The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Volyn]

You are too emotionally invested in trying to defend something, learn to handle the subject with maturity.

I have zero emotional attachment to this subject. You need to have the maturity to accept you've been called out!

Called out for what, asking a question? State your case - there are no judges, set down facts in relation to the topic.

.... the different battle phases that you mention should be seen in this context: The Germans did not plan on switching, therefore, their logistic planning was structurally unsound for the tasks assigned.

Disagree. The logistics planning was sound. The actual performance was greater than could be reasonably expected. The Heer decision to continue with the same maximum effort offensive approach was unsound.

Perhaps greater than could be reasonably expected, but it could not be sound - go back to my thread about the "Occupation" efforts, they were draining the "Invasion" efforts.

Was it not Hitler himself who said it had to be a 3-pronged attack?

Based upon his own planning and initiative? I doubt it. Weisung 21 may bear his signature, but it the political directive to get on with the military plan that the military (in particular the Heer) had presented him.

III. Die Führung der Operationen:
A. Heer (in Genehmigung der mir vorgetragenen Absichten):

Hitler rejected the original invasion plan (just like he did with the Invasion of France) and he insisted on a 3-prong attack.

The Heer as a whole needed to listen to the advise of its own logistic experts. They didn't. They carried on BARBAROSSA as if logistics would magically move materiel to the right place, in the right quantity at the right time.

Yes the magical part fits nicely with the mindset of the decision makers. However, I do not understand why you keep separating Heer from logistics, each service has their own logistics branch and none of them planned correctly for what they actually encountered.

Yes - so they should have done a better job at recognizing in advance what the real "on the ground" problems would be. Germany had already fought in this exact same terrain 20 years before, is it not shocking to see how unprepared they really were?

No. The did all of what you suggest. They planned, they war gamed, they saw the problems and they received the advice that they did not have the combat power to succeed. But the generals at the top of the tree decided not to listen.

Great, further evidence that the logistics people knew they could not fulfill the tasks assigned to them; so the war games are accurate and the Generals lost.

The logistics personnel are not the reason for these failings, it is the people involved in the decision making who are the ones that bear responsibility for not recognizing this reality.

Exactly. The logistic system did not fail the Heer. The Heer failed. The Heer decided to conduct operations that they had been advised were beyond their logistic (and other) capabilities.

"had been advised were beyond their logistic (and other) capabilities" is the operative statement here. It is clear that by October the logistics system has significantly weakened and in less than 2 months it began to break. My point is this, if the "Occupation" part of Barbarossa had been better planned for, the "Invasion" part would have had the real possibility of succeeding. When 6. Armee is engaged in Occupation duties - mass shootings, etc. then the invasion has definitely been compromised.

[Konig_pilsner]

look at your first post in the thread, act like what you expect to be treated as.
Stop posting like a holocaust denier.

I am not going to continue this much more with you.

A Jewish journalist/historian William L. Shirer wrote in the preface for his book "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" that history should never be written about untill 100 years had passed to avoid bias. He then went on to write a book filled them (bias).

It is not clear to me why you cannot detach yourself and recognize that the Eisatzgruppen performed a function associated with the war aims of the invasion it engaged in. It gives me no perverse pleasure to acknowledge that by pacifying a hostile segment of the population they were successful, and it was done with no consequences to the invasion itself.

I haven't kept up with new research that may have came out, I find the subject too morbid, and I am open to changing my mind. What I am not open to do is allowing the false narrative that "killing Jews wasn't just evil, it also negatively effected Barbarossa" go unchallenged. Incidentally, it is this distortion of history that breeds more antisemitism today.

You can spend as much time as you like sifting through ammunition data, it doesn't matter. What made the 1941 ID's so good was their transport, mg's and artillery, not a train full of rifle rounds. Nor have you shown any combat elements were in need of rifle ammunition, and couldn't acquire it due to the actions of the Eisatzgruppen. Again, stating anything different is either ignorant or disingenuous.

[Hanny]

Therefore, what the Germans thought is relevant to this discussion because they made their plans based on the priorities of the Nazi leadership's desires.

No. The Heer logistic system was entirely predicated upon how the Heer wanted to do war. Whether Hitler wanted to go left or right, up or down, long or short, the logistic system would be the same.

Was it not Hitler himself who said it had to be a 3-pronged attack? Therefore, Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, SS, etc. needed to provide their input based on what they could do or provide in order to assist with this plan. Trickle-down: Hitler issues his grand scheme and everyone else must try to fulfill it.

