where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Richard Anderson
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Jun 2019 15:02

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:42
No, no, no, you're misunderstanding me. Like I've said twice before now, I know that demobilization never truly occurred. I'm arguing that fear of it occurring helped push the OKH toward action in getting Hitler to turn east. Also, I can't see it as a coincidence that once the OKH starts planning for an invasion of the Soviet Union, that plans for demobilization were essentially reversed or worked around.
Sorry, but that is simply silly. How can "OKH" fear something that "never truly occurred"? Your argument that "fear" also "pushed the OKH" into an action Hitler was already inclined to is simple speculation, based on an ongoing misunderstanding of what the German "demobilization" actually entailed. Simply put, there was no demobilization or even a threat of a demobilization. There was a temporary release of personnel from the over-mobilized forces as well as a restructuring of the overall force. That is not a demobilization.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Jun 2019 15:09

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 09:50
Right, so, instead of responding to my posts, you degrade me by essentially saying I'm stupid. That's pretty childish.
He did no such thing. Meanwhile, you might note I finally hesitated pointing out this out in my previous reply, but...
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
Do you work or teach at a university?
Is nothing more than a veiled, and pretty childish, appeal to authority. If you are that thin-skinned, while so prone to logical fallacies and failures in critical thinking, then I'm afraid I have to doubt your own teaching credentials.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Max Payload
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 25 Jun 2019 16:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Jun 2019 15:02
Simply put, there was no demobilization or even a threat of a demobilization. There was a temporary release of personnel from the over-mobilized forces as well as a restructuring of the overall force. That is not a demobilization.
Well, it does seem to have been under active consideration.
From Halder’s diary -
1/7/40 - Fromm: ... Wants as much time as possible, for completion of demobilisation and deactivation. Thinks that
deactivation will not give any large boost to production.
3/7/40 - Buhle: Some of the specifications of the OKW directive on demobil­isation are utterly impracticable. Continued availability of discharged men assured only on furlough basis, not if demobilised.
7/7/40 - Buhle reports on: ... (c) Demobilisation.

ljadw
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2019 17:01

Dre Foerster wrote:
23 Jun 2019 19:20

3. There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil.


[/quote]

Romania was not Germany's main source of oil :in 1940 Germany had 6,9 million ton of oil available,of which 2,1 million came from imports : imports from Romania and the USSR .During the war Germany's main source of oil was synthetic oil .

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by ljadw » 25 Jun 2019 17:06

Max Payload wrote:
25 Jun 2019 16:40
Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Jun 2019 15:02
Simply put, there was no demobilization or even a threat of a demobilization. There was a temporary release of personnel from the over-mobilized forces as well as a restructuring of the overall force. That is not a demobilization.
Well, it does seem to have been under active consideration.
From Halder’s diary -
1/7/40 - Fromm: ... Wants as much time as possible, for completion of demobilisation and deactivation. Thinks that
deactivation will not give any large boost to production.
3/7/40 - Buhle: Some of the specifications of the OKW directive on demobil­isation are utterly impracticable. Continued availability of discharged men assured only on furlough basis, not if demobilised.
7/7/40 - Buhle reports on: ... (c) Demobilisation.
Fromm on June 20 1940 : Das Ersatzheer wird baldmöglichst aufgelöst : the reserve army will be disbanded as soon as possible.

Dre Foerster
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Dre Foerster » 25 Jun 2019 18:29

Max Payload wrote:
25 Jun 2019 11:11
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
June 28: Halder notes in his diary that there's no need for any more fighting in the west. Germany is finally free to move east.
He notes no such thing in his diary on 28 June.

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
June 28: Halder ... also states that the mission of AOK 18 will Initially be one of documenting presence of Russia troops. Rolf-Dietrich Mueller concludes that this was an attempt at a buildup for an eventual invasion
What was the basis of Mueller's conclusions?

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
June 30: Halder meets with Weizacker and notes that the priority was to show enough force IOT get Britain to back down, so Germany could have a "free hand in the east".
Where is the record of this aspect of the conversation? Certainly not in Halder's diary entry referencing his 11am meeting with Weizacker.

