The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Art]

Do you want me to give an example of using this very abbreviation "BUS" in official documents?

Yes, I want you to give me examples of this abbreviation in official documents relating to call of reservists from March to June 1941.

The so-called, alas, the so-called.

And so what? I don't understand your point.

[Aida1]

Hardly as it was FHO who consistently underestimated the red army and even Halder started to have doubts in august.

Halder's doubts in August were well founded.

The evidence coming from the front line was clear: the plan that he was responsible for had failed. That he only started to have doubts at this point is an indicator of hubris and delusion. Or is is it a sign of incompetence or stupidity? Take your pick.

More worryingly, instead of make an effort to understand why his plan was failing and doing something about it, he sought scapegoats to pass the blame onto - the FHO - and buried his head in the sand to the real problem and changed nothing.

The FHO hadn't underestimated, Halder hadn't bothered to listen and just worked from an imaginary Red Army strength existing only in his head!

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or plain stupidity. Take your pick.

Because of your obsession with your pet theory, you are bending history to conform to your theory .The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it wrong and the red army was not yet near destruction. However, that did not imply that it could not be defeated in 1941 anymore as there were no data from which its real regenerative power could be deduced.
No scapegoat was sought therefore. Kinzel was not replaced in August 1941. FHO was not resonsible anyway for the lack of intelligence data.
It is your delusion and your hybris that make you think the German plan was wrong. It could have been better but not the way you think. I already pointed out to you how wrong your ideas on the German plan are. They betray a total lack of understanding of operational principles.
Nothing you have written here makes you seem superior to the highly experienced officers of the general staff you are accusing of delusion,hybris or plain stupidity.

[Art]

And a little about the history of the question:

4) In order to increase mobilization readiness a training call-up is to be held during the year 1940 with a duration of 45 days for NCOs and 30 days for privates
Indicated for the training call-up are:
a) 5000 men in all divisions of 6000 strength, total 215 000 men in 43 divisions
b) 2000 men in divisions of the 12000 strength of the Kiev, Belorussian, Odessa, Kharkov, North-Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts, and 1000 men in 12000 divisions of the Transbaikal Military District. Total 83 000 men.
c) In all replacement regiments - 156 000 men.
d) in other units (GHQ artillery, air defense, fortified regions and training of reserve officers) - 297 000 men.
Total inducted for the call-up are 766 000 men, not counting 234 000 already called by the present moment.
5) In order to supply the training call-up 145 600 annual rations are allocated to the People's Commissariat for Defense.

From the Politburo Protocol of 22 May 1940.
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/ ... oc/1012208
Find 10 differences, as they say, with the situation of 1941.

[Hanny]

And a little about the history of the question:

4) In order to increase mobilization readiness a training call-up is to be held during the year 1940 with a duration of 45 days for NCOs and 30 days for privates
Indicated for the training call-up are:
a) 5000 men in all divisions of 6000 strength, total 215 000 men in 43 divisions
b) 2000 men in divisions of the 12000 strength of the Kiev, Belorussian, Odessa, Kharkov, North-Caucasus and Transcaucasus Military Districts, and 1000 men in 12000 divisions of the Transbaikal Military District. Total 83 000 men.
c) In all replacement regiments - 156 000 men.
d) in other units (GHQ artillery, air defense, fortified regions and training of reserve officers) - 297 000 men.
Total inducted for the call-up are 766 000 men, not counting 234 000 already called by the present moment.
5) In order to supply the training call-up 145 600 annual rations are allocated to the People's Commissariat for Defense.

From the Politburo Protocol of 22 May 1940.
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/ ... oc/1012208
Find 10 differences, as they say, with the situation of 1941.

I like history, i dont like revisionist history.

This refers to the SU mobilisation to take over the Baltic states, as on 10th May Hitler invaded the West 13th broke the back of the defence at was at Dunkirk by 24th. On 4 to 7 June 1940, the SU armed forces of three military districts (221 260 troops compared to 70,000 the month before) were concentrated in the border region under the pretext of military training. They then invaded.

Moscow on 24 May 1940 mobilised to take over the Baltic states. It also strengthened other Fronts. Art gives a portion of the Mobilisation order, but fails to give accurate context of why they were mobilised, and fails to note the reserves stayed in service till partialy de mobilised on 1 July, as it was largely a bloodless affair.

