The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 07 Dec 2019 10:42

Aida1 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 06:52
BDV wrote:
05 Dec 2019 16:11
Aida1 wrote: The main objective was Moscow
The main objective was the destruction of Sovjet Russia in one swift campaign.

An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.
The geographic situation of the border is whatever the geographic situation of the border is. That is clear.

However, even in 1940, the place of attack and the direction of attack was decided with the post-opening phase of operation in mind. That is, panzerwaffe broke out into the open space by the most expeditious means possible; and Panzerwaffe stayed in open terrain, with Panzer units forbidden from engaging in unfavourable terrain side-shows (Holland, Belgium Coast/Dunkirk).
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army. In 1940 the attack was launched in terrain that was supposedly unsuitable for tanks.
The main body of the Red Army was not in front of Moscow. The Red Army was spread from Leningrad to Moscow .
The Germans hoped that the Soviets had only small reserves ( which was wrong ) and that these reserves were concentrated in front of Moscow ( which was also wrong ) .
The Ardennes were not insuitable for tanks .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 07 Dec 2019 16:46

ljadw wrote:
07 Dec 2019 10:42
Aida1 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 06:52
BDV wrote:
05 Dec 2019 16:11
Aida1 wrote: The main objective was Moscow
The main objective was the destruction of Sovjet Russia in one swift campaign.

An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.
The geographic situation of the border is whatever the geographic situation of the border is. That is clear.

However, even in 1940, the place of attack and the direction of attack was decided with the post-opening phase of operation in mind. That is, panzerwaffe broke out into the open space by the most expeditious means possible; and Panzerwaffe stayed in open terrain, with Panzer units forbidden from engaging in unfavourable terrain side-shows (Holland, Belgium Coast/Dunkirk).
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army. In 1940 the attack was launched in terrain that was supposedly unsuitable for tanks.
The main body of the Red Army was not in front of Moscow. The Red Army was spread from Leningrad to Moscow .
The Germans hoped that the Soviets had only small reserves ( which was wrong ) and that these reserves were concentrated in front of Moscow ( which was also wrong ) .
The Ardennes were not insuitable for tanks .
Going for the capital is a valid method to provoke a battle with the main body of enemy forces. The ardennes is not good for tanks if properly defended.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 07 Dec 2019 18:03

BDV wrote:
06 Dec 2019 20:46
Aida1 wrote:
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army.
Please provide sourcing for this asessment.


The discussion between Hitler and the OKH about going for Moscow is wellestablished but i am willing to give a source (Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion Boog/Forster/Hoffmann/Klink/Müller/Ueberschar Fischer 1991 pp 572-595).

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 07 Dec 2019 18:28

Aida1 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 16:46
ljadw wrote:
07 Dec 2019 10:42
Aida1 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 06:52
BDV wrote:
05 Dec 2019 16:11
Aida1 wrote: The main objective was Moscow
The main objective was the destruction of Sovjet Russia in one swift campaign.

An operation does not have to be launched in the terrain that is most suitable for tanks. Was not done in 1940 either.
The geographic situation of the border is whatever the geographic situation of the border is. That is clear.

However, even in 1940, the place of attack and the direction of attack was decided with the post-opening phase of operation in mind. That is, panzerwaffe broke out into the open space by the most expeditious means possible; and Panzerwaffe stayed in open terrain, with Panzer units forbidden from engaging in unfavourable terrain side-shows (Holland, Belgium Coast/Dunkirk).
The intent was to go for Moscow in order to defeat the main body of the red Army. In 1940 the attack was launched in terrain that was supposedly unsuitable for tanks.
The main body of the Red Army was not in front of Moscow. The Red Army was spread from Leningrad to Moscow .
The Germans hoped that the Soviets had only small reserves ( which was wrong ) and that these reserves were concentrated in front of Moscow ( which was also wrong ) .
The Ardennes were not insuitable for tanks .
Going for the capital is a valid method to provoke a battle with the main body of enemy forces. The ardennes is not good for tanks if properly defended.
Going for the capital is a dubious method to provoke a battle with the main body of enemy forces: the Germans could not go to Moscow with the main body of their forces, thus there was no need for the Soviets to defend Moscow with the main body of their forces .
And the capture of a capital does not force the enemy to give up: Poland continued the fight after the fall of Warsaw, Belgium after the fall of Brussels, France after the fall of Paris .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 07 Dec 2019 21:14

The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 07 Dec 2019 21:25

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
There was never a conviction that the red army would try to escape,rather the contrary.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Dec 2019 14:24

Aida1 wrote:
HistoryGeek2019 wrote: The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
There was never a conviction that the red army would try to escape,rather the contrary.
And the hope that there was no more RKKA beyond what was present at the front spurred both the July improvisation and the November improvisation, with disastrous results.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Dec 2019 14:35

BDV wrote:
11 Dec 2019 14:24
Aida1 wrote:
HistoryGeek2019 wrote: The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
There was never a conviction that the red army would try to escape,rather the contrary.
And the hope that there was no more RKKA beyond what was present at the front spurred both the July improvisation and the November improvisation, with disastrous results.
You are overstating as with a correct estimation of red army strength ,there would have been probably a stop in october but the continuation in november beyond that caused no disaster.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Dec 2019 15:01

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
It was not a false premise,but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose . They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Dec 2019 16:28

ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 15:01
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
It was not a false premise,but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose . They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .
Was always unlikely as it would imply given up a lot of valuable areas.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Dec 2019 17:46

ljadw wrote:It was not a false premise, but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose .
And yet, going after the Soviet State (largest soviet population+industry centers) is what Germans did; in July and in October, with results that speak for themselves.

They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans.
But that's what Soviets did. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Dec 2019 18:30

ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 15:01
They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .
Whether it was the only way to win is impossible to determine definitively.

It is, however, the case that the Soviet plan was indeed to fight as far forward as possible and they tried to get as much forward as possible. In spite of this playing into Germany's hands, the Heer didn't give the Red Army sufficiant time to mobilize, concentrate and move forward all of their forces.

PS. Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 11 Dec 2019 18:36

BDV wrote:
11 Dec 2019 17:46
But that's what Soviets did. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left. Their calculations, however, were seriously flawed which lead to significant overstatements of how much of the Red Army they had already dealt with.

PS. Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Dec 2019 20:19

BDV wrote:
11 Dec 2019 17:46
ljadw wrote:It was not a false premise, but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose .
And yet, going after the Soviet State (largest soviet population+industry centers) is what Germans did; in July and in October, with results that speak for themselves.

They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans.
But that's what Soviets did. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
When the Germans were going after the Soviets, they lost .
When the Soviets came to the Germans, the Germans won .
A few weeks after June 22, Halder wrote triumphantically and also relieved : the Soviets accept the battle . If the Soviets did not accept the battle, Germany had lost the battle already in June .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Dec 2019 20:21

MarkN wrote:
11 Dec 2019 18:36
BDV wrote:
11 Dec 2019 17:46
But that's what Soviets did. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left. Their calculations, however, were seriously flawed which lead to significant overstatements of how much of the Red Army they had already dealt with.

PS. Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.
The Germans knew that their calculations were flawed.

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