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 3: Halder meets with Greiffenberg, and notes “Britain, which must be dealt with separately, and the east are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany’s dominant position in Europe. Special issues, such as the Baltic and Balkan countries, may introduce some variants” (pg. 221). Hmm, I wonder what that could mean?
Well it could mean that after the Soviet interventions in the Baltic States and Bessarabia, Germany needed to demonstrate its dominance over its last remaining continental rival through some act of military intervention of its own. It would be stretch to suggest that this was Halder proposing a march on Moscow.

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 3: The same day Otto is presented to Weizacker, ... During his meeting with Weizacker, when asked about Hitler's knowledge of Otto, Halder simply responds that he was "working towards the Fuehrer"
Halder makes no reference to a meeting with Weizacker in his diary. Where is the record of this meeting and what reliance can be placed on the record of it? It seems that much of your proposed article hinges on this.

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 21: Hitler is finally informed of Otto
Is he? What is your evidence for this?

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 21: ... Halder notes “Russian forces are to be defeated or, at least, as much Russian territory occupied as is necessary to prevent enemy air attacks on Berlin and Silesia’s industrial areas. Desirable to advance far enough for our Luftwaffe to destroy Russia’s most important areas. Political objectives: Ukrainian Empire; a Baltic federation; Byelorussia; Finland. Baltic states ‘thorn in the side’. Require 80-100 div: Russia has 50-75 good div. If we attack Russia this autumn, the aerial pressure on Britain will be relieved…” (pg. 224-225). This is essentially Otto.
What you have quoted is not from 21 July, it is from 22 July, AFTER the conference and AFTER Halder had been briefed by Brauchitsch as to the content of the previous day's meeting.
Here is an English translation of the last item of Halder’s diary entry for 22 July as it relates to his meeting with Brauchitsch (which includes, in its essential elements, your quote above) -
“Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning. The Fuehrer has been given the following information:
a) German assembly will take at least 4-6 weeks.
b) Object: To crush Russian Army or slice as much Russian territory as is necessary to bar enemy air
raids on Berlin and Silesian industries. It is desirable to penetrate far enough to enable our Air Force to smash Russia’s strategic areas. (Check with Foreign Armies East.)
c) Political aims:
Ukrainian State,
Federation of Baltic States,
White Russia — Finland
Baltic States as a permanent thorn in the flesh.
d) Strength required: 80 -100 Divs.; Russia has 50 -75 good Divs. If we attack Russia this fall,
pressure of the air war on Britain will be relieved. United States could supply both Britain and Russia.
e) Operations: What operational objective could be attained? What strength have we available? Timing and area of assembly? Gateways of attack: Baltic States, Finland, Ukraine. Protect Berlin and Silesian industrial area. Protection of Romanian oilfields. (Check with Op. Sec.)”

The first sentence suggests that to Halder’s knowledge their attention had not previously been turned to ‘tackling the Russian problem’ in any meaningful way and that planning had not been prepared. It is not clear when Hitler was given the information (a) to (e). It could have been (most probably was in my view) later on 22 July and is the sort of thing that could have been cobbled together by a competent strategic planning staff in a matter of hours. And I doubt that (e) had been given to Hitler, it isn't 'information', it's largely a list of questions.
My apologies, you’re correct. The following is the actual source: “Minutes, 28 June 1940, BA-MA, RH 20-18/40b”.

It mostly has to do with a combination of Halder’s desire for war with Russia, the moving of divisions, developing Otto, etc, while doing so under the nose of Hitler and when he’s supposed to be focused on Britain.

In 1962, Halder’s diary was edited so that the following points were ascribed to Hitler (instead of the blunt statements from the original, attributed to no one, so probably were general conclusions from Halder and Weizacker that day): “c) Eyes turned sharply to the East; d) Britain will probably require another demonstration of our military power before it rejects and frees up our rear for the East”

I never said there was an intention to march on Moscow. Otto deemed anything beyond a limited campaign logistically unfeasible.

Archival information found by Dircks, Janssen, Mueller, Lemay, Smelser and Stahel.

Because there is no evidence for Hitler being informed of Otto before that date, and we know that he was then presented it, or at least verbally in a summarized form. For more detail, I will continue to recommend reading Enemy in the East by Mueller or Der Krieg de Generales by Dircks and Janssen.

