The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 04 Dec 2019 18:31

BDV wrote:
04 Dec 2019 17:59
Aida1 wrote: You are completely factually wrong here.You seem to imply that 0 % of the panzer strength was in the south as 40 +60 is a 100.
I meant the armor concentrated for the Luga breakout (August) and Taifun (September).


And you are in denial of the fact that one wanted to go for Moscow.
One can:

A) Go for Moscow (subsequently and only after going for Leningrad),
or one can
B) Plan the attack against Bolshevik Russia "around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Choosing A. excludes B.
Choosing B. excludes A.
B does not exclude A. Leningrad will fall also

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 04 Dec 2019 21:30

Aida1 wrote: BDV:
A) Go for Moscow (subsequently and only after going for Leningrad),
or one can
B) Plan the attack against Bolshevik Russia "around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Choosing A. excludes B.
Choosing B. excludes A.


B does not exclude A. Leningrad will fall also
If one follows "panzerwaffe doctrine" one does not send panzers in a forested upland (Smolesk-Moscau), and even less so into a marshy forested basin (Luga Basin). In both cases, in addition to doing major repairs to every km of railway and every bridge in these theaters, support troops had to build roads and occasionally railways from scratch.

"Panzerwaffe doctrine" dictates a break-out from Belarus and NorthEast Romania into Eastern Ukraine-southern half of Russia, that is - to open terrain, fit for panzerwaffe action. That it was not done is not immediately a critique (beggars cannot be choosers).

Given how things evolved and opportunities and the Fata Morganas that were present during 1941 it is still somewhat of a "why not so" issue (to me). I incline towards an |incompetence/ impatience/ victory disease-brownose disease/ concern about US-UK| explanatory-combo for Grofaz et Co decision-making rather than a fatalistic explanation (they had only one option, and that option could only unfold like so).

Attack on Bolshevik Russia maybe was the only action/active option on the German side, but there was many ways in which this attack could have been pursued. Although at the end of the day fatalismus may be carrying the day on this issue.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 04 Dec 2019 22:23

BDV wrote:
04 Dec 2019 21:30
Aida1 wrote: BDV:
A) Go for Moscow (subsequently and only after going for Leningrad),
or one can
B) Plan the attack against Bolshevik Russia "around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Choosing A. excludes B.
Choosing B. excludes A.


B does not exclude A. Leningrad will fall also
If one follows "panzerwaffe doctrine" one does not send panzers in a forested upland (Smolesk-Moscau), and even less so into a marshy forested basin (Luga Basin). In both cases, in addition to doing major repairs to every km of railway and every bridge in these theaters, support troops had to build roads and occasionally railways from scratch.

"Panzerwaffe doctrine" dictates a break-out from Belarus and NorthEast Romania into Eastern Ukraine-southern half of Russia, that is - to open terrain, fit for panzerwaffe action. That it was not done is not immediately a critique (beggars cannot be choosers).

Given how things evolved and opportunities and the Fata Morganas that were present during 1941 it is still somewhat of a "why not so" issue (to me). I incline towards an |incompetence/ impatience/ victory disease-brownose disease/ concern about US-UK| explanatory-combo for Grofaz et Co decision-making rather than a fatalistic explanation (they had only one option, and that option could only unfold like so).

Attack on Bolshevik Russia maybe was the only action/active option on the German side, but there was many ways in which this attack could have been pursued. Although at the end of the day fatalismus may be carrying the day on this issue.
The main objective was Moscow and Rumania was not a good base for attack so it made sense to put the emphasis in the center.An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 05 Dec 2019 12:48

One could not have Moscow by advancing with 150 divisions .
Besides the main objective was not Moscow, but the Volga .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 05 Dec 2019 16:11

Aida1 wrote: The main objective was Moscow
The main objective was the destruction of Sovjet Russia in one swift campaign.

An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.
The geographic situation of the border is whatever the geographic situation of the border is. That is clear.