Conversely, in order for a plan to really work it has to be based on what can actually be achieved with what is available: Huge dreams do not make up for the lack of capacity required to accomplish them.

Correct OKH OKW role was to translate AH political desires into military plans, when they pointed out logistical problems, AH told them they wont matter, adjust the logistical plan to take what you need to win in 8 to 10 weeks. : ‘After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Germany and Italy will be military masters of the European Continent" War directive 32.

From, 16 August 1941 The needs of the army demanded that the high command come ‘out of the current cloud-cuckoo-land and down to reality’

[MarkN]

Disagree. The logistics planning was sound. The actual performance was greater than could be reasonably expected. The Heer decision to continue with the same maximum effort offensive approach was unsound.

Perhaps greater than could be reasonably expected, but it could not be sound - go back to my thread about the "Occupation" efforts, they were draining the "Invasion" efforts.

An invading army cannot ignore the need to logistically support the occupied territories, the occupation forces etc etc. The idea that such support was "draining" front-line efforts is absurd. It shows less understanding of the need than that shown by the Heer leadership who, clearly, had little desire to bother too much about it.

Hitler rejected the original invasion plan (just like he did with the Invasion of France) and he insisted on a 3-prong attack.

So? What has that got to do with the logistic effort? Hitler was being lobbied by different OKH and OKW generals to implement their pet plan. He chose bits of each.

Logistics is a red herring in understanding BARBAROSSA failure.
Hitler is a red herring in understanding why BARBAROSSA failed militarily.

Yes the magical part fits nicely with the mindset of the decision makers. However, I do not understand why you keep separating Heer from logistics, each service has their own logistics branch and none of them planned correctly for what they actually encountered.

If you don't understand why, well.... :roll:

Great, further evidence that the logistics people knew they could not fulfill the tasks assigned to them; so the war games are accurate and the Generals lost.

Paulus' wargames ended with the Heer being brought to a halt just before Moscow. Where did the Heer get to? But that point was NOT determined by logistics. It was the point at which Heer combat power was spent.

The Heer decisionmakers ignored most of their experts: logistic, operations, etc etc

It is clear that by October the logistics system has significantly weakened and in less than 2 months it began to break. My point is this, if the "Occupation" part of Barbarossa had been better planned for, the "Invasion" part would have had the real possibility of succeeding. When 6. Armee is engaged in Occupation duties - mass shootings, etc. then the invasion has definitely been compromised.

No. The logistic approach demanded and applied for the deep penetration battle erodes in effectiveness every single km the advance moves forward. BARBAROSSA was not "compromised" by occupation duties.

[Hanny]

I am not going to continue this much more with you.

Dont let the door hit you on the way out.

A Jewish journalist/historian William L. Shirer wrote in the preface for his book "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" that history should never be written about untill 100 years had passed to avoid bias. He then went on to write a book filled them (bias).

No he did not and no he was not .https://answers.yahoo.com/question/inde ... 759AAFmXpK
Presbyterian not jewish.

Your agenda has been clear for some time.

[MarkN]

Correct OKH OKW role was to translate AH political desires into military plans, when they pointed out logistical problems, AH told them they wont matter, adjust the logistical plan to take what you need to win in 8 to 10 weeks. : ‘After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Germany and Italy will be military masters of the European Continent" War directive 32.

From, 16 August 1941 The needs of the army demanded that the high command come ‘out of the current cloud-cuckoo-land and down to reality’

OKW and OKH senior toffs had decided to ignore logistic and other advice long before Weisung 21 was written It was not Hitler who did the ignoring. I doubt he was even briefed in a meaningful way on the logistic scenario.

[Volyn]

the Eisatzgruppen performed a function associated with the war aims of the invasion it engaged in. It gives me no perverse pleasure to acknowledge that by pacifying a hostile segment of the population they were successful, and it was done with no consequences to the invasion itself.

This is not completely accurate, see my previous post below. Occupation and pacification activities did have an overall effect on the outcome of Barbarossa. If we separate the Invasion from the Occupation you can see how, the Einzatzgruppen are not the only ones affecting it (just a more infamous example). If it were only the Eisatzgruppen shooting people then you would be correct to say they performed a function associated with the war aims, but 6. Armee (among others) are also tasked with responsibilities not related to combat operations. Every day that is spent in Occupation mode, and not Invasion mode, is a lost week's worth of time. It is the timetable that is the problem and the Germans are trying to do too much in way too of short period of time.

