where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[jesk]

Did Halder spread out myth about the eastern front? Did he lie or make thing to sound like it's not him the problem?

Halder's immediate post-war account of the preparation for BARBAROSSA, the principle reason for its failure and who was responsible for the direction and results of the campaign over the first few months is at significant odds with historical reality.

in wich way? Where did he lie? Did he blame everything on Hitler?

"Everything" is an unhelpful catch-all word. But it would be accurate to say Halder went out of his way to come up with plenty of examples and reasons why Hitler was to blame for political, strategic military and tactical military failure.

The point has no relation to events of 1941. Germans could take Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev in July, 1941. Only Hitler prevented it. Not the Red Army.

[jesk]

Did Halder spread out myth about the eastern front? Did he lie or make thing to sound like it's not him the problem?

Halder's immediate post-war account of the preparation for BARBAROSSA, the principle reason for its failure and who was responsible for the direction and results of the campaign over the first few months is at significant odds with historical reality.

in wich way? Where did he lie? Did he blame everything on Hitler?

"Everything" is an unhelpful catch-all word. But it would be accurate to say Halder went out of his way to come up with plenty of examples and reasons why Hitler was to blame for political, strategic military and tactical military failure.

what about halder himself? What mistake did he make?

Halder could not resist Hitler's desires. In that a problem.

[aurelien wolff]

did he have other problem?

[jesk]

In September 1942, his problems ended with resignation. Hitler stayed.

[aurelien wolff]

why have I the impression that some people are like "Halder alway's right" when they talk about him? What did he do wrong during the war what mistake did he make himself beside fellowing hitler order?

[MarkN]

Halder was captured by the British in May 1945 and interrogated. The interrogators wrote a report (the copy I have is 49 pages long) on his responses combined with those of Muller-Hillebrand. During the interrogation Halder was without any documents and thus his responses were soley from memory and thus some of the details are fuzzy. He had a lot to say about Unternehmen BARBAROSSA.

Here is one excerpt from the report. Remember, this is not a transcript of Halder's words, it is a report written by his British interrogators using their notes on what he said.

The number of divs employed for the initial attack against RUSSIA was sufficient for the frontier battles(1) but was not enough to cover later needs which were going to arise when the front advanced further to the EAST and became progressively longer, and presumable twice as many divs would be needed. HITLER, in view of the noticeable pressure on home morale brought about by the war against RUSSIA, did not wish to agree to a more intensive utilisation of the German manpower strength. He always stressed the idea, therefore, that the enemy's superiority in numbers would have to be levelled down by cracking large lumps out of the enemy front in each single action and destroying them completely. These ideas ware not new and did not interfere with planning. The necessity for reconciling this demand, however, with the nervous haste with which he pushed on towarde the EAST became disturbing. The limited forces available and the lack of communications made it impossible to carry out both demands simultaneously.

(1) I cannot remember exactly the number of formations at the disposal of the German Comd. I believe there were a total of 20 pz Divs, 10 Mot Divs, 4 Mot SS Divs , 1 Cav Div and about 120 Inf Divs.

With the benefit of hindsight, Halder correctly identifies that the Heer simply didn't have enough combat power to get much beyond the first bound (Leningrad - Smolensk - Kyiv) and opines that it would have needed double the force for BARBAROSSA to succeed. He then lays the blame for not have enough forces on Hitler.

In this single paragraph Halder is saying the reason BARBAROSSA failed is because they didn't have enough troops and that the reason they didn't have enough was because Hitler wouldn't let the Heer have them.

Now, reconcile that with the documentary evidence. It was Halder's office that came up with the strategy for Unternehmen BARBAROSSA, the forces required and the objectives achievable. It wasn't Hitler that got his numbers wrong, it was the Heer and, in particular, Halder's OKH staff.

I'll leave you to work out how this fits into other areas of the historical narrative. There's plenty to think about just from this one paragraph.

The entire reports is littered with Halder's recollections not tallying with historical reality and placing blame for military failure directly upon Hitler.

[aurelien wolff]

Halder was captured by the British in May 1945 and interrogated. The interrogators wrote a report (the copy I have is 49 pages long) on his responses combined with those of Muller-Hillebrand. During the interrogation Halder was without any documents and thus his responses were soley from memory and thus some of the details are fuzzy. He had a lot to say about Unternehmen BARBAROSSA.

Here is one excerpt from the report. Remember, this is not a transcript of Halder's words, it is a report written by his British interrogators using their notes on what he said.

