The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 11 Dec 2019 20:24

Aida1 wrote:
11 Dec 2019 16:28
ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 15:01
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
It was not a false premise,but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose . They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .
Was always unlikely as it would imply given up a lot of valuable areas.
Which is not unlikely,as the Kremlin always could change its policy : Halder was very relieved when the Soviets accepted the battle, because if they did not, Germany had lost on Day One .

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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 11 Dec 2019 20:57

ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 20:24
Aida1 wrote:
11 Dec 2019 16:28
ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 15:01
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
It was not a false premise,but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose . They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .
Was always unlikely as it would imply given up a lot of valuable areas.
Which is not unlikely,as the Kremlin always could change its policy : Halder was very relieved when the Soviets accepted the battle, because if they did not, Germany had lost on Day One .
. Executing a delaying action is far less easy than you think,certainly when surprised.

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 11 Dec 2019 21:49

Aida1 wrote: Executing a delaying action is far less easy than you think,certainly when surprised.
That may be, but the attacker's ability to sustain the attack against the delaying action also comes into play.

And if you can bamboozle (by luck or design, it don't really matter) the attacker into burning its puny logistical assets in this pursuit, voila, 1941!
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 12 Dec 2019 07:18

Aida1 wrote:
11 Dec 2019 20:57
ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 20:24
Aida1 wrote:
11 Dec 2019 16:28
ljadw wrote:
11 Dec 2019 15:01
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
07 Dec 2019 21:14
The whole notion of "provoking a battle with the main body of the Soviet forces" was based on the false premise that the Red Army would retreat into the Russian interior (as the Russians did against Napoleon) rather than engage the German army. In reality, the Red Army did the exact opposite. It was counter-attacking and massing all along the German lines across the entire width of the front. The Red Army didn't need any provoking. It was literally right in front of the Germans the entire time.
It was not a false premise,but a nightmare : if the Germans had to go after the Soviets, they would lose . They could only win if the Soviets were coming to meet the Germans .
Was always unlikely as it would imply given up a lot of valuable areas.
Which is not unlikely,as the Kremlin always could change its policy : Halder was very relieved when the Soviets accepted the battle, because if they did not, Germany had lost on Day One .
. Executing a delaying action is far less easy than you think,certainly when surprised.
The Soviets could withdrraw faster to Moscow than the Germans could advance to Moscow,because the Soviet forces in European Russia were closer to Moscow than to the border .

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 12 Dec 2019 14:25

MarkN wrote: BDV: But that's what Soviets did [defend forward]. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left.

So, you say that they gambled that their guesswork was correct?

LJADW's logic carries the day, then.

There were no more Sovjets because there HAD to be no more Sovjets.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 12 Dec 2019 14:58

BDV wrote:
12 Dec 2019 14:25
MarkN wrote: BDV: But that's what Soviets did [defend forward]. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left.
So, you say that they gambled that their guesswork was correct?
No. The Heer didn't gamble at all. Nor did they guess.

PS. Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 12 Dec 2019 17:58

MarkN wrote: No. The Heer didn't gamble at all. Nor did they guess.
They guessed that ALL their major estimates (enemy troops engaged in battle, enemy troops eliminated, available RKKA troops) were correct. There was no verification procedure, except trial by fire.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Dec 2019 18:53

BDV wrote:
12 Dec 2019 14:25
MarkN wrote: BDV: But that's what Soviets did [defend forward]. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left.

So, you say that they gambled that their guesswork was correct?

LJADW's logic carries the day, then.

There were no more Sovjets because there HAD to be no more Sovjets.
They had reports, numbers, AND math?

BDV you're clearly losing this argument. Nobody has ever used all three ace cards as part of guesswork.

Like maybe if they just had reports and numbers you could call it guesswork. But add MATH to the mix and...

Lol. Reports numbers and math. :lol: :lol: :lol:

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by MarkN » 12 Dec 2019 19:38

BDV wrote:
12 Dec 2019 17:58
MarkN wrote: No. The Heer didn't gamble at all. Nor did they guess.
They guessed that ALL their major estimates (enemy troops engaged in battle, enemy troops eliminated, available RKKA troops) were correct. There was no verification procedure, except trial by fire.
Nope, no guessing at all. Far worse. They assumed that every formation encountered was completely destroyed. Bit of a flaw, ej?

All they had to do was spend 5 seconds comparing the body count (dead and alive) to see the flaw. But, alas, it seems that was too much for the OKH.

PS. Since nobody else is bothering to evidence their comments, l won't bother either.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 13 Dec 2019 12:26

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Dec 2019 18:53
BDV wrote:
12 Dec 2019 14:25
MarkN wrote: BDV: But that's what Soviets did [defend forward]. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left.

So, you say that they gambled that their guesswork was correct?

