where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1400
Joined: 30 Apr 2003 05:16
Location: Canada

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 17 Jun 2019 04:52

MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 20:18
Paul Lakowski wrote:
16 Jun 2019 18:51
State your POV and move on.
That seems like a good idea until you realize all it does is encourage trolls to stalk you demanding answers to their nonsensical questions. :roll:

:welcome:
if they state their opinion AND MOVE ON , you just ignore it and move on or add them to the "ignore list".

This forum needs a "like" button.

Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1400
Joined: 30 Apr 2003 05:16
Location: Canada

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 17 Jun 2019 04:58

Max Payload wrote:
08 Jun 2019 12:52
Paul Lakowski wrote:
07 Jun 2019 23:33
You all miss the point , War Cabinet might have tolerated Churchill -but if they lose Dunkirk -the next step was to do a Norway Style port to port invasion, which would collapse the government!
Paul Lakowski wrote:
08 Jun 2019 02:55
Sources report the RN did not see its mission as stopping an invasion .... If Dunkirk happens as planned- Britain would be much more defenceless and opportunity for such moral collapse increases. If prewar thinking pans out the KM would start raids up and down the British coast with Norway style invasion. That could result in government collapse.
In sequential posts we have gone from “would collapse the government” to “could result in government collapse”.
The mission of the Royal Navy was to carry out the orders emanating from the Admiralty, and the Admiralty’s absolute priority in the event of invasion would have been to use its every resource to defeat that invasion. And as Hanny has indicated above, those resources were considerable.
You seem to be suggesting (the point we have all missed?) that an an-hoc invasion should have been attempted in the immediate aftermath of Dunkirk.Yet in the ‘port to port’ Norway invasion operation the Kriegsmarine surface fleet was crippled. If it had tried the same trick a few weeks later in Britain it would have been annihilated. Any embarked troops (presumably having been diverted from fighting the French) would have been starved of supplies and forced to surrender.
I don't play war-games or rely on them. As I said garbage in garbage out. Through out the cold war that was standard academic view of war games.

Your posts sounds like a Wally Wank to me, and the war cabinet would definitely collapse after a failed Dunkirk -if the politicians had there way....and they did. As I said the main precondition was RA fixed in France or destroyed in Dunkirk.

RN mission was exclusively to keep the sea lanes open , and defence of invasion was RA & RAF duty, plus hundreds of armed trawlers, read Churchill Vol 2 for this dialogue also read James Levy "Royal Navy at war ...."

KM were not crippled at Norway- unless you view it from RN POV. Honestly we never trusted the RN to punch their way out of a paper bag.

KM had 2 x BB 3 x CA 4 x CL 14 x DD 6 x TB 2 x FT & 15s SB plus Linenschiffe and 37 MB and armed trawlers escorted 20 merchant ships & 15 tankers . The KM lost 5 tankers & merchants at the cost of 3 cruisers and 10 DD plus 8 out of 28 U-Boats.

27 ships lost [mostly sunk] out of force of 147 ships/vessels or 18% loss .....or 23 warships sunk out of 104 warships participating or 22% , so hardly crippled - if it facilitated an invasion of a country.

SINCE the bulk of the WW-II KM FLEET was built after mid 1940 , they still would have a fleet of a handful of capital ships and cruisers escorted by dozens and dozens of Zerstroers/GTB plus 900 U-Boats plus 3-4000 coastal vessels supported by 170 M-Boot & similar number of S-Boot etc etc.


I WOULD GLADLY EXCHANGE THE ENTIRE MID 1940 FLEET TO NEUTRALIZE THE UK .

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2498
Joined: 12 Jan 2015 13:34
Location: On the continent

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 17 Jun 2019 11:18

Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 00:35
MarkN wrote:
16 Jun 2019 18:17
Documentary evidence shows ... that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.
If that were true why would Hitler have signed Directive 21?
What do you mean: "if that were true"?

Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.

