where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
MarkN
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 15 Jun 2019 17:29

ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 16:55
Such answers prove that the person who writes them,has no answer .
Let's keep this simple. You wrote:
ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 10:36
Weisung 32 mentions 2 points
...
There was NO point 3 : no intention to continue the war against the possible remainings of the Soviet state .
Here is the text of Weisung 32. (Cut & paste from another website)
Weisung Nr. 32 für die Kriegführung

Vorbereitungen für die Zeit nach Barbarossa

A.) Nach der Zerschlagung der sowjetrussischen Wehrmacht werden Deutschland und Italien das europäische Festland - vorläufig ohne die iberische Halbinsel - militärisch beherrschen. Irgendeine ernsthafte Gefährdung des europäischen Raumes zu Lande besteht dann nicht mehr. Zu seiner Sicherung und für die noch in Betracht kommenden Angriffsoperationen genügen wesentlich geringere Kräfte des Heeres, als sie bisher aufrechterhalten werden mußten.

Der Schwerpunkt der Rüstung kann auf die Kriegsmarine und auf die Luftwaffe gelegt werden.

Die Vertiefung der deutsch-französischen Zusammenarbeit soll und wird weitere englische Kräfte fesseln, die Rückenbedrohung des nordafrikanischen Kriegsschauplatzes beseitigen, die Bewegungsmöglichkeit der britischen Flotte im westlichen Mittelmeer weiter einschränken und die tiefe Südwestflanke des europäischen Kampfraumes, einschl. der atlantischen Küste Nord- und Westafrikas, gegen angelsächsischen Zugriff schützen.

Spanien wird in absehbarer Zeit vor die Frage gestellt werden, ob es bereit ist, an der Vertreibung der Engländer aus Gibraltar mitzuwirken oder nicht.

Die Möglichkeit, auf die Türkei und den Iran einen starken Druck auszuüben, verbessert die Aussichten, auch diese Länder mittelbar oder unmittelbar für den Kampf gegen England nutz­bar zu machen.

B.) Aus dieser Lage heraus, wie sie sich nach der siegreichen Beendigung des Ostfeldzuges ergeben wird, können der Wehrmacht für den Spätherbst 1941 und den Winter 1941/42 folgende strategische Aufgaben erwachsen:

1.) Der neugewonnene Ostraum muß organisiert, gesichert und unter voller Mitwirkung der Wehrmacht wirtschaftlich ausgenutzt werden.

Wie stark diese Sicherungskräfte im russischen Raum zu bemessen sind, läßt sich mit Sicherheit erst später übersehen. Aller Voraussicht nach werden aber etwa 60 Divisionen und eine Luftflotte, neben den verbündeten und befreundeten Kräften, für die weiteren Aufgaben im Osten genügen.

2.) Fortsetzung des Kampfes gegen die britische Position im Mittelmeer und in Vorderasien durch konzentrischen Angriff, der aus Libyen durch Ägypten, aus Bulgarien durch die Türkei und unter Umständen auch aus Transkaukasien heraus durch den Iran vorgesehen ist.

a) In Nordafrika kommt es darauf an, daß Tobruk erledigt und hierdurch die Grundlage zur Fortführung des deutsch­italienischen Angriffes gegen den Suez-Kanal geschaffen wird. Er ist etwa für November vorzubereiten mit der Maßgäbe, daß das Deutsche Afrika-Korps personell und materiell bis dahin auf den höchstmöglichen Stand gebracht und mit ausreichenden Reserven aller Art zu eigener Verfügung ausgestattet wird (bei Umbildung der 5. le. Div. in eine volle Panzer-Division), daß weitere große deutsche Verbände nicht nach Nordafrika überführt werden.

Die Vorbereitungen für den Angriff erfordern, daß das Transporttempo unter Zuhilfenahme französisch-nordafrikanischer Häfen und womöglich des neuen Seeweges aus dem südgriechischen Raum mit allen Mitteln gesteigert wird.

Aufgabe der Kriegsmarine ist es, in Zusammenarbeit mit der italienischen Kriegsmarine für die Bereitstellung des nötigen Schiffsraumes unter Charterung französischer und neutraler Schiffe zu sorgen.

Die spätere Überführung deutscher Schnellboote in das Mittelmeer ist zu prüfen.