Again, my apologies for this error: I meant to say the entry was referring to events from 21 July.
A) I’m not sure why you’re arguing that this was the beginning of tackling the “Russian problem” when we know Otto already existed, as parts of it were found by Dircks and Janssen in the archives in 1996, with it being begun at the end of May, 1940, and it’s final draft being completed on July 3, 1940.
B) Just because they have one plan in their back pocket, doesn’t mean the Germans are going to stop preparing and testing different ideas. While Halder was working on his own development from Otto, he also had Kinzel, Greiffenberg, Heusinger, and Marcks doing their own independent studies, and this was while Lossberg was making the OKW study.
C) All the same, we cannot at this time think of Otto as being tossed aside, because eight days later, Hitler privately confided with Jodl, asking him about the possibility of a limited campaign that summer or autumn. Jodl argues against it, so two days later, on July 31, it is then discarded. Still, the fact that Hitler asks this question, demonstrates the influence the plan and the general idea still had with Hitler and his generals. It was also at this time that everyone was telling Halder to go for broke, focusing on Moscow, and so with the OKH just happy to be getting a campaign at all (especially since it would have essentially a blank cheque), they were more than happy to let Otto go - in my opinion, this was a terrible mistake.

Dre Foerster
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Dre Foerster » 25 Jun 2019 18:56

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Jun 2019 15:02
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:42
No, no, no, you're misunderstanding me. Like I've said twice before now, I know that demobilization never truly occurred. I'm arguing that fear of it occurring helped push the OKH toward action in getting Hitler to turn east. Also, I can't see it as a coincidence that once the OKH starts planning for an invasion of the Soviet Union, that plans for demobilization were essentially reversed or worked around.
Sorry, but that is simply silly. How can "OKH" fear something that "never truly occurred"? Your argument that "fear" also "pushed the OKH" into an action Hitler was already inclined to is simple speculation, based on an ongoing misunderstanding of what the German "demobilization" actually entailed. Simply put, there was no demobilization or even a threat of a demobilization. There was a temporary release of personnel from the over-mobilized forces as well as a restructuring of the overall force. That is not a demobilization.
Clearly, you don’t understand the concept of paranoia or inter-agency rivalry. The Army Command has a piss poor relationship with Hitler for awhile, and this was made all the more worse when Hitler gave more attention to the Navy and Air Force, since they were both more nazified and deemed more important after France was defeated. Surely, in reality, this was minimal in actual effect, but Halder and Brauchitsch were proud, independent as well as loyal to the army first and foremost.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Dre Foerster » 25 Jun 2019 18:59

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Jun 2019 15:09
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 09:50
Right, so, instead of responding to my posts, you degrade me by essentially saying I'm stupid. That's pretty childish.
He did no such thing. Meanwhile, you might note I finally hesitated pointing out this out in my previous reply, but...
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
Do you work or teach at a university?
Is nothing more than a veiled, and pretty childish, appeal to authority. If you are that thin-skinned, while so prone to logical fallacies and failures in critical thinking, then I'm afraid I have to doubt your own teaching credentials.
Dude I already explained that that wasn’t meant as an attack, and I even apologized! Geez.

And well no shit I don’t have any teaching credentials, I’m a 22 year old officer cadet just starting post grad lol

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Dre Foerster » 25 Jun 2019 19:06

ljadw wrote:
25 Jun 2019 11:58
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:44
ljadw wrote:
25 Jun 2019 05:14
Dre Foerster wrote:
24 Jun 2019 13:25
ljadw wrote:
24 Jun 2019 11:11


There is no mention in Mein Kampf ( which was a collection of speeches and newspaper articles about total varied subjects )or in the Zweites Buch,of a stufenplan, or even of a plan .
Hitler did not write in MK that in 1935 he would restore conscription, in 1936 reoccupy the Rhineland, in 1938 execute the Anschluss and the annexation of Sudetenland etc ...Or that in 1939 he would sign a treaty with the SU .
Lol that is not what Mein Kampf is. While in prison in 1924 Hitler dictated it to Rudolf Hess.