It only becomes untrue AFTER you have reengineered the words "Holding part of the country alone will not do" through your conjecture into something that fits your preconceived narrative.

Even Sid Guttridge is beholden to the belief that Hitler's intention was to have the border east of the Urals. BARBAROSSA only delivers about half of that land grab.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 17 Jun 2019 11:34

MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 11:18
What do you mean: "if that were true"?

Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.". ....
It only becomes untrue AFTER you have reengineered the words "Holding part of the country alone will not do" through your conjecture into something that fits your preconceived narrative.
Either Hitler intended that sentence to be taken literally (i.e. the Wehrmacht would be required to advance to Vladivostok) or he did not.

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2498
Joined: 12 Jan 2015 13:34
Location: On the continent

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 17 Jun 2019 12:00

Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 11:34
Either Hitler intended that sentence to be taken literally (i.e. the Wehrmacht would be required to advance to Vladivostok) or he did not.
Which applies equally to every single statement made by everybody since man learned to communicate: did they mean what they said or not?

Are you really going down the path that you get to decide which statements are valid and which are not? Very ljadwesque.... :roll:

Anyway, whilst you are fixated on Vladivostok, the statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant only to the Volga. The documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind. That makes the statement true just as much as Vladivostok does.

Hanny
Banned
Posts: 855
Joined: 26 Oct 2008 20:40

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Hanny » 17 Jun 2019 13:50

Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58

I don't play war-games or rely on them. As I said garbage in garbage out. Through out the cold war that was standard academic view of war games.
3 fact free statements.
Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58
Your posts sounds like a Wally Wank to me, and the war cabinet would definitely collapse after a failed Dunkirk -if the politicians had there way....and they did. As I said the main precondition was RA fixed in France or destroyed in Dunkirk.
Your the wally wank argueing that something that never happened must result in government collapse, when the expected outcome was a failure to bring off the troops in large numbers, as WSC wrote, they expected to be able to bring out 30k only. So in reality, Dunkirk was expected to fail in bringing back the bulk of the BEF. Nothing in your cities supports you fantasy. Quite the oposite, Dowding wrote " If the fleet remains in being and the home forces are suitable organised to meet invasion we should be able to carry on the war single handed for some time"

Or how about WSC asking the cabinet and the UK Chiefs of staff, what to do if as expected, the BEF was lost and France surrendered, should the UK fight on on also surrender, the reply he received " Our conclusion is that prma facie Germany has most of the cards, but the real test in whether the morale of the fighting personnel and civil population will counter balance the numerical advantages which Germany enjoys. We believe it will".

WSC, with cabinet and joint chiefs backing to fight on in the eventuality of france surrender and only 30k coming back from France, went to Parliment and won hands down to continue alone, even with only 30k coming back from France.

Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58
RN mission was exclusively to keep the sea lanes open , and defence of invasion was RA & RAF duty, plus hundreds of armed trawlers, read Churchill Vol 2 for this dialogue also read James Levy "Royal Navy at war ...."
Except thats not true. Try the UK Offical history of WW2, by Roskill.https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... index.html

Home fleet for anti invasion duties: Scarpa :Capital Ships Nelson Rodney Renown Repulse, cruisers:Birmingham York Sussex Norfolk Southampton ,9 Destroyers ,157 minelayers.
The North Atlantic Command was responsible for the protection of convoys
Escourt duties to protect trade lanes in Home waters: 6 cruisers, 1 Aircraft carrier, 71 destroyers. Based in 6 ports. Secondry role on return from escort out of home waters, was also anti invasion.