However, even in 1940, the place of attack and the direction of attack was decided with the post-opening phase of operation in mind. That is, panzerwaffe broke out into the open space by the most expeditious means possible; and Panzerwaffe stayed in open terrain, with Panzer units forbidden from engaging in unfavourable terrain side-shows (Holland, Belgium Coast/Dunkirk).
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 05 Dec 2019 16:37

ljadw wrote: One could not have Moscow by advancing with 150 divisions .
Well, obviously not if first chasing Brits outta Tripolitania (then from Cyrenaica), chasing Brits out of Greece and its Archipelago, attacking Leningrad, Murmansk, and rolling up Western Ukraine. And then, when time for moving against Moscow comes, simultaneously and at the same time with the attack on Moscow, rolling up Eastern Ukraine and attacking towards Volkhov, Tikhvin, Tver, Donets, Sevastopol, and Rostov-on-Don.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 05 Dec 2019 19:41

Even without this to have the Volga with 150 divisions was impossible in 1941,because the bigger the army, the slower the advance .When Halder wrote in his diary in November 1940 that east of the DD line envelopping operations had no prospect of success,he said in other words that east of the DD line the Blitzkrieg would fail .A Blitzkrieg was only successful over short distances , not over a distance Warsaw-Magnitogorsk which is 3000 km by aircraft .The only possibility for a victorious advance east of the DD line was a pursuit of an enemy on the run ,with small forces.But as the Soviets were never on the run .....

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 06 Dec 2019 00:47

ljadw wrote:Even without this to have the Volga with 150 divisions was impossible in 1941,because the bigger the army, the slower the advance .
If Axis HAS to advance to Volga with 150 divisions (because 150 divisions are needed to push RKKA behind the Volga), the assessment is very correct. Neither is reaching AA line.

However, reaching the Volga as in "one panzer Group reached city X and its environs on the right bank of Volga" not outside the logistical abilities of the Wehrmacht in 1941 vs the abilities of its RKKA opponent.

When Halder wrote in his diary in November 1940 that east of the DD line enveloping operations had no prospect of success, he said in other words that east of the DD line the Blitzkrieg would fail. A Blitzkrieg was only successful over short distances , not over a distance Warsaw-Magnitogorsk which is 3000 km by aircraft.
Halder was a fool of first order. Besides distance, comes the opposition and terrain. 600 km doable in one terrain and against one level of resistance becames 200 km impossible against similar level of opponent, but in different terrain, as the dash-to-the-channel vs the mudbath-in-the-polders attests.

And "blitzkrieg", both German version and Sovjet version carried the day in between Volga and the Black Sea from August '41 until October '44.

But as the Soviets were never on the run...
They were so, occasionally, and in spots. Largest hurried withdrawal was in the North East, afaik; there were others, Rzhev rooms to Torzhok, Perekop Isthmus to Sevastopol.

The only possibility for a victorious advance east of the DD line was a pursuit of an enemy on the run, with small forces. But as the Soviets were never on the run ...
The only possibility for a victorious advance east of the DD line was having superior fighting forces to the enemy. A superior fighting force can force the enemy to be on the run (eastward or westward), and did so East of DD line from August 1941 until June 1944.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 06 Dec 2019 02:39

ljadw wrote:
04 Dec 2019 07:21

As usual you continue to claim that the Germans could have don in 1941 what the Wallies could not do in 1944 .
I did no such thing.
Even if the Germans could have the capability to build more railways,etc, this would not help them ,as
1 they did not have the locs and waggons needed to transport the supplies for the victorious advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga
I did not say they had or needed the capability to build more railways. Since when is 3 million men to the Volga a victory requirement?
2 if they had these locs and waggons,this does not mean that they would have the needed supplies an army of 3 million men needed to go to the Volga
Quibbling and a non-starter...if not a strawman.
3 even if they had the needed supplies,there was still one factor who would block the advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga = DISTANCE /TIME .It would take weeks for a train to move men and supplies to the Volga and to return . WEEKS .
Only Army Group Center requires the logistical base to reach Moscow before the Autumn rains and before the Soviet forces mobilizing there reach combat effectiveness. What stopped them was the forced pause at Smolensk due to reaching the end of the original Barbarossa operational construct and its support plan. Better Intel could have given the Wehrmacht planners the ability to plan better depth to the concept of support such that AGC's operational reach was prolonged through Late Sep-early Oct. By using more engineers, more engineer equipment, staged material stockpiles, enabling the railway conversion with priority support, etc. the Germans could have doubled the capacity of their assets through efficiency.
The ultimate aim is the fall of the Soviet Union, but taking Moscow in 1941 would have saved the Wehrmacht hundreds of thousands of casualties and created major disruption/displacement in the Soviet war effort. What I suggest is not a war winner for the Germans, its a campaign enabler and thats it.
When the Germans were on the run in August/September 1944, the Wallies were still unable to cross the Rhine,encircle the Ruhr and to march on Berlin,notwithstanding that they were closer to Berlin than the Germans were to the Volga
.