Order No 5258ss by the Political Department of the Red Army, which stipulated the following, “Our mission is clear. We want to ensure security of the USSR and securely lock every sea access to Leningrad and our North-East borders. We will achieve our historical goals by going over the heads of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian anti-popular cliques, and at the same time we will help the working class of these countries to break free. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia will become Soviet outposts on our sea and land borders. Readiness to attack must be kept in complete secrecy.

He would have readers believe a training call up from 22 May that brought 00s of 000s reservist to the front, who then invaded and completed the occupation of the Baltic states, and brought up other fronts manpower strength, with the reserves partialy demobilised on 1 July in those Baltic states, a period of 40 days, is not different from being mobilised in April and May 1941, fighting a war and not demobilised till 1945, except in how long you serve and how how many died. Its not a training mobilisation, its a mobilisation to invade the Baltic states.

Ok, so what was the name of the TO&E with 12000 men which you found in these links and books?

Your link answers you own question, its the same one i used from multiple authors. Everyone knows what it is but you.

[AbollonPolweder]

...

Ok, so what was the name of the TO&E with 12000 men which you found in these links and books?

Your link answers you own question, its the same one i used from multiple authors. Everyone knows what it is but you.

The guy has problems with the Russian language. In addition, he is sure that if there were 12,000 divisions, then there should be an appropriate TOE. In document No. 272 ​​the Russian language says:

По литеру «А» поднимались части по штатам военного времени, имеющие срок готовности только до М-10.
По литеру «Б» поднимаемые части только усиливались на 75–80 % до штата военного времени.
Ввиду того, что вариант по литеру «Б» предусматривался в основном только для частей и соединений, прикрывающих границу, и поскольку по мобилизационному плану 1941 года пограничные части по мирному времени в настоящее время содержатся в усиленном составе, считаю разрабатывать вариант литер «Б» нецелесообразным.

" According to the letter “A”, units went up in wartime states, having a readiness period of only M-10.
According to the letter “B”, the units being raised only increased by 75–80% war-time TOEs.
In view of the fact that the variant according to the letter “B” was provided mainly only for units and formations covering the border, and since, according to the 1941 mobilization plan, the border units in peacetime are currently being reinforced , I consider to develop a variant of the letter "B" impractical."
Zhukov said that border divisions had already been strengthened at least in February 1941 to 75-80% of the wartime TOEs.
14500*0,8= 11600
That's where the number 12000 could come from, although there might not have been such TOEs .
A little more arithmetic. It is generally accepted that in the West 170-180 divisions of the Red Army were concentrated against Germany. Or about 3 million people. Even if we divide 3,000,000 people into 200 divisions, we get 15,000 people per division.

[Art]

This refers to the SU mobilisation to take over the Baltic states

Wrong guess, see the part of the protocol above:

The available strength of the Red Army as of 1.5.40 is 3 990 993 men.
1) In order to curtail the army to the established strength of 3 302 220 men 658 773 privates and NCOs of reserve mobilized to the Army are to be released. Release related to curtailment is to be started beginning from privates of older ages. Officers and NCOs should be temporarily retained.
...
3) By 1 August 1940 all privates and NCOs mobilized from reserve are to be released.

So, in fact Politburo ordered curtailment of the Army strength and release of reservists permanently mobilized to the RA. Note, that reservists inducted for training are obviously not counted in the 3 302 220 authorized strength.

Your link answers you own question

It's not my question, my question was about the year 1941. So again, what was the TO&E with 12000 men active in April-June 41, which is known from multiple authors? What were the TO&Es in 1940 I know quite well, but I'm not asking about them.

[Art]

Zhukov said that border divisions had already been strengthened at least in February 1941 to 75-80% of the wartime TOEs.

Zhukov didn't cite any numbers, only said that border divisions had increased strength without specific figures. That refers to the TO&E 4/100 which had 10300 men by June 41, as repeated about 10 times here. Then formally 10300 is 71% of the 14500, not very different from margins considered by you. If you know an alleged TO&E with 12000 men active in June 41 - go on post it. Finally, your hypothesis obviously contradicts to the previous speaker, who maintains that Soviet divisions were well bellow 12 thousand men in February were increased to this level through mobilization in the months that followed. It would make thing easier if you first arrive to some version which would be not self-contradictory and only then argue with me.

A little more arithmetic. It is generally accepted that in the West 170-180 divisions of the Red Army were concentrated against Germany. Or about 3 million people. Even if we divide 3,000,000 people into 200 divisions, we get 15,000 people per division.

