where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[jesk]

With the help of England, Hitler tried to divert attention from Moscow.

http://srn.su/?p=3583

The main element of social management is to divert people's attention from important problems and decisions made by political and economic ruling circles, by constantly saturating the information space with insignificant messages. “Constantly distract the attention of citizens from real social problems, switching it to topics that have no real meaning. To ensure that citizens are constantly busy with something and they have no time to think", -writes Chomsky.

[MarkN]

[I believe Hitler's decision to attack Russia in June 1941 flowed from his ideology. That ideology is to be found in Mein Kampf.
However, real life is different to ideological desires. At times it was stategically prudent to be best of friends with the judeo-bolsheviks. BARBAROSSA was never designed to erase judeo-bolshevism, it was a limited land grab.

What does Hitler answer the questions of his generals?
"The Fuhrer: The plans of England at the present time can not be accurately determined. Whether the British enemy will continue to be limited to a war of attrition, or he will try to land his troops on the Iberian Peninsula or in West Africa. Against such attempts at disembarkation or in other necessary cases, mobile reserves must be prepared. For this purpose serve both tank divisions located in Germany, as well as the newly created tank units." And then Hitler promises 400 engines, when all issues are finally resolved. As you can see, even being in Russia, the Fuhrer first of all thinks of England.
It seems to me that Hitler's real ideology was 'love-hatred englandism'.

Yes, I know what the document says.

It seems to me jolly good evidence of the complete lack of coherence in German strategic thought and effort. You do realize that this contradicts the daft narrative that the purpose of BARBAROSSA was to coerce the British to capitulate, don't you?

It is also evidence that Hitler had many obsessions, changed his narrative every time his lips moved and couldn't be trusted as far as he could be thrown.

[AbollonPolweder]

With the help of England, Hitler tried to divert attention from Moscow.

http://srn.su/?p=3583

The main element of social management is to divert people's attention from important problems and decisions made by political and economic ruling circles, by constantly saturating the information space with insignificant messages. “Constantly distract the attention of citizens from real social problems, switching it to topics that have no real meaning. To ensure that citizens are constantly busy with something and they have no time to think", -writes Chomsky.

If you look at KTB OKW on December 5, 1940, you will see that the discussion of the operation Felix took longer than Barbarossa. The generals themselves were distracted from the Moscow. The Gibraltar was more important to them than the USSR.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
Yes, I know what the document says.

It seems to me jolly good evidence of the complete lack of coherence in German strategic thought and effort. You do realize that this contradicts the daft narrative that the purpose of BARBAROSSA was to coerce the British to capitulate, don't you?

It is also evidence that Hitler had many obsessions, changed his narrative every time his lips moved and couldn't be trusted as far as he could be thrown.

So far I do not understand for what purpose Hitler as a parrot insists on the USSR as the last hope of England. In top secret documents, not in Felkischer Beobachter.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
It is also evidence that Hitler had many obsessions, changed his narrative every time his lips moved and couldn't be trusted as far as he could be thrown.

There is and other evidence, for example:

As you can see, Adolf argues that from the very beginning he spoke of the secondary importance of Moscow.

[jesk]

...
It is also evidence that Hitler had many obsessions, changed his narrative every time his lips moved and couldn't be trusted as far as he could be thrown.

There is and other evidence, for example:

As you can see, Adolf argues that from the very beginning he spoke of the secondary importance of Moscow.

In the context of schemes and evidence; not the city matters. 70% of the Red Army (including the newly formed armies) were on the Moscow direction. Von Bock insisted on their destruction. It is difficult to imagine that the Russians would be able to restore the front after such a rout. This is the end. Attacking Uman and Kiev, Hitler took the threat from the main Soviet forces.

Here are the two images from Stumbling Colossus I meant to include with OP:

Second, the RKKA field armies' dispositions in late July and armies forming to the rear:

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/08.html

22/8/41

I called Halder, clarified my position and said that I consider this operation ill-considered, since it primarily prevents the offensive from going eastwards. All directives say that the capture of Moscow is not of great importance! I want to destroy the enemy army, and the main forces of this army are concentrated on my front! For this reason, the rotation of a part of the army of the Army Group Center will threaten the implementation of the main task of the Army Group, namely the destruction of the most combat-ready units of the Red Army before the onset of winter.
All in vain! In the evening, an order came from the Supreme Command of the ground forces to transfer "troops from the Gomel area" and, if possible, three more mobile units heading south.