Zur Verbesserung der Ausladeleistung in den nordafrikanischen Häfen ist der italienischen Kriegsmarine jede Unterstützung zu gewähren.

Ob. d. L. führt dem Afrika-Korps entsprechend dem Freiwerden im Osten ausreichende Fliegerverbände und Flak-Artillerie für die Weiterführung der Operation zu und verstärkt den italienischen Geleitzugschutz der Seetransporte in der Luft durch Einsatz deutscher Fliegerverbände.

Zur einheitlichen Leitung der Transportvorbereitungen ist der »Heimatstab Übersee« gebildet worden, der nach den Richtlinien des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht in Verbindung mit dem Deutschen General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht und mit dem Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost arbeitet.

b) Angesichts der zu erwartenden englischen Verstärkungen im Vorderen und Mittleren Orient und namentlich zum Schutz des Suez-Kanals wird eine deutsche Operation aus Bulgarien durch die Türkei ins Auge zu fassen sein mit dem Ziel, die englische Stellung am Suez-Kanal auch von Osten her anzugreifen.

Zu diesem Zweck ist vorzusehen, so frühzeitig als möglich so starke Kräfte in Bulgarien zu versammeln, wie nötig sind, die Türkei politisch gefügig zu machen oder ihren Widerstand mit Waffengewalt zu brechen.

c) Wenn der Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion die Voraussetzung dafür geschaffen hat, ist ferner der Ansatz eines motorisierten Expeditionskorps aus Transkaukasien heraus gegen den Irak in Verbindung mit den Operationen zu b) vorzubereiten.

d) Ausnutzung der arabischen Freiheitsbewegung. Die Lage der Engländer im Mittleren Orient wird bei größeren deutschen Operationen um so schwieriger sein, je mehr Kräfte durch Unruheherde oder Aufstandsbewegungen zeitgerecht gebunden werden. Alle diesem Zweck dienenden militärischen, politischen und propagandistischen Maßnahmen müssen in der Vorbereitungszeit engstens aufeinander abgestimmt sein. Als zentrale Außenstelle, die in allen Planungen und Maßnahmen im arabischen Raum einzuschalten ist, bestimme ich den Sonderstab F, der seinen Sitz im Bereich des Wehrmachtbefehlshabers Südost zu nehmen hat. Ihm sind die besten Sachkenner und Agenten beizugeben.

Die Aufgaben des Sonderstabes F regelt der Chef OKW, -soweit politische Fragen berührt werden, im Benehmen mit dem Reichsaußenminister.

3.) Schließung des Westeinganges in das Mittelmeer durch Ausschaltung von Gibraltar.

Die Vorbereitungen für das schon einmal geplante Unternehmen »Felix« müssen schon während des Auslaufens der Operationen im Osten in vollem Umfange wieder aufgenommen werden. Dabei kann damit gerechnet werden, daß auch das unbesetzte französische Gebiet, wenn nicht für den Durchtransport deutscher Truppen, so doch sicherlich für Versor­gungstransporte zur Verfügung steht. Auch die Mitwirkung französischer See- und Luftstreitkräfte liegt im Bereich der Möglichkeit.

Zum Übersetzen nach Spanisch-Marokko, nach der Weg­nahme von Gibraltar, sind Heeresverbände nur insoweit vorzusehen, als es die Sicherung der Meerenge erfordert.

Die Verteidigung der atlantischen Küste von Nord- und Westafrika, die Ausschaltung der englischen Besitzungen in Westafrika und die Rückgewinnung des von de Gaulle beherrschten Gebietes fällt den Franzosen zu, denen im Zuge der angebahnten Entwicklung die erforderlichen Verstärkungen bewilligt werden. Die Ausnutzung westafrikanischer Stützpunkte durch Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe, u. U. auch die Besitznahme atlantischer Inseln, wird nach Beherrschung der Meerenge erleichtert sein.

4.) Neben diesen möglichen Operationen gegen die britische Machtstellung im Mittelmeer muß die »Belagerung Englands« nach Abschluß des Ostfeldzuges durch Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe wieder in vollem Maße aufgenommen werden.