LJADW's logic carries the day, then.

There were no more Sovjets because there HAD to be no more Sovjets.
They had reports, numbers, AND math?

BDV you're clearly losing this argument. Nobody has ever used all three ace cards as part of guesswork.

Like maybe if they just had reports and numbers you could call it guesswork. But add MATH to the mix and...

Lol. Reports numbers and math. :lol: :lol: :lol:
WRONG : it is : there had to be no more Sovjets ( because if there were still Sovjets ,Germany had lost ), THUS there would be no more Soviets ,
It was the same in 1914 : they could win only if the French army was defeated at the border, thus the French army would be defeated at the border . At the start of the Marne battle, Moltke had already admitted that he had failed, but he refused to draw the logical consequences of his failure, which was to ask for peace . It was the same in 1941 : Barbarossa could only succeed if the standing Soviet forces were defeated and if this caused the collaps of the SU,when this did not happen, Germany refused to draw the needed consequences and as in 1914, they switched to another logic .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Peter89 » 13 Dec 2019 15:28

ljadw wrote:
13 Dec 2019 12:26
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
12 Dec 2019 18:53
BDV wrote:
12 Dec 2019 14:25
MarkN wrote: BDV: But that's what Soviets did [defend forward]. At which points Germans gambled on there being no more Soviets behind those already at the front (also, if there are no more Soviets, logistics is not going to matter to boot!). With results that speak for themselves.
The Heer didn't gamble at all.

They calculated, with combat report data, numbers and math not guesswork, that the Soviets had nothing left.

So, you say that they gambled that their guesswork was correct?

LJADW's logic carries the day, then.

There were no more Sovjets because there HAD to be no more Sovjets.
They had reports, numbers, AND math?

BDV you're clearly losing this argument. Nobody has ever used all three ace cards as part of guesswork.

Like maybe if they just had reports and numbers you could call it guesswork. But add MATH to the mix and...

Lol. Reports numbers and math. :lol: :lol: :lol:
WRONG : it is : there had to be no more Sovjets ( because if there were still Sovjets ,Germany had lost ), THUS there would be no more Soviets ,
It was the same in 1914 : they could win only if the French army was defeated at the border, thus the French army would be defeated at the border . At the start of the Marne battle, Moltke had already admitted that he had failed, but he refused to draw the logical consequences of his failure, which was to ask for peace . It was the same in 1941 : Barbarossa could only succeed if the standing Soviet forces were defeated and if this caused the collaps of the SU,when this did not happen, Germany refused to draw the needed consequences and as in 1914, they switched to another logic .
This is not correct. SU could win only if the western powers and Japan remain de facto neutral or join forces with them.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 13 Dec 2019 17:01

The case of the Western powers being allied to Germany is a fantasy and can be discarded .Besides, their input for Barbarossa would be meaningless .
The eventuality of the Western powers being neutral would make Barbarossa unnecessary,and also impossible : a neutral France + Britain in June 1941 would tie more German forces than were tied by a defeated France and fighting Britain in the OTL of 1941 .
June 1941 was the best scenario for the Germans : 150 divisions for Barbarossa, 50 tied elsewhere ( most of then not fit for Barbarossa ).
ALL other scenarios would be worse for Germany :
Britain and France neutral would result in a weaker Ostheer with less than 150 divisions.
Britain and France defeated and occupied would result in an even more weaker Ostheer : the occupation of Britain and Ireland would require 30 additional divisions,and only 120 would remain for Barbarossa .

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BDV
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by BDV » 13 Dec 2019 20:42

TheMarcksPlan wrote: They had reports, numbers, AND math?
....
Lol. Reports numbers and math. :lol: :lol: :lol:
Oh, MY! Germans had ... Reports ... Numbers ... AAAAND Mathematics?
Aristotelian logic sez: correct premises lead to correct inferences.

Soooo how come they were SO very very wrong?

Because of GIGO: Guesses In, Guesses Out.

Had Barbarossa been successful, the intelligence failure would have been harder to detect. The bootlickin' field exterminators Munchhausenian ways make it hard to detect as it is.

(unless you want to argue that they had simply fabricated their figures - given what transpired historically I really could not argue with THAT).
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 13 Dec 2019 20:45

Germany had not the strength to dominate Europe, neither had the SU, neither has the USA .Thus all the scenarios invented to make Germany winning WWII ,are a wast of time .

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 13 Dec 2019 22:16

BDV wrote:Soooo how come they were SO very very wrong?

Because of GIGO: Guesses In, Guesses Out
Even that's generous - more like wishes in, wishes out. I mean it doesn't take much intelligence in either the trade or colloquial sense to predict that a militaristic nation of 200 million probably has a few spare men to throw into battle.

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