What rail assets did the Western Allies have in 1944?
If the Wallies could not do it, why would the Germans be able to do it,especially as the Soviets were never on the run,but were always counter-attacking ?
no-sequitur
It was impossible to go to the Volga with 3 million men in 3 months .
Agreed, but that isn't the issue and it seems more like reductio ad absurdum to me.
The only thing that was possible was to go to the Volga with 300000 men in 3 months , but that was depending on the possibility that the SU would collaps if its standing forces were defeated west of the DD line . And that was depending on the Soviet willingness to collaps .
The truth is that success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Germans could/would or should do,but that it depended on the Soviets .
The key of victory was in the hands of the Soviets .
The Germans needed to destroy the Red Army in the field in 1941 to win the war, we agree on that. I'm simply stating that better Intel leads to a better plan and better odds for the Germans. They made many mistakes in the planning process and forfeit any chance of victory, negotiated peace or even stalemate. If Op Taifun starts even 10 days sooner than the OTL with a stronger logistical base, the Wehrmacht destroys what is left of the Red Army in front of Moscow and encircles it before the rains.
That cripples the Soviet rail network, displaces mobilization, government, etc. The net benefits to the Wehrmacht are huge to say the least.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 06 Dec 2019 02:48

Aida1 wrote:
04 Dec 2019 14:42
Even if your Intel about enemy strength is correct and the operational plan is adapted to it, consumption rate is still guesswork as you cannot accurately predict enemy resistance and speed of advance. There are other variables too you cannot predict when you do not have a similor campaign you can use as a yardstick. Plans rarely work out.There is always improvisation.
The consumption rate of a given unit is educated guesswork and within the realm of achieving accurate estimates. I have been a log staff officer on BDE, DIV and Corps staff, this is how we make a living. Consumption rates are generally overestimated in order to be safe, not vice versa. The German log estimates of pre-Barbarossa suffered from a lack of Intel on the amount of forces the Red Army actually possessed. The concept of support allowed the Wehrmacht to successfully destroy the known enemy forces west of the Dnieper river with a good deal of efficiency. The Germans clearly demonstrated the ability for efficient planning. Its everything after Smolensk that was pure improvisation, from the front to the factory.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 06 Dec 2019 06:52

BDV wrote:
05 Dec 2019 16:11
Aida1 wrote: The main objective was Moscow
The main objective was the destruction of Sovjet Russia in one swift campaign.

An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.
The geographic situation of the border is whatever the geographic situation of the border is. That is clear.

However, even in 1940, the place of attack and the direction of attack was decided with the post-opening phase of operation in mind. That is, panzerwaffe broke out into the open space by the most expeditious means possible; and Panzerwaffe stayed in open terrain, with Panzer units forbidden from engaging in unfavourable terrain side-shows (Holland, Belgium Coast/Dunkirk).
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army. In 1940 the attack was launched in terrain that was supposedly unsuitable for tanks.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 06 Dec 2019 06:59

Appleknocker27 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 02:48
Aida1 wrote:
04 Dec 2019 14:42
Even if your Intel about enemy strength is correct and the operational plan is adapted to it, consumption rate is still guesswork as you cannot accurately predict enemy resistance and speed of advance. There are other variables too you cannot predict when you do not have a similor campaign you can use as a yardstick. Plans rarely work out.There is always improvisation.
The consumption rate of a given unit is educated guesswork and within the realm of achieving accurate estimates. I have been a log staff officer on BDE, DIV and Corps staff, this is how we make a living. Consumption rates are generally overestimated in order to be safe, not vice versa. The German log estimates of pre-Barbarossa suffered from a lack of Intel on the amount of forces the Red Army actually possessed. The concept of support allowed the Wehrmacht to successfully destroy the known enemy forces west of the Dnieper river with a good deal of efficiency. The Germans clearly demonstrated the ability for efficient planning. Its everything after Smolensk that was pure improvisation, from the front to the factory.
Not only red army strength was underestimated. Fuel usage on the bad Russian was much higher than expected. The extent to which the red army succeeded in getting away the railways rolling stock was not expected.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 06 Dec 2019 20:46

Aida1 wrote:
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army.
Please provide sourcing for this asessment.

