where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

[Hanny]

So confident was the First sea lord, he did not object to transporting an Armd Brigade to libya in August.

Halder, on sealions chances, might just as well put the troops that have been landed through the sausage machine!.

[doogal]

SID

Hi MarkN,

Is there some doubt in your mind that the Germans wanted the shortest war possible? If so, why?

Do the facts that (1) they only began with five months of trained replacements (actually two, as losses were higher than anticipated) and (2) that they had not prepared for winter warfare, not indicate that they were hoping Barbarossa could be concluded by around November?

Of course, if you consider 5 months not to be a short campaign, given the scale of the task, then, at least by your own reference, you might be right.

The trouble is you haven't defined what you consider a short campaign. Two months? Three months? Four months? Five months? Six months? More? Less?

Cheers,

Sid.

I am pretty sure that the issue here is that (and there are posts on this thread where MarkN and i discussed this) Germany opted for a short campaign (that being Barbarossa)
Dir 21 " crush Russia in a rapid CAMPAIGN" page 93 HWD
which had the immediate operational goal of the destruction of the mass of the Red Army in western Russia and occupation of its main centres with an operational end point on " a general line Volga- Archangel" p94 HWD (With an expectation of a possible collapse)
After this we find reference to "the last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then if necessary be eliminated" p,94 HWD

There are references to continuing the war against Russia after Barbarossa in the planning stages as well.

We can conclude that Hitler saw that there was a possibility that Barbarossa would not entirely defeat the SU and as such it was a campaign within a war of longer duration negating any idea that it had been planned as a "short war" but rather a "short campaign " within a war.

There is no exact definition of what a short campaign should be, it is contextually driven by the circumstances at hand. We could produce a formula which factors in the size of the territory to be covered and occupied , and the size of the armed forces to be overcome, balanced against the size and composition of the attacking force. But this would not give a satisfactory answer. But if we look though history completion of an operation in one campaigning season has to be considered fairly quick, when considering the factors above.

[Max Payload]

We can conclude that Hitler saw that there was a possibility that Barbarossa would not entirely defeat the SU and as such it was a campaign within a war of longer duration negating any idea that it had been planned as a "short war" but rather a "short campaign " within a war.

I think that this is the essential point. If the war were to continue beyond the anticipated outcome of the planned ‘short’ campaign, it would have been against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat to the new German pan-European empire. In that context, whether or not the war continued thereafter, and in what form, (technically the war on the Korean Peninsula has not concluded) was not a matter of major concern to Hitler in the spring of 1941. Hence discussions of definitions of ‘war’ and ‘campaign’ in relation to the Barbarossa planning are little more than semantic distractions.

[MarkN]

I think that this is the essential point. If the war were to continue beyond the anticipated outcome of the planned ‘short’ campaign, it would have been against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat to the new German pan-European empire. In that context, whether or not the war continued thereafter, and in what form, (technically the war on the Korean Peninsula has not concluded) was not a matter of major concern to Hitler in the spring of 1941. Hence discussions of definitions of ‘war’ and ‘campaign’ in relation to the Barbarossa planning are little more than semantic distractions.

Semantic???

The planning for Unternehmen BARBAROSSA has the Heer at the peak of their delusion and strategic thinking and planning incompetence. For you to mimic their deluded thoughts and assumptions with the benefit of almost 80 years of historical hindsight is just so

[Max Payload]

The planning for Unternehmen BARBAROSSA has the Heer at the peak of their delusion and strategic thinking and planning incompetence.

Melodramatically expressed, though I wouldn’t disagree. Which makes the slight about mimicry puzzling. Perhaps you missed the word ‘anticipated’ in my post, or perhaps not. (Lots of pointless sad emojis)

[MarkN]

The planning for Unternehmen BARBAROSSA has the Heer at the peak of their delusion and strategic thinking and planning incompetence.

Melodramatically expressed, though I wouldn’t disagree. Which makes the slight about mimicry puzzling. Perhaps you missed the word ‘anticipated’ in my post, or perhaps not. (Lots of pointless sad emojis)

If the plan is to start a war and end it with a single campaign, then the words war and campaign are, for practical purposes, synonymous. Poland was beaten in a single campaign in 1939, as were the Balkan states in 1941.

However, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA had as an assumption written into the planning, the directives and the orders, that Germany would still be at war with Russia after a successful campaign. For the invasion of Russia, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was a plan where war and campaign are not synonymous; the were entirely separate. The Heer created a plan that started a war to enact a limited land grab without making any effort to define how that war would end or when.

You, Max Payload, wrote:

discussions of definitions of ‘war’ and ‘campaign’ in relation to the Barbarossa planning are little more than semantic distractions.

There is nothing "semantic" about this discussion. It is the very core of understanding just how incompetent the Heer was in strategic thought and planning. This sentence demonstrates that you, Max Payload, even with the benefit of almost 80 years of historical hindsight, seem to be of the belief that a successful end to Unternehmen BARBAROSSA would be the effective end of the Russian threat and the war with Russia. This is further evidenced by:

If the war were to continue beyond the anticipated outcome of the planned ‘short’ campaign, it would have been against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat to the new German pan-European empire.