Are you kidding me, all Hitler talks about his autobiographical sections is how he’s always wanted unification between Germany and Austria! Also, in the last chapter, which is about Lebensraum in Russia, Hitler rejects Weimar Germany’s friendship with the Soviets, declaring that no treaty can last. He even goes on to state that the Soviets, being Jews, will betray their trust, so the Germans should betray it first. This is further supported by several talks with his advisers from 1933 all the way to 1940. Hitler alsobtalks extensively of rebuilding Germany into a great power again and doing away with the Treaty of Versailles; this obviously would necessitate reinstating conscription. Specifics aside, Hitler always wanted people of German blood united under one flag. No one is saying that Hitler was a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, but there are unmissable clues present that Hitler was following a program to which he was blindingly loyal.
There was nothing special in Mein Kampf : it was only a lot of generalities expressing the sentiments of the majority of the Geman population .
If Hitler was NOT , as you are now saying, a prophet who laid out specific dates for events or necessarily how he would get to his desired end state, that means that there was NO stufen plan .
And, most of his program was similar to the program of Weimar .Both Weimar and Hitler wanted to undo Versailles and to do this, collaboration with the SU was needed .
If Mein Kampf was a general statement of popular German sentiment, then why was Hitler considered a radical for so long, never even gaining a majority before having dictatorial powers, while his book only ever had meager sales?

You make a lot of claims over and over again, but fail to back them up with evidence, or even to address my points.
The book had meager sales because it was not a serious book, but a collection of newspaper articles and speeches about subjects going from syphilis ( 13 pages !! ) to religion.It was very poorly written and most people did not take it serious. Hitler was a brilliant orator ,but a very bad writer .
Hitler said that MK was only fantasies behind bars that wqere little more than a series of articles for the Völkischer Beobachter and he told Hans Frank : If I had had any idea in 1924 that I would have become chancellor, I never would have written the book .
YOU said that he had a stufen plan ,referring to MK . The truth is that a stufen plan is a paper where is written ;
First in ...I will do .....
The following year, I will do ....
Etc .
Such a paper does not exist ,All Hitler's decisions were spontaneous,made when the moment offered the possibility .
Example : the infamous Hossbach conference, which had as subject the rearmament problems between LW and KM ,but was transformed by Hitler in a monologue about his foreign policy ( something those present had heard already countless times ): Hitler said : IF there is a civil war in France (for which there was no certainty ) ,we will use the opportunity to eliminate first CZ and then Austria .
And what happened ? No civil war in France and still Hitler eliminated first AUSTRIA and then CZ.
And why did Hitler have not much success in Weimar ? Because the policies of the other parties were not that different, and because the NSDAP was only a group of incapables and because between 1924 and 1930 the economic situation was relatively good .
Thus Hitler's stufenplan : an invention only .
Again, Hitler didn’t write Mein Kampf, he dictated it to Hess. It was essentially one long rambling session.

I think you and I have different ideas as to what stufenplan means. I think it’d be silly to suggest that Hitler intended to do something specific at specific times. I am not doubting his ability and necessity to adapt, seize opportunities, etc. But I do think that his policies had what we the military call an intent, mission, scheme of maneuver and finally end state. And with his scheme of maneuver, there were certain things that needed to come before the others, so the program exists in the form of steps or phases. That’s how I see it.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Dre Foerster » 25 Jun 2019 19:26

MarkN wrote:
25 Jun 2019 13:09
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 09:50
Right, so, instead of responding to my posts, you degrade me by essentially saying I'm stupid. That's pretty childish.
This encapsulates the principle problem that you seem to have: misunderstand the words you are reading and march straight to the wrong conclusion.

I did not call you stupid. I have no idea of the level of your intelligence. What I can discern is a poor ability to articulate your argument(s) to others. Let's use this small snippet I've culled from one of your first posts here.
Dre Foerster wrote:
23 Jun 2019 19:20
3. I am not saying though, that practical reasons (or at least what seemed practical to the Germans) did not play an important role in the Third Reich and Wehrmacht's decision making. If one actually examines the events within the German "High Command" between May and July 1940, you will actually find Hitler's attention being turned away from Britain toward Russia by Halder and Brauchitsch (who had secretly been building an army in the east while developing Plan Otto, all without approval from the Fuehrer). There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil. Lastly, Hitler believed an invasion of Britain would be unwise, so thought that taking away their "last hope" in Russia, would be the best course of action.
You claim, and present it as fact, "you will actually find Hitler's attention being turned away from Britain toward Russia by Halder and Brauchitsch". No attempt whatsoever to substantiate this claim other than to advise others to go off and read Dirks & Janssen.