The number of divs employed for the initial attack against RUSSIA was sufficient for the frontier battles(1) but was not enough to cover later needs which were going to arise when the front advanced further to the EAST and became progressively longer, and presumable twice as many divs would be needed. HITLER, in view of the noticeable pressure on home morale brought about by the war against RUSSIA, did not wish to agree to a more intensive utilisation of the German manpower strength. He always stressed the idea, therefore, that the enemy's superiority in numbers would have to be levelled down by cracking large lumps out of the enemy front in each single action and destroying them completely. These ideas ware not new and did not interfere with planning. The necessity for reconciling this demand, however, with the nervous haste with which he pushed on towarde the EAST became disturbing. The limited forces available and the lack of communications made it impossible to carry out both demands simultaneously.

(1) I cannot remember exactly the number of formations at the disposal of the German Comd. I believe there were a total of 20 pz Divs, 10 Mot Divs, 4 Mot SS Divs , 1 Cav Div and about 120 Inf Divs.

With the benefit of hindsight, Halder correctly identifies that the Heer simply didn't have enough combat power to get much beyond the first bound (Leningrad - Smolensk - Kyiv) and opines that it would have needed double the force for BARBAROSSA to succeed. He then lays the blame for not have enough forces on Hitler.

In this single paragraph Halder is saying the reason BARBAROSSA failed is because they didn't have enough troops and that the reason they didn't have enough was because Hitler wouldn't let the Heer have them.

Now, reconcile that with the documentary evidence. It was Halder's office that came up with the strategy for Unternehmen BARBAROSSA, the forces required and the objectives achievable. It wasn't Hitler that got his numbers wrong, it was the Heer and, in particular, Halder's OKH staff.

I'll leave you to work out how this fits into other areas of the historical narrative. There's plenty to think about just from this one paragraph.

The entire reports is littered with Halder's recollections not tallying with historical reality and placing blame for military failure directly upon Hitler.

so frow what I undertand,halder isn't always right and he's one of the reason for the barbarossa failure.

[jesk]

The number of divs employed for the initial attack against RUSSIA was sufficient for the frontier battles(1) but was not enough to cover later needs which were going to arise when the front advanced further to the EAST and became progressively longer, and presumable twice as many divs would be needed.

With the benefit of hindsight, Halder correctly identifies that the Heer simply didn't have enough combat power to get much beyond the first bound (Leningrad - Smolensk - Kyiv) and opines that it would have needed double the force for BARBAROSSA to succeed. He then lays the blame for not have enough forces on Hitler.

Halder did not know that in 1942 Hitler will want to attack the Caucasus. Only in July fights for the Crimea ended. The stretched front near Demyansk, Rzhev, the Siege of Leningrad.
In such context it is necessary to understand the lack of strength. In 1941 only for the Caucasus did not have the strength to break through. And only because Hitler wanted the war in the Crimea. Perekop could be blocked one division and all power of the 11th army to fall upon the Caucasus. Hitler did not want to take Leningrad, near Moscow the climate prevented. In February-March, 1943, 32(!) divisions moved to other sectors of the front after elimination of ledges of Rzhev and Demyansk. 9th Model army attacked Kursk. Previously busy by Moscow ..

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi MarkN,

"In this single paragraph Halder is saying the reason BARBAROSSA failed is because they didn't have enough troops and that the reason they didn't have enough was because Hitler wouldn't let the Heer have them."

The only thing that seems questionable is whether he should have used "couldn't" instead of "wouldn't".

Were there the necessary extra troops available?

If so, what were they?

How were they otherwise engaged?

Were they releasable from these engagements?

And, were they sufficient to change outcomes on the Eastern Front?

Fromm, head of the Ersatzheer, thought he had enough replacements for five months. In fact they were needed in two months because casualty rates were much higher than anticipated. This was clearly an Army calculation.

However, Hitler ordered the war and had absolute authority, so he, at the very least, shares the blame. If he "wouldn't" make the extra troops available, he was clearly at fault. If he "couldn't" make the extra troops available then he was also at fault for launching a campaign for which he had insufficient resources.

There also remains open the question of who drew up the final objective for the invasion of the USSR, as I asked earlier:

"In Hitler's Table Talk for 5/6 July 1941 he is quoted as saying: "To those who ask me whether it will be enough to reach the Urals as a frontier, I reply that for the present it is enough for the frontier to be drawn back as far as that. What matters is that Bolshevism must be exterminated. In case of necessity, we shall renew our advance wherever a new centre of resistance is formed."