Whilst Marcks included an "if" in his initial study, that "if" is noted by it's absence in subsequent planning and directives. Heer planning assumed Unternehmen BARBAROSSA would be successful and that war would continue and "it would have been against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat". You have had almost 80 years of historical hindsight to question that assumption and you have come up with the same belief - just reverted back to Marcks' "if". Using Korea as your example further demonstrates your opinion has homed in to mimicking the delusion of the Heer.

Your use of the word "semantic" is predicated upon the belief that a successful Unternehmen BARBAROSSA would be the effective end of the war with Russia; that the difference between campaign and war are negligeable. Historical evidence shows the Germans couldn't even get close to success in Unternehmen BARBAROSSA. On what basis do you assume that had they done so, the Russians would not have continued fighting tooth and nail on the Volga line? Would it be a "semantic discussion" if the Russians and Germans were still at it hammer and tong on the Volga?

[Max Payload]

The Heer created a plan that started a war to enact a limited land grab without making any effort to define how that war would end or when.

I would not describe German control of everything west of the A-A line as a limited land grab. And current opinions or ‘beliefs’ about what might have happened had that improbable outcome been achieved are irrelevant. What mattered in the spring of 1941 was what Hitler et al anticipated would be the outcome of their ‘short’ campaign - the collapse of the Soviet Union, its capitulation or, failing that, an ongoing conflict ...

... against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat to the new German pan-European empire.

Perhaps I should have been clearer initially - “If the war were to continue beyond the anticipated outcome of the planned ‘short’ campaign, it would IN THE PLANNER’S VIEW have been against a rump asiatic Russian state ...”

[MarkN]

The Heer created a plan that started a war to enact a limited land grab without making any effort to define how that war would end or when.

I would not describe German control of everything west of the A-A line as a limited land grab.

Unternehmen BARBAROSSA did not offer the elimination of the Soviet Union as a state - it is explicitely stated that Soviet Union would continue to exist east of the Volga at war with the Reich.
Unternehmen BARBAROSSA did not offer the elimination of Jewish Bolshevism - it is explicitely stated that Soviet Union would continue to exist east of the Volga at war with the Reich and there is no suggestion of how that surviving state was to be politcially changed.
Unternehmen BARBAROSSA did not offer the occupation of the entire Soviet Union - perhaps about 1/5th with a 2 second glance at a map.

Thus, I conclude it was a limited land grab.

And current opinions or ‘beliefs’ about what might have happened had that improbable outcome been achieved are irrelevant.

Indeed. It's just speculation. But my speculation is no less valid than yours.

What mattered in the spring of 1941 was what Hitler et al anticipated would be the outcome of their ‘short’ campaign - the collapse of the Soviet Union, its capitulation or, ...

The planning documents, directives and orders all include the planning assumption that the Soviet Union would continue to exist east of the Volga.

... failing that, an ongoing conflict against a rump asiatic Russian state too enfeebled to pose a strategic threat to the new German pan-European empire.

Yes, that is what their gross overconfidence lead them to plan.

Perhaps I should have been clearer initially - “If the war were to continue beyond the anticipated outcome of the planned ‘short’ campaign, it would IN THE PLANNER’S VIEW have been against a rump asiatic Russian state ...”

Since that changes it from a sentence describing your belief into your thoughts on what others believed, it does make quite a significant difference.

Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was a quick campaign that started a war of undefined duration. A limited land grab with no indication how the war would be terminated or when. There seems to have been a belief in some strategic circles in Berlin than Unternehmen BARBAROSSA would deliver even more than that. Nevertheless, campaign and war do not become synonymous or have only a "semantic" difference because the Heer decided so based upon their gross overconfidence. To try and argue that now, with the benefit of almost 80 years of historical hindsight, seems to be no more than an attempt to avoid discussing just how strategically incompetent the Heer were. It's an attempt to use their incompetence as an excuse to avoid discussing just how incompetent they were.

[doogal]

I still have problems with the term "limited land grab", it doesnt (in my opinion)express the scope of the German advance or the full scope or intention of initiating a conflict in the east (which Hitler did express in terms of smashing the bolshevik state ) without doubt they fell short of achieving Hitlers strategic goal but considering this failure included the bulk of western Russia, the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Baltic states which had been defined national territories the term "limited" seems incorrect.
But I do understand that in the context of the overall size of the SU and it's territory combined with the vague german strategy the word limited can be applied I'm just not sure it should be.

[MarkN]

I still have problems with the term "limited land grab", it doesnt (in my opinion)express the scope of the German advance or the full scope or intention of initiating a conflict in the east (which Hitler did express in terms of smashing the bolshevik state ) without doubt they fell short of achieving Hitlers strategic goal but considering this failure included the bulk of western Russia, the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Baltic states which had been defined national territories the term "limited" seems incorrect.
But I do understand that in the context of the overall size of the SU and it's territory combined with the vague german strategy the word limited can be applied I'm just not sure it should be.

