The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 06 Nov 2019 16:07

AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:51
But in the winter of 1941 the 2nd option fell away. Why? Because the border divisions were already strengthened. If in 38-39 border divisions were strengthened to 75-80% of war-time TOEs, then how much were they strengthened in 1941? Generals are conservative people. Why should they come up with new TOEs, for the numbers 75-80% were not taken by chance but were reasonable?
Sir, do you really have no opportunity to consult about a translation from Russian?
You are not making sense any longer.
Art wrote:
06 Nov 2019 13:38
This parts says that by the variant B border divisions would achieve 75-80% of the wartime strength after a partial mobilization, not that they had already had those 75-80% in a peacetime. In reality in 1938-39 only divisions in the Far East had this level of peacetime strength.
Thank you. That's how l read it too. Remember, 75% of the 1940 ShTat is over 14,000 troops.
Art wrote:
06 Nov 2019 08:46
They were not actually dispatched from the Moscow Military District but were used for newly formed rifle divisions instead.
That does not surprise me.

So, the Heer writes down two full divisions at the border. However, since at least 12,000 troops were missing from them, the Heer get to face another fresh division of troops that they have already destroyed!
Art wrote:
06 Nov 2019 08:46
Why so? The peace-time TO&E of the reinforced rifle division in 1940 was 12 000 men or about 70% of the wartime strength. In 1941 both the wartime and peace-time establishment were curtailed (14500 and 10300 respectively) but the same proportion remained.
How so. My comment relates to the claim that, during 1938-40 timeframe, rifle divisions were as a rule populated to 75-80% of wartime ShTat. They were not. That would mean 14-15,000 troops. How many divisions had that many? A handful at most.

When the rifle division ShTat was revised in (April) 1941 to approx 14,500, the % automatically increases. However, 75% of 14,500 is 10,875. Looking at Isaev's work regarding KOVO, not one of the border divisions had that many. Perhaps the numbers were higher in the Baltic or Western Districts.

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BDV
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Re: EQUIPMENT replacement

Post by BDV » 06 Nov 2019 18:36

Aida1 wrote: You are still in denial of the fact that the German army did not overestimate losses in dead,wounded and prisoners inflicted on the red army but instead underestimated the ability to replace losses in men and equipment.
Even accepting the phantasmagorical estimate of 90 RKKA divisions destroyed by July 7, that simply accounts for little more than the trophy weaponry acquired from the surrendering Poles* and Baltic Countries**, and abandoned by evacuated Roumanians.

_________________________________________________________
*using as back-of-envelope half of 1.1 million for Polish Army
** using 350 k for the total mobilizable strength of Baltic Countries, from this source
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Art » 06 Nov 2019 19:29

MarkN wrote:
06 Nov 2019 16:07
How so. My comment relates to the claim that, during 1938-40 timeframe, rifle divisions were as a rule populated to 75-80% of wartime ShTat. They were not.
If you talk about averaged numbers, then no, they were not. If you talk about some specific subset by the end of 1940 or in the first half of 1941, then there were those having close to 70% (but not 80% as a rule).

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 07 Nov 2019 18:24

MarkN wrote:
06 Nov 2019 16:07
AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:51
But in the winter of 1941 the 2nd option fell away. Why? Because the border divisions were already strengthened. If in 38-39 border divisions were strengthened to 75-80% of war-time TOEs, then how much were they strengthened in 1941? Generals are conservative people. Why should they come up with new TOEs, for the numbers 75-80% were not taken by chance but were reasonable?
Sir, do you really have no opportunity to consult about a translation from Russian?
You are not making sense any longer.
Generally speaking, it is quite possible, but not in this case. :milwink: This example is an additional confirmation of the value of knowledge of the language. I recently watched a book by David Glantz “Barbarossa Derailed”
I read to the place (p. 21) where he writes about the State Defense Plan
With minor modifications, the October variant of the defense plan became the basis for the Soviet Union’s Mobilization Plan (MP)41 and associated war plans, specifically, State Defense Plan 1941 (DP – 41).
https://books.google.ru/books?id=SDfInc ... &q&f=false
and quit reading because there wasn’t any Defense Plan in the USSR in 1941 but there were Border Cover Plans for individual districts and it is still unknown whether these plans have been approved. That's where the real lack of sense is. :(
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 12:46

AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 Nov 2019 18:24
MarkN wrote:
06 Nov 2019 16:07
AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:51
But in the winter of 1941 the 2nd option fell away. Why? Because the border divisions were already strengthened. If in 38-39 border divisions were strengthened to 75-80% of war-time TOEs, then how much were they strengthened in 1941? Generals are conservative people. Why should they come up with new TOEs, for the numbers 75-80% were not taken by chance but were reasonable?
Sir, do you really have no opportunity to consult about a translation from Russian?
You are not making sense any longer.
Generally speaking, it is quite possible, but not in this case. :milwink: This example is an additional confirmation of the value of knowledge of the language. I recently watched a book by David Glantz “Barbarossa Derailed”
I read to the place (p. 21) where he writes about the State Defense Plan
With minor modifications, the October variant of the defense plan became the basis for the Soviet Union’s Mobilization Plan (MP)41 and associated war plans, specifically, State Defense Plan 1941 (DP – 41).
https://books.google.ru/books?id=SDfInc ... &q&f=false
and quit reading because there wasn’t any Defense Plan in the USSR in 1941 but there were Border Cover Plans for individual districts and it is still unknown whether these plans have been approved. That's where the real lack of sense is. :(
????

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 08 Nov 2019 15:56

MarkN wrote:
08 Nov 2019 12:46
AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 Nov 2019 18:24
MarkN wrote:
06 Nov 2019 16:07
AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Nov 2019 12:51
But in the winter of 1941 the 2nd option fell away. Why? Because the border divisions were already strengthened. If in 38-39 border divisions were strengthened to 75-80% of war-time TOEs, then how much were they strengthened in 1941? Generals are conservative people. Why should they come up with new TOEs, for the numbers 75-80% were not taken by chance but were reasonable?
Sir, do you really have no opportunity to consult about a translation from Russian?
You are not making sense any longer.
Generally speaking, it is quite possible, but not in this case. :milwink: This example is an additional confirmation of the value of knowledge of the language. I recently watched a book by David Glantz “Barbarossa Derailed”
I read to the place (p. 21) where he writes about the State Defense Plan
With minor modifications, the October variant of the defense plan became the basis for the Soviet Union’s Mobilization Plan (MP)41 and associated war plans, specifically, State Defense Plan 1941 (DP – 41).
https://books.google.ru/books?id=SDfInc ... &q&f=false
and quit reading because there wasn’t any Defense Plan in the USSR in 1941 but there were Border Cover Plans for individual districts and it is still unknown whether these plans have been approved. That's where the real lack of sense is. :(
????
Citing an example from "Barbarossa derailed", I wanted to compliment you by comparing you with David Glantz. Although, maybe, I should have done the opposite, to compare David Glantz with you. :wink:
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

MarkN
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 08 Nov 2019 16:05

AbollonPolweder wrote:
08 Nov 2019 15:56
Citing an example from "Barbarossa derailed", I wanted to compliment you by comparing you with David Glantz. Although, maybe, I should have done the opposite, to compare David Glantz with you.
Thanks. But still ???

Glantz is fluent in Russian, l don't speak a word of it. However, l can understand alot of what l read.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Max Payload » 10 Nov 2019 16:57

AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 Nov 2019 18:24
I recently watched a book by David Glantz “Barbarossa Derailed”
I read to the place (p. 21) where he writes about the State Defense Plan
With minor modifications, the October variant of the defense plan became the basis for the Soviet Union’s Mobilization Plan (MP)41 and associated war plans, specifically, State Defense Plan 1941 (DP – 41).
https://books.google.ru/books?id=SDfInc ... &q&f=false
and quit reading because there wasn’t any Defense Plan in the USSR in 1941
‘Derailed’ is not without errors, even to the extent of confusing north and south on occasion. Slightly off-topic, but Glantz seems quite adamant (page 68) that Guderian was held up at the Dnepr for a week until 10 July and was unable to cross. Yet I’m sure I read that Model established a bridgehead on the left bank near Rogachev on 3 July and held it for three days before being driven back by 21st Army. Does anyone know which version is correct?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 13 Nov 2019 03:02

Max Payload wrote: Yet I’m sure I read that Model established a bridgehead on the left bank near Rogachev on 3 July and held it for three days before being driven back by 21st Army.
Model? It seems unlikely that any foot-mobile ID's were anywhere near that far east on July 3. Rogachev is ~350 miles form the Polish border; it'd take more than a marathon per day for foot-mobile infantry to run there by July 3.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Avalancheon » 13 Nov 2019 14:54

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Nov 2019 03:02
Max Payload wrote: Yet I’m sure I read that Model established a bridgehead on the left bank near Rogachev on 3 July and held it for three days before being driven back by 21st Army.
Model? It seems unlikely that any foot-mobile ID's were anywhere near that far east on July 3. Rogachev is ~350 miles form the Polish border; it'd take more than a marathon per day for foot-mobile infantry to run there by July 3.
At this time, Walter Model was in charge of a panzer division. Not an infantry division.