First, you can calculate like this (omitting the questions of exact numbers). Second, my question was about the tables of equipment or authorized strength. Actual strength could be less than authorized or larger than authorized, it's another question. My point, repeating it once again time, is that in by June 41 there were two levels of authorized strength established for the rifle division - 10300 and 5900. Actual strength of regular military personnel (and, again, reservists inducted for training were legally not regular military personnel) more or less corresponded to this authorized level. Induction of reservists didn't affect this authorized level.

[Hanny]

Hardly as it was FHO who consistently underestimated the red army and even Halder started to have doubts in august.

Halder's doubts in August were well founded.

The evidence coming from the front line was clear: the plan that he was responsible for had failed. That he only started to have doubts at this point is an indicator of hubris and delusion. Or is is it a sign of incompetence or stupidity? Take your pick.

More worryingly, instead of make an effort to understand why his plan was failing and doing something about it, he sought scapegoats to pass the blame onto - the FHO - and buried his head in the sand to the real problem and changed nothing.

The FHO hadn't underestimated, Halder hadn't bothered to listen and just worked from an imaginary Red Army strength existing only in his head!

Hubris and delusion, incompetence or plain stupidity. Take your pick.

Something neither Pahl or Thompson consider is the FHO estimates on Russian reserves over time, from which the campaign was planned.
*Paulus study and "war games pre invasion made allowances for ~30 new Soviet divisions to be raised within the first three months of conflict, rising to ~140 divisions within six months of the commencement of operations". Campaign was planned to be won in 3 to 4 months so thats the number of formations Halder was expecting to have to deal with.

20 June 1941, FHO assessed the total Red Army strength at 179 rifle divisions, 33 cavalry divisions, 10 armoured divisions, by a month another 30, by 6 months another 140, for a total of 392 Divisons by Dec 41, 252 by August.

So the oft used Halder quote of 200 is the root problem, as thats a number from 1940 planning long replaced more more accurate numbers in June, and lets not forget that the FHO based it on the pre war 18800 TOE Division, so by August the 179/33/10 start has been joined by 21 more Rifle Divs and 9 others, so 200 Rifle Divs of 18800, but the SU has moved onto the 5/41 TOE of 14400, which is 261 Rifle Divs not 200. Had FHO knew the Rifle Divs had shrunk in size and more of them raised, then the number Halder should have thinking of, and writing in his diary, is not 200 but 313 around August. SO FHO had not fallen down as much as some have in their pet theory. Of course by December and 6 months, thats where FHO was really out of whack, being wrong by 100%.

*Walter Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (London, 1963), pp.99-100. Based on Paulus account kin 1946 recounting of detailed war games he ran in December of 1940 for the projected invasion of the Soviet Union.

[Hanny]

The guy has problems with the Russian language.

least of his problems.http://actualhistory.ru/shein-bus and http://zhistory.org.ua/probus41.htm

[Hanny]

MarkN wrote: ↑30 Oct 2019 16:31
If Zhukov is right, and "Chuck's" numbers are right, then those from the 500,000 allocated to the border formations have already reached their units. It doesn't seem too much of a stretch to assume those from the 500,000 allocated to non-border formations have also reached their units. Not so?

Depends, formations were raised from a region, travial distance from that region, or training centre, to where the formation was stationed on the border, could mean a lengthy train trip on a military train. one example would be the 28 Rifle Divisions tasked 13th May to move from the interior to the frontier, and complete the move by 10 July.

See also here for time to travail after mobolisation, which in this case is greater than then time called up for, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39979677.pdf

[BDV]

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it wrong and the red army was not yet near destruction.

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it RIGHT and the red army was not yet near destruction.

But das Triumvirat decided to ignore the data and mostly stick to the original plan, which lead to the known Axis logistical issues in late 1941 (the forgotten topic of this thread).

[MarkN]

Depends, formations were raised from a region, travial distance from that region, or training centre, to where the formation was stationed on the border, could mean a lengthy train trip on a military train. one example would be the 28 Rifle Divisions tasked 13th May to move from the interior to the frontier, and complete the move by 10 July.

See also here for time to travail after mobolisation, which in this case is greater than then time called up for, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/39979677.pdf

I'm trying to analyse numbers. To compare the FHO estimates to actual Red Army numbers: when, where, how etc. Your answer refers to my attempt to identify whether all the March 500,000 call up was with their units or not, to build an estimate of how many were with border units and non-border units, and whether another call up had been made. All part of the up to 8,000 or from 8,000 to 12,000 query.