In 1940 the attack was launched in terrain that was supposedly unsuitable for tanks.
And the armor exited those rooms as quick as possible, and stayed out of unfavourable terrain for the duration.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 06 Dec 2019 22:12

Appleknocker27 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 02:39
ljadw wrote:
04 Dec 2019 07:21

As usual you continue to claim that the Germans could have don in 1941 what the Wallies could not do in 1944 .
I did no such thing.
Even if the Germans could have the capability to build more railways,etc, this would not help them ,as
1 they did not have the locs and waggons needed to transport the supplies for the victorious advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga
I did not say they had or needed the capability to build more railways. Since when is 3 million men to the Volga a victory requirement?
2 if they had these locs and waggons,this does not mean that they would have the needed supplies an army of 3 million men needed to go to the Volga
Quibbling and a non-starter...if not a strawman.
3 even if they had the needed supplies,there was still one factor who would block the advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga = DISTANCE /TIME .It would take weeks for a train to move men and supplies to the Volga and to return . WEEKS .
Only Army Group Center requires the logistical base to reach Moscow before the Autumn rains and before the Soviet forces mobilizing there reach combat effectiveness. What stopped them was the forced pause at Smolensk due to reaching the end of the original Barbarossa operational construct and its support plan. Better Intel could have given the Wehrmacht planners the ability to plan better depth to the concept of support such that AGC's operational reach was prolonged through Late Sep-early Oct. By using more engineers, more engineer equipment, staged material stockpiles, enabling the railway conversion with priority support, etc. the Germans could have doubled the capacity of their assets through efficiency.
The ultimate aim is the fall of the Soviet Union, but taking Moscow in 1941 would have saved the Wehrmacht hundreds of thousands of casualties and created major disruption/displacement in the Soviet war effort. What I suggest is not a war winner for the Germans, its a campaign enabler and thats it.
When the Germans were on the run in August/September 1944, the Wallies were still unable to cross the Rhine,encircle the Ruhr and to march on Berlin,notwithstanding that they were closer to Berlin than the Germans were to the Volga
.

What rail assets did the Western Allies have in 1944?
If the Wallies could not do it, why would the Germans be able to do it,especially as the Soviets were never on the run,but were always counter-attacking ?
no-sequitur
It was impossible to go to the Volga with 3 million men in 3 months .
Agreed, but that isn't the issue and it seems more like reductio ad absurdum to me.
The only thing that was possible was to go to the Volga with 300000 men in 3 months , but that was depending on the possibility that the SU would collaps if its standing forces were defeated west of the DD line . And that was depending on the Soviet willingness to collaps .
The truth is that success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Germans could/would or should do,but that it depended on the Soviets .
The key of victory was in the hands of the Soviets .
The Germans needed to destroy the Red Army in the field in 1941 to win the war, we agree on that. I'm simply stating that better Intel leads to a better plan and better odds for the Germans. They made many mistakes in the planning process and forfeit any chance of victory, negotiated peace or even stalemate. If Op Taifun starts even 10 days sooner than the OTL with a stronger logistical base, the Wehrmacht destroys what is left of the Red Army in front of Moscow and encircles it before the rains.
That cripples the Soviet rail network, displaces mobilization, government, etc. The net benefits to the Wehrmacht are huge to say the least.
If/when/after the Germans where at the Volga, the Soviets would be defeated .But to go to the Volga, the Germans had first to defeat the Soviets .
If the Germans wanted to defeat the Soviets east of the DD line/at the Volga, they needed to cross the DD line,to go to the Volga with 3 million men ,because they could not go after the Soviets with 3ooooo men . As it was impossible to go to the Volga with 3 million men ( who would occupy the conquered territories ),they had to go to the Volga with 3ooooo,after having defeated the Soviets west of the DD line .
The Ostheer could not go to the Volga : Halder said clearly that envelopping operations ( by the Ostheer ) east of the DD line would not be decisive .The Germans needed to destroy the Red Army to win the war, but the destruction of the Red Army could only happen west of the DD line .
And it is not so that Taifun could start 10 days earlier with a stronger logistical base, because if Taifun would start sooner, its industrial base would be weaker .
That the WM could destroy the Soviet forces in front of Moscow is meaningless and wrong, because the strength of these forces would be determined by the Soviets and if these forces were weak, the Ostheer would have no benefit of it .Destruction of the Soviet forces in front of Moscow would not result in the capture of Moscow or in an advance to the Volga, unless you can prove that the Red Army would have no more reserves if these forces were destroyd .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 06 Dec 2019 22:32

BDV wrote:
06 Dec 2019 20:46
Please provide sourcing for this asessment.
The last 3 pages or so have been a series of posts by 4 posters shouting claims at one another. Not a single piece of evidence to support a single one of the numerous claims shouted.

History on AHF is becoming a competition to see who can shout the most claims, the loudest and the most frequently.

The victor in this shouting match writes the AHF version of history. Last man standing rules apply.

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