Alle diesem Zweck dienenden Rüstungsvorhaben haben damit innerhalb der Gesamtrüstung den Vorrang. Gleichzeitig gilt es, die deutsche Luftverteidigung aufs höchste zu steigern. Vorbereitungen für eine Landung in England werden dem doppelten Ziel zu dienen haben, englische Kräfte im Mutterland zu binden und einen sich abzeichnenden Zusammenbruch Englands durch eine Landung auszulösen und zu vollenden.

C.) Zu welchem Zeitpunkt die geplanten Operationen im Mittelmeerraum und im Vorderen Orient begonnen werden können, läßt sich noch nicht übersehen. Die stärkste operative Wirkung würde ein möglichst gleichzeitiger Beginn der Angriffe gegen Gibraltar, Ägypten und Palästina ergeben.

Ob das möglich sein wird, hängt, neben einer Reihe von Faktoren, die heute noch nicht abzusehen sind, in erster Linie davon ab, ob die Luftwaffe in der Lage sein wird, die erforderlichen Kräfte zur Unterstützung dieser drei Operationen gleichzeitig einzusetzen.

D.) Die Herren Oberbefehlshaber ersuche ich, nach diesen vorläufigen Absichten ihre gedanklichen und organisatorischen Vorbereitungen zu treffen und mich von deren Ergebnissen so rechtzeitig zu unterrichten, daß meine endgültigen Weisungen noch während des Ostfeldzuges erlassen werden können.
There's a lot more than 2 points there!!!!

:roll:

And yes, the wording implied the Reich is still at war, and warring, with CCCP.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by ljadw » 15 Jun 2019 20:42

There is A and there is B .
C is the rehearsel of A and B and D is the usual end of Hitler's Weisungen .
There is NO mention of a new offensive in 1942 against the SU, something which would be impossible with an OCCUPATION force ( not an operational army ) of 60 divisions .
After the end of the war against the SU in the autumn of 1941, the war against Britain would be continued ,if needed , by the KM and LW, while a big part of the army would be disbanded . The armament Schwerpunkt was already before the start of Barbarossa transferred to the KM and LW .
Irgendeine ernsthafte Gefährdung des europaïschen Raumes zu Lande besteht dann nicht mehr .
This means that there would no longer be anywhere a serious danger on land of the European continent .
This sentence is preceded by : after the defeat of the Soviet military the European continent, for the time being without Spain and Portugal , will be dominated militarily by Germany and Italy.
The only danger were the Soviet armed forces,and after their defeat, there will be no longer any danger .
If it was needed to continue the war against the USSR in 1942 . that would mean that the SU was not defeated and that the European continent was still threatened by the SU . In this case, Hitler would not order to demobilise a big part of the land forces ,

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 15 Jun 2019 20:47

MarkN wrote:
15 Jun 2019 16:11
AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 10:12
MarkN wrote:
12 Jun 2019 14:58
AbollonPolweder wrote:
12 Jun 2019 10:55
how and when would planned finish of Unternehmen Weiss, Gelb and Marita?
I have never researched, studied or analysed German intentions, planning or preparations for either WEISS or GELB.
So you assume that these plans are as vague as Barbarossa, and maybe even more uncertain?
I have made no assumptions at all about WEISS or GELB. Nor have l commented on them in any way.

There was little to no uncertainty in the Unternehmen BARBAROSSA plan. There was simply no consideration of when or how the war with CCCP would end.
About the same situation was with the Fall Weiss and Fall Gelb. The method of warfare is the same: almost the entire mass of forces suddenly strike forward to a certain line, say, the river (Vistula) or the coast. Moving forces on the flanks. The envelopment or surroundings for the destruction of the main forces of the enemy. In Poland it worked, in France it worked. Hitler considered the USSR Armed Forces weaker than the Armed Forces of France. Why did he have to plan a war with the USSR differently?
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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AbollonPolweder
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 15 Jun 2019 21:17