Secondry role of Escort duty forces was a daily interdiction of ports.Partly in consequence of these attacks, which made the nearer Channel ports exceedingly unsafe anchorages for German transports, the Royal Navy found fewer good targets for their guns than might have been expected. On the night of 8th September ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sent to bombard Calais and Boulogne could find no ships at Calais; and as no barges were seen there either, fire was withheld. At Boulogne thick weather allowed only a short bombardment. Next night destroyers of the 21st Flotilla found no ships at Calais and scarcely any at Boulogne. On the 10th, two destroyers and an escort vessel fared better off Ostend, where they opened fire on trawlers as well as barges. Other spoiling operations in September and October included frequent sweeps off the French coast by destroyers and motor torpedo-boats, as well as a bombardment of Cherbourg in the early hours of 11th October by the battleship Revenge, escorted by seven destroyers and six motor gunboats.


Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58
KM were not crippled at Norway- unless you view it from RN POV. Honestly we never trusted the RN to punch their way out of a paper bag.

KM had 2 x BB 3 x CA 4 x CL 14 x DD 6 x TB 2 x FT & 15s SB plus Linenschiffe and 37 MB and armed trawlers escorted 20 merchant ships & 15 tankers . The KM lost 5 tankers & merchants at the cost of 3 cruisers and 10 DD plus 8 out of 28 U-Boats.

27 ships lost [mostly sunk] out of force of 147 ships/vessels or 18% loss .....or 23 warships sunk out of 104 warships participating or 22% , so hardly crippled - if it facilitated an invasion of a country.

Mostly wrong, at Narvik alone it lost 1C 2 CL, 10DD ( 4 more than you think they start with) 1 TB,13 troop transports lost, ( half of German KIA for entire campaign were from drowned at sea)117000 tons, 10% of all troop transports the start with.

When the campaign ended KM had 3 CA/CL, 4DD 6 U boats operational.

It started 39 with 2 Battleships, 2 Old Battleships, 3 Pocket Battleships, 2 Heavy Cruisers, 6 Light Cruisers, 22 Destroyers, 20 Torpedo Boats, and 62 Submarines

So 0% of BB operational, 50% of CA/CL, 255 of DD, 10% of U boats and 90% of MTB.

Try THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN: HOW MUCH WAS THE KRIEGSMARINE
WORTH?
LCdr D.J. Thompson at

https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/31 ... ompson.pdf

The rest of your post is from your latest game of playing HOI and simply ignored, 170 E boats is over three times the number built, 900 U-Boats, when never more than 150 at sea in any year, and usually 100.
Last edited by Hanny on 17 Jun 2019 14:25, edited 2 times in total.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 17 Jun 2019 14:14

Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58
KM were not crippled at Norway- unless you view it from RN POV. Honestly we never trusted the RN to punch their way out of a paper bag.

KM had 2 x BB 3 x CA 4 x CL 14 x DD 6 x TB 2 x FT & 15s SB plus Linenschiffe and 37 MB and armed trawlers escorted 20 merchant ships & 15 tankers . The KM lost 5 tankers & merchants at the cost of 3 cruisers and 10 DD plus 8 out of 28 U-Boats.

27 ships lost [mostly sunk] out of force of 147 ships/vessels or 18% loss .....or 23 warships sunk out of 104 warships participating or 22% , so hardly crippled - if it facilitated an invasion of a country.
Of the six heavy cruisers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940, one was sunk and one was so badly damaged that it was not repaired until 1941.
Of the four operational cruisers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940 two were sunk and one was reassigned to training duties prior to June. (One other, under repair in April, became operational before June).
Of the nineteen operational destroyers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940 eleven were sunk and one was damaged sufficiently badly that it did not return to service until September. (Two others, under repair in April, became operational before June).
The two pre-WWI battleships were reassigned as training ships in May 1940.

Clearly we have different concepts of what constitutes the crippling of a surface fleet.

Kriegsmarine surface fleet main operational assets –
May 1940 BS 2; HC 6; LC 4; D 19
June 1940 BS 0; HC 4: LC 2: D 9

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 17 Jun 2019 15:10

MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 12:00
Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 11:34
Either Hitler intended that sentence to be taken literally (i.e. the Wehrmacht would be required to advance to Vladivostok) or he did not.
Anyway, whilst you are fixated on Vladivostok, the statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant only to the Volga. The documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind. That makes the statement true just as much as Vladivostok does.
You can't have it both ways. If he didn't intended that sentence to be taken literally (which you now seem to acknowledge) then, since the country being referred to stretches all the way to the Pacific, you have also "reengineered the words "Holding part of the country alone will not do" through your conjecture into something that fits your preconceived narrative."