Then, "who had secretly been building an army in the east while developing Plan Otto". Again no evidence to support your claim that a secret army was being built. Moreover, you write sentce in a manner that implies building this army is separate from Plan OTTO. I have hinted to you that the redeployment of forces eastwards after Fall ROT was nothing out of the ordinary. Your thesis is based upon it being entirely out of the ordinary. No evidence to support that claim just a presumption that everybody should agree with you.

Then, "all without approval from the Fuehrer". All of the redeployment orders were issued according to normal procedure. There was no attempt whatsoever to divert from normal procedure to either hide the movements from Hitler knowledge or to keep it a "secret".

And finally, for now perhaps, "There was also the fact that the Red Army had occupied the Baltics and Bessarabia on the border of Romania, Germany's main source of oil." So, as a military officer (under training) would you agree that the DS answer to what scale of forces should be deployed on the eastern front to confront this Red Army threat equates to 18 divisions: more than 18, exactly 18, or that 18 is overkill?

If you want to have a serious discussion, you can't just throw out a bunch of your unsubstantiated opinions, expect others to accept them as facts and then expect everybody else to fall into line with your debating methods. I'm not the only one here questionning your research credentials and analytical credibility. EVERYBODY is questionning your reasoning, conclusions and lack of evidence.
I took it as another way of calling me stupid. When someone says I can’t articulate well and constantly jump to the wrong conclusions, how else am I supposed to
perceive that?

My arguments for that statement have to do with Otto, the buildup in the east, the view of Russia as an indirect attack on Britain, the fact that in eight days from 21 to 29 July, as he is presented with ideas for attacking the Soviets, Hitler turns from apathy toward them to wanting their annihilation the next spring, etc; and I’ve now made many posts supporting them.

I recommend authors because I try to be humble enough to admit I’m not an expert, and that I can’t write a book or article here. And why not propose different works with different opinions to people? Knowledge is power baby! Always be willing to learn! God knows I’ve changed my beliefs a zillion times over my short life and will certainly continue to do so. I’ve already learned plenty from the little time I’ve spent on this site.

I’m not sure what you’re asking in your last point. French is my first language so sometimes it’s a little difficult for me (that’s also most likely why my posts are sometimes difficult to read as well, so my bad on that).

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 25 Jun 2019 23:31

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 19:26
I took it as another way of calling me stupid. When someone says I can’t articulate well and constantly jump to the wrong conclusions, how else am I supposed to perceive that?
Perhaps literally?
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 19:26
My arguments for that statement have to do with Otto, the buildup in the east, the view of Russia as an indirect attack on Britain, the fact that in eight days from 21 to 29 July, as he is presented with ideas for attacking the Soviets, Hitler turns from apathy toward them to wanting their annihilation the next spring, etc; and I’ve now made many posts supporting them.
It seems you are making a whole gammut of points and having real problems deconflicting them into understandable posts. Perhaps thats why everybody is taking issue with your words.

You have zero evidence to support your belief that Plan OTTO was anything out of the ordinary, that the redeployment of formations back eastwards after Fall ROT was anything out of the ordinary. You have failed to support your claim that this was all done in secret and Hitler was deliberately kept out of the loop.

Dirks and Janssen don't evidence these claims either, they just speculate and theorize and hope their readers make the same leaps of faith they do in their interpretation of fragmentary records. It seems you did.

You claim to be a military type, at least training to be one. Why not put your military education to use and explain how you are going to defend the Reich from a Red Army causing mischief on the border with a handful of Landseer regiments left in Poland. Don't you think the idea of moving a few divisions back to the east might be a smart move? Would it be a normal and prudent decision to make and implement?

Or is it a little byline of history that can be tweaked into a story to make a couple of writers famous?

Max Payload
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Max Payload » 26 Jun 2019 00:52

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 18:29
Max Payload wrote:
25 Jun 2019 11:11
Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 3: The same day Otto is presented to Weizacker, ... During his meeting with Weizacker, when asked about Hitler's knowledge of Otto, Halder simply responds that he was "working towards the Fuehrer"
Halder makes no reference to a meeting with Weizacker in his diary. Where is the record of this meeting and what reliance can be placed on the record of it? It seems that much of your proposed article hinges on this.