MarkN wrote:
15 Jun 2019 16:11
...
AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 10:12
AbollonPolweder wrote:Could you answer why Hitler did not listen to General Marcks?
MarkN wrote:Who says he didn't? Have you established that as a historical reality?
Marcks’ plan is significantly different from Barbarossa.I already posted about this in mid-April.
What's that got to do with Hitler "listening" to Marcks?
I would say "not listening". Because the plan (Barbarossa), which Hitler signed, can be said to be significantly different from the plan of Marcks. You seem to have read Operationsentwurf Ost. Right?
I still have no evidence that Hitler read the Operationsentwurf Ost. But since Adolf, on the one hand, did not trust Halder and on the other, as in the example of Mashtein, he was in the habit of speaking to the author personally, I consider the probability of Hitler’s personal meeting with Marcks to be high.
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AbollonPolweder
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 15 Jun 2019 22:24

MarkN wrote:
15 Jun 2019 16:15
AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 10:58
MarkN wrote:
14 Jun 2019 00:06
doogal wrote:
13 Jun 2019 21:12
I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts.
Indeed. However, for greater clarity it would be better written as: The intention of the invasion of the USSR and the objective(s) of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA were wholly different.
I apologize, but the intention and objective are different concepts, at least in Russian. The intention means how, in what way. And the objective - what for. Do you want to say that Barbarossa's intention could not lead to the achievement of it's objective?
Translating between languages often leads to some quite spectacular failures in understanding.
It seemed to me that I just didn’t translate your sentence correctly. I was confused by this phrase:]I think its fairly clear that the intention of Barbarossa and the objective were opposing concepts (doogal).
Indeed.(MarkN)
Barbarossa, like any plan, has a goal and a way to achieve a goal. In German it will be das Ziel and die Absicht. If I am right that intention=Absicht and objection=Ziel then I do not understand what your and doogal meant. Could you explain?
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 16 Jun 2019 01:00

AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 10:12
Marcks’ plan is significantly different from Barbarossa.I already posted about this in mid-April.
I tried, based on the text of Ost’s plan of General Erich Marcks, to show the originality of his ideas. It can be carefully (for now) argued that Marx did not borrow other people's ideas, at least Hitler's ideas.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941 ... prilozenia
Let's start with the "little things".
1. The time of the operation: from mid-May to early October, and if the winter is warm, then from early May. Yes, Hitler spoke about spring and May on July 31, but it follows from the phrase of Marcks that he independently and in detail studied this question.
2. 2. It is necessary to pay attention to the phrase about Moscow as the economic and political center of the USSR. Marcks does not have the word transport, but not because he did not take into account this moment. On the contrary. He highlighted the nuance of transport in a separate item. For example, Marx counted. that in order to terminate the railway connection with the Urals and the Far East, it is enough to destroy the railway lines in such cities as Gorki, Kasan, Uljanowsk and Sysran. But then he has the word "spiritual." The military man understood the importance of seizing a political and spiritual center in a dictatorial state. You take the Kremlin = you take all of Russia to the last village. This could be done by the Poles at the beginning of the 17th century, the Bolsheviks did it at the beginning of the 20th century, and this was demonstrated by the Russian pseudo-democrats at the end of the 20th.
3. Marcks proposes to start the campaign with 2 Army Groups, and after leaving the forest and crossing the Dvina, add the 3rd Army Group, using the AОК 18 as basis. Starting with three groups, in his opinion, meant slowing down the movement of troops advancing north Pripyat because of the small number of roads.
4. Well, the main idea: the seizure of Moscow and turn to the south to capture Ukraine. Yes, first isolate the railway center, in order to deprive the USSR of the transfer of troops from different regions through Moscow to the south. Very logical!
I also previously posted about this in April (Page 14 post#200) -

“It remains a fact that all of the locations (operational objectives) mentioned by Hitler [on 31 July] are included in the Marcks report as is the general concept of a wide pincer movement north and south of the Pripet Marshes. ...
The point at issue was the whether the stated objectives (of an operational nature) articulated by Hitler on 31 July influenced the 5 August Marcks report. ...
In that the former produced a detailed report and the latter stated objectives ... during a conference, it is unsurprising that they are different to some degree. But I don’t view it as mere coincidence that Hitler’s stated objectives (of an operational nature) as recorded by Halder all appeared in Marcks’ report five days later.”

If, as you claim, “Marx did not borrow other people's ideas, at least Hitler's ideas”, could you identify which of Hitler’s operational proposals and objectives as recorded by Halder on 31 July are not included in Marcks’ report?

AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 21:17
plan (Barbarossa), which Hitler signed, can be said to be significantly different from the plan of Marcks.
You have raised this point before. Why do you find it significant that a plan that was produced in seven days in early August should be modified over the subsequent four months?

AbollonPolweder wrote:
15 Jun 2019 21:17
I consider the probability of Hitler’s personal meeting with Marcks to be high.
Conjecture based on limited precedent. Would this unrecorded ‘probable’ meeting have taken place before, during or after the writing of the report? And if it did take place, what do you propose was its significance?
What we do know is that Halder was in contact with Marcks and Halder was aware of Hitler’s thoughts on how the operation should be conducted.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 16 Jun 2019 11:58

Max Payload wrote:
16 Jun 2019 01:00
I also previously posted about this in April (Page 14 post#200) -

“It remains a fact that all of the locations (operational objectives) mentioned by Hitler [on 31 July] are included in the Marcks report as is the general concept of a wide pincer movement north and south of the Pripet Marshes. ...
The point at issue was the whether the stated objectives (of an operational nature) articulated by Hitler on 31 July influenced the 5 August Marcks report. ...
It is your interpretation of Halder's words that Hitler was presenting "stated objectives (of an operational nature)" and that Marcks was duty bound to adher to them. My interpretation is that Hitler was name dropping the big dots on a map and Marcks' study was using the same map and thus went through the same big dots.

Why did Marcks ignore the strategic objectives in the same speech?
The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots in one blow. Holding part of the country alone will not do.
Marcks generated a plan to smash the Red Army forces on the border and seize only part if the country. No shattering of the state, no crushing of the country.

In my opinion, the link between Hitler's 31 July speech and Marcks' study is tenuous. But you can believe what you wish.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 16 Jun 2019 12:20

ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 20:42
There is A and there is B .
C is the rehearsel of A and B and D is the usual end of Hitler's Weisungen .
Yes. Your deliberate reengineering of evidence to fit your fantasy narrative is legendary.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 20:42
There is NO mention of a new offensive in 1942 against the SU, something which would be impossible with an OCCUPATION force ( not an operational army ) of 60 divisions .
Indeed. There was no plan to end the war with CCCP.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 20:42
After the end of the war against the SU in the autumn of 1941, ...
Nonsense!

The campaign to seize a limited chunk of Soviet territory was due to end, the war continued.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 20:42
... the war against Britain would be continued
Indeed. The war with Britain still went on even though its army had been roundly defeated in the field. After BARBAROSSA, the war with CCCP would still go on even after part of the Red Army near the border had been roundly defeated.
ljadw wrote:
15 Jun 2019 20:42
Irgendeine ernsthafte Gefährdung des europaïschen Raumes zu Lande besteht dann nicht mehr .
This means that there would no longer be anywhere a serious danger on land of the European continent .
This sentence is preceded by : after the defeat of the Soviet military the European continent, for the time being without Spain and Portugal , will be dominated militarily by Germany and Italy.
Germany would still be at war with Britain and CCCP. There would still be threats on three fronts: west, south and east. But the belief in Berlin was that they were not ernsthafte.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 16 Jun 2019 13:41

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 11:58
Why did Marcks ignore the strategic objectives in the same [Hitler 31 July] speech?
The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots in one blow. Holding part of the country alone will not do.
Marcks generated a plan to smash the Red Army forces on the border and seize only part if the country. No shattering of the state, no crushing of the country.
Can we agree that when Hitler used the phrase, “Holding part of the country will not do,” he was not expecting the Wehrmacht to advance to Vladivostok?
If so then the implication of the comment must be that minor territorial gains would not do.
In the context of German perceptions in July 1940, Hitler and his entourage might reasonably have assumed that a plan to crush the Red Army west of the D-D line and leave German forces in occupation of Soviet territory west of the A-A line would, by default, achieve the goal of shattering the Russian state to its roots in one blow (i.e. in a short campaign).