And just an FYI. In the first phase of operation Barbarossa, even regular infantry divisions were marching at a very high speed. This exhausted the troops involved, but successfully closed the gap between them and the panzer divisions (after they had come to a brief halt).

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 13 Nov 2019 15:08

At this time, Walter Model was in charge of a panzer division. Not an infantry division.
Ach, richtig. Reading too fast, was thinking of Kluge. Nicht sehr kluge.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 26 Nov 2019 04:23

To help get a glimpse of just how disastrous Germany's supply situation in Russia was, David Stahel states in Retreat from Moscow that the OstHeer required 300 trains a day in order to meet its supply needs in December 1941. But the actual number of trains arriving was 45.

Thus, weather wasn't the primary culprit in the failure of Operation Barbarossa. It was logistics.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 26 Nov 2019 11:48

three points
1 The supply problems in the winter of 1941-1942 were not caused by production problems, but by transport problems .
2 What was the result of the German supply situation in December 1942 and following other winter months ? The result was that AGC remained where it was : the Red Army was not able to recapture Minsk or Smolensk and the Ostheer survived the winter .One should relativise and be careful with the use of raw figures and also with the word ''needs '':needs are depending on the mission, weather, fighting,enemy attacks.One example : artillery consumption was less in December than in the Summer .And an other : the offensive capacities of the Red Army were lower in December than in the Winter .
3 Of course weather was not the culprit, not even the secundary one ,as Barbarossa failed in the Summer also .That it was logistics should not people do believe that with better logistics and more supplies Germany could have won,because it was in 1941 simply impossible to go to the Volga/Urals with an army of 150 divisions .The technology and means did not exist .The railroad/road infrastructure west of the Urals could not afford the advance of an army of 3 million men in a few months .And last point : there was also the presence of a Red Army .
That's why I said : if it was needed to go to the Volga with 3 million men,because of the resistance from the Soviets, it was impossible to do it .
And if it was possible to go to the Urals,it was only possible to do it with a few divisions;this implies the collaps of the Soviets west of the DD line .
Three years later, the allied advance in France was blocked by the same problems : going east of the Rhine with all forces was impossible .That's the reason for Market Garden .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 26 Nov 2019 15:32

I think that the figure of 300 trains a day in December 1941 that were needed for the Ostheer is a typo : 300 a day means 9300 for December .

On Geschichtsforum de. thread Winterkleidung oder Munition )(winterclothes or ammunition ) I found the following on post 7 with as reference Klaus Schüler
For the whole East front numbers of arriving military trains
October : 1860/minimum was 72 per day = 2232 ,thus shortage 370
November : 1701/minimum was 2160, shortage 460
I don't see why suddenly the Ostheer would need 9300 trains in December
Last edited by ljadw on 27 Nov 2019 09:08, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 26 Nov 2019 19:19

Here is the quote from Stahel in Retreat from Moscow, Chapter 9:
Lieutenant-General Rudolf Gercke, the chief of Wehrmacht transport responsible for running the trains, reported to Halder on December 15 that the supply of the Eastern Front required some 300 trains a day, but that this had not been possible given shortages in coal, personnel, iron, water pumps, siding track, and provisions for the men. Two days later, on December 17, Gercke reported to Hitler the inflated figure of 122 trains a day departing for the Eastern Front. It is unclear where this figure came from, but it may reflect the difference between the number of trains dispatched to the front and the number of those arriving. It is therefore very possible that many trains were not progressing all the way to the front before unloading their stock and turning back. This artificially suggested more trains were servicing the Ostheer than in fact was the case. Gercke’s planning schedules, therefore, functioned far more effectively on paper than in practice, which meant he was reporting bogus figures and was almost certainly aware of this fact. Indeed, Gercke confidently told Hitler that by January 1, 1942, the number of trains reaching the front every day would increase to 140 trains a day, and by March 1 some 180 trains a day. It was an astonishing claim given that the opposite trend was taking place. Not only were there fewer trains arriving in December than in November, but January saw a steep decline in train arrivals at the front, from a total of 1,643 supply trains in December to 1,420 trains in January. This resulted in a reduction from 53 trains a day to just 45.

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