[jesk]

...
Yes, I know what the document says.

It seems to me jolly good evidence of the complete lack of coherence in German strategic thought and effort. You do realize that this contradicts the daft narrative that the purpose of BARBAROSSA was to coerce the British to capitulate, don't you?

It is also evidence that Hitler had many obsessions, changed his narrative every time his lips moved and couldn't be trusted as far as he could be thrown.

So far I do not understand for what purpose Hitler as a parrot insists on the USSR as the last hope of England. In top secret documents, not in Felkischer Beobachter.

On August 18 and 22, Hitler only distracted attention from the USSR with help of England. Speech was conducted about defeat of the USSR in 1941!

[David Thompson]

Two fact-free opinion posts by jesk, which added nothing of importance to the discussion, were removed pursuant to forum rules.

3. Opinions

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The same reasoning applies to opinion threads.

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[AbollonPolweder]

...
On August 18 and 22, Hitler only distracted attention from the USSR with help of England. Speech was conducted about defeat of the USSR in 1941!

Whose attention was distracted by Hitler?

[jesk]

...
On August 18 and 22, Hitler only distracted attention from the USSR with help of England. Speech was conducted about defeat of the USSR in 1941!

Whose attention was distracted by Hitler?

Tried to divert attention of generals of eastern front. Moscow is nonsense, here is the landing of England in the Pyrenees, something to worry about!

[ljadw]

This quote from Roberts is interesting (my underlining).

However, Kleist was underestimating Rundstedt's important role in the initial decision-making, but with Hitler willing to take the ultimate glory for the campaign, he must also take the ultimate blame for not allowing Kleist to take on the BEF outside Dunkirk. When Kleist met Hitler on the airfield at Cambrai a few days later, he had the courage to remark that a great opportunity had been lost at Dunkirk. Hitler replied: "That may be so. But I did not want to send the tanks into the Flanders marshes – and the British won't come back in this war."

And yet, a month or so later he was claiming the invasion of Russia was merely a strategic ploy to knock Britain out of the war!!!!

Treat everything the overpromoted Austrian corporal said with the same degree of credibility as that of ljadw and jesk....

The quote of Roberts is not proved and can be considered as an invention .The only proof is Kleist himself .
Besides : there were no marshes in the region, and Hitler knew it, thus ...
What Kleist and Hitler said on the airfield at Cambrai is as credible as what Guderian claimed he and Kleist told each other when they met at the airfield of Montcornet .

[ljadw]

rom Nigel Askey Operation Barbarossa Volume II B P 82
Norway : 123000
AG D West
7th A : 141000
1st A : 106000
15th A : 205000
Reserves : 55000

12th A (Balkans ) : 169000

DAK : 82000

Replacement Army : 1076000

Total : 1960000,of whom less than 900000 for occupation duties . The 2 million figure for occupation forces is wrong .
The figure of 1960000 includes army, WSS, LW ground and Naval Coastal artillery units .

I think it is clear that even a significant reduction of occupation forces and there use in the east would not in any real sense have had a positive effect. In reality it may have hastened Nazi Germanys defeat.

Norway 123000? Why are you fooling yourself? Up to half a million at the peak reached the number of German groups there. I think 4 divisions psychologically comfortable figure for the defense of Norway. But the divisions were 14. Hitler wanted to lose war. And he did it. LOOOL

Order of battle (21 Aug 1943)

At the disposal of Armee Norwegen
- 25. Panzer-Division
- 196. Infanterie-Division
- 274. Infanterie-Division (forming)
- 280. Infanterie-Division
LXXI. Armeekorps
- 230. Infanterie-Division
- 270. Infanterie-Division
- 199. Infanterie-Division
XXXIII. Armeekorps
- 14. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division
- 702. Infanterie-Division
- 181. Infanterie-Division
LXX. Armeekorps
- 269. Infanterie-Division
- 295. Infanterie-Division (forming/in transit)
- 214. Infanterie-Division
- 710. Infanterie-Division

I am talking about June 1941 . August 1943 is irrelevant . And you know it .