And the validity of that narrative requires not that the "documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind" but that the evidence establishes it as factual. Only then can you perhaps claim, "that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands." Even then 'in direct contradiction to' might be putting it too strongly - 'failing to fully meet' might be more accurate.
And notwithstanding your reluctance to "encourage trolls to stalk you demanding answers to their nonsensical questions", could you indulge me and answer the point I raised earlier today in relation to your claim that, "the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands",
"If that were true why would Hitler have signed Directive 21?"

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2498
Joined: 12 Jan 2015 13:34
Location: On the continent

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 17 Jun 2019 16:00

Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 15:10
MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 12:00
Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 11:34
Either Hitler intended that sentence to be taken literally (i.e. the Wehrmacht would be required to advance to Vladivostok) or he did not.
Anyway, whilst you are fixated on Vladivostok, the statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant only to the Volga. The documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind. That makes the statement true just as much as Vladivostok does.
You can't have it both ways.
No, you can't have it both ways.

I wrote:
Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.

Documentary evidence:
Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.

It is not for me to prove or disprove whether Hitler was speaking literally or not. The words are there in black & white that demonstrate my statement was accurate.

Now, you may choose to disbelieve Hitler's words when it suits you. You may also speculate to you heart's content as to what you think he really meant.

But my statement only becomes untrue if Hitler meant the whole of the CCCP meant only up to the Volga.

It is not for me to prove or disprove your speculation.
Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 15:10
If he didn't intended that sentence to be taken literally (which you now seem to acknowledge) then, since the country being referred to stretches all the way to the Pacific, you have also "reengineered the words "Holding part of the country alone will not do" through your conjecture into something that fits your preconceived narrative."
???
Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 15:10
And the validity of that narrative requires not that the "documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind" but that the evidence establishes it as factual. Only then can you perhaps claim, ....
Maybe it's time that you started to offer some evidence that establishes your conjecture as factual before you get uppity about me having to provide evidence that documented evidence is factual. :roll:

You can't have it both ways.
Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 15:10
...could you indulge me and answer the point I raised earlier today in relation to your claim that, "the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands",
"If that were true why would Hitler have signed Directive 21?"
Why? We can only speculate why Hitler chose to accept the Heer's plan/offer as there does not appear to be any documentary evidence that explains the reason why.

And l see no point in speculating on something with you when you've already set the ground work to deny any speculation l say that doesn't fit your narrative.

Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1400
Joined: 30 Apr 2003 05:16
Location: Canada

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 17 Jun 2019 20:01

Max Payload wrote:
17 Jun 2019 14:14
Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 04:58
KM were not crippled at Norway- unless you view it from RN POV. Honestly we never trusted the RN to punch their way out of a paper bag.

KM had 2 x BB 3 x CA 4 x CL 14 x DD 6 x TB 2 x FT & 15s SB plus Linenschiffe and 37 MB and armed trawlers escorted 20 merchant ships & 15 tankers . The KM lost 5 tankers & merchants at the cost of 3 cruisers and 10 DD plus 8 out of 28 U-Boats.

27 ships lost [mostly sunk] out of force of 147 ships/vessels or 18% loss .....or 23 warships sunk out of 104 warships participating or 22% , so hardly crippled - if it facilitated an invasion of a country.
Of the six heavy cruisers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940, one was sunk and one was so badly damaged that it was not repaired until 1941.
Of the four operational cruisers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940 two were sunk and one was reassigned to training duties prior to June. (One other, under repair in April, became operational before June).
Of the nineteen operational destroyers in the Kriegmarine’s fleet in April 1940 eleven were sunk and one was damaged sufficiently badly that it did not return to service until September. (Two others, under repair in April, became operational before June).
The two pre-WWI battleships were reassigned as training ships in May 1940.