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 06:38
July 21: Hitler is finally informed of Otto
Is he? What is your evidence for this?
Archival information found by Dircks, Janssen, Mueller, Lemay, Smelser and Stahel.

Because there is no evidence for Hitler being informed of Otto before that date, and we know that he was then presented it, or at least verbally in a summarized form. For more detail, I will continue to recommend reading Enemy in the East by Mueller or Der Krieg de Generales by Dircks and Janssen.
It seems that your entire proposed article and the accuracy of statements such as, “I’m not sure why you’re arguing that this [22 July] was the beginning of tackling the “Russian problem” when we know Otto already existed, as parts of it were found by Dircks and Janssen in the archives in 1996, with it being begun at the end of May, 1940, and it’s final draft being completed on July 3, 1940.” will rest on your ability to produce and demonstrate that the specific archival material referred to (found by Dircks, Janssen, Mueller, Lemay, Smelser and Stahel) validates your argument.
I’m sure you will appreciate that recommending a book list is an insufficient argument, any more than my attempting to prove that Russia was about attack Germany in 1941 by recommending that you read Suvorov’s Icebreaker.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2019 01:03

Max Payload wrote:
25 Jun 2019 16:40
Well, it does seem to have been under active consideration.
From Halder’s diary -
1/7/40 - Fromm: ... Wants as much time as possible, for completion of demobilisation and deactivation. Thinks that
deactivation will not give any large boost to production.
3/7/40 - Buhle: Some of the specifications of the OKW directive on demobil­isation are utterly impracticable. Continued availability of discharged men assured only on furlough basis, not if demobilised.
7/7/40 - Buhle reports on: ... (c) Demobilisation.
Yes, it was quite obvious even before the French Campaign kicked off that the Wehrmacht, and especially the Heer, had overmobilized manpower and resources, causing the industrialists to scream bloody murder. So it was know that a short-term reduction in manpower in the armed forces, particularly in critical job categories, was required...the question was how to do it without reducing the core strength of the Heer. The final decision was for a combination of disbanding the shadow divisions that relied too much on older manpower classes that were never completely mobilized (and most did not have the requisite equipment and weapons either), mobilizing new divisions in a more orderly fashion than the spring call ups in 1940 that created the problem, while sending critical manpower on "work furloughs" until the spring 1941 campaign season...where ever that was going to be. While spoken of as a "demobilization" it was more properly a force balancing...and most of those discharged on work furloughs in the fall were back in the army in winter, so it only had an effect for about three to four months anyway.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2019 01:16

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 18:56
Clearly, you don’t understand the concept of paranoia or inter-agency rivalry. The Army Command has a piss poor relationship with Hitler for awhile, and this was made all the more worse when Hitler gave more attention to the Navy and Air Force, since they were both more nazified and deemed more important after France was defeated. Surely, in reality, this was minimal in actual effect, but Halder and Brauchitsch were proud, independent as well as loyal to the army first and foremost.
Sorry, but please don't tell me I don't understand inter- or intra-agency rivalry. I worked for nearly 27 years for the U.S. Department of Defense in various capacities, so I know quite while how those things work. However, such a "rivalry" has nothing to do with the relationship between the "Army Command" - I suppose you mean OKH? - and Adolf Hitler. By spring-summer 1940 Hitler had OKH...and OKW, OKL, and OKM firmly under his thumb. The subservience of OKH to Hitler was confirmed in the Blomberg-Fritsch affair in 1938 and was solidified by the victories in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France. Yes, Halder and Brauchitsch were proud and loyal to the army, but "independent"? Maybe in their diary entries, but not in their actions. Nor were they capable of assembling a "secret army" of any significant size, let alone 80 divisions, while working for a micro-manager like Hitler.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Jun 2019 01:18

Dre Foerster wrote:
25 Jun 2019 18:59
Dude I already explained that that wasn’t meant as an attack, and I even apologized! Geez.[/quote]

Uh, dude, if you did I didn't read it in this thread since you posted that.
And well no shit I don’t have any teaching credentials, I’m a 22 year old officer cadet just starting post grad lol
That what was your point in asking such a question?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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