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 16 Jun 2019 15:10

Max Payload wrote:
16 Jun 2019 13:41
MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 11:58
Why did Marcks ignore the strategic objectives in the same [Hitler 31 July] speech?
The sooner Russia is crushed the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots in one blow. Holding part of the country alone will not do.
Marcks generated a plan to smash the Red Army forces on the border and seize only part if the country. No shattering of the state, no crushing of the country.
Can we agree that when Hitler used the phrase, “Holding part of the country will not do,” he was not expecting the Wehrmacht to advance to Vladivostok?
If so then the implication of the comment must be that minor territorial gains would not do.
In the context of German perceptions in July 1940, Hitler and his entourage might reasonably have assumed that a plan to crush the Red Army west of the D-D line and leave German forces in occupation of Soviet territory west of the A-A line would, by default, achieve the goal of shattering the Russian state to its roots in one blow (i.e. in a short campaign).
AbollonPolweder has a preconceived understanding of what historically occured and why. To help promote his/her understanding, he/she has to use - in your words - "conjecture" to lend it credibility. You seem to take a negative view of this approach.

But then, you present a series of assumptions based upon your "conjecture" to promote your preconceived understanding.

It is your "conjecture" what Hitler means or doesn't mean with: "Holding part of the country alone will not do."

It is your "conjecture" as to what Berlin considered "minor territorial gains".

It is your "conjecture" as to the link between Hitler's speech of 31 July and Marcks' plan.

As regards to what you think is reasonably to assume, to me what you are describing is the product of wishful thinking on what the outcome could look like in a best case scenario. In other words it was not the outcome expected of BARBAROSSA, but an outcome that they hoped might be effected. The reality that some bought into that hope as being a reality is NOT an indication of what BARBAROSSA was supposed or expected to deliver, but the scale of over-confidence and delusion in those minds.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 16 Jun 2019 16:54

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 15:10
It is your "conjecture" what Hitler means or doesn't mean with: "Holding part of the country alone will not do."
So it seems we cannot even agree “that when Hitler used the phrase, “Holding part of the country will not do,” he was not expecting the Wehrmacht to advance to Vladivostok.”

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 15:10
It is your "conjecture" as to what Berlin considered "minor territorial gains".
It follows logically from the above.

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 15:10
It is your "conjecture" as to the link between Hitler's speech of 31 July and Marcks' plan.
Clearly, you do not believe there is such a link. “But you can believe what you wish.”

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 15:10
what you are describing is the product of wishful thinking on what the outcome could look like in a best case scenario. In other words it was not the outcome expected of BARBAROSSA, but an outcome that they hoped might be effected.
Pure conjecture.

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 15:10
The reality that some bought into that hope as being a reality is NOT an indication of what BARBAROSSA was supposed or expected to deliver, but the scale of over-confidence and delusion in those minds.
You are conflating two things in this sentence; the benefit of hindsight and your conjecture as to the ratio of hope over expectation in the minds of people long dead.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 16 Jun 2019 18:17

The historical record is incomplete and will never be complete. People will always have to fill gaps with speculation, conjecture and guesswork. We all have to do it almost all of the time to join the dots.

Unfortunately, you seem to take the approach that when others join the dots in a way that contradicts your understanding and narrative it is to be frowned upon and wrong. Whereas all the dot joining you do is miraculously evidence that proves the validity of your understanding and narrative.

I accept other peoples dot joining. I may not agree with it, but l accept it for what it is and am comfortable with them having it. Hence: you can believe what you wish. I make no attempt to change others' opinions or understanding. Fool's errand on here.

Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA was implemented as a quick campaign that resulted in a ongoing war of unspecified duration.

Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.

Documentary evidence shows that several individuals were expecting more from BARBAROSSA on the personal level than the stated expectations in the policy/strategy documents.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 16 Jun 2019 18:51

No one has a monopoly on the truth. Most of the arguments on these forums can be reduced to POV.

State your POV and move on.

MarkN
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Location: On the continent

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 16 Jun 2019 20:18

Paul Lakowski wrote:
16 Jun 2019 18:51
State your POV and move on.
That seems like a good idea until you realize all it does is encourage trolls to stalk you demanding answers to their nonsensical questions. :roll:

:welcome:

Max Payload
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Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 17 Jun 2019 00:35

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 18:17
Documentary evidence shows ... that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.
If that were true why would Hitler have signed Directive 21?

Paul Lakowski wrote:
16 Jun 2019 18:51
Most of the arguments on these forums can be reduced to POV.
But not all. And even some of those that can may be worth having.
And statements made on these forums that are factually incorrect deserve to be challenged.

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