If one is determined only to see Unternehmen BARBAROSSA through the narrow prism of German eyes, then limited does not make sense as they were effectively at maximum effort. However, if one takes a step back and sees this through a far wider prism of how Unternehmen BARBAROSSA fit into the bigger picture, it was limited in just about every metric possible.

It's the same with the campaign / war discussion. therough the narrow prism of German eyes, they became almost one and the same. Step back, look at the bigger picture, ooops!

[doogal]

Even if one steps back and looks at the bigger picture I don't believe that Hitlers intentions were limited. But it is clear that the heer produced an operational plan which was limited in scope.

[Max Payload]

... campaign and war do not become synonymous or have only a "semantic" difference because the Heer decided so based upon their gross overconfidence.

But they are virtually synonymous when discussing German planning assumptions ‘through the narrow prism of German eyes’, whereby any ongoing conflict after the successful conclusion of the campaign would be expected (by the planners) to be inconsequential.

If one is determined only to see Unternehmen BARBAROSSA through the narrow prism of German eyes, then limited does not make sense as they were effectively at maximum effort. However, if one takes a step back and sees this through a far wider prism of how Unternehmen BARBAROSSA fit into the bigger picture, it was limited in just about every metric possible.

Only in terms of total acreage. Of the 14 non-Russian republics, all but five would have been under German control with Germany in possession of half the non-Russian population and more than half the non-Russian gdp. Of Russia’s twelve current economic regions, only four would have been beyond German total or partial control.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi MarKN,

By my calculations that is the seventh time you have run away from answering my questions alone, often, as this time, by playing the man, not the ball.

If you post something here, you must, on occasion, expect questions and even challenges.

If you persistently avoid answering questions, then posters are entitled to draw their own conclusions.

My provisional conclusion from my own experience is that you are a habitual controversialist (no bad thing of itself) unwilling or unable to justify your own posts or opinions when challenged (definitely a bad thing).

So let's try again. To repeat:

Is there some doubt in your mind that the Germans wanted the shortest war possible? If so, why?

Do the facts that (1) they only began with five months of trained replacements (actually two, as losses were higher than anticipated) and (2) that they had not prepared for winter warfare, not indicate that they were hoping Barbarossa could be concluded by around November?

Of course, if you consider 5 months not to be a short campaign, given the scale of the task, then, at least by your own reference, you might be right.

The trouble is you haven't defined what you consider a short campaign. Two months? Three months? Four months? Five months? Six months? More? Less?

Whether I ".....have a bona fide interest in engaging in serious discussion on this topic" or not, these are bona fide questions deserving of an answer.

I would again encourage you to "play nice" here and step up to your responsibilities as a contributor by engaging with others in a civil and constructive manner.

Cheers,

Sid.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
If the plan is to start a war and end it with a single campaign, then the words war and campaign are, for practical purposes, synonymous. Poland was beaten in a single campaign in 1939, as were the Balkan states in 1941.

However, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA had as an assumption written into the planning, the directives and the orders, that Germany would still be at war with Russia after a successful campaign. For the invasion of Russia, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was a plan where war and campaign are not synonymous; the were entirely separate. The Heer created a plan that started a war to enact a limited land grab without making any effort to define how that war would end or when.
...

You are very confident with the terms "war" and "campaign." I envy you. To begin with, the military never plans a war, they plan a military campaign, that is, a time-limited armed conflict. Won't you argue that the military headquarters of France, Austria and Russia planned the Seven Years War 1756? Moreover, no Thirty Years or 118-year wars were planned. Because it is impossible for the human mind, at least for now.The difference between the "war" and the "military campaign" is rather arbitrary, and the former differs from the latter only in time. Or the war can be called a completed short campaign.
Can you give examples from the Weiss, Marita, or Gelb plans, which would indicate when these activities ended?
I think you too often refer to the "80 years of historical hindsight". Everyone knows that Germany lost. So Hitler and Co. made gross mistakes in the planning and implementation of the Barbarossa plan. There is nothing to argue about! The dispute can only be about whether Germany could successfully solve the problem of eliminating the danger from the USSR 1941.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi BDV,

You ask, "What precisely do you mean by "not prepared for winter warfare"?

I mean that while (as one poster here on AHF put it) ".....only 50-60 divisions were supposed to remain in Russia during the winter as an occupation force meant that winter equipments stayed behind in Warzaw."

Thus, there would appear to have been only sufficient winter equipment for that minority of the Ostheer that was meant to stay in Russia as occupation troops over the winter of 1941/42, and even this was not distributed in time. The reason for this would appear to be the extension of the fighting into the winter, which put a higher priority on the likes of munitions, which tied up the available rail transport.

For a litany of the woeful consequences, try The Battle for Moscow by David Stahel.

Cheers,

Sid.