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

You post, "Sid, you are starting from a wrong point of view: it is not so that Barbarossa failed because the Germans were not strong enough. Barbarossa could succeed with a weaker Ostheer, it also could fail with a stronger Ostheer. Barbarossa failed because the Soviets refused to give up, and, even with a stronger Ostheer the Soviets would refuse to give up ."

Soviet response is an unpredictable variable. One man on foot with a pistol and a packed lunch from his Mum could have conquered the USSR if the Soviets had given up.

What is your point?

Only German planning and strength were within the control of either Hitler, or the German Army. What we are trying to establish here is whether either of these were sufficient for the task of conquering the USSR and, if not, whether Hitler, the German General Staff, or both, were responsible for any limitations.

Cheers,

Sid

That is not a good POV :the reality is that German planning and strength were not related to the task of conquering the USSR ,because the possibility to defeat the USSR depended only on what the Soviets could do, would do . Not on what the Germans could do, would do .
Discussing if German planning/strength were sufficient or not is falling in the post war /Cold War trap where all western authors were trying to resuscite a situation where the German army could, would, should defeat the enemy of the west , and always finishing that they could have done it, but were prevented by an Austrian corporal .I thought that this period of adulation for the Prussian monocled generals was over, but it seems that I am wrong .
The truth is that the Germans did not lose, but that the Soviets won . And the Soviets won, not because the Germans were too weak or made mistakes, the Soviets also made mistakes, but because the Soviets were too strong .Only a miracle, a Deus ex Machina, could give the Germans victory . And they knew it : Adolf knew it and the monocled brigade knew it .And they put ev erything on it .
They lost after a few weeks, they could have lost after a few days .The initiative was at the Soviet side .

[jesk]

rom Nigel Askey Operation Barbarossa Volume II B P 82
Norway : 123000
AG D West
7th A : 141000
1st A : 106000
15th A : 205000
Reserves : 55000

12th A (Balkans ) : 169000

DAK : 82000

Replacement Army : 1076000

Total : 1960000,of whom less than 900000 for occupation duties . The 2 million figure for occupation forces is wrong .
The figure of 1960000 includes army, WSS, LW ground and Naval Coastal artillery units .

I think it is clear that even a significant reduction of occupation forces and there use in the east would not in any real sense have had a positive effect. In reality it may have hastened Nazi Germanys defeat.

Norway 123000? Why are you fooling yourself? Up to half a million at the peak reached the number of German groups there. I think 4 divisions psychologically comfortable figure for the defense of Norway. But the divisions were 14. Hitler wanted to lose war. And he did it. LOOOL

Order of battle (21 Aug 1943)

At the disposal of Armee Norwegen
- 25. Panzer-Division
- 196. Infanterie-Division
- 274. Infanterie-Division (forming)
- 280. Infanterie-Division
LXXI. Armeekorps
- 230. Infanterie-Division
- 270. Infanterie-Division
- 199. Infanterie-Division
XXXIII. Armeekorps
- 14. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division
- 702. Infanterie-Division
- 181. Infanterie-Division
LXX. Armeekorps
- 269. Infanterie-Division
- 295. Infanterie-Division (forming/in transit)
- 214. Infanterie-Division
- 710. Infanterie-Division

I am talking about June 1941 . August 1943 is irrelevant . And you know it .

I always consider Barbarossa on a long distance. The Germans could attack Moscow in 1942 and 1943. Hitler did not want to.

[jesk]

This quote from Roberts is interesting (my underlining).

However, Kleist was underestimating Rundstedt's important role in the initial decision-making, but with Hitler willing to take the ultimate glory for the campaign, he must also take the ultimate blame for not allowing Kleist to take on the BEF outside Dunkirk. When Kleist met Hitler on the airfield at Cambrai a few days later, he had the courage to remark that a great opportunity had been lost at Dunkirk. Hitler replied: "That may be so. But I did not want to send the tanks into the Flanders marshes – and the British won't come back in this war."

And yet, a month or so later he was claiming the invasion of Russia was merely a strategic ploy to knock Britain out of the war!!!!

Treat everything the overpromoted Austrian corporal said with the same degree of credibility as that of ljadw and jesk....

The quote of Roberts is not proved and can be considered as an invention .The only proof is Kleist himself .
Besides : there were no marshes in the region, and Hitler knew it, thus ...

And? Why did Hitler talk about the terrain unfit for tanks?