If poster Art's suggestion that the 500,000 March call ups were principally for 45 days and no more, they'll have already returned home by the end of May. Not so?

[MarkN]

Something neither Pahl or Thompson consider is the FHO estimates on Russian reserves over time, from which the campaign was planned.
*Paulus study and "war games pre invasion made allowances for ~30 new Soviet divisions to be raised within the first three months of conflict, rising to ~140 divisions within six months of the commencement of operations". Campaign was planned to be won in 3 to 4 months so thats the number of formations Halder was expecting to have to deal with.

20 June 1941, FHO assessed the total Red Army strength at 179 rifle divisions, 33 cavalry divisions, 10 armoured divisions, by a month another 30, by 6 months another 140, for a total of 392 Divisons by Dec 41, 252 by August.

So the oft used Halder quote of 200 is the root problem, as thats a number from 1940 planning long replaced more more accurate numbers in June, and lets not forget that the FHO based it on the pre war 18800 TOE Division, so by August the 179/33/10 start has been joined by 21 more Rifle Divs and 9 others, so 200 Rifle Divs of 18800, but the SU has moved onto the 5/41 TOE of 14400, which is 261 Rifle Divs not 200. Had FHO knew the Rifle Divs had shrunk in size and more of them raised, then the number Halder should have thinking of, and writing in his diary, is not 200 but 313 around August. SO FHO had not fallen down as much as some have in their pet theory. Of course by December and 6 months, thats where FHO was really out of whack, being wrong by 100%.

*Walter Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (London, 1963), pp.99-100. Based on Paulus account kin 1946 recounting of detailed war games he ran in December of 1940 for the projected invasion of the Soviet Union.

I broadly concur with this.

Early in the thread l cast a fly to see if anybody knew where Halder got his "200" divisions from. The delusion denyers just ignored it. I wonder why. As Richard Anderson wrote, it could well be a simple approximation of what he was briefed the standing army size was. However, l suspect there is another answer.

The comprehensive survey that FHO produced in January 1941 contains an illustrative calculation of Red Army personnel numbers. They used the standard strategic planning tool 'notional division' for this calculation. A force of 200 notional divisions equated to approx. 5,6 million troops. Add in rear services to support them and you get to 6,2 million. This appears in Thomas despite poster Aida1's desperate attempts to pretend it doesn't exist.. The notional division is 28,000 strong - or 31,000 if you want to simplify the calculation and include the rear services too. To cross check, see the August 1941 briefing l posted earlier where FHO writes of the Red Army being 370 (notional) divisions: 370 x 31,000 = 11,47 million (written up in January 1941 as 11-12 million).

I suspect Halder's 200 comes from fixating on an illustrative calculation using the strategic planning tool 'notional division' and ignoring all of the estimates provided by FHO regarding actual tactical divisions in the field!!!!!

I'm also suspect of the assumptions regarding mobilization times and scales. Whilst it is clear that the OKH/Heer deluded itself about such things, the details you post from Paulus' notes are evidence of this, this delusion does not seem to have come from FHO. There is nothing in the briefings regarding timeframes from 1940 onwards, but some detail in their 1938 survey indicates a belief that things would happen a lot quicker than Paulus' assumptions.

[MarkN]

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it wrong and the red army was not yet near destruction.

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it RIGHT and the red army was not yet near destruction.

Whilst the evidence demonstrates the FHO pre-invasion briefings were broadly accurate, more overestimate than anything elsr, they fell into the same delusional fog affecting everybody else by early July. Then they were punting out briefings recording the identification of divisions and assuming they had been entirely wiped from the Red Army orbat. No attempt to reconcile this drawdown of divisions with an actual body count (dead and alive). Their drawdown of entire divisions being a significant (3-4 fold) overstatement of actual Red Army combat loss.

[Aida1]

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it wrong and the red army was not yet near destruction.

The evidence from the front was that the FHO had gotten it RIGHT and the red army was not yet near destruction.

But das Triumvirat decided to ignore the data and mostly stick to the original plan, which lead to the known Axis logistical issues in late 1941 (the forgotten topic of this thread).

No It was FHO that estimated that the red army was near destruction(Thomas Foreign armies east p 279 )Such a thing as a triumvirat did not exist.