It could be argued that the Eisatzgruppen were effectively given the same tasks that the NKVD had when they took over Eastern Europe (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, etc.). The difference is, the NKVD committed their atrocities after the combat portion was concluded, not during the fighting.

In reality Barbarossa was a 2-part plan being conducted simultaneously, they can be called "Invasion Barbarossa" and "Occupation Barbarossa". We can see in retrospect that the Einzatzgruppen were well prepared (pre-invasion) both mentally and physically for their role in the merciless security measures that they instigated immediately. That means there were plans put into place which the German High Command had to consider as part of their logistics burden. However, meager it may seem to the overall "Invasion Barbarossa" phase, they were a significant part of "Occupation Barbarossa": We need to consider the consequences of both as equals when it comes to priorities. Hitler intentionally wanted to use Barbarossa as his cover for mass murder and genocide, the soldiers would participate when needed, but mostly they would be fighting too far up front to notice.

It appears that "Occupation Barbarossa" was not correctly planned for, and any use/misuse of resources needed to perpetuate this were actually draining "Invasion Barbarossa", just enough, to eventually stall them a critical points along the way. Recall that in AGS it was the 6. Armee that was used to kill at Babi Yar in 29-30 SEP 1941 and this was done with the full blessing of Generalfeldmarschall Reichenau. That is time spent not fighting against the RKKA, and used thousands of soldiers firing tens of thousands of bullets. Then he issues his "Severity Order" on 10 OCT 1941, which has absolutely nothing to do with "Invasion Barbarossa". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Severity_Order

The Army has to aim at another purpose, i. e., the annihilation of revolts in hinterland which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.

This directive begins consuming resources at an accelerated rate, which becomes more difficult to replenish over time as AGS continues moving farther East.

Barbarossa's timetables are so tight that 1 or 2 days could actually be counted as a week lost; the weather hinders everything later. Think of a centipede as it is crawling, the head knows exactly where the tail is, because the whole body is known. Initially Germany moves successfully like this, however, as the larger numbers of POWs are taken it becomes clear that they were not adequately planned for either (yes they did plan for them to starve, etc.) but it still took a toll on an already fragile system because they had to guard them, move them and pen them up somewhere. Add up all of these "problems" and we see that the "German ecological system of logistics" was simply incapable of achieving the full intended measure for both parts of this operation.

I haven't kept up with new research that may have came out, I find the subject too morbid, and I am open to changing my mind. What I am not open to do is allowing the false narrative that "killing Jews wasn't just evil, it also negatively effected Barbarossa" go unchallenged.

You can spend as much time as you like sifting through ammunition data, it doesn't matter. What made the 1941 ID's so good was their transport, mg's and artillery, not a train full of rifle rounds. Nor have you shown any combat elements were in need of rifle ammunition, and couldn't acquire it due to the actions of the Eisatzgruppen. Again, stating anything different is either ignorant or disingenuous.

I present the case above, in light of these 2 parts being separated I would say there was a negative effect on "Occupation Barbarossa" phase of the operation.

[Richard Anderson]

A Jewish journalist/historian William L. Shirer

Not sure how you managed to get the idea that Shirer was Jewish? He was Presbyterian.

[MarkN]

My point is this, if the "Occupation" part of Barbarossa had been better planned for, the "Invasion" part would have had the real possibility of succeeding. When 6. Armee is engaged in Occupation duties - mass shootings, etc. then the invasion has definitely been compromised.

You claimed you just want to discuss the actual logistic effort. And yet, here you are suggesting BARBAROSSA could/would have succeeded if only they had devoted less logistic effort in delivering bullets to murder squads!!!!

:roll:

The Heer failed with their first intermediate objective, their second and their third. They got nowhere near the Endziel. Nowhere close.

But, if they had not "drained" their logistic effort by a couple of million rifle rounds, there was a "real possibility of success". Barking mad!

[MarkN]

A Jewish journalist/historian William L. Shirer

Not sure how you managed to get the idea that Shirer was Jewish? He was Presbyterian.

Shirer. Sounds jewish, doesn't it? And he probably had a big nose and refused to work on Saturdays.

[Konig_pilsner]

Presbyterian not jewish.

Appreciate the correction. Book was still widely known for its bias.

Not sure how you managed to get the idea that Shirer was Jewish? He was Presbyterian.

Read it over 20 years ago, and my recollection was wrong. I think I was actually corrected on this before, won't make the mistake again.

Your agenda has been clear for some time.

If you say so, :roll: why support your flawed argument when you can make accusations. Typical. So you won't be providing that evidence then?