Clearly we have different concepts of what constitutes the crippling of a surface fleet.

Kriegsmarine surface fleet main operational assets –
May 1940 BS 2; HC 6; LC 4; D 19
June 1940 BS 0; HC 4: LC 2: D 9
Can't understand HANNY , If you don't understand "garbage in garbage out", you are doomed!!!


Yes we have very different views of naval warfare, large warships are a waste of resources. AMPHIBIOUS INVASIONS count on numbers of smaller vessels not large warships. The only real value of large warships would be to provide long range fast escort in port to port invasions , which could be a day ahead of any Wallie response , so they would be gone before any response arrived. RN Ocean surveillance was so bad most ships transiting the channel and GIUK gap until well into the war [41/42].

What naval exchanges that did occur, went the AXIS way. from 1939-1941 reportedly 90 ALLIED warships with 718 guns battled with 62 German warships sporting 486 guns . In these clashes 15 NAZI warships were sunk or crippled, while 11 were damaged, while 23 ALLIED warships were crippled of sunk and 11 damaged.

Using O'HARA VOLUMES; 62 NAZI warship sorties -each averaging 55% chance of inflicting damage on ALLIED warships in these exchanges [34/62].90 ALLIED warships sortie sank/crippled /damaged 26 NAZI warships or 29%.

In other words NAZI sortie were twice as effective as ALLIED sortie at inflicting damage during battles.

Naval battles are mostly determined by command decision.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 18 Jun 2019 00:01

MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 16:00
No, you can't have it both ways.

I wrote:
Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.

Documentary evidence:
Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
But you are trying to have it both ways. You can’t on the one hand claim that “the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands” if the objectives didn’t include the occupation of the whole country, and then (post #815) state that the “documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind”, which is clearly not the whole country.
And your assessment of what “the documentary evidence suggests” is speculation on your part. But in case you are tempted to ask, “It is not for me to prove or disprove your speculation.”

MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 16:00
And l see no point in speculating on something with you when you've already set the ground work to deny any speculation l say that doesn't fit your narrative.
My sentiments exactly.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 18 Jun 2019 00:24

Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 20:01
... large warships are a waste of resources. AMPHIBIOUS INVASIONS count on numbers of smaller vessels not large warships.
On the other hand successful amphibious invasions against an opponent with a powerful fleet and an effective airforce require a combination of resources including large warships.
Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 20:01
The only real value of large warships would be to provide long range fast escort in port to port invasions , which could be a day ahead of any Wallie response , so they would be gone before any response arrived.
Leaving the capital ships of the ‘Wallie response’ navy free to shoot up the smaller resupply and reinforcement vessels and starve any disembarked troops of the resources they need to effect a successful invasion.

Paul Lakowski
Member
Posts: 1400
Joined: 30 Apr 2003 05:16
Location: Canada

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 18 Jun 2019 00:47

Max Payload wrote:
18 Jun 2019 00:24
Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 20:01
... large warships are a waste of resources. AMPHIBIOUS INVASIONS count on numbers of smaller vessels not large warships.
On the other hand successful amphibious invasions against an opponent with a powerful fleet and an effective airforce require a combination of resources including large warships.
Paul Lakowski wrote:
17 Jun 2019 20:01
The only real value of large warships would be to provide long range fast escort in port to port invasions , which could be a day ahead of any Wallie response , so they would be gone before any response arrived.
Leaving the capital ships of the ‘Wallie response’ navy free to shoot up the smaller resupply and reinforcement vessels and starve any disembarked troops of the resources they need to effect a successful invasion.

That's not likely to happen since both Churchill & FSL Pound insisted they would only send capital ships into the channel if the Nazi do the same. The real world is never a war-game.

