 10
Few if any divisions were at wartime strength when the Germans attacked in June 1941. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the average Russian rifle division had from 8,000 to 12,000 men and 80 to 90% of authorized
-78-

weapons. By July 1941 the official strength of the division decreased to 10,859 men, 171 machine pistols, 270 machine guns, 54 76mm and 45mm guns, and 203 motor vehicles. 11 By mid-July 1941, the average was down to 6,000.

[MarkN]

There is zero reason to doubt the statement by FHO in december 1941

You have spent this entire thread posting your opinion that the FHO got all their estimations horribly wrong because they had very little intelligence data ro work from.

You find one unsubstantiated statement and suddenly "There is zero reason to doubt the statement by FHO in december 1941". Do you realize just how silly you look?

[AbollonPolweder]

As can be seen from the document - BUS is a hidden mobilization.

Fine, but neither Zhukov nor Zakharov referred to this abbreviation. The document quoted above doesn't say that any training call-up means mobilization.

Not so fine as it seems to you! Learn Russian language and logic.
Who is the author of this document? Zhukov! It is he who offers to disguise mobilization as a BUS.

а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».

а) первый вариант предусматривает проведение мобилизации отдельных военных округов, отдельных частей и соединений, устанавливаемых специальным решением Совета Народных Комиссаров Союза ССР — скрытым порядком, в порядке так называемых «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)».

Who uses the abbreviation BUS to indicate the order of mobilization? Zhukov?

По мобилизационному плану 1938–1939 гг. проведение «Больших учебных сборов» (скрытой мобилизации) предусматривалось также по двум вариантам, т.е. по литеру «А» и «Б».
По литеру «А» поднимались части по штатам военного времени, имеющие срок готовности только до М-10.
По литеру «Б» поднимаемые части только усиливались на 75–80 % до штата военного времени.
Ввиду того, что вариант по литеру «Б» предусматривался в основном только для частей и соединений, прикрывающих границу, и поскольку по мобилизационному плану 1941 года пограничные части по мирному времени в настоящее время содержатся в усиленном составе, считаю разрабатывать вариант литер «Б» нецелесообразным.
При скрытой мобилизации полагал бы необходимым оставить только один вариант в порядке «Больших учебных сборов (БУС)» на все части, независимо от их сроков готовности. Это мероприятие позволит отмобилизовать при необходимости отдельно каждую часть.

Zhukov said that in the USSR two mobilization options were envisaged: open and hidden (BUS). Was an open mobilization option announced before June 22? No! Were BUSes announced until June 22? Yes! What did Zhukov mean by BUSes? Hidden mobilization! It was he who in the winter of 1941 proposed to disguise the hidden mobilization under the smoke screen of the BUSes. But after the war he "forgot" about it. Or the party ordered to forget!

[Aida1]

There is zero reason to doubt the statement by FHO in december 1941

You have spent this entire thread posting your opinion that the FHO got all their estimations horribly wrong because they had very little intelligence data ro work from.

You find one unsubstantiated statement and suddenly "There is zero reason to doubt the statement by FHO in december 1941". Do you realize just how silly you look?

Oh really. What is silly is putting into doubt the more realistic assessment of the red army by FHO in december 1941 based on reality .So, i do accept the statement about being surprised by the amount of equipment the red army had . When an army you think was almost destroyed ,turns out to be alive and kicking, you got it wrong somewhere.

[BDV]

Oh really. What is silly is putting into doubt the more realistic assessment of the red army by FHO in december 1941 based on reality .So, i do accept the statement about being surprised by the amount of equipment the red army had . When an army you think was almost destroyed ,turns out to be alive and kicking, you got it wrong somewhere.

FHO: 500 RKKA divisionen x 18000 mann = 9 millionen

STAVKA: total mobilizable strength of RKKA is 9 million.

So where is the mistake?!?

[Art]

Not so fine as it seems to you! Learn Russian language and logic.
Who is the author of this document? Zhukov!

I've talked about Zhukov's memoir. In his memoir Zhukov didn't said that the call-up of reservists of 1941 was BUS. Neither Zakharoiv said that etc.

Were BUSes announced until June 22? Yes!

Where they were announced and by whom?

[MarkN]

When an army you think was almost destroyed ,turns out to be alive and kicking, you got it wrong somewhere.

There most certainly were mistakes made by FHO and the wider Heer. There can be no doubt about that. And we are fortunate in having many years of hindsight and open archives to analyse exactly where the mistakes were made, their scale and their impact on events. It is foolish just to believe the words of the Heer generals who failed and tried to shift blame for their own failures in post war memoirs and narratives.

We are unable to verify your unsubstantiated handwave because it us just a quote of another handwave which is itself a quote of yet another handwave.

In the absence of any numbers/data, it is impossible to verify whether the FHO handwave is true and accurate or simply a handwave to deflect attention away from a more serious error that they are trying to cover up and hide.