On 27 July he is reported as saying: "When I say this side of the Urals, I mean a line running two or three hindred kilometers to the east of the Urals. It should be possible to control this region with two hundred and fifty thousand men plus a cadre of good administrators."

Is this Hitler setting out Barbarossa's goals, or Hitler accepting what his generals told him was achievable in a single campaign?"

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Sid, you are starting from a wrong point of view : it is not so that Barbarossa failed because the Germans were not strong enough . Barbarossa could succeed with a weaker Ostheer, it also could fail with a stronger Ostheer .Barbarossa failed because the Soviets refused to give up, and, even with a stronger Ostheer the Soviets would refuse to give up .

[MarkN]

Sid, you are starting from a wrong point of view : it is not so that Barbarossa failed because the Germans were not strong enough . Barbarossa could succeed with a weaker Ostheer, it also could fail with a stronger Ostheer .Barbarossa failed because the Soviets refused to give up, and, even with a stronger Ostheer the Soviets would refuse to give up .

More pseudo-intellectual garbage by ljadw.

It it is quite true that one side in a conflict doesn't get to dictate the result before it's started, so the Germans couldn't just announce victory and hey presto victory occurs. But, by the very same logic, neither could the Soviets.

According to ljadw logic, Fall Gelb would have failed in 1940 irrespective of the size of the German war machine if Belgium had refused to give up.



BARBAROSSA didn't fail "because the Soviets refused to give up". It failed because the German's didn't employ sufficient combat strength to overcome that refusal.

[wm]

He means in that "game" the Soviets, or rather the Russians had all the trump cards in their hands.
They couldn't lose as long as they played.

The French had some trump cards, but not all.

[MarkN]

He means in that "game" the Soviets, or rather the Russians had all the trump cards in their hands.
They couldn't lose as long as they played.

With the benefit of hindisght, we have the ability to readily recognise that the Germans were never going to have the combat strength necessary to overcome the Soviet Union. It is precisely that same insight, also with the benefit of hindsight, that Halder is channelling in 1945.

But what about 1940-41?

The Heer were well aware even then that the Soviets enjoyed a numerical superiority. They then used the idea that they were not certain as to how great that numerical superiority was as an excuse for their failure. But they knew that numerical superiority was great enough to prevent them winning the war outright and thus they drew up a military plan that was only a land grab rather than a war winning campaign. They always knew they would never have enough to completely defeat the Soviets. BARBAROSSA was devised as a "quick campaign" that started a war of undefined duration. Moreover, and just for their limited land grab, the Heer had deluded themselves into believing that they had a tactical strategy that would overcome that numerical inferiority and allow a victorious BARBAROSSA.

The point?

It was the Heer that created the "kick in the door and the whole house will crumble strategy" not Hitler. It was a strategy channelled straight out of Schlieffen's handbook.

The French had some trump cards, but not all.

Comparing the forces on paper on the eve of Fall GELB, the Germans shouldn't have succeeded, but they did.

Comparing the forces on paper on the eve of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA, the Germans shouldn't have succeeded, and they didn't. But based upon their earlier successes in Fall GELB and Fall ROT, the Heer had deluded themselves that they would succeed.

[jesk]

Hitler stretched the front line. Try to understand it. For example, China attacked Germany. China has an army of 100 million soldiers. The war is on the front with a length of 10 km. In these 10 km, China was able to push only 5 divisions. The Germans have the same number and they confidently defend themselves. 5 divisions are able to stop the 100 millionth army.
The same eastern front. Germany could win at the front of 1000 km. Hitler wanted 2,000 kilometers and with positional defense there was not enough manpower for this. After the demolition of Demyansky protrusion, 9 army in full force went under the Kursk. The front on the Smolensk direction did not collapse, the Germans had enough defense density.
There is a maximum value of saturation of the front with fire weapons, the rest is displayed in the second, fifth echelon and expects the opportunity to join the battle.

[jesk]

Comparing the forces on paper on the eve of Fall GELB, the Germans shouldn't have succeeded, but they did.

Comparing the forces on paper on the eve of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA, the Germans shouldn't have succeeded, and they didn't. But based upon their earlier successes in Fall GELB and Fall ROT, the Heer had deluded themselves that they would succeed.

Your thoughts are absurd. Ignore the fighting, the seizure of territories to Moscow, 5 million Soviet prisoners and many of Hitler’s mistakes. Kindergarten understanding of history.