MarkN
Member
Posts: 2498
Joined: 12 Jan 2015 13:34
Location: On the continent

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 18 Jun 2019 20:38

Max Payload wrote:
18 Jun 2019 00:01
MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 16:00
No, you can't have it both ways.

I wrote:
Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.

Documentary evidence:
Hitler's said on 31 July, according to Halder's diary, "Holding part of the country will not do.".
Marcks' study provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 21 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
Weisung 32 provides for Germany to be holding only part of of CCCP.
But you are trying to have it both ways. You can’t on the one hand claim that “the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands” if the objectives didn’t include the occupation of the whole country, and then (post #815) state that the “documented evidence suggests he had, at the least, east of of the Urals in mind”, which is clearly not the whole country.
I see the mental gymnastics needed in your scrambling are too great for you to cope with.

On 31 July 1940, it is reported by Halder that he said ABC regarding how the invasion of Russia should be. That is documented.

Between August 1940 and June 1941, a series of studies, directives and plans were evolved by the Heer that did not provide in any shape, size or form the outcome allegedly stated by Hitler on 31 July 1940. That is documented.

QED: Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.

A year later, at the end of July 1941, Hitler is alleged to have made comments about a different set of outcomes that he expected from the invasion of Russia. The outcomes of BARBAROSSA did not conform to those words either. That too is documented, but is a separate issue to the previous.

Are you that incapable of recognising that what he said in July in 1941 may not be the same as what he said in July 1940? Remember, you are the one who is disputing the evidence and claiming you know better about his thoughts and intentions!!!!

Very, very sad that you are unable to grasp that.
Max Payload wrote:
18 Jun 2019 00:01
MarkN wrote:
17 Jun 2019 16:00
And l see no point in speculating on something with you when you've already set the ground work to deny any speculation l say that doesn't fit your narrative.
My sentiments exactly.
As I suspected. Your question was not an honest question but a deliberate trolling attempt.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 459
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 19 Jun 2019 00:46

MarkN wrote:
18 Jun 2019 20:38
On 31 July 1940, it is reported by Halder that he said ABC regarding how the invasion of Russia should be. That is documented.

Between August 1940 and June 1941, a series of studies, directives and plans were evolved by the Heer that did not provide in any shape, size or form the outcome allegedly stated by Hitler on 31 July 1940. That is documented.

QED: Documentary evidence shows BARBAROSSA did not conform to Hitler's intentions and desires with the invasion of CCCP. It also shows that from the earliest planning stage to actual execution, the objectives of the campaign were in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands.
So let’s look at what’s documented.
According to Halder Hitler said several things on 31 July in relation to objectives
(1) Russia’s destruction must be made part of the struggle
(2) The purpose of the attack is to shatter the Russian state to its roots with one blow
(3) Holding part of the country will not do
(4) The task is anticipated to take five months if it can commence in May 1941
(5) The destruction of Russian manpower is the objective
(6) The operation will be divided into three parts - Kiev; the Baltic States and Moscow; link up of the northern and southern prongs (my emphasis)

There is reference to a subsequent ‘limited drive on Baku oilfields’ and a final rider - “Ultimately: Ukraine, White Russia, Baltic States to us. Finland extended to the White Sea.”

We agree that (3) is not to be taken literally, although interestingly, though there is specific reference to Kiev, the Baltic States, Moscow, Baku, Ukraine, White Russia, and the White Sea, there is no reference whatsoever to the Urals.
Several other terms in relation to the attack are not defined; ‘destruction’, ‘the struggle’, ‘shatter the Russian state to its roots’, ‘one blow’, ‘the task’, ‘Russian manpower’. We can only speculate on what precisely Hitler meant by these terms.

But given the above record from Halder of Hitler’s stated objectives, to claim that the objectives of the Barbarossa plan, the one that Hitler was content to sign off on in December, were “in direct contradiction to Hitler's stated demands” is ludicrous.

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”