[Volyn]

An invading army cannot ignore the need to logistically support the occupied territories, the occupation forces etc etc. The idea that such support was "draining" front-line efforts is absurd. It shows less understanding of the need than that shown by the Heer leadership who, clearly, had little desire to bother too much about it.

It is a draining effort, because anything that was used for the Occupation activities cannot be used for the Invasion activities. You are trying to compare apples to apples, but I am saying that we need to see 2 separate agendas at work. We are in agreement that the logistics personnel were accurate in their assessments and it was the higher ranking personnel who ignored them. However, we are not using an agreed upon definition for the word "logistics". The German capacity to Invade and Occupy at the same time did not exist.

Yes the magical part fits nicely with the mindset of the decision makers. However, I do not understand why you keep separating Heer from logistics, each service has their own logistics branch and none of them planned correctly for what they actually encountered.

If you don't understand why, well.... :roll:

Please do a better job at explaining your position.

Paulus' wargames ended with the Heer being brought to a halt just before Moscow. Where did the Heer get to? But that point was NOT determined by logistics. It was the point at which Heer combat power was spent.

This is where the point about Occupation and Invasion are felt, the Germans could have reached farther then they did, but excessive interruptions using combat forces for Occupation activities did in fact hinder their overall advance. The early weather problems were something that could not be predicted, this is why their timing was out of alignment with reality.

The logistic approach demanded and applied for the deep penetration battle erodes in effectiveness every single km the advance moves forward. BARBAROSSA was not "compromised" by occupation duties.

For each new km delayed due to non-combat roles, is an act of compromise. You cannot ignore that 6. Armee is wasting time shooting non-combatants, and they are not the only Wehrmacht unit tasked with these odious commands. Do you think that 6. Armee's lack of advance during their activities at Babi Yar would have no affect on the overall military objectives of AGS?

[Richard Anderson]

Shirer. Sounds jewish, doesn't it? And he probably had a big nose and refused to work on Saturdays.

Or because a Scottish sheep-shearer must be Jewish? Anyway, no William Lawrence is not your typical Jewish given names, nor are his father's, Seward Smith, or his mother's, Josephine, nee Tanner. I suspect the confusion is with the German surname Scheurer, which many also mistakenly assume is of "Jewish" origin, when it is simply someone from Scheuren. The Yiddish surname Sheuer, is of Jewish origin, but that isn't the root for Shirer.

[Konig_pilsner]

It appears that "Occupation Barbarossa" was not correctly planned for, and any use/misuse of resources needed to perpetuate this were actually draining "Invasion Barbarossa", just enough, to eventually stall them a critical points along the way. Recall that in AGS it was the 6. Armee that was used to kill at Babi Yar in 29-30 SEP 1941 and this was done with the full blessing of Generalfeldmarschall Reichenau.

I didn't respond since your post is inaccurate, and your aren't grappling with reality. Perhaps Hanny can tell you which units of the 6th Army, how many Grenadiers, how much ammunition, and how much time the action cost the advance since he of course has no "agenda".

[MarkN]

It is a draining effort, because ....

Now you are embarrasing yourself.

I suggest that you read up on the responsibilities of a belligerent aggressor, invader and occupier, according to international law. And then, have a quick think as to whether the logistical requirements to murder the conquored population as soon as possible is greater or lesser than the logistical requirements needed to meet the requirements of international law.

Then think upon your belief that they should have done even less. What would be the consequences of that?

This is where the point about Occupation and Invasion are felt, the Germans could have reached farther then they did, but excessive interruptions using combat forces for Occupation activities did in fact hinder their overall advance.

And now you're embarrasing yourself even further.

The point of the deep penetration battle was to cause the enemy to surrender without having to go through the tiresome business of killing everybody first. In otherwords, their approach to war, by default, left millions of of people behind the lines that were probably not a great a fan of the Heer. The idea that they could just ignore this reality, "occupation Barbarossa" as you call it, is just plain stupid.

For each new km delayed due to non-combat roles, is an act of compromise. You cannot ignore that 6. Armee is wasting time shooting non-combatants, and they are not the only Wehrmacht unit tasked with these odious commands. Do you think that 6. Armee's lack of advance during their activities at Babi Yar would have no affect on the overall military objectives of AGS?

Logistic support to rear areas is NOT a "compromise" it is both a neccessity AND direct consequence of the way the Heer chose to conduct their offensive operations.

Because of who they were, and how they chose to deal with this reality (murder etc), the "drain" on logistic resources was infinitely less than one would assume were the Heer following international law.